

SOME NEW BOOKS.

The Colonies of Spain.

The questions: Why and how did Spain lose her colonial possessions in the Old World and the New, are answered in a first volume, entitled 'The Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy, by Rear Admiral FREDERICK CHADWICK, U. S. N. (Charles Scribner's Sons). It is a relevant record of doings in diplomacy from 1763 to 1898. The second volume will set forth doings in actual war after Congress had ordered in the name of Spain an armed intervention in Cuban affairs. The book is an outcome, the author tells us, of his study of the causes of that war. He began with the intention of presenting those causes in a single chapter preliminary to the war record, but found them so many and intricate as to require a separate volume. The colonial relation of Spain to the United States and the diplomatic intercourse of the two nations with each other have been heretofore described by lawyers, diplomats and historians, but not till now by a naval officer. Admiral Chadwick has had adequate professional training and experience for making the publication. Besides customary service afloat and ashore in the several grades of his profession, he had seven years of study and observation as Naval Officer attached to the American Embassy in London. He was Chief of Staff of Admiral Sampson during the war with Spain. During three years he was president of the Naval War College at Newport.

I.

An introduction to the volume describes in a striking way so much of the beginnings of Spain, her constituent kingdoms—differing in race, lineage and religion—as should form a basis for the opinions which the author expresses regarding the causes of her loss of colonies, the acquisition of which followed discoveries by Columbus. Those familiar with Macaulay's essay on "The War of the Succession in Spain" will recall the sentences in which, after describing the empire of Philip II, as at one time "undoubtedly one of the most powerful in the world," he exclaims: "But how art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! How art thou cut down to the ground, that didst weaken the nations! If we overleap a hundred years and look at Spain toward the close of the seventeenth century, what a change do we find! The vast possessions, acquired not by Spanish effort, but brought to her by Charles V. as German Emperor, were, in the opinion of Admiral Chadwick, the primal cause of her subsequent ruin and poverty. During that sixteenth century the New World was as to foreigners in the exclusive possession of Spain and Portugal, but in 1580 the last named State, which had acquired Madeira, the Azores, had doubled the Cape of Good Hope and made settlements in Brazil and in India, was annexed to Spain, and held by Philip II, till, shorn of her glory, she was in 1640 released by the efforts of England. Thus during the time written of by Macaulay Spain was sole possessor of those vast dominions in Europe, Asia and America, sketched by his brilliant pen.

Lord Mahon said in his "History of the War of the Succession in Spain"—which Macaulay reviewed in his essay—that the foundations of the power and grandeur of Spain under Philip II. were undermined by "bigotry and despotism." And yet his volume was written to show that Louis XIV. "by several unprovoked and unnecessary wars wrested from Spain many most valuable possessions," and that the alliance between Austria, Holland and England against the purposes of France in Spain resulted in a dozen years of war by those allies against France and Spain and ended in the Treaty of Utrecht, which compelled Spain to cede to England Gibraltar and Minorca, and to the House of Austria the sovereignty of the Netherlands, Milan, and Sardinia—nearly one-half of the Spanish monarchy in Europe.

In both the Americas Spain led in the settlement and occupation of the territories for the discovery of which Columbus pointed the way. Thereby she became the original granter of the basic title from that of the original thirteen States down to Porto Rico and the Philippines. Spain led her colonial possessions in part no doubt by "bigotry and despotism" and bad government of the colonists, but Admiral Chadwick shows that loss also came of the wars begun by outsiders, which she did not provoke excepting by such bad government. If Spain acquired and held colonies in order to extract revenue therefrom, so three centuries ago did other colonizing nations in western Europe. Why and how did England lose her thirteen colonies in North America and retain Canada? If European nations did not treat their colonies as "a part" but as mere properties or possessions of the acquiring State, so do we of the United States even now treat the "unincorporated" Philippines.

II.

Excepting Newfoundland, discovered in 1497 by John Cabot, visited in 1500 by the Portuguese Cortereal and occupied in 1583 by Gilbert for Queen Elizabeth, Spain was alone in North America at the close of the reign of Philip II. Nova Scotia, discovered in 1497 by Cabot, was not occupied till 1604, and then by the French. England had in 1603 no possessions outside of her island. Her empire building in America began at Jamestown in 1607 and at Plymouth Rock in 1620. Her navy did not take definite form till 1689.

Earlier landed in Canada in 1534 and took possession in the name of the King of France. In the same year the "English began at Jamestown. Champlain began at Quebec that marvellous career by which her flag was borne up the St. Lawrence to the Great Lakes, and in the hands of La Salle down the length of the Mississippi. France derived a valid title to its basin and that of the St. Lawrence. Soon came, in the Seven Years War, the desperate struggle between France and England for the New World. The preliminary treaty of Paris ended it by the cession to England of all French possessions in North America save a few islands and a small French colony in Louisiana. England took Florida in exchange for Havana and its prosperity began. That defeat by

England in 1763-65 France avenged twenty years later by aiding the thirteen revolting American colonies, and by the cession of Louisiana to the United States twenty years afterward. The rivalries and animosities between France and England were the making of the United States and the unmaking of Spain. In the same year the King of France died of pure love and affection, as he declared in the deed, ceded forever to his cousin the King of Spain all the country known as Louisiana.

It was her Louisiana discovery and settlement in 1683 that brought France to the front in the southwest of North America. Ceded to Spain in 1762, retroceded to France in 1800 and sold finally by Napoleon to Jefferson in 1803, she doubled the territorial area of the United States and gave to them a progeny of States so numerous that it is not easy for one to mention them offhand. At that point Admiral Chadwick begins the body of his work. "Spain came in 1762," says the author, "into the greatest potential heritage with which a nation was ever endowed. Her possessions included three-fourths the habitable parts of North and South America, the richest and greatest islands of the West Indies were hers, she stretched from frozen north to frozen south through 110 degrees of latitude, holding within her grasp the richest mines then known of the world, and far richer which were yet to be discovered. Never had race or nation such opportunities. But this great estate was in her hands to use it; the gift from France of half a continent was in itself a cause of terror and foreboding, as bringing Spain into direct and hated contact with the Anglo-Saxon, a contact she had hoped to avoid through the continuance of a buffer state under the dominion of France."

The shock caused by the invasion of Spain and Portugal by Napoleon in the beginning of the nineteenth century started, like an alpenstock blow by an Alpine climber, an avalanche that gave a release of Central and South America from transatlantic control and left to Spain only Cuba and Porto Rico among the islands, and Florida on the mainland of the United States. That last title of Florida to Spain was surrendered by the United States in 1819, ratification of which was so delayed by Ferdinand VII. in the vain hope, among other things, of putting off, perhaps recognition of the independence of the South American republics, that the cession was not completed till 1821.

What causes inflicted on Spain such colonial losses? Did similar ones affect France? Were they avoidable in executing European colonial theories of two centuries ago? With one or two trifling exceptions, the group of islands in the West Indies, extending in a crescent shape from Florida to Venezuela, and almost making an inland sea of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, were settled and colonized by Spain early in the seventeenth century, but eleven years ago, when the American-Spanish war began, only two—Cuba and Porto Rico—were held by her. The Bahama group, stretching from Hayti to Florida, were taken by the English, and after various vicissitudes were ceded to England in 1783 by the peace of Versailles. Cromwell seized Jamaica in 1655. He said to his last Parliament:

"Why, truly, your great enemy is the Spaniard. He is a natural enemy. He is naturally so; he is naturally so throughout by reason of that enmity that is in him against whatsoever is of God. . . . An enemy is put into him by God."

Trinidad, first Spanish, then Dutch, then French, was finally English in 1797. Throughout the life there was a general hostility of the inhabitants against France, Holland and England. The islands changed hands either by conquest or by ceasants the results of wars in Europe. One or two gained independence. The islands were no doubt wretchedly held by Spain when held by her "for revenue only," but was that bad government of the inhabitants the chief cause of many transfers and changes in rulers? Porto Rico alone remained undisturbed and seemingly contented. It was not an object of the successful cupidity of European nations, or American filibusters. Why was it? There was no revolt in the island against Spain. It was attacked and seized by us in war as was our right. We had no quarrel with Porto Rico, and yet without consulting the inhabitants we annexed the island after peace with Spain had come, even although President McKinley had said in his first annual message that "forcible annexation" of Cuba would "by our code of morality" be "criminal aggression." Cuba, on the other hand, suffered the destruction of Havana by the French in 1538, and again in 1554. The English captured it, as we have seen, in 1762, and ceded it to Spain by the treaty which closed the Seven Years War.

III.

The first chapter of Admiral Chadwick's narrative unfolds the attitude of Spain during the revolt of the thirteen colonies against England. He denies that Spain was an ally in the achievement of their purposes. Her inner motive was to so weaken England that Spain could recover Gibraltar. He dwells on the experience of Mr. Jay in Madrid in 1780, and sympathizes with the view that while France and Spain aided the British colonies in gaining independence both were willing to see them confined between the Atlantic and the Alleghenies. He thinks that France was then seeking from Spain a retrocession of Louisiana. Hence the American and British negotiators of the treaties of peace of 1783-85 worked behind the backs of France and Spain contrary to the instructions of the American Congress.

The second chapter describes the discontent of Kentucky and Tennessee with the condition in which peace with England had left them regarding navigation of the Mississippi and access to the Gulf of Mexico, and the happy issue out of their troubles by the Pinckney-Godoy treaty of 1795 between the United States and Spain, which nearly a century later played so important a part in Cuban affairs. Then comes a most interesting chapter on the cession of Louisiana to France in 1800, and three years later its sale by Napoleon to Jefferson. If the acquisition of Florida, the consequent loss of Texas, its subsequent reannexation and the Mexican War led up to the war of secession, there are now probably few American regrets for the present or the future.

Admiral Chadwick gives scant praise to Jefferson. Indeed he gives him none. He is convinced that the project of the sale of Louisiana to us came unasked from Napoleon, who fancied he was giving to the United States a troublesome acquisition, which we have not found vexing, unless the enactment and repeal of the "Missouri Compromise Line" and the consequences in 1861 gave to it that character. Our memories of the efforts of Napoleon III. nearly half a

century ago to take over from the United States part of the Louisiana Purchase and reestablish in Mexico European dominion have been revived by Mr. Bigelow's "Retrospections." The Mississippi and the State at its mouth have had an eventful history at the hands of France since they first came into the ken of her explorers.

After the second chapter the author gives some eighty pages to a narrative of what went on after the acquisition of Louisiana for the cession of the Floridas. Then come the revolts from Spain and recognition of the independence of the Central and South American colonies, the Panama Congress which struck and founndered on slave labor, the Monroe Doctrine and its development, the Holy Alliance and Spain, the Lopez filibuster expedition against Cuba, the attitude of Fillmore's Administration against acquisition of the island on any terms, the proposal by England and France to the United States of a tripartite convention by which the three should guarantee Cuba to Spain forever, and the reply of Mr. Everett and almost universal commendation thereof alike by Whigs and Democrats; the marked change of public opinion in the elections of 1852 regarding the acquisition of Cuba, the opinions of Pierce and the conduct of Marcy, the unceasing activity of Buchanan in its favor while Secretary of State under Polk, Minister at London and President; the episode of Soule, the "Ostend manifesto" and Marcy's stinging sarcasm in repudiation of both which drove Soule into retirement from Madrid, but the force of which on public opinion was obscured by the nomination of Buchanan, the first signer of the "manifesto," as the Democratic candidate for President; the threatened Africanization of Cuba by England or France or both in 1854, and the Quitman filibuster expedition against the island in that year. Those several topics bring the author's narrative down to our civil war.

The value of Admiral Chadwick's labors is not only in the new facts he presents from Spanish and American sources, obtained since publication of the latest continuous history of the same period, but in the assembling and publishing in the edition of both which are authorities and transcripts from official papers to be found only in numerous books not of easy access to the casual student.

IV.

A stranger to American history, reading the volume for the first time, might receive the impression that the United States did from the beginning insist on the "Monroe Doctrine" in regard to Cuba, long before it was formulated in 1823, as meaning that no part of the American continent was then open to acquisition of title by occupation or colonization, and that the United States considered the exclusion of both European and European colonies in North America were England and Russia, both of which denied President Monroe's colonization exclusion. Spain had by the treaty of 1819 ceded to the United States all that the former had north of the forty-second parallel, and Mexico had the remainder of Spain's possessions. The United States and England were in a dispute closed in 1849, to the disadvantage of the United States, growing out of the discovery and occupation of territory in the northwest.

Early in 1808 President Jefferson wrote that "we shall be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence, but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, especially of the former." That tone characterized subsequently all official utterances by the United States. The fate of Cuba from the beginning to the end seems to have been an object of anxiety in Washington. Had it not been for intervention by the younger Adams, to which Admiral Chadwick (page 384) makes allusion, Cuba might in that day have escaped from the thralldom of Spain. While this or that party, or certain groups of individuals, might now and then deplore enlargement of national boundaries, the record seems to show that acquisition of Cuba was all along generally desired. The silent stipulation, forced by an English Tory Government into the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, had done its part, and so much slave labor gave added solicitude and sectional partisanship to the Cuban problem. Cuba became a burning question in our politics till displaced by the war of secession, when a general desire to acquire the island ceased.

V.

The prefatory remarks with which Admiral Chadwick begins the story of the ten years Cuban insurrection of 1868-78 contain new and interesting matter relative to the contemporaneous revolution in the peninsula, which sent Queen Isabella to France as a fugitive, made Gen. Serrano head of the provisional Government and Gen. Prim, both military politicians, President of the Council and head of the army. Prim had for many years suggested the sale of Cuba, for a price, to the United States. He declared to the Cortes that the revolution in the peninsula was not responsible for insurgency in Cuba, "which is due," he said, "to the errors of past Governments." He promised an end of slave labor. He sent a new Captain-General to carry out his liberal ideas. Gen. Dulce began by executing that policy in Cuba. He proclaimed an amnesty to all political offenders and a cessation of prosecutions for political offences, and included therein all those in insurrection who within forty days laid down their arms. That liberal action was strangely enough the ultimate cause of his own undoing, of the ten years of sanguinary strife in Cuba and of sharp diplomatic conflict between Washington and Madrid.

The Cuban population was about a million and a half. Two-thirds were negroes, Chinese and those of mixed blood. Of the white inhabitants one-half could not read or write. The business men in the chief cities were chiefly Spaniards, immigrants from Spain or the Canaries and their sons. It has been said that there were some 20,000 persons holding certificates, more or less honest, of American naturalization by five years continued prior residence in the United States. The leaders of the revolt at Yara in the previous October represented the native Cubans, or Creoles, who aimed at independence of Spain. The predecessor of Dulce had only some 5,000 regular Spanish troops when the insurrection began. He called into service some 40,000 volunteers, made up, as the American Consul-General reported, of the worst elements of the Spanish (peninsula) part of the population. The better class of Spaniards organized in Madrid a Casino Español, with associated clubs in the cities. Those two dominated what was done to suppress the insurgency. The volunteers were densely ignorant of international law and the treaty of 1795 between the United States and Spain. Neither they nor the Spanish political

clubs wished or would tolerate liberal reforms or extinguishment of slavery or independence of Spain. Governor-General Dulce was within a month compelled to reverse his liberal policy and use vigorous military measures to suppress the revolt. Within another five weeks he issued a preposterous decree that vessels captured "on the high seas" and having on board men, arms and munitions of war or articles that could in any manner promote the insurrection, whatever their derivation or destination, should be treated as "pirates" in accordance with naval ordinances and all persons found thereon be "immediately" put to death. They who pushed on the decree had no perception of the definition of "pirates" in international law. If they thought thereof at all, they had in mind persons denounced as pirates by local Spanish laws. Other decrees followed forbidding in effect American owners of property in Cuba to alienate it without official supervision, and declaring that every man found away from his habitation without good cause should be shot, every unoccupied house burned and every occupied dwelling not flying a white flag be reduced to ashes.

Finally, in order to cut off the obtaining of money with which to buy munitions of war and supplies for the insurgents, seizures were ordered and made of property in the island of all owners, then residents in Cuba or anywhere else, who aided the insurrection. The pretence was that the revolt would come to an end if the insurgents could not get without the aid of the United States. Those who compelled the decree fancied that a civil commotion or insurgency, which Spain denied was belligerency, had obliterated as to the United States the law of nations and the treaty of 1795. The Governor-General, holding supreme power, could seize in Cuban waters any vessel and on land any property violating his decrees, but the volunteers and the clubs did not know or care to know that, if the vessels or properties were owned by citizens of the United States, he must proceed against them, and their owners in the ordinary courts according to the stipulations of the treaty of 1795. The volunteers and the clubs cared as little for Madrid as for Washington. They were financial supporters of the United States in Washington and Madrid to write thereon long diplomatic notes. Many thousands of dollars as damage for seizures were paid by Spain to the United States, but similar seizures were repeated. Madrid seemed powerless in her own island. There was, as Admiral Chadwick says, a double revolt in Cuba. The Government at Madrid thought it controlled the Governor-General, but the power behind the palace in Havana was the Casino Español and the volunteers. The Ministry and the Cortes took as little interest in and knew as little of the goings on in Cuba as our own Executive and Congress know of current events in the Philippines. The result was that notwithstanding these brutal decrees Dulce was in a short time superseded by Weyler. Their monstrous illegality was never denied. The endeavor at Madrid was to extenuate them or postpone decision.

Spain denied that the island insurgency in Cuba was international belligerency and the United States acquiesced. Had she conceded belligerent rights other nations might have followed. Had she instituted and maintained an adequate naval blockade of the island she could have arrested on the ocean filibusters intending to violate it and carried them into her ports for prize adjudication. She insisted that instead of herself guarding Cuban shores the United States police the Atlantic coast and prevent the departure not only of hostile expeditions against Cuba, but of munitions of war sent in a commercial way. The United States used "due diligence" in the disagreeable duty. That is shown by the failure of Spain to present any formulated reclamations for failure.

There were indications in the results of the Hague conference of 1907 that either by declarations of what the law of nations requires or by special treaties the rights and duties of a friendly State when insurrection exists in another State should be more definitely fixed, and especially in regard to the sale or exportation or supply by individuals to either of the parties of military articles. That a neutral State or Government, which supplies war material to either side, "goes without saying." But what may individuals do, and what restraint is the neutral State in which they are residents bound to exercise? During the last Hague conference there were treaties signed by the delegates from the United States and ratified by the Senate regarding neutral rights and duties in war on land and sea, but the position of individuals was not fixed in its entirety. Concentration and devastation on land were, for example, not specifically mentioned, nor were military expeditions at sea. Prevention of supply by a neutral individual of things useful to an army or fleet was, said the conference, not required of a neutral Government, but nothing was included in the Hague treaties that touched on such supplies intended to be the means or part of a military expedition. That is the critical and troublesome point. The United States will, it is to be hoped, be permanently a neutral, but what bearing will the Hague treaties have on neutral States in the far East if unhappily the Government at Washington shall confront a formidable insurrection in the Philippines?

If a war now threatened shall exist in Central America our producers and vendors of munitions of war will, it is to be expected, supply them for use by one side or the other, or both sides. Prohibitions will be as difficult to enforce as tariff exclusion of imports which our people seek.

Mr. Fish, weary at last of doing police duty along 5,400 miles of coast, of sending complaints and protests to Madrid and receiving only extenuations and vain excuses, wrote to Mr. Cushing the then famous "No. 266," saying in effect that Spain must immediately put order into Cuba or concede its independence. A copy of "No. 266" was sent to the Ministers of the United States at London, Paris, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Rome, who were directed to read it confidentially, or orally give its substance, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and assure him of the President's sincere desire for peace in Cuba and of his opinion that the good offices of the European Powers in the way of urging an end to the Cuban insurrection would be better than to explain the situation. He called into service some 40,000 volunteers, made up, as the American Consul-General reported, of the worst elements of the Spanish (peninsula) part of the population. The better class of Spaniards organized in Madrid a Casino Español, with associated clubs in the cities. Those two dominated what was done to suppress the insurgency. The volunteers were densely ignorant of international law and the treaty of 1795 between the United States and Spain. Neither they nor the Spanish political

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Government having given assurance that the insurrection would soon be suppressed, she was not inclined to go further. Austria made no formal answer, but her disinclination was visible in the official newspapers of Vienna. Russia and Italy were more favorable to the wishes of President Grant. After having thus sounded the great European Powers Mr. Fish did not further urge pacific intervention, nor did the President deem it expedient to submit to Congress a project of armed intervention. The publicity in Spain and in Europe excited into conditions in Cuba a profound, however good result in another way. The Carlist revolts in the peninsula having been suppressed by the energies of Generals Campos and Jovellar, Señor Canovas, then the Prime Minister, forthwith fixed his attention on Cuba. Jovellar was sent to the island as Governor-General, with Campos as commander in chief of the large armies hurried forward. The Casino Español and the volunteers on the one hand and the revolution on the other hand were vigorously grappled with, and before long there was relative peace in Cuba and a revived prosperity which continued for seventeen years.

Admiral Chadwick emphasizes the fact that Mr. Fish, by permission of the President, kept in his own hands and without legislative interference the entire conduct of the Cuban affairs, and with Great Britain, growing out of the Alabama claims. A series of arbitrations adjusted and extinguished all then existing grievances between Washington and London. Happier results in the British Foreign Office than in 1875 thus came in 1898, when differences between the United States and Spain regarding Cuba again became acute.

VI.

Admiral Chadwick offers to his readers a varied assortment of opinions of publicists, economists, historians and partisan leaders, American, Spanish and Cuban, regarding the causes of the second revolt, which had from the outset more strength and violence in Cuba, more financial support in the United States, and more vigorous resistance than had its predecessor seventeen years before.

It is not suggested that the Government at Washington promoted the second insurgency unless by the duty laid on sugar in 1894. Mr. Olney expressed the opinion that the previous insurrection was not conquered by Spain, but yielded to her promises of political reform in the island which were not fulfilled. The new revolt caused the loss to Spain of her colonies in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

The question returns: "How and why was it?" Did Spain lose those colonies because she had not educated, disciplined and trained them to habits of self-government nor permitted the exercise thereof? If, because of proprietary interests, she had nationalized the property of Cuba from Madrid, suppression of individualism and self-government, does there emerge any warning voice for our own Congress (1-1 day)?

Although in the seventeen years interval of comparative repose Cuban sugar and tobacco estates prospered and trade with the United States increased, yet there were signs of preparation for a new uprising with a financial and military base in New York. When it came new men were in power and new diplomatic agents in Washington and Madrid. Since Mr. Cushing left the last named capital in 1877 there had been nine different Ministers to Spain from the United States, some of them acquainted with the country, its public men and its quickly changing political skies, and as many changes of Spanish diplomatic agents in Washington. Both countries found it convenient to conduct diplomatic affairs with fresh agents as dynasties and party power rose and fell. In natural consequence there began in 1895 a beating of the old straw. Complaints and replies were much the same as before. The language of diplomatic notes varied, but premises and arguments did not. The treaty of 1795, the statute of 1818 and the law of nations were expounded on both sides as if recent creations. Few new rules of conduct were evolved. It had, however, come to be seen in Washington that, if an end of fighting in Cuba was sought, recognition of belligerency could not be a useful instrument for that. Spain renewed expression of her grievance because of the doings of the Cuban junta in New York, of honors paid in the United States to rebels against her rule in Cuba, of derogatory comments on that rule in speeches at our public meetings and in our newspapers. It was difficult for the State Department to meet successfully all complaints. When it pleaded that Congress had not imparted to the Executive adequate power of prevention Spain referred to what the United States had replied to England during the war of secession regarding better municipal laws.

The Spanish Minister complained, for example, that at the State Department of the sale of lottery tickets in Key West to obtain filibustering money. The Department explained that no Federal laws authorized the President or the Federal courts to stop such sales, and referred the Minister to the State of Florida. The fundamental law of our political liberties forbade Congress to abridge freedom of speech and of the press. The Spanish Government and its public men could not be protected from a kind of criticism freely written on our own. Members of the Cuban junta in New York could only there be punished for violation of the laws of that State or of the Congress. They could not be arrested for violation of the statute of 1818, unless they were found in some one made a complaint on oath and offered satisfactory evidence of an offence committed. Mere diplomatic representations from Madrid were insufficient. To do all that Spain asked was therefore impossible without a radical change of our political institutions, a disregard of our established code of criminal procedure and an overthrow of our legislative independence.

In that aspect Spain's complaint and remonstrance did take a new form during the second revolt. Señor Gullon, Spanish Minister of State, took advantage in October, 1897, of the earliest professions of special friendship for Spain, made by the McKinley Administration when urging an end to the Cuban insurrection, to explain the situation. He called into service some 40,000 volunteers, made up, as the American Consul-General reported, of the worst elements of the Spanish (peninsula) part of the population. The better class of Spaniards organized in Madrid a Casino Español, with associated clubs in the cities. Those two dominated what was done to suppress the insurgency. The volunteers were densely ignorant of international law and the treaty of 1795 between the United States and Spain. Neither they nor the Spanish political

clubs wished or would tolerate liberal reforms or extinguishment of slavery or independence of Spain. Governor-General Dulce was within a month compelled to reverse his liberal policy and use vigorous military measures to suppress the revolt. Within another five weeks he issued a preposterous decree that vessels captured "on the high seas" and having on board men, arms and munitions of war or articles that could in any manner promote the insurrection, whatever their derivation or destination, should be treated as "pirates" in accordance with naval ordinances and all persons found thereon be "immediately" put to death. They who pushed on the decree had no perception of the definition of "pirates" in international law. If they thought thereof at all, they had in mind persons denounced as pirates by local Spanish laws. Other decrees followed forbidding in effect American owners of property in Cuba to alienate it without official supervision, and declaring that every man found away from his habitation without good cause should be shot, every unoccupied house burned and every occupied dwelling not flying a white flag be reduced to ashes.

Finally, in order to cut off the obtaining of money with which to buy munitions of war and supplies for the insurgents, seizures were ordered and made of property in the island of all owners, then residents in Cuba or anywhere else, who aided the insurrection. The pretence was that the revolt would come to an end if the insurgents could not get without the aid of the United States. Those who compelled the decree fancied that a civil commotion or insurgency, which Spain denied was belligerency, had obliterated as to the United States the law of nations and the treaty of 1795. The Governor-General, holding supreme power, could seize in Cuban waters any vessel and on land any property violating his decrees, but the volunteers and the clubs did not know or care to know that, if the vessels or properties were owned by citizens of the United States, he must proceed against them, and their owners in the ordinary courts according to the stipulations of the treaty of 1795. The volunteers and the clubs cared as little for Madrid as for Washington. They were financial supporters of the United States in Washington and Madrid to write thereon long diplomatic notes. Many thousands of dollars as damage for seizures were paid by Spain to the United States, but similar seizures were repeated. Madrid seemed powerless in her own island. There was, as Admiral Chadwick says, a double revolt in Cuba. The Government at Madrid thought it controlled the Governor-General, but the power behind the palace in Havana was the Casino Español and the volunteers. The Ministry and the Cortes took as little interest in and knew as little of the goings on in Cuba as our own Executive and Congress know of current events in the Philippines. The result was that notwithstanding these brutal decrees Dulce was in a short time superseded by Weyler. Their monstrous illegality was never denied. The endeavor at Madrid was to extenuate them or postpone decision.

Cuba. Mr. Olney wrote to the Spanish Minister in Washington that "the right of Spain, as of every other sovereign State, to expel aliens need not be discussed," but he did complain and demand redress for the "harsh, unreasonable and oppressive" method of expulsion. There was not during either of the Cuban insurrections any law of Congress for the eviction of obnoxious aliens. The power of Congress to evict aliens is undisputed, but whether it can expel citizens of the United States or of other States, is another and very different question. Perhaps a clearer conception of that Spanish view can be had if we conceive of a revolt against the United States in the Philippines as formidable as was that in Cuba, and conspirators therein, as efficient as the Cuban junta in New York, resident in Tokio, doing the things against the United States which the junta in New York did against Spain. Neither the law of nations nor the Hague conference has as yet specifically dealt with such conditions when international war is nonexistent.

More than a year after the insurrection began Mr. Olney tendered to Spain the friendly offices of the United States for its suppression. They were refused, until the rebels had laid down their arms. He quite sternly admonished the Spanish Minister at Washington that there must be a complete pacification of Cuba. Spain was then distinctly and almost brusquely told that the President did not seek to put an end to her sovereignty over Cuba, but to obtain autonomy for the Cubans. Mr. Dupuy de Lôme was either unable to receive the intended impression or to transfer it to his Government. That was in April, 1898. Possibly Spain did realize the peril of Cuba and Spanish delusions respecting the relative superiority of the naval forces of the two countries, and hope of aid from the naval European Powers may account for refusal by the Government at Madrid to heed, then and there, the admonition and warning by Mr. Olney which, had they been heeded quickly, would have prevented the loss of Cuba and the Philippines and might have retained a limited Spanish suzerainty over Cuba.

In the next June the Republican national convention that nominated Mr. McKinley for the Presidency expressed its "best hopes" for the "full success" of the insurgents and declared that the United States should "actively" use its influence to give "independence" to the island. Had Spain been at that time adequately served in the United States by her diplomatic and consular agents she should have discerned, after the result of the Presidential and Congress campaign was known, that the fate of Cuba had been decided. The Bryan minority party was in accord with the present Secretary of State. Petitions were filed claiming some sixty millions of dollars as damages inflicted by the orders of Gen. Weyler or by the insurgents. The Attorney-General filed a demurrer to the effect that the claimants could not recover even if all they said in their petitions were true. He argued to the commission that it must take judicial notice that the insurrection passed from that first "beyond the control" of Spain; that it was not liable for the damages inflicted by the insurgents, nor for consequences of the Weyler order, unless the injuries were unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted. The United States was, he said, before the commission in the place of Spain. He insisted that under the President Lincoln there were similar acts of devastation by secession, and Sheridan in the case of secession, and under President McKinley by Bell in the Philippines. The opinion of President McKinley had not, he contended, expressed the law of nations. The commission by three to two sustained the Attorney-General's contention and the claimants had no award. It was cruelly pathetic that claimants holding certificates of American naturalization, who had all along asserted that the revolt in Cuba was "beyond control" by Spain, were thus beaten by their own affirmations. The Hague conference of 1907 obtained from an expression of its opinion on the Sherman, Sheridan, Weyler and Bell method of devastation in war to cripple the resources of an enemy or from formulating a new rule.

Admiral Chadwick has apparently been so desirous to permit a side in the Cuban controversy to display themselves in his volume that his reproduction of long despatches is an impediment to a general reader who does not care for minute details, but the book is thus a painstaking and complete compendium of facts not accessible regarding events which culminated in war. Those facts are supplemented with valuable and helpful comments by the author. Students of history who wish accurate citations by volume and page will be grateful to him for the attention he has bestowed on that detail.

There is obscurity regarding the source of intervention at the Vatican to prevent secession. He refers (page 568) to Archbishop Ireland of Minnesota as the possible intervenor. If that shall be verified, the Archbishop should be able to throw needed light on the relation of President McKinley to that final and most touching effort for peace "at the request of the Holy Father, in Passion Week and in the name of Christ," which came so near success. Gen. Woodford has been reported as having said in a paper read in 1904 before the Hebrew Young People's Society of New York that "the independence of Cuba would have been obtained without war, had it not been for the destruction of the Maine, the De Lôme letter and the suggestion that the President had requested the Pope to tender his good offices to get Spain to grant an armistice." He added another Boston utterance already referred to.

Old Florentine Baptismal Font.

From the Youth's Companion. In the old baptistry at Florence—the baptistry with the wonderful bronze doors which Michael Angelo called "so beautiful that they were worthy to be the gates of Paradise"—most of the babies of Florence have been baptized for many hundred years. Almost any hour of any day you will find baptismal parties waiting before the font, with babies of every rank in life from the princely heir of a great house nearly smothered in costly laces and attended by a small army of attendants, and relatives, to the little creature dressed out in gaudy cotton and held in the arms of a solitary peasant woman.

No register of baptisms was kept in the very early days. The first record was made in this way, a certain priest called into his head to record the number of the number of children he baptized. Accordingly he put a white bean into a box for every boy and a black bean for every girl.

Later on records were carefully kept, and if one could look them over it would be a most interesting study, for probably the greater part of the painters, scholars, poets and soldiers who have made Florence famous received their names at the font of "my dear little Saint John"—as Dante called it.

VII.

The book before us affords ample evidence of the intelligent zeal and accurate forecast with which Gen. Woodford toiled in Madrid to prevent war and preserve peace. He accomplished successfully the work required of him by his superiors, but each concession he obtained from the Madrid Spanish Foreign Office brought to him from the Washington State Department a requirement for another. A critical time was in the months of February and March, 1898. On the fifteenth of the former month was the destruction of the Maine, and seven days before had been the publication of the offensive De Lôme letter written in the previous December. On the twentieth of the next month the State Department threatened Spain with turning of every thing over to Congress, which meant war. Five days thereafter the President sent his ultimatum to Madrid, which included an armistice until the next October, a revocation of reconcentration orders, and if his agreement came before October then, his own final arbitration. Gen.

Woodford reported to Washington that his first efforts to induce Spain to accept the President's terms had broken down over an armistice, although he had secured revocation of reconcentration, but our Minister at Madrid did not abandon hope. He begged the President for a little more time for further negotiations, and on the next day he cabled that the armistice sought had been granted by the Queen. But the President was not so readily convinced, and the result of Congress had the President had before it in full the pathetic cable message to himself, not to the State Department, pleading for peace and proclaiming an armistice in Cuba, sent by Gen. Woodford on the fifth of April must be a matter of conjecture.

Historians have often found it difficult to fix relative responsibility at the diplomatic turning point for precipitating war. Dispute yet exists whether or not Prince Bismarck by his editing of the famous Ems despatch of July, 1870, and giving out his version to be telegraphed over Europe goaded France to its declaration, six weeks after which she had neither a government, nor an army, nor an ostensible candidate for a new King of Spain. Admiral Chadwick refers to another new diplomatic feature of the second insurrection. It grew out of Gen. Weyler's orders of reconcentration and devastation in 1898, which Mr. Sherman, the Secretary of State, first denounced to the Spanish Minister at Washington in June of the next year, and on which the President in his annual message of 1897 poured his anathemas: "It was not civilized warfare! It was extermination!" That anathema had much to do with the subsequent armed intervention by Congress. The episode culminated after the treaty of peace in this way:

By the seventh article of the treaty which closed the war the two Governments relinquished all national and individual claims for indemnity against one another that may have arisen since 1898, when the second revolt began. In order further to protect Spain from those claims the United States stipulated to adjudicate and settle all valid claims that its citizens might have against Spain on that account. In execution of the stipulation Congress enacted on March 2, 1901, that a commission of five lawyers, selected by the President and confirmed by the Senate, be appointed to adjudicate said claims, "according to the merits of the several cases, the principles of equity and of international law." The statute further required that every claim be presented by petition, "pray judgment upon the facts and laws" and be served on the Attorney-General who was required to defend the United States and file a demurrer or answer. During the adjudication that officer was Mr. Knox, the present Secretary of State. Petitions were filed claiming some sixty millions of dollars as damages inflicted by the orders of Gen. Weyler or by the insurgents. The Attorney-General filed a demurrer to the effect that the claimants could not recover even if all they said in their petitions were true. He argued to the commission that it must take