## SOME NEW BOOKS.

### A New History of the Revolution.

We have before us the sixth volume of the syndicated *History of North America*, edited by GUY CARLETON LEE of Johns Hopkins University and published by George Barrie & Sons. This volume of nearly five hundred large octavo pages is devoted to "The Revolution," and has been prepared by Dr. C. W. A. Veditz, professor of history in Bates College, and Dr. Bartlett Burleigh James, professor of philosophy in Western Maryland College. No careful reader of the work will dispute the editor's assertion that it has been wisely planned and well constructed. Its authors have avoided that method of historical writing which, instead of a lively narrative, prescribes an amplified chronology, a table of events and dates. They have, on the other hand, eschewed that other plan by which hypotheses and philosophy are made to take the place that belongs to exact statement. The joint authors of this book have presented all the material necessary to a thorough understanding of the Revolution and of its genesis, but they have made no attempt to detail the minutæ of the struggle for independence. Because of this process of construction they have been able to include in the volume under review enough of the historical philosophy of the Revolution to stimulate the intellect as well as to satisfy its demand for facts.

There is no doubt that, until a recent period, the study of the history of the United States, as distinguished from that of the thirteen British colonies, has been hampered by the clogs fastened upon impartial investigation by conventional patriotism. For a century the myths of history have been allowed to obscure the facts, and from childhood until old age the average person has imbibed erroneous ideas concerning not only the causes and events of the uprising for independence, but also the conditions existing in the patriotic party. For many years the general reader has been imbued with the assumption that the American colonists, so far as freedom under the colonial governments was concerned, were nearly on a level with the Israelites in their bondage to the lords of the two Egypts, and that the movement against the continuance of British control was a great and spontaneous one, in which all the colonists took part, except a very few of the less worthy members of certain communities. This false opinion of the cause and force of the outbreak that developed into the Revolution has been fostered by well nigh every popular historian of the nineteenth century. Throughout that period hatred for the "redcoat" and for the "minions of the tyrant King," was sedulously inculcated, and a self-glorification that misplaced the credit for the happy ending of the struggle between Great Britain and the United States was strongly encouraged. It is true, of course, that a correct view of the Revolution has been at all times attainable, and certain scholars have learned the truth from the right sources of history, but their voices were not loudly raised during the hundred years next following the recognition of the independence of the United States by Great Britain. Only within the last decade, indeed, has any perceptible impression been made upon the long prevailing ignorance concerning the true history of the Revolution.

The spirit which animates the present book is as far removed from the ill balanced enthusiasm of Chauvinism as from the iconoclastic fervor of those who reject patriotism as mere sentiment. The authors have not hesitated to exhibit the worth and importance of the American Loyalists, to whom separation between the Colonies and Great Britain seemed an unmitigable evil; while the bickerings, indifference, selfishness and treachery that were rife in the ranks of the Revolutionists are unsparingly laid bare. To France and to the British well wishers of the American cause is accorded due credit for the aid that may fairly be said to have given independence to the United States. It may, no doubt, be argued that, when the whole truth is told concerning the Revolution, the struggle is stripped of all romance, and patriotism finds nothing in which to glory. This is not the opinion of the authors of this narrative. They hold that the more closely we get to the actual facts of the Revolution, the more does our admiration for genuine patriotism increase. To show that the Loyalists were numerous and rich does but convey a correct idea of the opposition which confronted the Revolutionists, and brings out distinctly the dual nature of the tremendous struggle. The disclosure of fraud, cowardice and treason in the ranks of the men who warred for independence does but accentuate the merit of those who were steadfast through desperate straits. Credit may be given for French and British aid, and yet not one jot be taken from the praise due to the patriots for their courage and self-sacrifice. In fine, we rather promote than impair patriotic enthusiasm by demolishing the historical myths that had long prevented a just appreciation of the merits of the participants in the Revolution.

The characteristic qualities of this book may be exemplified by directing attention to the third chapter, in which the extent of popular representation in the colonial governments is defined; to the fourth chapter, which deals with the British restrictions on colonial trade and industry; to the eighth chapter, in which the genesis and development of independence are traced; to the ninth, in which the relative strength of the adversaries is computed; the twelfth, in which the subject of foreign intervention is considered; the eighteenth, in which the cost of the Revolutionary war is estimated; and the nineteenth, or final chapter, in which the rapid disintegration of the Confederation after the treaty of peace and other important topics, are discussed.

I.

It is well known that the relation of the British Parliament to the American colonies was long a matter of dispute. In the earliest period of colonization the English Parliament may be said to have had no share at all in the direction of colonial affairs. It was generally assumed that the American wilderness was part of the King's private domain and not subject to Parliamentary control. In pursuance of this assumption it was the King who, as owner of all the land, made all the grants, gave all the charters, created all the colonies, and governed many of them directly. In the course of political evolution in England this theory died out; but in America it continued to be accepted by the colonists. The Long Parliament took charge of the management of the American colonies after the execution of Charles I., and, although much of the original royal power reverted to King Charles II., at the Restoration, in 1660, Parliament still continued to pass laws which applied to the colonies. Parliament, for example, established a colonial postal service and fixed the rates of postage. Again, Parliament regulated the currency used in the colonies, and enacted a universal law of naturalization. From time to time Parliament passed acts for the purpose of regulating colonial trade. The colonies, it is to be noted, did not protest against these latter laws—perhaps because of the fact that they were not enforced. It appears to have been admitted, both in England and in the colonies, that no law of Parliament should apply to the colonies unless they were specifically mentioned in it. The theory which ultimately came to be accepted by the colonists was that both Great Britain and the colonies had the same King, but different Legislatures; and that each colony possessed its own rights of legislation, over which the British Parliament had no more control than had the Legislature of one colony over that of any other.

The degree of self-government enjoyed by Connecticut and Rhode Island, the two republican Commonwealths in which practically all the officers, local or general, were elected by the people, was, of course, greater than that of the colonies south of Virginia, which had no local self-government and in which the popular Assembli es possessed but little real power. In many of the colon es last referred to, indeed, the Assemblies were called irregularly, and represented but a small fraction of the people, because their members were chosen on the basis of a limited popular suffrage. Originally in Massachusetts only church members could vote. Through the efforts of the Crown, however, the religious qualification for voters was abolished before the opening of the eighteenth century, and a property qualification was substituted. In Connecticut, under the charter of 1662 a Governor, twelve assistants and a House of Deputies were elected annually by the freemen, the term "freeman" being applied to any adult male owning real estate to the amount of twenty pounds sterling and recommended by the selectmen of his town as of "honest, civil and peaceful conversation." At first, the Government of Rhode Island was the most thoroughly democratic in New England. It was, in truth, too democratic to work successfully, and eventually the colony abandoned its earlier principles and restricted the franchise to those possessing certain property qualifications and moral requisites. With regard to the character of the local governments in the various colonies, as to which there was a wider divergency than with regard to the central governments, it is customary to separate the colonies into three distinct classes: First, there was the township system developed in New England; secondly, the county system of Virginia and the South; thirdly, the compromise or mixed system of the middle colonies. Geographical, social and religious circumstances accounted to a large degree for the differences in local government.

We have spoken of the property qualification for the franchise. It will, of course, be understood that such a qualification was less difficult of fulfilment in America with its abundance of uncultivated land than in Great Britain. As a matter of fact, the Assembly of Massachusetts was vastly more representative than was the contemporary British Parliament, and the suffrage in Connecticut was five times as liberal as that in Yorkshire. Compared, in short, with the number of persons who shared in the government of Great Britain, the colonies were decidedly democratic.

II.

There is no doubt that the overthrow of the French in North America caused the Home Government to determine to carry out its purpose, conceived long before, of impressing upon the colonies the sense of economic dependence on Great Britain, and of directing their development into channels looked upon as clearly beneficial to the mother country. It is at the same time admitted by the authors of this book that the desire to reduce the colonies of Great Britain in America to a position of subserviency, political and economic, must not be regarded as a proof that that nation was an exceptionally selfish or unprogressive one for those days. The contrary statement would be nearer the truth. Compared with the attitude of France and Spain toward their respective colonies, Great Britain was a model of generosity and kindness. Her restrictions on the commerce of her American dependencies were not examples of extreme and anomalous tyranny. The historian Lecky has pointed out that a knowledge of the practices of other European nations reveals the fact that the British commercial policy was simply the moderate expression of ideas then prevalent almost universally in regard to the relations of colonies to their mother country. Neither is it true that in shackling the trade of the colonies the mother country made no reciprocal concessions on her part. In compensation for the advantages which Great Britain sought to secure for herself she frequently conferred some special privilege on the colonies, or even burdened herself with some restrictions calculated to benefit the latter.

For example, whereas most European nations compelled their colonies to pay the full duties imposed by the mother country upon imported goods, even though such commodities should ultimately be sent out to the colonies, Great Britain usually allowed the same drawbacks on goods that were reexported to the colonies as were allowed on imported goods subsequently sent abroad again to foreign nations. In consequence of this regulation it was possible to buy many kinds of foreign goods more cheaply in the colonies than in Britain herself. The complaint was frequently made in England that German linens were sold in the colonies much more cheaply and, therefore, more extensively than those of British production. Again, the colonies not only had a monopoly of the British market for "enumerated articles," but they could send all unenumerated goods to any foreign country without any other restriction than that of forwarding them in ships built and chiefly manned by British subjects. Such non-enumerated goods were among the important products of the colonies and included the great staples of grain, timber, salted provisions, fish and rum. The colonists were forbidden, indeed, in the ordinary state of the law, to send salted provisions or any kind of grain except rice to Great Britain. In the interest of the British sugar colonies the importation of sugar, molasses and rum from the French or Spanish West Indies was virtually prohibited. This prohibition, however, of a commerce which was of extreme importance to the New England colonies was allowed, with the tacit connivance of the British Government, to become a dead letter. The colonists continued to carry their goods to the French and Spanish islands in exchange for spirits and sugar and for the gold and silver they needed with which to buy goods from Great Britain.

We note finally that smuggling was lucrative and almost universal in the American colonies. It did not arouse the disapproval which usually attaches to the violation of law. The New Englanders violated Parliamentary restrictions upon their trade almost openly. The royal customs officials learned that the easiest road to wealth lay in collusion with the importers. It was not uncommon for collectors of customs in the British West Indies to grant fraudulent clearances, which would be accepted by the collectors of customs in New England. So, too, merchants would often be permitted to discharge vessels laden with dutiable goods in the absence of the customs officials. At the very time when Great Britain was straining every nerve to drive the French out of North America, when sacrifices were being made for the defence of British colonial possessions in the New World, and when the mother country was not only incurring an enormous war debt, but was sending large sums of money to the colonies to be used in the French and Indian War, the New England colonists were actually providing the common enemy with supplies. Under the cover of flags of truce, granted ostensibly for the exchange of prisoners of war, these colonists carried goods to the French fleets, the French garrisons and the French West Indies. For this unpatriotic service they were, of course, well paid, and the practice was sometimes cynically defended on the ground that it was justifiable to make money out of the enemy. It is, in truth, significant that the customs revenues received by Great Britain from the colonies amounted to less than £2,000 annually, while it cost £7,000 to collect it.

The authors of this book recognize that to specify all of the sources which contributed to the idea of independence, as it came eventually to obtain in Britain's American colonies, would be to trace the history of economic development in the New World; for in a very important sense the idea of independence was an economic one. It was an outcome of colonial manufactures and colonial commerce. At first Great Britain had taken but little commercial account of the struggling settlements along the Atlantic coast of North America. When, however, the exports from the colonies came to be of wider importance than fish, furs and ship timber, she became interested in seizing the major benefits of colonial commerce. Then began the struggle for commercial freedom upon the part of the colonies. Any attempt to refer the idea of independence to sources which do not take account of the educational effect of the colonial struggle for freedom in trade would result in an imperfect conception of a most important element. It is here denied that the study of the social philosophy of the day by American leaders was in any sense an inducing cause of the Declaration of Independence; on the contrary, the doctrine so derived served only to give form and character to convictions arrived at independently. The proclamation by George III. of a state of rebellion in the colonies was the circumstance which crystallized the tenets of the independence party, and when crystallized they naturally took the shape of the thought which the patriotic leaders had been imbibing.

III.

There is no doubt that most of the patriots regarded the absolute severance of the ties binding them to England as a regrettable step. There has been an attempt in certain quarters to disparage the sincerity of the leaders of the patriotic party and to regard the Declaration of Independence as the consummation of a carefully prepared scheme, whose real purport was but gradually divulged. The documents of the period clearly denote the perception and apprehension of the trend of political affairs by the champions of Colonial rights, but in the judgments of the authors of this history they do not disclose hidden purposes or political machinations of any sort. Touching this point, we read: "It goes without saying that there was bitterness of feeling between the patriotic party and the loyalists; but these were not fixed parties, for as the spirit of independence developed and the uncompromising attitude of the mother country became clear many loyalists, abandoning their hope of generous treatment at the hands of the home Government, cast in their fortunes with the popular party, while many of the earlier adherents of the latter, shrinking from the finality of political independence, found their way into the Tory camp." The prospect, indeed, of a long and severe war with the best equipped of European nations was well calculated to induce feelings of seriousness and even of foreboding. The ultimate opponents of independence were not necessarily Tories by conviction. In many instances they were men who would have liked to see the authority of the home Government divested of real potentiality, yet who regarded it as something nevertheless to be desired, and only to be relinquished when even the semblance of self-government was denied. It was but natural, indeed, that the colonists, considered as a whole, should falter before a word which seemed to many persons to be fraught with evil omen. Independence, defined as a principle of self-direction, was as dear to any of them as it was to Massachusetts, but few of them had advanced so far along the path of practical freedom as had their Northern colleague.

The whole history of New England had prepared that section for the reception of the idea of independence, not simply as an abstraction, but as a fact. While the Middle and some of the Southern colonies were hesitating in the path of a swift moving destiny, the newspapers of Massachusetts were glowing with exhortations to them to stand by the stern facts of their faith as they were to be seen on the New England battlefields. Thus the opening of the year 1776, big with the fate of a new born nation, found a divided sentiment upon the feasibility and desirability of declaring independence of the mother country. In New England the preponderance of opinion had crystallized in favor of it, while throughout the Middle and Southern colonies independence was still an individual, not a collective, aspiration. New Year's Day, 1776, was made prophetic by the action of Washington in unfurling the flag of thirteen stripes as the banner of the Union. The authors of this book concur with most students of the period in regarding Thomas Paine's pamphlet, "Common Sense," which was published Jan. 9, 1776, as a prime agent in the transmutation of the philosophy of a new social order into the terms of the language of a disaffected people. By that polemic, manhood was summoned to assert itself at the behest of suffering and indignity. What independence as a political principle could not of itself accomplish was effected by an appeal to sentiment. Thousands were converted by Paine's rhetoric. The theory at which they had shivered was elevated into a principle which they avowed with ardor. The work of Paine became the textbook of the new era.

IV.

In the ninth chapter the relative strength of the adversaries is computed. Unquestionably, compared with England, the colonies were weak—indeed, insignificant—considered as a naval or military power. In 1775 their population certainly did not exceed 3,000,000, of whom about 500,000 were slaves. The colonial population was scattered along the coast, and so separated by obstacles to transportation and travel that it could not exert simultaneously its whole military strength. Great Britain and Ireland had, on the other hand, a total population of at least 10,000,000. The so called "industrial revolution" had already begun in England. The manufactures and commerce of the country were extensive and profitable. Great Britain, moreover, possessed rich colonies in almost every part of the globe, and there seemed to be no limit to her resources or to her trade. Since the Seven Years War her mastery of the sea had been practically undisputed, and this circumstance alone gave her an enormous advantage. Under these circumstances it was unlikely that the war would terminate in favor of the colonies. Again, from the beginning to the end of the contest, the troops of the colonies were ill armed, poorly clothed and sparely fed. The men readily became homesick; they pined for their farms and their firesides; hundreds of them deserted. The need of an effective force, both on land and sea, continued to be felt throughout the war.

It is true that England's army under the colors in 1774 numbered but 17,547 men, while the naval force did not exceed 16,000. In 1775, however, Parliament voted to increase the personnel of the navy by 28,000 men, and the land forces by 55,000. Early in the war, moreover, the British Government employed foreign mercenaries, and, surprising as it may appear, these mercenaries made excellent soldiers, and sometimes saved British armies at critical conjunctures. It is, therefore, evident that, so far as numbers were concerned, the British possessed a great advantage at the start, and retained it, practically, till the close of the struggle.

Not only in the matter of numbers, but in the matter of discipline as well, a comparison of the British with the Continental army was altogether favorable to the former. The seasoned campaigners of European wars and the trained Hessian mercenaries outclassed the raw militia of the colonies at every point except that of strategy, in which the colonials were adepts, and courage, a quality of which the latter certainly had as much as their foes. The British had been taught to fight in close formation, in accordance with the prevailing military rules, whereas the militia had learned the art of adapting their methods of war to the conditions of the country and to the meagreness of their armament. The failure of the British Generals to see and grasp their opportunities, their inaction when activity was demanded, and their incapacity to appreciate a situation from the viewpoint of its real possibilities, together with a perverse tendency to underestimate the fighting qualities of the men and the generalship of the officers in the American armies, go far to explain, when coupled with the defective mobility of the British troops, the ultimate triumph of the American forces. It was not, in a word, the British soldier, but his superior, who was at fault; the British commanders, on the whole, were inferior to the Americans. The successes of the British were almost invariably traceable to superior numbers and favoring conditions. A lack of training in the technique of war was more than made up in the American commanders by native ability. The authors of this history deem it one of the most fortunate circumstances of the revolutionary contest that, although experienced Generals were lacking, the American army did not have to await the evolution of capable leaders through the costly experiences of defeat. The selection originally made of Generals was in most cases quickly justified by their exploits. Washington, Greene, Arnold, Wayne and others who achieved victories for the American cause, soon showed themselves not inferior in every element of military capacity to the best Generals among the British. Indeed, the latter were frequently distinguished rather for personal bravery than for efficiency as commanders.

Attention is further directed to the fact that there was in favor of the colonial cause a moral influence which strengthened the courage of its champions in their hours of despair. This influence was found in the generally favorable attitude of the Continental powers. Although the sentiment which inspired their leaning toward a group of colonies engaged in a war of rebellion was no way kindred to that which had led the colonists to take up arms, nevertheless the latter had reason to rejoice in the fact that, whether from feelings of fear or of jealousy, practically the whole of Continental Europe wished to have them succeed. France, as we know, was not only willing early in the contest to aid the colonies by lending them moral support, but was forward as well—though at first secretly—in giving their cause substantial furtherance. Spain, also, was well disposed toward England's revolting colonies, and permitted their ships to anchor in her harbors, the excuse offered to England being that the vessels were not known to be American. When the British Government turned to Russia, that country refused to aid it in the subjection of the colonies. Only from Hesse-Cassel and some minor German principalities could mercenaries be recruited for the war in America. Finally, the Americans possessed an almost incalculable advantage over the British in intimate knowledge of the vast field of the war, which stretched from north to south at least a thousand miles, though from east to west it extended little more than a hundred. They were thoroughly inured to climatic conditions, and were adepts in fighting after the only fashion that might be employed successfully in forest encounters, the method employed by the aborigines. On the other hand, the configuration of the country, the diversity of mountain and glade, of forest and river, the bewildering inlets of the coast, with their numerous islands, presented almost insuperable difficulties to the British. Thus both by land and water the nature of the country favored the cause of the colonists.

V.

It is in the twelfth chapter that the attempts to secure foreign intervention are recounted at length. Only in comparatively recent times has the tremendous importance of the material as well as moral aid received from Continental Europe been adequately recognized. From the outbreak of the Revolutionary contest Congress had maintained agents abroad, in order properly to gauge the sentiments of foreign States, although, of course, such agents could not be formally accredited to foreign courts, even after the Declaration of Independence, until that independence had been by those courts acknowledged. The peculiar interest of France in anything that tended to weaken her neighbor across the Channel naturally made its officials watch with keener concern than was felt by other Continental Governments the progress of events in America. In consequence of this lively interest the Court of France took care to keep itself thoroughly informed. As early as August, 1775, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comte de Vergennes, sent secretly to America an agent to report to him concerning the American situation. About the same time that this agent departed on his secret mission Beaumarchais, the dramatist, who had been employed by Louis XVI. in a quasi-diplomatic capacity, had interviews with Arthur Lee and other representatives of the colonies, and soon afterward presented to the King a secret memorial in favor of taking the part of the insurgents. On Sept. 21, 1775, the subject was discussed in the King's Council, but the French Ministers were divided upon the question of giving assistance to America and no decision was arrived at for twelve months.

Vergennes, personally, was convinced of the judiciousness of such a step, and gradually the King himself came under his influence. On the same side were arrayed Sartine, the Minister of Marine, and Sainte-Germaine, the Secretary of War. In March, 1776, Vergennes received a report from the agent whom he had sent to America, and on it based a set of "Considerations," to be submitted to the King. They set forth the advantage which in any event must accrue to France and Spain from the war begun in America, inasmuch as it would tend to exhaust the victor and the vanquished alike. The Minister pointed out, however, that the British Government might be driven to conciliate the colonies, or else, being beaten by them, might seek indemnity at the expense of the colonial possessions of France and Spain. Then, again, if the colonists should attain independence, they might, from the exigencies of their situation, and impelled by the spirit of conquest, assume the aggressive against Spanish America. After an elaboration of these possibilities, and their effect upon France and Spain, Vergennes drew the conclusion that the war should be allowed to continue for at least a year, and that Great Britain should be kept persuaded that France and Spain were neutral, in order that thus she might be encouraged to carry on an active and costly campaign in America. At the same time, the courage and persistence of the Americans might be kept up by secret favors and the holding out to them of vague hopes by France. The policy thus set forth comported with the extension of underhand assistance to America, while it did not contemplate an early recognition of the colonies as a sovereign power. The chief opponent in the Cabinet to the policy recommended by Vergennes was Turgot, then Comptroller-General of Finance. The King directed that the memorial drawn up by Vergennes should be referred to Turgot for his written opinion. After three weeks' deliberation, the latter submitted his report to the King. It expressed a conviction that the independence of the American colonies was inevitable, but asserted the undesirability of France or Spain doing anything that might provoke a war between them and Great Britain. Turgot based his objection to his country's becoming involved in the war upon its financial straits, as well as upon the broader consideration that such a war would be a blunder from the viewpoint of political principle. Nevertheless, his summary of the points in dispute between the colonists and their mother country was an impressive tribute to the former, as well as an able arraignment of the policy of colonial subjection. On the whole, therefore, Turgot's report practically helped the cause which ostensibly it opposed. The Minister of Marine, on his part, implored the King to risk a war with Great Britain on behalf of the American colonies.

These divergent views represent the fluctuating state of opinion in France as to what attitude that country ought to take toward the American cause. By May, 1776, however, the King of France reached a decision, and informed the Madrid Government of his intention of advancing, under cover of the name of a commercial house, $200,000 to the Americans. The Madrid Government, some weeks after the receipt of this information, remitted secretly to Paris a draft for an equal sum. Thus the French Court, cooperating with that of Spain, entered upon the policy advocated by Vergennes of encouraging the Americans in their resistance to Great Britain. Early in the summer of the year just named Beaumarchais announced to Arthur Lee that he was authorized to promise aid to the amount of nearly $1,000,000. Evidently the tide of enthusiasm for America was on the rise. On Dec. 21 Benjamin Franklin reached Paris, having been commissioned, in conjunction with Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, to propose a treaty with France. A week afterward the three commissioners were received secretly by Vergennes, and on the following day by the Spanish Ambassador. The outcome of these interviews was a promise given on behalf of Spain or France that American privateers and their prizes might find a refuge in the ports of the two countries. On Jan. 5, 1777, the commissioners put forward a request for eight ships of the line, ammunition, brass field pieces and 20,000 or 30,000 muskets. This request was rejected, but additional secret succor was promised, and $100,000 was paid to the commissioners quarterly. With this money three French vessels were loaded with munitions of war and despatched across the Atlantic.

There seems to be no doubt that personally Louis XVI. was not favorable to assisting the Americans; it is said, indeed, that he "would break into a passion whenever he heard of help furnished to them." Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the French people could not be held in check by the sovereign. Vergennes was in full sympathy with the national feeling, and in July, 1777, he fixed upon February, 1778, as the time when France and Spain should engage Great Britain in war, or else be condemned to lament forever afterward the loss of a great opportunity. The surrender of Burgoyne's army thrilled Paris and a wave of sentiment overbore the adverse counsels of Mauripas, Chief Minister of Louis XVI. On Dec. 17, 1777, Gerard, one of the secretaries of Vergennes, informed the American commissioners that the King in Council had determined not only to acknowledge the United States, but to sustain them as well. On Feb. 6, 1778, a treaty of amity and commerce, looking toward an eventual alliance, was concluded between the King of France and the United States, largely upon the lines of the treaty proposed by the American Congress. The conclusion of the treaty between France and the United States was formally announced to Great Britain on March 13 and was regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war. One week later the American commissioners were officially received by Louis XVI. in his palace at Versailles. On April 10, 1778, Gerard, bearing credentials as Minister to the Congress of the United States, sailed from Toulon with a French fleet. It was not, however, until April, 1779, that Spain joined France in the war against Great Britain.

We have seen that two of the most powerful nations of Europe became allies of the United States in time to aid effectively in bringing to a successful issue the American struggle for independence. As the conflict drew toward a close, countries which before had hesitated to acknowledge the independence of the United States prepared to do so. Five months previously to the signing of the treaty of peace between Great Britain and her former colonies a treaty between Sweden and the United States was concluded. Subsequently Frederick of Prussia and the King of Denmark indicated a willingness to take similar steps, but as a matter of fact they did not carry out such intentions until after Great Britain herself had acknowledged the independence of the colonies. In estimating the importance of the foreign aid given to the United States during their struggle for independence the authors of this history are disposed to think that, aside from its moral effect, the assistance was of no great practical moment until the last campaign. Although previously, at Newport and at Savannah, the French had made honest efforts to help the Americans, the result was failure. In the final blow, however, delivered to the British at Yorktown, it is admitted that the cooperation of France cannot be too highly valued. But for the operations of the French fleet, Cornwallis would have escaped by way of the sea, and but for the French land forces he would have broken through the American lines.

VI.

According to the computation made in the book before us, the pecuniary cost of the Revolutionary War to the colonies did not fall far short of $170,000,000, an amount, of course, which, in proportion to the abilities of the people amounted to many times as much as it would to-day. The cost of the Revolutionary War, however, like that of any great conflict, is not reducible to exact figures. The burning of towns, the ravaging of the country, the horrors of Indian warfare and the no less atrocious conduct of roving bands of Tories, the destitution and distress brought upon families by the calling out of militiamen, the miseries of hospitals and the unspeakable horrors of the British prison ships, must all enter into the sum total of the cost of the contest. Of the actual money disbursed, two-thirds had been expended by Congress, and the rest by individual States. Four methods had been adopted for raising the funds needed for the civil and military expenditures of the Government: a depreciation of the currency, the imposition of indirect taxes, the borrowing of cash and the incurring of debts for supplies. To levy direct taxes upon the people was impracticable, Congress being without means of enforcing its will. Congress sought, however, in 1780, to make the States contribute in kind, but the experiment was quickly abandoned. The flood of fiat money issued by Congress was joined in the channels of circulation by thirteen streams of similar State currency. Some States, such as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, honorably redeemed their credit by funding their bills at their nominal value. In some other States the bills were redeemed partially by the issue of land warrants. The remainder of the State issues met the fate of the Continental currency, namely, practical repudiation. Toward the close of the war direct taxation had to be resorted to by the States, and the conclusion of peace found them bearing a heavy burden of this sort.

VII.

The final chapter of this narrative contains an interesting review of the state of things in the colonies at the date of the recognition of their independence, as regards the institution of slavery. The fact is recalled that the British courts had adjudged slavery to be contrary to the law of the land, so that the colonial Legislatures and courts were without authority to give the institution a legal status. Nevertheless, at the outbreak of hostilities, it existed in every one of the United Colonies. No provision on the subject of slavery was made in any State Constitution, except that of Delaware, which provided that "no person hereafter imported from Africa ought to be held in slavery under any pretence whatever," and that "no negro, Indian, or mulatto slave is to be brought into this State for sale from any part of the world." In Massachusetts, an attempt had been made previously to the Revolution to test the legality of slavery, but it did not result in emancipation. In 1777, however, a prize ship with several slaves on board was brought into the port of Salem by a privateer. The slaves were advertised for sale, but the General Court ordered them to be set at liberty. The declaration inserted in the Massachusetts Bill of Rights that "all men are born free and equal" was construed by the Supreme Court of that State to prohibit slavery. This position was sustained in 1783. A similar clause in the second Constitution of New Hampshire was construed by the courts of that State in the same way. An Act of Pennsylvania in 1780 forbade the introduction of slaves, and gave freedom to all persons thereafter born in the State. Four years later, the Pennsylvania enactment was substantially adopted by Connecticut and Rhode Island. In 1778 the Virginia Assembly, on motion of Thomas Jefferson, prohibited the further introduction of slaves, and in 1782 a colonial statute, which forbade emancipations, except for meritorious services, was repealed. This repeal remained in force for ten years, during which emancipations were numerous. In 1783 Maryland followed Virginia in prohibiting the further introduction of slaves and in removing the restraints on emancipation.

At this period, indeed, condemnations of slavery, considered as an institution, were wellnigh as frequent and forcible in the South (except in South Carolina and Georgia) as in the North. Jefferson pronounced it "a perpetual exercise of the most unremitting despotism on the one part and degrading submission on the other." Patrick Henry wrote: "Would any one believe that I am a master of slaves of my own purchase? I am drawn along by the general inconvenience of living here without them. I will not—I cannot justify it. I believe a time will come when an opportunity will be offered to abolish this lamentable evil. Everything we can do is to improve the opportunity, if it happens in our day; if not, let us transmit to our descendants, together with our slaves, a pity for their unhappy lot, and an abhorrence of slavery." Washington said that "it was among his first wishes to see some plan adopted by which slavery might be abolished by law." It is true that in North Carolina the Assembly of 1777, on account of the troubles occasioned by freedmen, reenacted essentially an old law restricting emancipation by making it necessary for the owner to obtain the consent of the county courts. In 1786, however, an act was passed declaring the introduction of slaves into the State to be of evil consequences and highly impolitic, and imposing a duty of £5 a head upon all future importations.

Worthy, also, of the careful attention which it receives in the concluding chapter is the treatment of religion in the several State Constitutions. The Church of England, to which the majority of the Loyalists belonged, lost by the Revolution the official establishment which it had possessed in the Southern colonies, and the official countenance and privileges which had been accorded to it in New York and New Jersey. The second Constitution of South Carolina made the "Christian Protestant religion" the established religion of that State. All persons professing faith in God and a future life were tolerated, while if in addition they held Christianity to be the one inspired religion they might form churches of their own, which would be entitled to be admitted as parts of the establishment. The Constitution of Maryland authorized the Assembly of that State to levy a "general and equal tax" for the support of the Christian religion. The Constitutions of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia provided that no man should be required to attend any church or to pay an ecclesiastical tax against his will. The Constitution of Virginia ignored the subject of religion, but it came up in the first meeting of the Assembly. The Episcopalians were in the ascendancy in that body, although they had become a minority of the people. It was therefore only after a warm contest that the advocates of doing away with the old disabling acts succeeded in legalizing all forms of worship, and in releasing the Dissenters from paying parish rates and in having their collection suspended until the next session.

In 1779 such rates were entirely abrogated by the Assembly. The Religious Freedom act of 1785 did away with all religious tests in Virginia. The Constitutions of New York, Delaware and Maryland disqualified priests and ministers from holding civil office. Georgia would not permit them to be members of the Assembly. The Constitution of Maryland prohibited gifts for pious purposes, excepting grants of land not exceeding two acres each as sites for churches and churchyards.

We observe, lastly, that the prejudice against the Catholic religion cropped out in the Constitutions of New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, which required the chief State officials to be Protestants. Massachusetts and Maryland required all office-holders to profess their belief in the Christian religion. South Carolina prescribed belief in a future state of rewards and punishments; North Carolina and Pennsylvania, acknowledgment of the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments; Delaware, belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. The French alliance had much to do with lessening prejudice against Catholicism. In 1784 Rhode Island set an example of liberality in this particular by repealing its law withholding the suffrage from Catholics. In all the States the Colonial laws for the preservation of the sanctity of the Sabbath were continued.

M. W. H.

## A GREAT AFRICAN MISSIONARY.

### Beneficent Influence of Francois Coillard, Who Saved Serpa Pinto's Life.

News has just come from Africa of the death of François Coillard, a French Protestant missionary and one of the best known men in Africa. Perhaps no other missionary has ever wielded among the African natives so great an influence as he.

It came in his way once to save the life of a distinguished explorer, and all explorers who ever visited him have praised him to the skies in their books. These are the reasons why Coillard has of late years been better known in all civilized lands than any other missionary in Africa.

When Serpa Pinto went home to Portugal and wrote about his great journey across Africa he said that he owed his life to this missionary and Mrs. Coillard. No African traveller was ever in a more distressful plight than Serpa Pinto was when Coillard came to his relief.

The Portuguese explorer had pushed inland from the west coast to the Barotse country near the headwaters of the Zambesi. One day his 150 porters suddenly deserted him to a man.

They took with them all his resources and left him stripped in the heart of Africa. A feeling of compassion for the poor stranger induced two men and two women to do what they could for him in their rude way.

The man was dying in the wilderness when Coillard and his wife happened by the merest chance to come into that neighborhood. That chance saved Pinto's life.

The missionaries were travelling in an ox cart, and the cart became a small hospital. It was the only place where they could put the sick man, and here he was nursed back to health.

Mrs. Coillard lavished the most assiduous attention upon him and she and her husband watched by his side night and day till care and rest and better diet brought about a happy change in mind and body. They helped him on his way when his strength was restored, and we owe it to them that he lived to write one of the great books of African exploration.

The best work that Coillard did for Africa was through the influence he gained when he won the perfect confidence and friendship of Lewanika, the King of Barotse. The country governed by this black potentate is larger than Uganda or any other present native kingdom of Africa, excepting Abyssinia. Lewanika's word is law throughout his domain. His policy is permeated through and through with European ideas, and he got them all from Coillard.

The young missionary stood for two years at the doors of Lewanika knocking for admittance and the King kept him out. At last, won over by his persistency, gentleness and tact, the King admitted him to the country, and in the course of time the Frenchman became a power in the land. Every one says so who has ever been to Lialui, the King's capital.

Major Gibbons, the latest to write about these two men, says that "the lofty character and impressive personality of Coillard finally obliterated the harsh side of Lewanika's character and developed a certain liberality of sentiment and a laudable desire to raise his people to a higher scale of civilization."

When Lewanika attended the coronation of King Edward VII. he said he wanted more white teachers for the children of his country and more carpenters to show his people how to build houses. The civilization that has become a reality in Mashonaland and Matabeleland has also obtained a substantial foothold in Barotseland, and the man to whose influence this change is chiefly due was the humble missionary, Coillard.

He lived for thirty years in Barotseland and died at the age of 70 at the King's capital.

## MANUFACTURE OF ANTIQUES.

### Flourishing Industry, Archæologist Says, in Wisconsin.

*From the Milwaukee Sentinel.*

"The manufacture of imitation antiques, especially in the form of copper and flint implements, is quite a prominent industry in Wisconsin, in spite of the fact that it is forced to flourish secretly and that the Wisconsin Archæological Society is doing all in its power to put an end to these frauds," said H. J. Crosby, president of the State archæologists yesterday.

"We have been able to locate a number of men throughout the State who have made a business of manufacturing these imitations, and we have recently secured the promise of one of the men in the interior part of the State that he will go out of the business.

"A blacksmith is almost always connected with the fraud, although he may not be the originator of the plan. He hammers out the copper implements at his forge and then they are treated with chemicals or buried in a river bed to give them the appearance of age. Then they are buried, and after a little it becomes necessary to plough up the field where they are hidden, and the manufacturer hires a man to do the ploughing and incidentally to find the recently manufactured antiquities. This is necessary, as the members of the society require the name of the finder before purchasing the article.

"One man north of this city has done an extensive business, and the large number of the same kind of implements found by him aroused our suspicions. Then the majority of them get in too much of a hurry and do not wait for the chemicals to work properly, and this gives them away. Mistakes are also made by the men who make antiquities out of flint. As a rule they have no scientific knowledge, and they pound the flint into shapes never dreamed of by the Indians.

"The great objection to these imitations is that they get into really fine collections. Perhaps the collector buys them knowing that they are fine imitations, but when he dies, unless his cabinet is labelled, the imitations are sold as genuine, and it is important for scientific investigation that this should be avoided. The new law will aid the society in putting an end to these frauds, who are to be found in all parts of the State and many of whom have been located."