SOME NEW BOOKS.

The Republican Tradition in Europe.

The subject treated by HERBERT A. L. FISHER of New College, Oxford, in *The Republican Tradition of Europe* (G. P. Putnam's Sons) is large, and he does not pretend to supply more than a bare outline of the course of republican thought and action from the downfall of the Roman Empire to the present day; but he feels that to an American audience, nurtured in the republican tradition of the New World, it may be interesting to learn at what epochs and within what limits and with what results a political ideal similar to their own has been an operative force in European politics.

I.

The political conditions of the Middle Ages were unfavorable to the growth of republican sentiment. The countries which were best ordered were those the extent of whose territory did not exceed the powers of a mediæval monarchy to control, such as Aragon, Sicily, England; and the advance of monarchy was a sure indication of national progress. Political thought is for the most part the product and not the cause of political conditions. Students of history remarked that the world had passed under a succession of empires, and in a sequence so constantly attested it was an instinct of theology to discover evidence of a polity plotted by God for the well being of man. Aristotle maintained that of all forms of government the most perfect was the rule of one good man, and the Christian teacher saw in the government of God both the pattern of the perfect monarchy and the exemplar expressly devised for the imitation of His human subjects. There can be no clearer proof of the strict limitations which the character of the mediæval polity imposed upon political speculation than the case of John Wycliffe. In the whole course of mediæval history few thinkers were bolder or were driven by the consecutive employment of a powerful understanding to more original conclusions. He anticipated all the main positions of Protestanism a century before Luther was born and a generation before the summoning of the first General Council for the reformation of the papacy. But he still conceived the world as organized in a feudal hierarchy. He dreamed of a society in which wealth and power would be strictly determined by moral qualities; but while he denied that a community organized on any other principle could possess an adequate moral sanction, he made no proposals for a political revolution, and cannot be included among European republicans.

II.

In Italy alone the political conditions helped to sustain the memories of the classical age. Venice slowly and by degrees shook itself free from Byzantine control and vied with Genoa in imperial enterprise. But the spirit and memory of the ancient republic were most clearly exhibited in the checkered and violent history of mediæval Rome, where in the middle of the twelfth and again in the middle of the fourteenth century attempts were made to revive the ancient Respublica Romanorum, by those picturesque figures, leaders of forlorn movements, Arnold of Brescia and Colo di Rienzo. But some four hundred years afterward Montesquieu made the just observation that the republics of Italy had done less to secure human liberty than the constitutional monarchy of England. In them liberty in the sense of political independence and class privilege was better understood than liberty in the sense of political toleration. To their spirit of jealous exclusion operating alike against rival factions, dependent cities, and the humblest elements of society, we trace the rise of the Italian despotisms. The free cities of the Middle Ages owe the loss of their liberties as much to the violence of their own inner discords as to the crimes or ambitions of the successful usurper. Nor is it possible to assert that the Italian genius flourished more abundantly in the fierce air of freedom than under the shelter of princely rule. At the end of the fifteenth century Florence, then the intellectual capital of Europe, suddenly threw off a despotism, expelled the Medici and adopted a popular constitution. For thirty years after that date (1494) the political fate of Florence was in the cauldron. The stormy republic of Savonarola and Soderini was followed in 1512 by a restoration of the Medici, and this in turn after fifteen restless and unquiet years by a brief, unsteady gust of liberty. Finally in 1530 the second Florentine republic succumbed to the overwhelming force of the imperial arms and the Medici ruled the State for some two hundred years upon a system which lasted until the French Revolution, and if the verdict of history is to count for anything it proves that the Medicean system rather than the republic was best suited to Florentine conditions. Yet it is only just to remember that the experiment of a free commonwealth was tried at a crisis of overwhelming difficulty and only overthrown by an unscrupulous league. The reasons why the republican form of government flourished in some parts of Italy and not in others, in Tuscany and Venice, and not in Naples, Lombardy or the Romagna, furnished matter for speculation. To the political philosopher of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Venice seemed to have solved the great riddle of statecraft; she alone of all the Italian States preserved her polity uninjured through every vicissitude. To the mind of Machiavelli and his contemporaries such stability was a sign not of weakness but of vigor and health. The notion that continuous change is a part of improvement, or that States must be always adjusting themselves to conditions which are in turn continually altering, was entirely foreign to that age.

III.

The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century was the great dissolvent of European conservatism. Yet the leaders of this great and comprehensive revolt were careful to mark their respect for the secular authority. Luther, who railed against the rebellious peasantry, was as peremptory in his defence of political obedience as Calvin, who dedicated his "Institutes" to Francis I., or William Tyndale, who wrote "The Obedience of the Christian Man." If European democracy owes much to the Protestant Reformation it owes nothing whatever to the direct teaching of the Protestant leaders.

One new republic emerged from the religious conflicts of the sixteenth century. The Dutch threw off the Spanish yoke, founded a new nation, broke away from the most powerful monarchy in Europe, and out of the nation grew an empire beyond the seas. Thomas Hobbes, who did not like republics, attributed some part of the English revolution to the admiration which London and other English trading towns had conceived for the prosperity of the Low Countries. But so far were the Dutch from desiring to found a republic that while Holland and Zealand insisted upon placing themselves under William of Orange, the remaining provinces invited the Duke of Anjou to step into the place of the King of Spain. The sovereignty of the Dutch provinces was offered in turn to the Hapsburg, Valois and Tudor houses, and in the institution of the Stadtholderate the Dutch found a means of gratifying something of that monarchical instinct which the tyranny of Spain had been unavailing to destroy. No great revolution in affairs has had so little foundation or support in revolutionary theory.

In England neither the great rebellion nor anything like it would have come to pass, in all probabilty, had not Archbishop Laud interfered with the Church; for it is seldom that revolutions arise from political causes alone. It was only gradually and by reluctant stages that the leaders of the parliamentary struggle were driven to see that it might be necessary to depose the King and create a republic. For some forty years there was a republican party in England. But when Oliver Cromwell was king in all but name, and a party arose which demanded that he should assume the title as well as wield the power, he refused. The Commonwealth then remained, growing in the lineaments of its outward structure more and more like the ancient monarchy. In no sense could it be called a democratic republic. To glorify liberty is one thing; to prompt revolution another. The republics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rose out of practical grievances and were the work of men steering to no certain goal, but driven onward by the stress of unexpected tides. Geneva throws off the yoke of Charles III. of Savoy just in time to become the republican capital of the Calvinist faith; the Dutch Republic is the reluctant answer of an oppressed people to the cruelties of a persecuting Church and an alien army; the English Commonwealth is the protest of a contentious, conservative and divided nation against innovations making for tyranny in Church and State. Wherever we find it flourishing, the tree of liberty grows from the root of injured interests. Nor was it in the countries of Latin speech and of the classical tradition that the principle of monarchy was first repudiated. European republicanism, which ever since the French Revolution has been in the main a phenomenon of the Latin races, was a creature of Teutonic civilization in the age of the Sea Beggars and the Roundheads. The only partial exception was the half Latin city of Geneva, the source of the stream of democratic opinion in Church and State which flowing to England under Queen Elizabeth was repelled by persecutions to Holland and thence directed to the continent of North America.

IV.

The eighteenth century has rightly been regarded as the age of enlightened despotism. In Russia there was Peter the Great, and after an interval Catherine II.; in Naples and Spain, Charles III.; in the Austrian dominions, Maria Theresa, Joseph II. and Leopold; in Prussia, Frederick the Great; in Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus. In each of these different countries the problems to be attacked, the abuses to be swept away had their own peculiar character, but one symptom was common to the general malady. The evils of European society were rooted in feudalism and intrenched in privilege. Nowhere was progress so swift and palpable as in Russia, where monarchy was absolute, unfettered by the opposition of privileged corporations or estates, where the Czar united in his own person the supreme and absolutely authority both in Church and State; nowhere so slow as in France, where the royal will was impeded by a powerful judicial corporation and by the great and opulent interests of a numerous and privileged aristocracy and a mundane and privileged Church.

The foundation of the United States of America was a fact the magnitude and import of which was at once perceived in Europe. It proved that a great modern State could adopt the republican form; it showed that a pure democracy was capable of avoiding the follies and dangers which were considered to be peculiar to democratic government. No country in Europe was so quick in appropriating morals from the American revolution as France. To give a complete account of the causes which secured the triumph of the republican principle in France would involve the whole story of the early stages of the revolution. But there are some occasions in history in which everything seems to depend upon the character of an individual. The continuance of the monarchy in France depended on the character of Louis XVI. A man of strength and clearness of vision, a man whose character, bearing and intellect would have appealed to the imagination of France as of one who was resolved to control the storm rather than be driven hither and thither with every gust would certainly have saved a throne which was rooted in some of the deepest instincts of the nation. The unfortunate Louis committed almost every error which it was possible for him to commit. The Queen, his more determined half, committed the rest. When the royal pair fled, France, which had never been without a King, imagined that every conceivable form of horror might ensue from the lack of one, and breathed freely when they were recovered. But when the King was at last suspended from his functions and "a republic ad interim" proclaimed, France woke up to find itself without a King and realized that the earth still revolved in its accustomed orbit.

There is perhaps no more crucial episode in the annals of modren Europe than the history of the Legislative Assembly which met in September, 1791, and for the space of one year governed the destinies of France. It was this Assembly which declared war upon Austria, and thus began that great duel which received its final settlement on the field of Waterloo. The new democracy was pitted against the old dynasties of Europe, an experiment against an instinct, a reason against a romance, a theory of human equality against the stubborn fact of human deference. The Assembly was succeeded by the elected Convention, which proceeded to pass decrees. On September 25, 1792, upon the motion of Danton, the Convention passed the famous resolution that the republic is one and indivisible. But not one of its important decrees, neither the decree abolishing the monarchy, nor that establishing a republic, nor that which declared against the Federal solution, was submitted to a plebiscite.

The war out of which the French republic grew was not entirely the result of dynastic interests. But the treatment of the French royal family was the main grievance which weighed with Austria and the other courts of Europe. The Emperor Leopold had no desire to draw the sword, but he could not turn a deaf ear to the entreaties of his sister, Marie Antoinette, who thought that some sharp external pressure would school the strange impudence of the French democrats and restore the throne to its former position. Just at this time the members of the Legislative Assembly were being elected. They were not initiated into the subtle and complicated undercurrents of European policy and were not aware that nothing was further from the Emperor's wish or designs than a war with France. But several parties in Paris eagerly desired the war. The defeat of the Emperor's ally, Prussia, whose troops were commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, on the very day that the Convention held its first session, proved that the new democracy, which could thus give a check to the famous army of Prussia, was not merely a thing made up of frothy speeches and newspaper articles of mad and extravagant follies which could leave no durable print on the tablets of history. Yet the newspaper element, or what took its place in that day, the writings of Rousseau, exerted a mighty influence. Consciously or unconsciously, every one in politics used his language and debated his ideas. His thoughts, his catch words, his sentiments permeated the atmosphere; and so far as the creation of the republic can be referred to any one intellectual influence it may be traced to the mind of this shiftless, brilliant and corrupt adventurer, who had carefully explained that the republican form of government is only adapted to a small State.

The French Republic was a new phenomenon in the history of the world. The republics hitherto known to Europe had been either civic or federal or essentially aristocratic, or a combination of all three. But this was a great unitary democratic State, not the result of a long, slow process of growth, but founded in a sudden revolution and by a wonderful manifestation of national energy. Among the qualities which distinguished it there was one which, as it aroused the greatest consternation among contemporaries, so has continued from that time onward to be an enduring element in the republican movements of the Continent. The French Republic was anti-clerical. The interests of the revolution demanded that the Church should be the hireling of the State, that instead of being rich it should be poor; that instead of rioting on endowments it should starve on salaries, that its ancient chapters should be abolished, its wealthy monasteries dissolved. The old religious monopoly was broken down and could never again be mended. Seldom has a political assembly embarked on a more momentous course than did the Constituent Assembly when it agreed to accept those rules as to payment, discipline and regulation of the Church known as the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. A schism was the inevitable result. The scrupulous minds refused to swear the oath to the Constitution; the timid, the careless, the time serving, the men who were Frenchmen first and priests afterward, accepted it. The refractory priests became outlaws and suffered all the glories and hardships of persecution.

In the history of revolutions certain broad phenomena constantly present themselves. They arise out of real and admitted grievances and receive support from the generous emotions and sometimes from the most enlightened speculation of the age; they begin in moderation; they steadily increase in violence, they end in the ostracism of their opponents. Then an inevitable revulsion sets in. Men begin to ask themselves why they have been carried so far and whether the policy into which they have been driven really expresses their original meaning. But meanwhile the revolution has created a mass of vested interests, swelling in proportion to its duration and dangerous to disturb; and in this fact lies a problem of infinite difficulty. So it was with the French Revolution. It began in the idealism of 1789, rose to the Terror of 1793, and sank to the compromise of 1799, which only the authority of a despot could procure and enforce. It was while on the declining curve that France was governed by the Directory, a body of men whose collective epitaph may thus be written: "They preserved the land settlement of the revolution and introduced conscription into Europe." The Jacobins put out declarations of the Rights of Man and established a system of popular government which was, as popular government always must be, nothing but organized ostracism. They believed that justice could be realized on earth, whereas God is unjust in time, though just in eternity; they thought the world was rational, whereas it is a system of profound, solid and vigorous absurdities; they believed in the existence of Humanity, whereas we can know nothing but individual men. None the less, having the settlement of the indivisibility of their country, the Jacobins were the blind instruments of God. They saw that France should be a nation and they made her a nation. The long, obscure process of history begun in the Middle Ages was brought to completion by a generation of republicans who, while appearing to flout all the traditions of their country, were unconsciously serving the oldest and deepest instincts of the French race.

V.

In the passions evoked by the great European struggle the character of the polity which was set up in France by the genius of Bonaparte was imperfectly understood. The enemy saw the obvious things and was blind to the things which were less acceptable to a biassed intelligence. In the conquests of the Revolution, the Consulate and the Empire the political gospel of the new French nation was spread abroad through Europe, creating here feelings of violent revulsion, and here educating unsuspected and fruitful affinities. The quarter in which this influence proved to be most permanent was the peninsula of Italy.

Of all the countries in Europe, Italy alone possessed, as we have seen, ancient republican traditions, but these had become so empty of democratic content that, as Napoleon remarked to the Directory, there was less material for the constitution of republics in Italy than there was in France. Of the ancient republics two alone, Venice and Genoa, retained the external signs of former greatness, but their empire was broken and they had lost political animation. While preserving republican forms these States were in reality controlled by civic aristocracies. The Italians themselves speak of their national movement of the nineteenth century as a "risorgimento," a resurrection, and no phrase could be more appropriate. The summoning of the States General to Versailles on May 5, 1789, is the real birthday of the Italian risorgimento. The French Revolution roused Italy from her torpor, broke down the barriers which had obstructed the tides of national life, dislodged the Austrians from Milan, the Bourbons from Naples, and for the first time since the age of Justinian brought the whole peninsula under what was in fact if not in name a single political system.

Being swept into the whirlpool of the French wars, Italy received from the French those impulses toward democratic and republican ideas which, combining with aspirations of a different origin and quality, finally secured her national union. Ephemeral as were these Italian republics and the creatures of military coercion and founded on financial greed, they at least accomplished one thing, they broke an old tradition and started a new one. It was not in vain that the tricolor had waved over Milan, Rome and Naples, and the brief Roman Republic formed a precedent for that larger design which fifty years later, thanks to the valor of Garibaldi, was printed so deeply on the Italian heart. But while the process of extending the dominion of France throughout the peninsula was still in progress and the greater part of it still in the future, the Government of France passed from a disguised republic to an undisguised empire. The cisalpine republic was converted in 1804 into the Italian Kingdom and a monarchy was established at Naples, after the reigning King and Queen had been ousted. But before the power of Napoleon was broken and the French dominion in Italy crumbled to pieces, Napoleon had sowed the idea of Italian unity, and a republic was among the modes in which patriotic Italian minds came to conceive that great result. The old dynastic traditions had been interrupted, the old boundaries temporarily effaced and the twin spirits of loyalty and locality had lost something of their hold upon the intellects and instincts of the people. In England also there was a reflection of the influence from France.

VI.

The wars of the Revolution and the Empire involved changes too violent to be durable, and in its essential features the Europe of 1815 did not differ from the Europe of 1789. The reaction spread over the whole surface of human interests. In a chapter entitled "Autocracy and Its Critics," Mr. Fisher deals with the monarchical mistakes of Louis XVIII. and Charles X. and Louis Philippe in France, and with those of other Continental rulers in the interval which preceded the Second Republic in France. The terrible drama of the Polish insurrection supplied an additional weapon to the logical armory of the monarchists. The calamities of that unfortunate nation might be traced to the partitions of the eighteenth century, and these in some measure to the fact that the Polish kingship was elective and not hereditary. The evils which followed from this unwise arrangement, the diplomatic intrigues, the pretexts for foreign intervention and the like, belonged to the most threadbare commonplaces of European knowledge, but on every fresh advertisement of the Polish tragedy the lesson received a new and lurid illustration. Could there be a more awful example of the consequences of an elective headship? In France the acute and painful recollection of governments which had immediately preceded it had been one of the principal supports of the restoration monarchy. However ill the mass of Frenchmen thought of Louis XVIII., they thought far worse of the terror, the taxes and the tyranny from which they had been so recently delivered. But as time went on memory began to work its accustomed marvels. The revolution appeared humanitarian, the empire a liberal movement. An intellectual ferment arose and grew apace. Reform banquets were organized to break down the dictatorship of "Lord Guizot" and open the door to social reforms, not with the purpose of founding a republic. A battle in the streets, arising indirectly out of the prohibition of a reform banquet, brought about the resignation of Louis Philippe. He was unmade, as he had been made, by the barricades.

It was not heroism, but it was at least fatigue and common sense. Such was the birth of the Second Republic. It was launched on the world by the pressure of the Paris mob, without any knowledge on the part of its principal promoters whether it would be acceptable to the general body of the nation. The country was not prepared for the republic and was throughly alarmed at the prospect of socialism. No nation fortunate enough to possess a large landed proprietary will readily accept a government which spreads a feeling of insecurity about land. Accordingly when the Constituent Assembly met in Paris on May 4, 1818, and it was the first Assembly in Europe to be elected upon a system of direct universal suffrage, it was found to be a body of a thoroughly conservative complexion. De Tocqueville remarks that no French legislature had ever contained so many nobles, clergy or large proprietors. Some 400 out of a total of 840 members were monarchists, and no fact was of greater significance than that Louis Blanc and Ledru-Rollin, who were regarded as the chieftains of the Socialist and Radical doctrine, were returned at the bottom of the Parisian list.

The Assembly, having no other option, was prepared to accept the republic, but it was very clearly determined that it would have nothing to do with socialism. The struggle which ensued was one of the most terrible of which a civilized capital has ever been the witness. In the midst of the terrible anxieties attendant the Assembly drafted a constitution, decided upon one chamber, chiefly because the Directory, the Monarchy and the American Republic had two chambers, and the executive might establish a tyranny by playing off one against the other, and a President. "In France," writes De Tocqueville, the most distinguished member of the Assembly, "there is only one thing which cannot be created, and that is a free government, only one thing which cannot be destroyed, and that is centralization." A President of the Republic with full control could not fail to be a very powerful person, and might easily be a very dangerous person, especially if elected by the direct suffrages of the people upon a plan adopted from America. But precisely that method of election was settled upon, and the vote gave the Presidency to Louis Bonaparte and prepared the way for the Second Empire.

VII.

There is no more remarkable example in history of the contagious quality of ideas than the sudden spread of revolutionary excitement through Europe in 1848. In the course of a few weeks the established order seemed everywhere to be crumbling to pieces. The revolution began in Palermo, crossed the Straits of Messina and passed in successive waves of convulsion through central Italy to Paris, Vienna, Milan and Berlin. It has often been remarked that the Latin races are of all the peoples of Europe most prone to revolution, but this proposition did not hold good in 1848. The Czechs in Bohemia, the Magyars in Hungary, the Germans in Austria rose against the paralyzing encumbrance of the Hapsburg autocracy. In different times during two tumultuous years republics were proclaimed in France and Hungary, in Baden, Venice and Rome. The chances for republicanism in Europe were never so good; the spirit of the republic was never so widely diffused; the prestige of monarchy was never so low. At this crisis the genuis of Mazzini exerted a powerful and eventually a determining force in Italy. Among all patriotic and enlightened Italians it was common ground that the Austrians must be driven beyond the Alps. But what was to follow? Mazzini at an early period in his life had convinced himself that the republic was the perfect polity. That the monarchy of Piedmont would be worthy to united Italy was a supposition entertained at one fitful moment and then rejected. Mazzini regarded Piedmont as an autocratic, priest ridden State without culture or light, and never changed his opinion. He would not appreciate the series of great and fruitful measures by which, under guidance of Cavour, Piedmont became the most progressive State in Italy, and when in 1870 the Sardinian King entered Rome and the scattered members were at last gathered together in a single body the triumph of a union so accomplished was to Mazzini the tragic inversion of his most cherished hope. But the scope of his genius was not political so much as religious or prophetic, and his rare quality of sustained moral elevation and power of persuading people to confront difficulties counted for as much in his special sphere as did the statesmanship of Cavour in effecting the union of Italy. He made Italy a moral unity before the Piedmontese monarchy made it a political unity. The Italian revolution of 1848 was the result not of a single stream but of many converging currents. Monarchists and republicans combined with liberals of every type and shade of opinion in a simultaneous protest against the Austrian rule with all its unwholesome corollaries. Garibaldi's share in the great work is familiar and unforgettable.

Germany at this crisis was a country which despite flourishing schools and universities was paralyzed by the most irrational Constitution in Europe. The Federal Diet was a mere shadow, a congress of diplomats acting under the instructions of the several States without sovereign power or moral influence. The republican education of Germany which preceded the disorders of 1848 came from various sources; from the Poles in exile who stirred up so much political rancor throughout Europe after the annihilation of their monarchy, from Germans settled in America, from the examples of Switzerland and France. But the real truth is that republican principles had little hold on the general mass of the German people. A few professors, students and scattered knots of workmen, nowhere very numerous, did not constitute the main body of the German nation, which was rooted in respect for the ancient dynasties and did not advance beyond the conception of a federation of constitutional monarchies. It is interesting to notice that Bismarck, who first rose to prominence in 1848 as a leader of the high Tory party in Prussia, comes to the conclusion that had the Prussian King taken advantage of his opportunities he might have formed a stricter and stronger union of Germany than was possible in 1870. Frightened by the revolution, the rulers of Bavaria and the smaller German States would have made concessions which Prussia was in no position to demand from its allies in the Franco-Prussian war. Thus while Karl Marx thinks that the situation in 1848 if properly handled would have led to a democratic republic, Bismarck with a saner estimate of moral forces detects in it the squandered hope of a powerful empire. After long and wearisome debate the Frankfort Parliament patched together a Federal Constitution and offered the imperial crown of a reconstructed Germany to the King of Prussia. Had Frederick William IV. been a man of imagination or resolve he would have accepted a gift which whether or not it involved him in a war with Austria would have implied the foundation of a great national State framed on liberal lines in central Europe. But he first declined the crown and then repudiated the Constitution. The republican party in Germany has never recovered from the blow it received in 1849, and the unity of Germany was destined to be achieved by men to whom the tradition of revolutionary France represented everything that was hateful and dangerous to society.

VIII.

No government founded on a crime can ever be stable. The Second Empire conferred some services on France, but it was founded on proscriptions and a coup d'état. For a time the Emperor enjoyed general applause. But from the moment a French army marched into Italy to assist Piedmont against Austria, and in 1861 all Italy save Venice and Rome were united in a single polity under the Sardinian crown, the French Empire lost the confidence of the Roman Catholics. The withdrawal of clerical support, however, would not in itself have been sufficient to undermine the empire; the tradition of the revolution was even more powerful than the Catholic Church. Napoleon III. not only alienated the Roman Catholics; he failed to conciliate the liberals. Moreover, the Second Empire was not frank. For example, it retained universal suffrage, but exercised a strong and vigilant pressure which insured the return of none but official candidates. From 1852 until 1860 political life was entirely extinguished in France, the press was muzzled, an insolent hierarchy of officials served by an army of inquisitive police dominated the country. In the Parliamentary opposition there were two parties, one believing in the possibility of a liberal empire, the other resolved to overthrow the tyrant and establish a republic. The way to a new government was opened by the defeat at Sedan in 1870. When news of the capitulation reached Paris the Assembly was invaded and dissolved by an armed mob, and the Deputies of the Left, headed by Jules Favre and Gambetta, proceeded to the Hotel de Ville, pronounced the abolition of the empire, proclaimed the republic and established a provisional government of national defence. Their action was no more constitutional than was the attack upon the Tuileries on August 10, 1792. Four years elapsed before this republic was formally accepted by the Legislature of France.

It was then carried as the lame but unavoidable conclusion of a disappointing history, without a ray of enthusiasm and by the narrowest of all possible majorities. The representatives no longer believed that they were giving the law to Europe or that they were framing a perfect constitution, or that their craftsmanship conformed to any classical and preordained model of pure democracy. The Commune and all that had taken place in the interval had effectually sobered Frenchmen. After recording the history of that troublous period which followed between Sedan and the present day Mr. Fisher sums up the situation: "So we are led to consider the ultimate antinomy which divides society in the Latin States of Europe. On the one hand there is the republican tradition dominant and established in France, evident though overmastered in Spain, partially transfused into the institution of the national monarchy in Italy. On the other hand there is the Roman Catholic Church, the ally of the Bourbons, who can never rule in France, and the enemy and the victim of the French Revolution. The gulf is clear, the incompatibility absolute, the war truceless. The syllabus of 1864 and the infallibility decree of 1870 have cut away the hazy middle ground in which many a generous and divided soul found a reconciliation for his inner discords. A French child must either be brought up a Roman Catholic or he must be brought up a republican. In the first case he will learn that the French Revolution was the crime of crimes, and so forth; in the second he will learn just the opposite of all this, that the Church in all ages has been the enemy of human freedom and progress, and that the French Revolution was the discovery of social justice upon earth. The Third Republic has captured the schools, dissolved the congregations and disestablished the Church, but it still rules over a divided nation.

IX.

The republican movement in England was an eddy rather than a current. Apart from the Irishmen who are always ready to fish in troubled waters there was a small residuum of artisans who resented the cost of the monarchy and the long retirement of the Queen from public gaze. The republican clubs which were formed in 1870 struggled on for a few years, gave some anxiety to Mr. Gladstone, and then perished of inanition. But while they still flourished they spent a good deal of enthusiasm on the Spanish Republic. This endured a short and tragic life. It was born on February 11, 1873, and died on October 29, 1875, of a military pronunciamento, in the true Spanish order of congruity. In its brief span of tortured existence it battled with a serious cantonal insurrection in the south, with an equally serious Carlist rising in the north, endured four coups d'état and experienced five Presidents, the first of whom dismayed the faithful by secretly eloping to Paris to escape his political responsibilities. It considered but never applied the frame of a federal constitution borrowed from the United States. It planned largely. There was to be no more conscription, no more war; but what with the Carlists and the Federalists two hundred thousand men were in arms through those two years in Spain itself, not to mention eighty thousand in Cuba; and when the last red flag had been hauled down from the last rebel fort in Cartagena only twenty-eight houses in that great marine city were uninjured by the bombardment. Spanish republicanism grew out of Spanish liberalism, and this in turn was a graft from the French Revolution. But the story of the Spanish revolution affords a curious instance of the difficulty of infusing the wine of new doctrine into a receptacle which had not been devised to hold it. The monarchy was restored under successive sovereigns. By degrees a parliamentary government was forced upon the Crown, but worked in a manner peculiar to Spain. Party government, in the true sense of the term, did not and does not exist in Spain. The members of the Cortes act, for the most part, for their own interests. They expect favors from the Government, and if they do not get them they lay their heads together to procure its overthrow. A federal republic was advocated, but it has been described by a French writer as "a chimera of Proudhon translated into Spanish," and its supporters chose the wrong moment, the wrong methods and the wrong arguments. But the cause of Federalism still flourishes in Catalonia, the province of its birth and the principal focus, Barcelona in particular, of republican agitation in Spain.

X.

There can be but little question, says Mr. Fisher in summing up, that since 1870 the cause of republicanism has made no substantial progress in Europe. France is still the only great European republic, and the political history of France under her new régime has not been such as to invite imitation. The position of the monarchies, which seemed so precarious in 1848, has been considerably, indeed progressively, improved since the failure of that great and generous outburst of high but ill calculated ideals. The level of political intelligence, which was very low in the generation preceding 1848, has certainly improved, and the virtues of Queen Victoria and King William I. of Prussia have had some share in dispelling the clouds of criticism which had collected around the representatives of their respective houses. A great change has been silently and insensibly accomplished in England within the last twenty years. That the change has been mainly due to accidents of personal excellence, the characters of Queen Victoria and Edward VII., no one can deny. Physica science has aided. Photography now enables the remotest subject to become familiar with the features and actions of his rulers at all possible moments and to feel a pleasing sense of familiarity and community of interest in them. Moreover in Great Britain the sentiments of the people can produce a more prompt effect upon public affairs, which are controlled only nominally by the King, and a gust of popular disfavor may at any time drive the real ruler of the land, the Prime Minister, out of office, whereas a President of the United Sates is safe for four years. In these days too the cost of monarchy is less burdensome; the wealth of Europe has greatly increased, the financial burden of royal families has remained very much where it was, and many a subject is far richer than the sovereign. A vague, all pervading discontent with the structure of society has taken the place of the simple, direct protest against the costliness of crowns and the profligacy of courts.

Other factors have contributed to the decline of European republicanism. The first of these is the success of Bismarck's statesmanship in Germany. Finding Germany poor, weak, divided, he left it the greatest military and industrial power on the Continent. A second factor is the growth of imperialism and "world policy." Ask nine Englishmen out of ten what they consider to be the preeminent value of the British monarchy and they will reply that the Crown keeps the empire together. This answer would not have been given in 1830, nor yet in 1850, but it would certainly be given now. The taste for ritual, for playthings, for make believe, is deeply rooted in human nature, and monarchy appeals to the deferential instincts of the ordinary human being. Overthrow the monarchy, replace the King with an elective President, and what would become of the loyalty of Australia, New Zealand or Canada? The British colonists have no particular respect for the Mother of Parliaments, and a very particular and not ill grounded aversion to the rule of Downing Street, but they regard the Crown with feelings of simple and passionate veneration. The argument can be reenforced from another quarter. The success of the United States proves that an elective President may rule a continent which is geographically continuous. It does not prove that the republican system is adapted to communities so disjointed from one another by vast intervals of space as to be incapable of uniting in a common electoral system for legislative purposes. Conversely, it may be affirmed that the cause of monarchy in the Iberian Peninsula has been permanently weakened by the loss of the American colonies of Spain and Portugal.

It is now a very general belief that the cause of European peace is assisted by the social and family ties which subsist between the monarchs of Europe. Mr. Fisher illustrates this by several examples, including the instance of Queen Victoria saving France from a second war with Germany in 1875.

There can be no more signal instance of the decline of republican feeling in Europe, says Mr. Fisher, than the action taken by Norway in 1905, upon the severance of her constitutional bond with Sweden. Its insistence upon a King for ruler was the counsel of prudence. The republican movement of Europe reached its zenith in 1840. The Latin world has experienced many subsequent convulsions; kingship is less secure in Spain and Italy than in Teutonic, Scandinavian or Slavonic peoples; and it is a nice question whether the cause of monarchy is more injured by its alliance with Ultramontanism in Spain or by its estrangement from the whole clerical connection in Italy. Yet the Republican party in Italy is overshadowed by the Socialists; the Republican party in Spain discredited by its association with anarchical or federalist aims. The accepted formula of progress seems, if we are to be guided by the recent examples of Russia and Turkey, to be constitutional monarchy rather than republicanism. The republican movement has done its work. Its ideals have been appropriated and used with more or less completeness in the political system of Europe, and most of the domestic programme of 1848 is now fixed and embodied in the constitutions of the Continent, which, save only in France, Switzerland and Portugal, retains an explicit devotion to hereditary monarchy.

SUSAN GLASPELL'S DOG.

Voila the Original of the Puppies in "The Visioning."

Miss Susan Glaspell, the author, has a dog, which fact is of more importance than might at first appear. For in her new novel "The Visioning," are introduced two frolicsome puppies named Pourquoi and N'est-ce-pas. And there are no two more real characters in the whole book than Why and Ain't It, to use their names in English form.

It was Miss Glaspell's own dog, a bohemian beast, that inspired the creation of "The Visioning's" twin puppy clowns. The real dog also has a French name, Voila. When its owner bought it, over in Paris, she wanted at first to name it Raspail, both in memory of the boulevard on which she lived and as a sympathetic cognomen for a sensitive souled Parisian dog. But her family objected. They could not see their way clear to shouting, "Come, Raspail! Raspail! Raspail!" So Miss Glaspell compromised on Voila.

Voila has vagaries. It is a wanderer. It is a collie, and a collie, it evidently thinks, ought to be afield. Whenever it feels that way, away Voila goes. Fortunately, it wears a collar with Miss Glaspell's name and address. She has come to think nothing of such a phone message as this:

"Hello! Is dis Miss Glaspell? Vell, dis is der bartender bei Hans Bummelransen's saloon. No, no, vait! I didn't got der wrong phone number. I choost vant to say I got here your tog. Vill you come for him?"

Then the author of "The Visioning" has to drop chapter plans and seek out Herr Bummelransen's place with sorrow—and a dollar. But were it not so there might never have been a N'est-ce-pas and a Pourquoi.

What Rex Beach Wrote in the Subway.

Rex Beach, whose new novel, "The Ne'er-Do-Well," was published last week, was riding in a New York subway train with a friend who asked him where the book was written.

"This is quite as good a place as any," Beach replied, "for writing Arctic stories like 'The Silver Horde' or Panama stories like 'The Ne'er-Do-Well.' But I don't write on the train.

"Another friend saw me making notes once. 'Probably the plot of his next novel,' was his comment. 'Funny picture, isn't it? Subway train halts at Ninety-seventh street, thermometer also halts at 97, and Beach puts down something like this: "The men shivered in their fur sleeping bags, and the dogs whined dismally in the fierce Arctic cold."'

"As a matter of fact, I wasn't making notes for a new novel, I was adding to a list of things Mrs. Beach had given me to buy. If you want to make the story of an Arctic author realistic it'll have to read this way: 'Ninety-seventh street, so many cases of gasolene; Eighty-sixth, so many cases of soups; Sixty-sixth, one black satin bathing suit, with cap, parasol and shopping bag.'"

Brewer as a Novelist.

From the London Evening Standard.

Mr. Temple Thurston, whose dramatized novel "Sally Bishop" will be presented at the Prince of Wales Theatre, was originally intended for a brewer, and did in fact enter his father's brewery at the age of 15. He did not receive much parental encouragement in his early literary endeavors, and the first intimation Mr. Thurston had that his son was really seriously inclined in the direction of authorship was the sight of a review of a small volume of poems which were published at young Thurston's expense.

The sequel is, perhaps, best told in the author's own words: "My father called me into his presence and told me to take a month off, during which time I was to satisfy him as to my literary capabilities. During that time I wrote a lot of miscellaneous matter, including 1,700 lines of verse, which I read over to my father. After that," adds Mr. Thurston somewhat ambiguously, "he did not say a single further word about my going back to the brewery."

Electricity From the Stars.

From Harper's Weekly.

Experiments conducted in Ireland, if they are to be trusted, reveal a distinct electromotive force exercised by the stars. Using a reflecting telescope of two feet aperture to concentrate the star rays, and a sensitive electrometer to note their influence, the experimenters had reason to believe that they were able not only to detect, but to measure, the electromotive force of both stars and planets.

To Venus, for example, they ascribed a force of about seventeen one-hundredths of a volt, and to Jupiter a force of at least three one-hundredths of a volt. In the case of Jupiter only a part of the planet's light fell upon the electrometer, so that the experimenters inferred that his entire electric influence must be much greater than that stated. Sirius, which appears to us as the brightest of the fixed stars, showed a force amounting to two one-hundredths of a volt.