

French Yellow Book Says Germany Long Planned War

Puts Primary Responsibility on Austria for Serbian Note, but Accuses Kaiser and War Party of Forcing the Crisis.

DECLARES FRANCE ALWAYS WORKED FOR PEACE

Special Cable Despatch to The Sun.
PARIS, Nov. 30.—The French Yellow Book, containing the diplomatic exchanges in which France took part preceding the declaration of war, was made public by the Foreign Office today.

The Yellow Book contains 160 documents. It covers a larger field than the British White Book or any of the other official publications. It emphasizes the efforts of the Triple Entente to preserve peace and demonstrates the deliberateness of Austria and Germany in forcing the war.

The first section of the book contains documents showing the determination of the German military party to start a war of aggression on France, the measures taken toward carrying out this plan, and the changes in the attitude of the Kaiser, who, yielding to the influence of his advisers acquiesced in the idea of war.

The French obtained early in 1913 a secret German report formulating a policy of piling up the burden of armaments so that eventually Germany would regard war as a deliverance. The author of the secret report regarded the Algerian conference as indicating that France, Russia and Great Britain had an understanding which was dangerous to Austria and Germany.

He charged France with violating the Moroccan convention and remarked that the progress of the French army, the moral revival of the French nation, the ascendancy of aviation and the accumulation of machine guns justified the strengthening of Germany's forces. He said a guarantee of Germany's influence in the affairs of the world would be a sacred duty to sharpen the sword.

The German Government's Part.
 The writer of the report said the German Government must get into the people the idea that the German armaments were a reply to the French policy, to accustom them to the idea of an offensive war and to prepare for one financially without arousing the mistrust of financiers.

A rising, the author of the report said, must be prepared, and in this connection Egypt was suggested as a particularly appropriate sphere. Small States, such as Holland and Belgium, must be constrained to follow Germany or be broken. In northern Germany the army could be considerably increased by Dutch troops.

Another striking feature of the book is a report by M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, dated November, 1913, of a conversation which the Kaiser had just had with the Count von Moltke. Remarkable on the accentuation of German hostility to France and that the Kaiser had ceased to be a friend of peace, Cambon says King Albert had hitherto believed, like everybody else, that the Kaiser had often used his influence for peace. He now found that the Kaiser had completely abandoned this policy and was naturally believed that his overwhelming superiority meant certain victory for the German army.

Count von Moltke backed the Kaiser, saying that war had become necessary and inevitable. He was even more confident than the Emperor.

King Albert's Protest.
 King Albert protested against their interpretation of the French intentions. He suggested that Germany was allowing herself to be misled, but the Kaiser and Count von Moltke persisted. The Kaiser was at that time familiarizing himself with ideas which were once repugnant to him.

Defends France's Stand.
 The sections of the book dealing with the crisis arising from the tragedy at Sarajevo dwell on Germany's responsibility for the war and France's and Russia's conciliatory attitude. The following paragraph sums up the conclusions: "Germany's aim was long prepared for a war for hegemony, which was to open with the crushing of France, chose the pretext and hour, pushed her Austrian ally to the front, instructed all attempts at a peaceful settlement made with untiring patience by Great Britain, France and Russia and, disclosing her game, proceeded to declare war against Russia and France at the very moment when Austria had been enlightened as to the seriousness and had decided for an understanding."

Bavaria Possibilities.
 The Yellow Book includes a note from M. Henri Alliez, Minister of France to Bavaria, to Benvenuto Martin, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, under date of July 23, saying "the Bavarian press believes that a pacific solution is possible, but the official circles are pessimistic."

"The President of the Council told me today," M. Alliez says, "that the Austrian note, with which he is acquainted, was drawn up in terms acceptable to the Serbians, and that the situation seemed most grave."

This admission that the contents of the Austrian note were known to the Bavarian Government is taken as proof in Paris that Berlin also must have known of the contents, although such knowledge always has been officially denied.

The most interesting parts of the Yellow Book are the accounts of interviews of Ambassador Schoen, the German Ambassador at Paris, and M. Benvenuto Martin. The latter informed Baron von Schoen that Premier Viviani was then in Stockholm, and that Berlin also must have known of the contents, although such knowledge always has been officially denied.

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Hope of Peace Gone.
 "France and Russia accepted this proposal to internationalize the question, but Germany refused under the pretext that she could not thus humiliate her ally, and she proposed, in the place of this common action, the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, saying the latter was ready to consent to this arrangement."

"The outline seemed consequently at this time to be progressing toward a settlement, when for the third time Austria, by a fresh provocation, killed the hopes authorized by that had been done up to the present, in the direction of conciliation, she declared war on Serbia (July 28) and began at the same time a partial mobilization against Russia on her frontiers (July 29)."

"The chances for peace now seemed greatly reduced, particularly as the Austrian army began the bombardment of Belgrade, the occupation of which seemed to be nothing more than a question of hours."

"The Powers of the Triple Entente did not, however, give up all hope of accomplishing something in these last remaining minutes. On one side Sir Edward Grey (British Foreign Secretary) started a new project for four-sided mediation, a project in which Russia joined at the demand of France. M. von Jagow, to whom this project was communicated, evaded it by asserting, although he adhered to its principle, it was necessary to find a formula that would be acceptable to Austria. He was not prepared to undertake any measures directed against the sovereignty of Serbia, even after having occupied Belgrade."

"It was then that the Cabinet of Vienna, perhaps suffering of itself consequences of its irresponsibility and feeling the necessity of taking a step backward, declared for the first time that it was ready to discuss with Europe the

fundamental principle of its difference with Serbia.

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"At the beginning of the conflict this power, Germany, had commenced military preparations, and she continued them with feverish haste. At the very moment when her representatives in foreign countries were protesting her pacific intentions, the 31st of July, in the evening, Germany addressed to the Russian Government an ultimatum, giving Russia twelve hours in which to demobilize on her Austrian as well as on her German frontiers.

"The alternative was that Germany would mobilize. This was done at a time when the Russian Government had given evidence of its conciliatory attitude and at a time when Austria-Hungary was showing herself disposed to discuss with Europe the question of her armaments."

"Events which then took place are fresh in the memory of every one. On the 31st of July there were acts of hostility, clearly defined, on our frontiers, the 2d of August saw the violation of the neutrality of Luxembourg and the entrance by German troops on three points of our territory, while our troops were holding themselves at a distance of ten kilometers (six miles) from the frontier."

"The same day Belgium was summoned to permit Germany's military operations against France. Finally, on the 3d of August the declaration of war was brought by M. von Schoen to the Grand Orsay, which act preceded by a short time only the violation of the neutrality of Belgium."

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importance of those paragraphs of the note in which it is stated that "Germany esteems the present question one for Austria and Serbia to settle alone" and that the most serious interest of the other Powers was to limit the question to those two.

"Germany ardently desires that the conflict be decided," the note continues, "by intervention from another Power being bound by the natural effect of the alliance to provide incalculable consequences."

M. Marin pointed out the danger of a revolution in Serbia if her Government submitted, and added that only two hypotheses seemed to be anticipated by the note, Serbia's absolute refusal or a provocative attitude on her part, although a third was possible—Serbia's acceptance of everything compatible with her sovereignty and dignity. Germany's desire to localize the conflict, he said, made the position unnecessarily difficult for a third Power, which was unable to dissociate itself from Serbia morally or sentimentally.

Baron von Schoen replied vaguely that there was "always room for hope," declaring that he had no personal feeling whether the Austrian note was a summons allowing discussion or an ultimatum.

The preface of the Yellow Book contains a letter written in November, 1913, by M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin to M. Stephen Pichon, French Foreign Minister, conveying the warning that Germany had been unable to increase and that the Kaiser had ceased to advocate peace. The letter continues:

"The King of the Belgians had the same impression as to the conversation with the Emperor in the presence of Von Moltke. The reason is, perhaps, that the Kaiser is jealous of the growing popularity of the Crown Prince, who is hating the Pan-Germanic passions."

The French Government's summary of the Yellow Book, as sent out by the Associated Press, says:

"It was first in the spring of 1913 that we noted this colossal and expensive military effort which alone can explain the desire to impose the German superiority and hegemony on the Powers of the Triple Entente. When France responded to this movement by the drafting of the law of three years service in the army this measure of defence was denounced in official circles in Berlin as a 'provocation which should not be tolerated.'"

"In April of 1913 a secret and official German report defined the objective and the means of the national policy as follows: 'Convince the people of the necessity of an offensive war against France, prepare uprisings in Russia and in north Africa; provide for, in case of hostilities, the immediate absorption of Belgium and Holland.'"

"The German Ambassador came to the Quai d'Orsay (the French Foreign Office in Paris) and endeavored to carry through a proposal which he represented as an offensive war against France, which was in reality threatening."

"He asserted that the conflict should remain 'localized' and that any intervention on the part of a third Power would be a failure from the very start."

"Confronted with this situation the first thought of the Powers forming the Triple Entente was to gain time to examine the conflict with calm and to establish a peaceful ender less access. The Powers therefore asked that Vienna extend the period of delay allowed Serbia for her answer."

"Then Austria became fearful that she would be left without a pretext of war and she endeavored to ward off this danger by another expedient. She declined or avoided the request for an extension and pronounced herself ready to accept the answer, which was given to her in good time and which admitted and accepted her principal demands."

"Austria, thereupon ordered her Minister to leave the Serbian capital (July 26), and diplomatic relations with Serbia were severed."

"With this development the situation became considerably aggravated. The Powers of the Triple Entente, however, still endeavored to bring about a settlement. In the meantime M. von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Paris, came to the Quai d'Orsay and demanded that France exert her influence on Russia in a peaceful sense, but he refused to exert similar peaceful influence at Vienna."

"England proposed to avoid a crisis by submitting the Austro-Serbian difficulty to the official mediation of the four Powers which were not directly interested therein."

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
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
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
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"Events which then took place are fresh in the memory of every one. On the 31st of July there were acts of hostility, clearly defined, on our frontiers, the 2d of August saw the violation of the neutrality of Luxembourg and the entrance by German troops on three points of our territory, while our troops were holding themselves at a distance of ten kilometers (six miles) from the frontier."

"The same day Belgium was summoned to permit Germany's military operations against France. Finally, on the 3d of August the declaration of war was brought by M. von Schoen to the Grand Orsay, which act preceded by a short time only the violation of the neutrality of Belgium."

"In the light of the documents contained in this Yellow Book the roles played by the different Powers in this European crisis show up with striking clearness. It is scarcely necessary again to emphasize the responsibility of Austria, the primal cause of the conflict."

"The responsibilities of Germany are

even more crushing, in spite of the fact that in the beginning she stood for the second plan. The reason for this is that Germany systematically avoided every opportunity to discuss measures of conciliation.

"She forced Austria to