SOME NEW BOOKS.

Maclay's History of the Navy.

We have before us the three volumes comprising the new and enlarged edition of *A History of the United States Navy* by EDGAR STANTON MACLAY (Appletons). All but thirty-six pages of the third volume are devoted to an account of the Spanish-American War and of the subsequent naval operations in the waters of the Philippines. In a preface the author tells us that his narrative has been based on the official reports of the Spanish and American commanders taking part in the contest. All material conflicting with these reports has been rejected. As a further guarantee of accuracy, nearly every commanding officer concerned has read and corrected proof-sheets dealing with actions in which he figured. Mr. Maclay deems it remarkable how many mistakes—in some cases glaring errors—have crept into popular records of our navy's doings in the Spanish war. He has made, he tells us—and his book sustains the assertion—unsparing exertions to set aside these misconceptions.

I.

Let us begin with a glance at that part of the narrative in which Brigadier-General Fitzhugh Lee aided the writer by editing the account of certain incidents which occurred in Havana harbor previously and subsequently to the destruction of the Maine. On page 44 Mr. Maclay points out that it would be unfair to Gen. Weyler to say that he was the originator of the bitter system of reconcentration. By his well-known order of Oct. 21, 1896, he merely aggravated a diseased condition that already existed. "Reconcentration had been practised before Weyler arrived in Cuba. In 1895 the people were flocking to military posts for protection, both from the insurgents and detached bodies of Spanish troops, and, in 1896, Secretary Olney reported to Congress: 'There are in one provincial city alone some four thousand necessitous refugees from the surrounding country to whom the municipal authorities can afford little or no relief.' There is no question, however, that Weyler's edict added greatly to the sufferings of the island. "The result was a complete paralysis of rural industries, which so affected the large towns that the commerce between the United States and Cuba declined from $95,804,000 in 1894 to $26,666,000 in 1897. Besides this, the sufferings of the *pacificos* were indescribable, it having been estimated that some two hundred thousand of them perished."

The sober and equitable spirit in which this narrative has been composed is further exemplified by the author's admission that "It also would be unfair to say that the Spaniards made no attempt to relieve the condition of these unfortunate people. Relief societies were formed in many towns, and to a small extent aided the sufferers. Marshal Campos, before Weyler's arrival, endeavored to raise a relief fund, contributing $2,000 himself, besides which the soldiers subscribed a day's pay." In view, however, of the fact that the Spanish Government frequently was unable to pay its own soldiers, we can readily imagine that the 'day's pay' was but another of the mockeries which had long characterized Spanish dealings with the island. Gen. Weyler was recalled Oct. 6, 1897, and his successor, Captain-General Blanco, promptly revoked the reconcentration order. Blanco also gave $100,000 in Spanish silver for the relief of the sufferers, while the city of Havana, by special tax, raised $80,000 for the same purpose. In March, 1898, the Cortes voted six hundred thousand dollars for the *pacificos*, but the money was never sent, war with the United States serving as an excuse."

Some aid for the *reconcentrados* was also forthcoming from the United States. The author reminds us that "On Consul General Fitzhugh Lee's report that some six to eight hundred American citizens were among the sufferers, President McKinley promptly called a special session of Congress, May 17, 1897, and $50,000 were voted for their relief. On Dec. 24, 1897, the President issued a public appeal in behalf of the sufferering Cubans and about two hundred thousand dollars were subscribed. By the aid of the Red Cross Society, whose President, Miss Clara Barton, went to Havana, food was purchased for Havana, and distributed, Blanco graciously admitting the provisions free of duty. It must be added that, although, many of the Spanish residents in Cuba, and especially in Havana, expressed the bitterest opposition to this 'impudent meddling' with their right to manage Cuba, Blanco exerted all his influence to further the object of the philanthropists." Mr. Maclay goes on to note that the exasperation of the Spaniards against what they deemed the unwarranted interference of Americans in their domestic affairs was inflamed by the filibustering expeditions which were projected in the United States by Cubans and their sympathizers. "It is not denied that many Cubans obtained American citizenship only to protect themselves from Spanish authority, or that in many instances they flaunted their naturalization papers in the face of Spanish officials out of mere bravado. Doubtless many of the 'six to eight hundred American citizens' reported by Consul-General Lee as being victims of the reconcentration were native Cubans of this class. Credit must be given, however, to the Government of the United States for using all legitimate means to prevent the fittting out and departure of filibustering expeditions from our shores." No impartial onlooker will dispute the author's assertion that in this matter "our Government acted far more conscientiously than did the British Ministry in 1861-65, else we should have seen sailing from the United States Cuban Alabamas, Floridas, Rappahannocks, Shenandoahs and Sumters, which in a short time would have annihilated Spanish commerce in every quarter of the globe."

It may be remembered that on May 20, 1897, the United States Senate passed a resolution according belligerent rights to the "government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba." This recognition of the independence of Cuba got no further than the Senate. Intervention by the United States was delayed by the pretended effort of Spain to give autonomy to the island. Touching this incident our author remarks: "The 'new constitution' proved to be only another in the long list of shams with which Spain had tantalized the wretched islanders. It was spurned by the loyal Spaniards and Cubans alike. On the part of the Cubans the only force that surrendered under the conditions of the new constitution was one consisting of 110 men under Juan Masso in the Province of Santiago de Cuba. Having reason to believe that the insurgent leader Aranguren would also submit to the new order of things, Blanco sent Col. Joaquin Ruiz of the Spanish Army under a flag of truce to treat with him. Ruiz was seized by the insurgents and, notwithstanding his flag of truce, was murdered in cold blood. On Jan. 12, 1898, officers from the garrison at Havana led a mob in attacking the newspaper offices of three papers which had favored the new constitution, the *Diario de la Marina*, the *Reconcentrado* and the *Discusion*. Troops that had been sent to suppress the disorders fraternized with the rioters, and threats were made not only against Cuban-Americans, but also against Americans who were in no way connected with the insurrection."

II.

Mr. Maclay points out that it was in anticipation of just such a contingency that the battleship Maine had been sent to Key West with orders to be in readiness at a moment's notice to steam to Havana, only ninety miles distant, to take on board any Americans who should find their lives in danger. "As the excitement resulting from the mob's attack on the newspaper offices seemed to justify the preparation of warships for this service, Consul-General Lee on Jan. 13, 1898, cabled to Washington: 'Uncertainty exists whether he [Blanco] can control the situation. If it be demonstrated that he cannot maintain order, preserve life and keep the peace, or that Americans or their interests are in danger, ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly.'" Our author goes on to record that "in keeping with the great tact he had shown throughout these trying times, Gen. Lee did not immediately ask for assistance, but, carefully watching events, stood ready to take decisive action at any crisis. On Jan. 24 the Government at Washington, feeling that the situation was too grave to admit of further delay, informed Lee that the Maine had been ordered to Havana on a 'friendly visit.' Feeling that the arrival of this ship might incite the Spaniards to further violence. Lee at once cabled: 'I advise that the visit be postponed six or seven days to give the last excitement more time to disappear.' Capt. Sigsbee, however, had received his sailing orders, and at 11 o'clock on the morning of Jan. 25, the magnificent battleship, resplendent in her dress of white, exchanged salutes with the Spanish batteries, and moved majestically into the harbor of her doom."

In order to give his visit every appearance of being a friendly one, Capt. Sigsbee had made a landfall on the coast of Cuba well to the west of Havana, at daylight on Tuesday, Jan. 25. The early hours of the morning were employed in putting the battleship in the best order. The officers donned their frock coats and the crew were dressed with exceptional neatness in blue. "Having made these preliminary arrangements, Capt. Sigsbee headed his ship eastward, and, when abreast of Havana, sent her ahead at full speed, with the national colors at the peak, and the jack at the foremast head. In response to the signal, 'We want a pilot,' a pilot was sent off by the captain of the port, a navy man, who with great care and skill brought the battleship into the harbor, and moored her to a buoy of his own selecting. At that time there were in the harbor of Havana the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII. and the square-rigged German training steamer Gneisenau, the latter being some four hundred yards north of the Maine in the man-of-war anchorage off the Machina. A day or so after the Maine's arrival, the German training steamer Charlotte put into the port." Mr. Maclay proceeds to tell us that "wishing to maintain the most friendly relations with the Spanish officials, Capt. Sigsbee attended to the courtesies of the port with unusual care. When the first Spanish officer, a Lieutenant of the navy, visited the battleship, Capt. Sigsbee received him with every mark of attention. He seemed to the American commander to be 'embarrassed and even humiliated in carrying out his duty.' This officer was quickly followed by another Spanish Lieutenant and a Lieutenant from a German warship. Capt. Sigsbee promptly made all the necessary official calls and was received with every expression of courtesy." To this he bears witness in a letter to the author. "Anxious to test the effect of the Maine's arrival on the public before taking further steps, Capt. Sigsbee kept all his officers and men aboard the ship, excepting Naval Cadet Jonas H. Holden, his aide, whom he sent ashore to Consul-General Lee with the announcement that the commander of the Maine would soon follow." In an article written by Capt. Sigsbee for the *Century Magazine*, November, 1898, part of which is here reproduced, he says that, when he landed, he noted that "there was a crowd assembled; but only of moderate size. There was no demonstration of any kind; the crowd closed in on me slightly. I thought the people stolid and sullen, so far as I could gather from an occasional glance, but I took very little notice of anybody. On my return, however, I noted carefully the bearing of the various groups of Spanish soldiers that I passed. They saluted me, as a rule, but with so much expression of apathy that the salute really went for nothing. They made no demonstration against me, however, not even by look. All visits were made without friction, and with courtesy on both sides, and, apparently, with all the freedom of conversation and action usually observed."

It seems that on the following Sunday a bull fight was to take place, and as it is on such occasions that the Spanish nature reveals itself most clearly, Capt. Sigsbee determined to witness the performance with several of his officers. He accordingly, accepted a box courteously offered by Gen. Parrago, who was acting as Captain-General in the absence of Captain-General Blanco, then absent on a tour of the island. On the way to the bull ring at Regla some one thrust into Capt. Sigsbee's hand a copy of a circular then widely distributed in Havana, a translation of which follows: "Spaniards! Long live Spain with honor! What are you doing that you allow yourselves to be insulted in this way? Do you not see what they have done to us in withdrawing our brave and beloved Weyler, who at this very time would have finished with this unworthy rebellious rabble who are trampling on our flag and on our honor? Autonomy is imposed on us to cast us aside and give places of honor and authority to those who initiated this rebellion, these low-bred autonomists, ungrateful sons of our beloved country! And, finally, these Yankee pigs, who meddle in our affairs, humiliating us to the last degree, have for a still greater taunt ordered to us a man-of-war of their rotten squadron, after insulting us in their newspapers. Spaniards, the moment of action has arrived! Do not go to sleep! Let us teach these vile traitors that we have not yet lost our pride, and that we know how to protest with the energy befitting a nation worthy and strong as our Spain is and always will be! Death to the Americans! Death to autonomy! Long live Spain! Long live Weyler!"

Mr. Maclay tells us that, putting the copy of the above circular into his pocket, Sigsbee attended the bull fight. "It was observable that an unusually strong military guard was in attendance, but aside from the many scowling glances that were directed toward the box occupied by the Americans the affair passed off without incident. When, however, the American officers returned to their ship people returning from the bull fight passed near the Maine in ferryboats and saluted her with derisive calls, but made no further demonstrations of hostility. In short the behavior of the Spanish officials and that of the people, if the abnormal conditions be considered, could not be complained of, except that native boatmen in the harbor, while giving prompt attention to calls from the Spanish cruisers and other vessels in port, manifested a reluctance amounting to absolute insult to answer signals from the Maine." It seems that a like feeling of enmity was evinced by the tradesfolk on shore who were requested to supply the wants of the battleship.

Our author next invites attention to the fact that, notwithstanding the apparently orderly condition of Havana, Capt. Sigsbee took every precaution that could be devised by a capable officer in a frindly port to guard against foul play. "Etiquette prevented him from dragging the harbor in the vicinity of the Maine's moorings, and also prevented the establishing of picket boats, or the use of the searchlight. Every preparation, however, that could be made within the ship was carefully looked to. Extra sentries were stationed on the forecastle, poop and bridge. The corporal of the guard was instructed to watch with unusual vigilance the hundreds of people who visited the ship. Ammunition was placed on deck for instant use, and instead of fire being kept under one boiler only, two boilers were made ready for immediate service. 'The purport of my own orders and instructions was,' says Capt. Sigsbee, 'that we should consider the Maine in a position demanding extreme vigilance and requiring a well-sustained routine, both by day and by night,' though, 'until the night of the explosion, nothing whatever was developed to show that there was any special need for extreme watchfulness.'"

It is well known that the tragedy occurred on the night of Feb. 15, 1898, three weeks after the Maine's arrival in Havana. That evening the American battleship had been observed by several of her officers and many of the crew to be heading in a direction she had not taken since her arrival, namely, northwest. The day had been unusually sultry, and the night was dark. "In keeping with the rule of refusing shore leave to the men, which had been adopted by Capt. Sigsbee since his arrival in Havana, all of the 328 men in the battleship were aboard, and of the twenty-six officers, only Passed Assistant Engineer Frederic C. Bowers, Naval Cadet Pope Washington (of the Engineers), Paymaster's Clerk Brent McCarthy and Gunner Joseph Hill, were absent. The usual extra precautions to guard against treachery were observed. At ten minutes after 9 o'clock Marine Bugler Newton played the order to 'turn in and keep quiet,' in an elaborate style, and, as the musical echoes of the blast resounded from the uttermost corners of the harbor orderly preparations for retiring for the night were under way."

At 9:40 P. M. a terrific explosion took place at the forward end of the ship, quickly followed by a second report. Capt. Sigsbee at the time was sitting at a writing table in the Admiral's cabin, the Maine having been fitted as a flagship. "In an instant every electric light in the vessel was extinguished, leaving all in total darkness. Realizing the serious nature of the disaster, Sigsbee broke his way through the cabin along a passage and thence to the superstructure. On his way someone ran violently against him. It proved to be William Anthony, the orderly at the cabin door. His training rendered him oblivious of his own danger, and, apologizing for the collision, he saluted and reported that the ship had been blown up and was sinking. Reaching the main deck Capt. Sigsbee was promptly surrounded by his surviving officers, ready to carry out his orders. In a moment it was realized that the Maine was hopelessly wrecked. Finding that the inrushing water rendered it unnecessary to flood the magazines, Capt. Sigsbee gave attention to rescuing the survivors. An effort was made by Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, Lieut. Hood and Naval Cadets Boyd and Cluverius to man the fire mains with a view to extinguish the fire that was raging in the central part of the ship. These officers at great risk made their way over the poop awning, but found that the fire mains were disabled beyond repair. Only two of the ship's fifteen boats were available. These were manned by the surviving officers and men conjointly, and within fifteen minutes every man who could be roused was rescued. One wounded man, pinned under a fallen ventilator, was liberated by Lieut. Hood and Lieut. Blandin just as the water was rising over him. Meanwhile, boats had put out from the Alfonso XII. and from the American passenger steamer City of Washington."

Capt. Sigsbee, who was the last man to leave the Maine, went aboard the City of Washington and there penned the despatch announcing the loss of his ship: "Maine blown up in Havana harbor at 9:40 to-night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded and others aboard Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamer. Send lighthouse tenders from Key West for crew and few pieces of equipment above water. No one has clothing other than that upon him. *Public opinion should be suspended until further report.* All officers believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representatives of Gen. Blanco now with me to express sympathy. SIGSBEE." Our author points out that a single sentence of this despatch, that, namely, which we have italicized, is alone sufficient to mark Capt. Sigsbee as a Commander of remarkable coolness and ability. "The loss of his ship is the most serious catastrophe a naval officer can face. The tendency on all such occasions is to lose no time in throwing the blame on anybody and everybody but the commander himself. Capt. Sigsbee had every reason to believe at that moment—just as the American people believe to-day—that the Maine was foully and treacherously destroyed through Spanish agencies." Instead of availing himself of this plausible cover for the disaster, Capt. Sigsbee, in his efforts to avert war, offered every opportunity for tracing the cause of the explosion to his own negligence or to that of his officers, although, as it afterward appeared, no negligence could be imputed. "Had Capt. Sigsbee in his first despatch announcing the loss of the Maine stated, or even intimated, that the explosion was due to Spanish treachery—as he would have been perfectly justified in doing—nothing could have restrained the infuriated Americans from declaring war at once." As a matter of fact, not only were "many wounded and doubtless more killed," but out of the 350 men and officers on the Maine at the time of the explosion no fewer than 260, including two officers, Lieut. Friend W. Jenkins and Assistant Engineer Darwin R. Merritt, were killed" or subsequently died of injuries received. "Some months later Lieut. Blandin died from causes attributed to the shock of the explosion. About 100 of the bodies were not recovered from the wreck. Next to the blowing up of the United States frigate Randolph in 1777—when 311 men in a complement of 315 perished—it is the greatest disaster that has ever befallen a single ship of our navy." Our author notes that the Spanish authorities in Havana promptly made visits of condolence and stoutly disclaimed all knowledge as to the cause of the disaster. All possible assistance was given to Capt. Sigsbee and other survivors of the Maine and the interment of the dead at the Cristobal Colon Cemetery on Feb. 17 was attended with every mark of respect and apparently sincere regret.

Continuing his recital of the story of the Maine, Mr. Maclay reminds us that a court of inquiry was promptly convoked by our Government. "It consisted of Capt. Sampson, President; Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, Judge Advocate; Capt. Chadwick and Lieutenant-Commander Potter. Sessions were held in the lighthouse tender Mangrove, which brought them from Key West, Feb. 21. During sittings at Havana and Key West, which lasted several weeks, the disaster was thoroughly investigated, and a report was delivered to President McKinley on March 21. Divers had been sent down, eyewitnesses of the explosion had been examined, the surviving members of the ship's company had been closely questioned, and, after a most thorough consideration of every circumstance, the court had come to the conclusion that the first explosion was caused by a submarine mine, and that it had been followed by a second explosion which was attributed to the forward magazine of the battleship. The Spanish authorities on their part made an independent investigation; but it has been conclusively shown that their search was merely perfunctory, and the charge that the findings of their board of inquiry were drawn up before the investigations were fairly started has not been satisfactorily refuted." Many of our readers will remember that, while the American court of inquiry was in session at Havana, the Spanish cruiser Vizcaya entered that port. This vessel had previously called at New York to return the friendly visit of the Maine to Havana. Our author notes that "Capt. Eulate, her commander, did not know of the loss of the Maine until his arrival in the American port. So great was the excitement in the United States at this time that extraordinary precautions were taken by both the Federal and municipal authorities to guard against any similar 'accident' to the Spaniards." Another fact to be borne in mind is that, about the time that the Vizcaya reached Havana, her sister ship, the Almirante Oquendo, entered the same port, the two forming a nucleus for a formidable flying squadron which would have a convenient base for operations against the coasts of the United States.

Although President McKinley received the report of the court of inquiry into the loss of the Maine on March 21, he deemed it prudent to withhold it from Congress until March 28, and subsequent delays were interposed for the express purpose of giving the country time in which to prepare for war. Not till April 11 did the President send to Congress a message reviewing the hopeless condition of Cuba, and declaring that the hour for intervention had come. "Two days later the House of Representatives voted for intervention. On April 20 the President sent an ultimatum to Spain demanding that the Madrid Government 'at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.' The President annnounced that he would wait for a 'full and satisfactory response' until noon, April 23, and, if such answer was not made by that time, the United States would forcibly eject the Spanish authorities from Cuba."

Mr. Maclay concludes his story of the Maine by recalling that the ultimatum just mentioned was never officially presented to the Madrid Government, for on April 21 our Minister to Spain was informed by the Madrid Government that diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain were severed." On April 25 Congress declared that war had existed between the United States and Spain since April 21, the day on which the Madrid Government had summarily broken off all relations with this country.

III.

We shall glance presently at the author's account of the naval battles of Santiago and Manila Bay. A word, however, should here be said about the preparations made for an exhibition of sea power as soon as the explosion of the Maine rendered it almost certain that the United States would intervene between Spain and Cuba. On March 9, 1898, Congress had placed at the disposal of the President $50,000,000 "for national defence," and Commander Willard H. Brownson was at once sent to Europe with authority to purchase war craft. Before his arrival in England, however, Lieut. John C. Colville, our naval attaché in London, had secured the Brazilian cruisers Amazonas and Almirante Abrouall, of the Cincinnati class, which were renamed New Orleans and Albany, respectively, while a torpedo boat, rechristened Somers, was purchased in Germany. Another small cruiser, the Diogenes, renamed Topeka, was bought in England. Finally, the cruiser Nictheroy was purchased of Brazil at Rio de Janeiro.

Mr. Maclay holds that not the least notable feature of the Hispano-American War was the energy and skill displayed by the Navy Department in mobilizing our maritime forces. "When hostilities seemed probable, the navy consisted of seventy-seven war craft, not including twenty-two torpedo boats, many of which latter were in course of construction. Of the sea-going vessels thirteen were undergoing repairs, nine were in ordinary and seven were in the service of militia organizations, thus leaving only forty-eight warships at the immediate disposal of the Navy Department. Of these, fourteen were on the North Atlantic station, seven were on the Pacific coast; three, the Cincinnati, Castile and Wilmington, were in the South Atlantic; two, the San Francisco and Bancroft, were in European waters, and six, the Olympia, Boston, Raleigh, Monocacy, Concord and Petrel, were on the Asiatic station. Eight vessels were in use as training schools, three were on special service, and the same number was held in reserve." We believe that most readers will concur with the author of this history in thinking that the rapidity and skill with which these ships stationed in different parts of the world and scattered at widely separated points of their several stations were concentrated at a few strategic points should arouse the admiration of all intelligent observers.

As early as Jan. 11, 1898, Secretary Long sent a note of warning to Rear Admiral Selfridge on the European station, urging him to make ready his squadron for active service. At that time the Helena, Commander William T. Swinburne, was on her way to the Asiatic station, and on Jan. 16 Long intercepted her at Funchal with the following message: "In view of recent events, it is considered advisable to delay departure from Funchal." On the following day the Secretary ordered the Helena to Lisbon, which port he had selected as a rendezvous for our cruisers in European waters. In pursuance of his instructions the San Francisco, Bancroft and Helena were swiftly brought together at Lisbon, under orders to keep a full supply of coal on hand, and to be prepared to sail for any point at an instant's notice. On March 12 the Secretary ordered the Bancroft to Norfolk, Va., the Helena to Key West, and, two days later, Commodore John A. Howell, who had succeeded Selfridge on Feb. 6, was directed to sail in the San Francisco for Newcastle-on-Tyne, where he was to hoist the flag of the United States over the recently-purchased cruisers New Orleans and Albany. The command of the New Orleans devolved on Lieutenant-Commander Arthur T. Nazro, who was to proceed at once to New York under the convoy of the flagship.

At this time the Spanish torpedo boat destroyer Audaz was in English waters, and it was feared that she might make an attack on the American cruisers. Howell sailed as he was instructed, but saw nothing of the Spaniards. Reaching the United States, Howell was placed in command of the northern patrol squadron, still having the San Francisco as his flagship. To this squadron, which was organized for the protection of the Atlantic coast north of the Delaware capes, were attached the auxiliary cruisers Yankee, Commander W. H. Brownson; Dixie, Commander Charles H. Davis; Prairie, Commander Charles J. Train; and Yosemite, Commander William H. Emory. In May the Columbia, Capt. Theodore F. Jewell, and the Minneapolis, Capt. James H. Sands, were detached from the Flying Squadron and placed under Howell's orders.

Without following our author any further in detail, we may note that in a surprisingly short time every available vessel on the European station and the whole of the South Atlantic squadron were unostentatiously concentrated and made ready for immediate service. At Key West was collected a magnificent fleet of warships within instantaneous communication of Washington, and prepared for any emergency. Capt. William T. Sampson, having been made an acting Rear Admiral, was, on April 21, appointed to the command of this fleet. The same rapid concentration of naval forces was observable in the Asiatic squadron. On Jan. 27, 1898, Secretary Long cabled Commodore George Dewey at Yokohama: "Retain until further orders the crews of the squadron whose terms of enlistment have expired." On Feb. 25, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt cabled Dewey: "Order the squadron except the Monocacy to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of a declaration of war against Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then to undertake offensive operations in the Philippine Islands." Realizing that the scene of active operations in the Atlantic would be in the West Indies, the Navy Department deemed it desirable to reenforce the fleet in those waters with the first-class battleship Oregon, then in Puget Sound, Washington. On March 12 the Secretary telegraphed to the commander of that vessel. "When in all respects ready for sea, proceed with the vessel under your command to Callao, Peru, and await further orders. In view of the present critical condition of affairs, the Oregon should leave San Francisco at the earliest possible date, and arrive at Callao as soon as practicable. The crew is to be constantly drilled, but the passage of the ship is not to be delayed thereby." By April 4 the Oregon had reached Callao, where it quickly took on a supply of coal. Two days later the Naval Department cabled to Capt. Clark, her commander: "Proceed at once to Montevideo, or Rio Janeiro." Having obtained a fresh supply of coal at Sandy Point, the Oregon reached Rio Janeiro on April 30, where her commander received a despatch from Washington stating that war had existed between the United States and Spain since April 21. Although it was known that four Spanish armored cruisers and three torpedo boat destroyers had sailed on April 29 from Cape Verde to the West, the Oregon pushed forward, and making a wide sweep round Barbadoes, steamed eastward of all the islands and reached Key West on the morning of May 26, having thus made the remarkable run of fourteen thousand miles around the continent under the most trying conditions in sixty-eight days.

IV.

We shall not follow in detail the author's description of the battle of Manila Bay, for all the incidents of the memorable engagement are familiar, but shall confine ourselves to some of the reflections embodied in the twelfth and thirteenth chapters of the third volume of this narrative, chapters respectively entitled "After the Battle" and "Dewey's Place in History." Mr. Maclay is not alone in considering the course taken by Commodore Dewey in giving his men a rest and in taking count of his ammunition and damages after the first bout of the battle of Manila, before completing the destruction of the Spanish fleet, one of the most striking features of that momentous combat. In our author's judgment, however, Dewey's withdrawal of his ships after the enemy had surrendered was even more remarkable. We are reminded that in naval history there is scarcely an instance where a victorious commander has delayed taking possession of the enemy after the latter had acknowledged defeat. "An ordinary commander would have promptly sent an armed force ashore to sieze the forts at Cavité and the immense quantities of stores that were known to be there. At the same time, he would have detailed part of his force to proceed at once to Manila and demand the surrender of the city. Instead of doing this, Dewey quietly withdrew his ships, and in the most matter-of-fact way determined his casualties, the stock of ammunition on hand and the general fitness of his squadron for further operations." It was this exhibition of self-control on Dewey's part that so wofully misled the Spaniards. "Had not," they asked, "the Americans failed to sieze Cavité after a bloody contest? Had they not moved far out in the bay, safe from the few remaining guns of the shore batteries?" A victorious Spanish commander would have been only too eager to grasp the prize within his reach. Almost any victor would have done this. Yet there were the American ships—apparently in perfect fighting trim, making off to a safe position. Thus reasoned Captain-General Augustin, and so he cabled to Madrid: "The Americans were compelled to take refuge behind the merchantmen in the harbor," and "they had withdrawn to bury their dead." Our author points out that Dewey knew that the Spaniards were crowding the cables with despatches giving their version of the battle. He was aware that his astonishing victory was being misrepresented, even to the extent that Cabinet officials in Madrid could "scarce restrain their emotions." He knew that it would be days before he could give his side of the story. Yet, notwithstanding the temptations and distractions surrounding him, Dewey contented himself with cleaning his decks, replenishing his ammunition and making everything ready for any contingency that might arise; leaving it to the future to publish to the world his victory. In Mr. Maclay's opinion, Dewey, by this manifestation of self-control, set a standard of naval excellence that will scarcely be surpassed.

The work of repairing the inconsiderable injuries sustained by the American ships in the battle was soon completed. "Our crews," wrote Consul Oscar F. Williams, "are all hoarse from cheering, and, while we suffer for cough drops and throat doctors, we have no use for liniment or surgeons." On the afternoon and evening of Sunday, May 1, the day of the engagement, the American squadron lay quietly in the bay. Soon after it had come to anchor, the British consul at Manila boarded the flagship and in behalf of the foreign residents requested that the city might be exempted from bombardment. Dewey willingly complied. Through this consul he notified Captain-General Augustin that Manila was in a state of blockade, that the Americans purposed to occupy Cavité and that if a single hostile shot was fired they should at once destroy every battery in and around the city. In the hope that some arrangement might be made by which he could send a despatch to Washington Dewey further declared that if the Spaniards would not permit the Americans to use the cable he would cause it to be cut. The cable officials would readily have allowed their line to be used, but Augustin forbade them to receive or transmit any message from the squadron. Consequently, on Monday afternoon, the line was grappled and severed. It was also on Monday, May 2, that Dewey shifted his squadron and made a temporary anchorage off Cavité. Early that morning a tug came up the bay from the direction of Corregidor under a flag of truce. It bore an offer from the commandant of that island to surrender. On Tuesday, May 3, accordingly, the Baltimore and Raleigh accompanied the tug to that island with orders to take possession and to blow up the forts should the least sign of treachery be manifested. Arriving off Corregidor the Americans found the place deserted by all save the commandant himself; in pursuance of the Spanish desire to leave nothing for the conquerors to seize, all the guns had been overturned.

On the morning of May 2 Dewey sent his chief-of-staff, Commander Lamberton, in the Petrel to take possession of the arsenal at Cavité. The little gunboat ran within 500 yards of the arsenal and then halted, for the white flag which had been shown Sunday had disappeared, and instead of the arsenal being deserted a large number of armed men were observed in and around the works. After some parley, however, with the Spanish officer in command, the white flag was again raised and the arsenal was surrendered. The evacuation of Cavité by the Spaniards was the signal for swarms of natives who had been hovering on the outskirts of the place to rush into the streets and houses and carry off everything of value. A force of marines was promptly landed and put the town under martial law. The Spanish wounded were taken to Manila under the Red Cross flag, and the Americans gave their attention to repairing the fortifications and to getting the guns in position for future operations.

In his thirteenth chapter the author inquires just how Dewey's achievement compares with the exploits of other great naval commanders in modern history. The fact is recalled that one of the most conservative biographers of England's greatest Admiral has declared that Nelson's victory at Aboukir, the Battle of the Nile, was his "masterpiece." It should be a fair test then, to contrast the engagement at Manila with that action. Mr. Maclay begins the comparison by inviting us to observe that "the two battles were fought under circumstances remarkably similar. In each case the enemy was anchored in a wide harbor; Nelson and Dewey both took the initiative. The American, however, forced what was thought to be a dangerously mined port at night, while the Englishman entered a spacious bay free from all submarine obstructions and explosives, in broad daylight. Furthermore, Dewey's opponent had the support of formidable shore batteries, and was aided by mine fields, even when in the harbor, while Nelson had neither of these dangers to guard against." It is a point generally overlooked that with respect to tonnage Dewey's squadron at Manila was about equal to Nelson's fleet at Aboukir. Nelson's thirteen ships of the line had an aggregate capacity of 20,000 tons; Dewey's six fighting vessels aggregated 19,098 tons. Mr. Maclay goes on to argue that if we allow for the quick firing of modern ordnance, as opposed to the cumbersome and tedious method of muzzle-loading in 1798, it is not unfair to compute the broadside shot weight of the American and Spanish forces at Manila at 30,000 pounds, as compared to the 11,000 and 12,000 pounds of the English and French respectively at Aboukir. It follows that Dewey with six fighting vessels had a much greater power for offence and defence than had Nelson with his thirteen ships. Our author, indeed, expresses the opinion that a single 13-inch rifle with modern appliances for loading and quick firing would almost be equal to Nelson's entire broadside.

Attention is next directed to the fact that the English losses at Aboukir were 218 killed and 678 wounded, while those of the French are placed at about 2,000, or fewer than one-fifth of their entire number. At Manila the Americans had none killed and only six wounded, while the Spanish casualties were 618, or almost half of their whole force. "These figures seem the more remarkable when we remember that Nelson had no considerable land batteries, or torpedoes, or submarine mines to dread. Dewey not only destroyed or captured every Spanish ship, but he silenced formidable land batteries as well. Nelson did not destroy or capture all the French ships, some of them—owing to the distressed condition of the British fleet after the action—escaping. Neither can it be said that the Spaniards fought with less heroism or skill than Nelson's opponents, for, as seen in the results, Montojo's men held out to the last plank, many of them going down with their craft." We are reminded that Aboukir has been considered one of the most decisive naval engagements in the world, for the reason that it directly brought about the abandonment of Egypt by the French. Our author submits that the fight at Manila was in no less degree decisive in its effects, for it deprived Spain of a territory greater than Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Switzerland combined, and nearly equal to England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland.

When our author proceeds to compare the battle of Manila with the more recent naval operations of our Civil War, he finds the conditions materially altered. He examines, for example, Farragut's passage of the New Orleans defences in 1862 and the battle of Mobile Bay in 1864. At New Orleans the seventeen ships that forced their way up the river carried 154 guns, opposed to the 146 in Forts Jackson and St. Philip and in the Confederate flotilla. Most of Farragut's guns were of much larger caliber than any Dewey had, the latter's heaviest guns being 8-inch rifles, while the national fleet at New Orleans carried as high as 11-inch calibers; being muzzle-loaders and using the old-fashioned powder, however, it is pronounced doubtful whether Farragut's cannon possessed the destructive force of Dewey's. Aside from this question, Farragut had to contend against fire ships, ironclads, a ram and a formidable barrier in a narrow channel where there was a swift current. At Mobile Farragut's victory was even more brilliant than that achieved by him at New Orleans, for here the enemy had the ironclad ram Tennessee, which, without counting the support of the forts, proved to be a formidable antagonist to the entire national fleet. Besides this, the narrow ship channel was obstructed by a double row of torpedoes, numbering in all 180. The total number of guns available for the defence was 96, while in Farragut's ships there were 174 guns. Dewey, to be sure, had torpedoes to contend with at Manila; but he had a wide bay in which to manœuvre, while Farragut was compelled to pass a double line of torpedoes, one of his four ironclads being sunk by them and carrying down ninety-three men.

Considering, then, Dewey's achievement in the light of history, our author reaches the conclusion that he excelled Nelson's victory at Aboukir and gained a more complete and decisive triumph than did the English at Trafalgar. He thinks that it cannot be said, however, that Dewey equalled Farragut's feat, either at New Orleans or in Mobile Bay. The opposing forces at Manila may have been as powerful and the victory was as complete, but "Dewey certainly did not have the obstacles to contend with that Farragut had on both occasions." It is, at the same time, admitted that "Dewey has shown himself to be a worthy pupil of the great Admiral, and, had the opportunity offered, he would have demonstrated that he possesses all the requirements that go to make up a great naval commander. It was no fault of his that he did not have under his command a much larger force, or that Montojo was not proportionately strong. He took what he had, and handled his resources with all the dash, tempered with sound judgment, that is so necessary to great success in naval enterprises."

It is well known that persistent efforts have been made to convey the impression that the Spaniards at Manila were totally unprepared for the attack made by Dewey on May 1, 1898. Some have gone so far as to characterize the entry of the American squadron into that harbor as a "midnight surprise." Montojo's ships have been described as "antiquated" craft, fit only to be anchored as targets and fired at, while the guns in the shore batteries have been depicted as "old-fashioned" ornaments, "venerable" relics of the Middle Ages. Mr. Maclay holds that "nothing could be more unjust to the gallant officers and men of Dewey's squadron than such wilful untruths." The facts in the case are as follows: "Montojo's ships were not 'antiquated,' their average date of launching having been November, 1883, while that of the American vessels was July, 1888, a difference of fewer than five years. By May 1 the Spaniards at Manila had made far more elaborate preparations for defence than had their opponents for offence. Only a short time before, war over the Caroline Islands had become imminent between Germany and Spain. With a view to defending the Philippines, elaborate plans were perfected for the protection of Manila. Vast quantities of ammunition and military supplies of the latest and best manufacture had been sent out." With respect to such supplies, as also in the matter of coal, Dewey was "dangerously handicapped, even to the extent of being required to exercise the greatest economy. As to his entry into Manila harbor being a "midnight surprise," it is now known that both Augustin and Montojo, weeks in advance, were thoroughly advised as to the exact number and force of the American ships, and that they knew the precise moment the ships left Mirs Bay and the direction in which they headed. The arrival of Dewey's squadron off Cape Bolinao Friday night (April 29) was promptly telegraphed to Manila, as also was its reconnoissance of Subig Bay on the afternoon of April 30. All this we have on the word of Montojo himself, besides the fact that the discovery of the invading squadron at the entrance of Manila harbor was made at midnight, and instantly communicated both to Montojo and Augustin. Dewey on his part was not only in total ignorance of the whereabouts of the Spanish war craft, but he was completely in the dark as to their dispositions for defence."

The author of this history considers the fact that Dewey, during the long, anxious weeks before reenforcements reached him, maintained his fleet in Manila Bay and handled successfully the delicate machinery of international diplomacy, a triumph in itself fully equal to the victory achieved by him on May 1. It is certain that many nations were watching his operations with jealous eyes. Thirteen days after the battle there were in Manila Bay one British, one French, one Japanese and two German warships. The German squadron was rapidly increased to five ships, some of them being armored cruisers. It was thus made superior to the American naval force at Manila, and this, notwithstanding the fact that Germany had fewer commercial interests in the Philippines than any other governments represented by warships. The Germans soon gave expression to their sympathy for the Spaniards, and seemed to avail themselves of every opportunity to show their enmity toward the United States. The Kaiser's officers and men landed and paraded the streets of Manila arm-in-arm with Spaniards. German warships persisted in moving about the bay at night, which was against blockade rules, and they evinced annoyance when American searchlights followed them. "One of their cruisers extinguished her lights and attempted to enter port at night, and would have succeeded had not the Americans sent a shell across her bow. All this Dewey bore without impatience, but patience ceased to be a virtue when he learned that a German cruiser had landed provisions in Manila. Dewey at once sent his Flag Lieutenant to Rear Admiral von Diederich "with his compliments" and with orders to call Diederich's attention to "an extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse," and "to tell Admiral von Diederich that if he wants a fight he can have it right now." Diederich did not want a fight. He professed to be "sorry" for what had happened, and declared that he was ignorant of the misdoings of his officers, an assertion which our author deems "a commentary on the much boasted German military training."

V.

The twenty-third and twenty-fourth chapters of Mr. Maclay's third volume are devoted to the battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898. We are reminded that a council of war between our navy and army commanders had become imperative. Shafter, ill with fever, could not come to Sampson; so Sampson, with extreme reluctance, decided to leave his station off Santiago, and to have an interview with Shafter on land. Accordingly, at ten minutes before 9 o'clock on the morning of July 3, Sampson caused the signal "Disregard movements commander-in-chief" to be displayed from the New York, and moved leisurely toward Siboney, where he was to land, and, after proceeding several miles inland, to meet Shafter. Just as the barren hills of Siboney were standing out distinctly off the port bow, Sampson stood on the quarter-deck of the New York to take a parting look at the fleet. At this moment a man on the signal bridge cried out: "Smoke in the harbor!" An instant later he yelled: "The fleet's coming out!" Glasses were at once trained on the dull yellow streak which indicated the position of the Morro. "Yes, they are coming out," calmly replied Sampson. "Hoist two-fifty"—that signal meaning "Close in toward the harbor entrance and attack vessels!" The flagship's eastward movement was promptly checked, and, spinning round, she retraced her course. To the chagrin of every man in the flagship, Cervera's ships were observed turning westward, and the New York used her best endeavors to reach the scene of action. For the detailed account of the resultant action we must refer the reader to our author's narrative. We shall only note what he has to say about the performance of the Brooklyn which has been the subject of a heated controversy. "When it was discovered," says Mr. Maclay, "aboard the Brooklyn—the swiftest American boat then on the scene of action—that Cervera was coming out, Commodore Schley started ahead at a speed of twelve knots. In five minutes the forward turret guns had opened on the enemy's leader. Observing that this ship, the Infanta Maria Teresa, was making in his direction Schley hastily ordered the helm aport, all the other large American ships having put their helms to starboard. 'You mean starboard, sir?' the navigator of the Brooklyn ventured to inquire. 'No! Port,' was Schley's rejoinder. 'But that will carry us into the Texas,' said the officer. 'Let the Texas take care of herelf,' was the heartless reply, and the shameful spectacle was presented of an American warship, supported by a force superior to the enemy's deliberately turning tail and running away. According to his own official report, Schley was at close quarters with the enemy, 'possibly ten minutes,' and it was in that ten minutes that the Brooklyn received the bulk of her much-boasted injuries."

Speaking of Schley's "evasion of duty," the late Rear Admiral Philip said to the author of this history: "The Texas at this time was doing her best to close on the Spaniards when to my surprise and consternation I saw the Brooklyn swing around with port helm—when all the other American warships had used the starboard—away from the Spaniards and place herself directly in our course. I was compelled to stop and reverse our engines and even then came nearer to a collision then I could wish. On account of this circumstance the Texas lost a splendid chance of closing with the enemy." Mr. Maclay reminds us that at first Schley attempted to justify his manœuvre by saying that he feared ramming. Our author's comment on this plea is: "If such was the case it is strange that he turned to starboard so as to actually run away from the enemy instead of turning to port, as each of the other American ships did, where he could have avoided ramming, not only as well, but better—to say nothing of avoiding the danger of collision with his consort—and at the same time have brought his ship into the best position for engaging the enemy. That his first excuse was untenable is shown by the fact that Schley himself afterward endeavored to substitute for it the explanation that he turned to starboard so as not to blanket the fire of the other American ships." This second excuse is pronounced "even more unmanly than the first. We have seen how Philip in his official report with evident vexation complained of the Oregon coming between the Texas and the Almirante Oquendo so as to blanket his fire. Philip felt hurt because his fire was blanketed even 'for a short time.' Schley was perfectly willing to avoid blanketing the fire of the other American warships even at the risk of a disastrous collision with the Texas, so long as he could escape getting too close to danger. The one great lesson that Nelson gave in naval strategy was that 'a Captain is never out of position when alongside an enemy.' Farragut's great axiom sixty years later was that 'the nearer you get to your enemy the harder you can strike.' Schley's contribution to naval strategy, as to plainly shown by his conduct throughout this campaign, was 'Avoid your enemy as long as possible, and if he makes for you, run!' After making a wide circle, which landed him broad off to sea and placed the Oregon, Iowa and Texas between him and his enemy, Schley put on full steam and tenaciously held a position to the south or outside of all our pursuing ships, excepting the Vixen."

One of the two chapters allotted to the Battle of Santiago is entitled "Wainwright and the Destroyers." When Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright of the Gloucester realized that the Spanish cruisers were escaping from Santiago, he made up his mind that the destroyers Pluton and Furor would soon follow, and he determined to reserve his efforts for those craft. The fact is recalled that the Gloucester was nothing but a frail pleasure yacht, hastily fitted out as a despatch boat when the war began. She was rigged as a two-masted schooner, and a battery of four 6-pounders and four 3-pounders, with two 6-millimetre machine guns, was placed on her. Both the Furor and the Pluton were the latest and best products of the Clyde shipyards. They were considerably longer than the Gloucester, and, having been constructed for war purposes, were immeasurably superior to her in fighting qualities. Each was armed with two 14-pounders, two 6-pounders, two 1-pounders and two 14-inch torpedo tubes.

After the last of Cervera's cruisers had issued from the harbor of Santiago and turned westward, the two destroyers came out of the rat-hole entrance at their highest rate of speed, "like cornered rodents making a dash for liberty." With cat-like agility, the Gloucester closed in upon them single-handed. "Not satisfied with attacking one of the destroyers at a time, Wainwright divided his puny fire between the Pluton and Furor, the forward starboard two 6-pounders and one 3-pounder being trained on the leading Spaniard—the Pluton—while the after guns, the two 3-pounders, were directed at the Furor. The enemy opened a terrific, though ill-directed, fire on the yacht, hundreds of missiles falling in a few minutes near the Gloucester, and whipping the sea into a froth. On this occasion the Spaniards operated a 1-pounder Maxim gun with terrifying if not terrible effect. Had the tornado of merciless steel been properly directed, the Gloucester would have been riddled like a sieve in five minutes, and probably not one of her people would have been left alive to tell the story." But, as the commander of the Pluton has testified: "The Americans continued to fire very rapidly, which made it extremely difficult for us to serve the guns."

Our author's account of the Gloucester's achievement concludes as follows. We gladly reproduce the paragraph, and therewith take leave of a valuable and interesting book, which is likely long to be accepted as an authoritative history. "By 10:15 A. M. Wainwright had reduced the Pluton's lead to 1,200 yards, at which range the Gloucester probably did her best firing, the two 6-millimetre guns now operating with effect. By this time signs of distress were discovered aboard the Pluton. The furious pace she had set began to falter. In a few minutes she gave a hesitating yaw to port, away from land, and then turned abruptly to starboard and made a mad rush for the shore, entangling herself in a shoal of rocks some distance from the beach. Satisfied that the Pluton was out of the fight, Wainwright concentrated his fire on the Furor. Gradually he reduced her lead to 600 yards, and fairly covered her with a shower of steel, the Spanish gun crews actually being swept away as fast as they could be formed. Presently the Furor began that sickening circling round—unerring signs to a sailor's mind that the ship's end is near—and Wainwright knew that he had won a second victory. She was pointing off shore and in his direction, leading him to think she was about to close with him. She continued to turn, however, completing her circle to port at decreasing speed. Steam and smoke from her decks and her slackening fire showed her to be damaged, and it was evident she was disabled too seriously to continue the action. A moment later some one in the forward part of the Furor waved a white cloth, and the Americans ceased firing." M. W. H.