do both, and do it successfully, they then denied our power to carry on a war without our own boundaries, should circumstances require such an exertion of national strength. This was our first great trial, for in the invasion of Canada during the last war, the operations were so near that they did not test our strength for distant warfare. The trial has been made, and has succeeded. No one will hereafter call in question our capacity to assert our rights, wherever there may require our interference. If the great experiment had failed, it would have taken ages to recover from the misfortune. But now, wherever the American flag is borne, or the name of America can known, said that wherever it is everywhere the glorious feats of this war have proclaimed our power, and have announced that we have taken our position side by side with the mightiest nations of the world. Hereafter, in the wildest dreams of ambition there will be no dream of conquering us—no will any host be foot pollute our shore but to escape from it, if it can, as best it may.

The present bill provides for raising ten additional regiments of infantry to serve during the war. The average number of each regiment in the field is rather less than three-fourths of the legal establishment; so that this measure, if adopted, will add about 7,500 men to the army. The organization is precisely the same as that provided in the last session of Congress for raising an additional force; and as the details were then fully considered, and are well known to the Senate, I need not recapitulate them here.

The reasons which render this increase of force necessary, are so clearly and forcibly stated in the Report of the Secretary of War, that I need do little more than request that that portion of the document may be read.

The following extract from the Report of the Secretary of War was then read by the Secretary:—

"Unprecedented success, so disastrous to Mexico; our conquest of a moiety of her States and territories; the subjugation and occupation of her capital; the defeat and dispersion of her armies; the capture of most of her material of war, and the annihilation of her former commerce, have not yet brought peace, or the offer of such terms as could be accepted by the United States without national degradation. The war still continues, and it is proper to present some suggestions in regard to its further prosecution. In making these suggestions, I pass without remark the propositions that we should hold all our acquisitions and withdraw our troops from the enemy's country. Such a proposition could only be seriously entertained if we were in reality the vanquished party, and were convinced of our inability to prolong the contest with reasonable hopes of success.

Of the other operations must, in my opinion, be conducted in one of the three following modes:—first, to take and hold an indemnity line; to recede from all places and positions now occupied in advance of it, and cease from all aggressive operations beyond that line; second, to overrun the whole country, and hold all the principal places in it by permanent garrisons; and third, to retain what we now possess, open the lines of communication into the country, and extend our operations to other important places, as our means and the prospect of advantages shall indicate, keeping a disposable force always ready, within approachable limits, to annoy the enemy, to seize supplies, enforce contributions, and frustrate his efforts to collect means and assemble troops for the purpose of protracting the war.

A full discussion of the comparative merits of these modes of conducting our military operations would exceed the communication to an unwarrantable length; I shall, therefore, confine my remarks to a few prominent considerations relative to each.

With reference to a speedy peace, with proper indemnity and security—the only object of a rational war—the line policy is regarded as objectionable. If our present position cannot command acceptable terms of pacification from Mexico, retiring to an indemnity line would certainly fail to produce such a result; it would weaken the inducements of the enemy to sue an end to hostilities. Restored, by our voluntary surrender, to the possession of his capital and important departments, and relieved from the pressure of our arms, and from all apprehensions of further conquest and annoyance, beyond the limits we might select, he would be left with more abundant resources than he now possesses, to prepare at leisure and in security to strike an effective blow with concentrated forces at our detached posts. To hold these posts safely, and to retain possession of the seaports we now have (if that should fall within the policy), and to prevent incursions into the territories which we might choose to appropriate to ourselves, would, in my opinion, require a force as large as would suffice to maintain what we now occupy, and to carry our operations still further into the interior of the enemy's country, and thus take the war into the country, in a way best calculated to induce him to seek for peace. But if in this I am mistaken, and the line policy should enable us to reduce the number of our troops, still, it will not, as I conceive, thereby effect a reduction of our actual expenditures for the war.

In consequence of the interruption of intercourse between the seaports in our possession, and the central parts of Mexico, the collections on imports have hitherto been inconsiderable. If the line policy is adopted, the intercourse will continue to be interrupted, and, consequently, the receipts of revenue from this source will be small.

Under the operation of the line policy, all expectations of lessening the burden of sustaining our troops, by deriving our supplies and contributions from the enemy, would be disappointed. The supplies in the vicinity of our posts would be withdrawn from our reach, as soon as our design to seize and appropriate them was ascertained or suspected. But, were it otherwise, as our posts would be remote from the wealth and resources of the country, the amount which could be obtained would be inconsiderable.

So far from deriving any advantage from the line policy, by way of receiving assistance from the resources of the enemy, towards the support of our troops, we should, I apprehend, confer upon a portion of the people of Mexico a direct benefit by opening to them a market, in which we should be enabled to become the purchasers of their products at an exorbitant price. These considerations, without bringing into view other, have led me to look to one of the other modes of operation I have mentioned, as preferable to that of occupying an indemnity line.

In regard to the second mode suggested—that of occupying the whole country—the wide extent of territory embraced in the Mexican republic, the many important points to be garrisoned and the long lines of communication to be kept open, present difficulties of no ordinary magnitude, if our occupancy is to be of such a character as to supersede the Mexican authority, and require the temporary establishment of civil governments. In carrying this system into effect, it would not be reasonable to rely upon the favorable disposition, or even neutrality, of any considerable part of the Mexican people, until some assurance of the stability of our power was derived from its continuance. Our posts must, therefore, be strong, and our forces numerous, in order to secure the many and long lines of communication, to disperse and chastise the guerrilla bands which would attract them, and to suppress the more powerful uprisings of the people wherever they may be attempted. I cannot safely estimate the force requisite to carry into full effect this plan, at less than seventy thousand men. To insure the presence of that number in the enemy's country, and at places where they would be wanted, it would be necessary to raise a much larger force. The great expense of raising, organizing and sending to their remote destination so large a body of troops as soon as needed to give effect to this plan, would, I apprehend, bring a very heavy, and perhaps embarrassing demand upon the treasury.

The third mode presented is, in my judgment, preferable to the others. Beyond certain limits, it admits of expansion and contraction; but, as a fixed condition, all now held is to be retained, and no part surrendered, but in compliance with treaty stipulations. This plan also contemplates further acquisitions extending to other important points, more or less numerous, as circumstances may warrant.

Notwithstanding our victories have fallen with crushing weight upon the assembled armies of Mexico, most of those who hold in their hands the destiny of the country, have stood beyond the range of the physical evils inflicted by the war. By extending this theatre of it, and changing the mode of conducting it, they can be made to feel its pressure—in consequence of our liberal and humane policy, we have as yet, scarcely touched the substance of the wealthy and influential classes in Mexico. A portion of the Mexican army has long been in the pay of government, in preference to exposing its officers to excessive risks, its destruction has not deeply enlisted their sympathies, or alarmed their fears. Our army has afforded them but a perfect protection in their own; and thus, by our presence and our forbearance, they have, within certain limits, hitherto escaped exactions from either. But our success has given new opening for the way to act upon and influence the wealthy, if, as they will, put an end to hostilities. By making them suffer the usual calamities of war, they must be made to desire peace.

In addition to the troops required to garrison places to be retained, it is proposed to have in the field a competent force for aggressive operations, to strike the enemy wherever he may present a vulnerable point; to open avenues from the ports in our possession into the enemy's country, and to cover and to subject to our control some of his rich mining districts, and productive agricultural regions. It is not deemed proper to point out in more detail the measures and objects contemplated in the further prosecution of the war upon this plan."

Assuming that this plan of operations recommended by the Secretary of War is the true one—and, for myself, I have no doubt upon that subject—we have then four great objects to be kept in view in estimating the force to be provided for the future conduct of the war:

1. The continued occupation of the important positions we now hold.

2. The taking possession of such other commanding points as experience may show to be proper, and as the circumstances of the war may require.

3. The preservation of the necessary communication between our positions as well from the seacoast to the capital, as to the portions of the country which may be brought into subjection to us.

4. A force, independent of what is necessary for these purposes, which shall always be kept upon the alert, and ready to move when ever they may be any appearance of an outbreak on the part of the Mexican people.

The organization and maintenance of a large force may be the means of rendering its employment unnecessary. It is much better to render opposition hopeless by the display of strength, than to excite it into action by the exhibition of weakness, and then be compelled to resort to desperate strugglers. To remedy evils which ordinary prudence would have prevented. It is true humanity, also, and to prevent effusion of blood, we have done and suffered so much, to the enemy and to the world. Remember, sir, that our troops are 2000 miles from home, in the midst of a hostile population of eight or ten millions, and that by great exertions and unparalleled bravery, they have succeeded in a partial subjugation of the country. But we have no right to expose them to such perils. There is a vast superiority of physical force opposed to them. All experience shows that in this condition an invaded people will suddenly break out in insurrections, and sometimes display an energy and courage which they failed to exhibit upon the battle field. Who would weigh with a critical balance the amount of opposition we have to apprehend, and the strength necessary to overcome it, and then coolly provide this calculated force, and leave events to take care of themselves? What kind of political arithmetic would that be, which would say it so many troops have done so much, how many will it require to do so much more? I trust that the supplies we may vote will be given upon a far better principle. Upon a principle which shall look indeed to results, but which shall make the most liberal arrangements for attaining them.

The proceedings of this government are as well known in Mexico as here. They do not indeed travel upon the wings of the wind, but they travel with the power of the press, and are spread through the civilized world. Vigorous and prompt action will produce the happiest effect upon the state of things in Mexico. Nothing would conduce more to impress upon the people of that country the necessity of a peace than a unanimous determination in Congress to put forth all the strength of the nation till it is obtained.

I have caused the following abstract to be prepared from the Report of the Adjutant General, exhibiting the entire strength of our present army, including regulars and volunteers:—

VOLUNTEERS.

Actual force about		20,000
To complete the organization will require	12,500	
Twenty-five regiments of regulars. Full legal complement, exclusive of officers	28,814	
Actual strength		21,533
To complete the organization will require	7,281	
During the last year there were recruited—		
For the old army	11,618	
For the new army	11,162	
Forces in the field under Gen. Scott—		
Regulars	17,101	
Volunteers	15,055	
Aggregate	32,156	32,156
Deduct the garrisons of Tampico and Vera Cruz	1,947	
Makes for all the operations between Vera Cruz and Mexico, including garrisons, together with the sick and disabled	30,209	

The returns in the Adjutant General's office do not show the actual distribution of this force. Under General Taylor, but temporarily commanded by General Wool:

Regulars	3,937	
Volunteers	2,790	
Aggregate	6,727	6,727
Under Gene al Price, in New Mexico.		
Regulars	255	
Volunteers	2,902	
Aggregate	3,157	3,157
On the Oregon route, under Lieut. Col. Powell, Fort Kearny:		
Volunteers	477	
In California, under Col. Mason:		
Regulars	216	
Volunteers	603	
Aggregate	1,019	1,019
		43,536

Total land force employed in the prosecution of the war:

Regulars	21,566
Volunteers	22,027
Aggregate	43,536

—By which it will be seen that we have in Mexico, under Gen. Scott, besides the garrisons of Tampico and Vera Cruz, about 30,000 men rank and file, excluding officers; and in the command of Gen. Taylor an aggregate of 5,727 men, officers included.

From the statements of the Adjutant General, it appears that the actual force kept up is less, by one fourth, than the legal force authorized by law. The continually recurring casualties of war, and other circumstances, occasion this difference. And it is not probable that the existing legal establishment could, by any effort, be made to keep in the field a greater numerical strength than is now there. So that, if the force of the army is to be materially augmented, this must be done by the creation of new regiments, and by multiplying the arrangements, and procuring recruits and volunteers.

I know nothing more of the proposed plan of the campaign than is disclosed in that part of the report of the Secretary of War, which has just been read to the Senate. I do not, therefore, presume to speak so horistively upon the subject; and, indeed, it may well be that no fixed system of operations has been or will be prescribed by the Executive, but that after expressing its general views, the conduct of the war will be left to the discretion of the commander. But it is easy to see, that if the obstinate injustice of the Mexicans drives us to greater exertions, and to a more enlarged sphere of operations, there are a number of positions, which, from their importance, military or political, we must seize and hold. These can only be indicated by an exact knowledge of the country, and particularly of its great lines of communication, which must be commanded and guarded.

And the mining countries would claim their share of attention, in the efforts we may be called on to make. The rich districts of Zacatecas and San Luis yet contribute their supplies to the reduced treasury of the enemy. In a few days a letter from one of the most gallant and distinguished generals in Mexico, which estimates the revenue now derived from the mines at an amount so much higher than I was prepared to expect, that I am now willing to state it to the Senate. I am not at liberty to name my authority.

If the same infatuation continues to prevail in the Mexican councils, we can hold on, as indeed we must hold on, and let the enemy pay the cost of a state of things whose existence is owing to themselves. Without the extinction of their independence, and the annexation of such a vast population to our country, with few and no ties to unite them to us, we can continue to govern them, if we govern them with energy and justice, such as never was in their history, till the lessons of adversity shall have taught them to do us right, and till the experience of our kindness and its operation around them shall have brought them to a better state of feeling. We can then treat with efficient rulers, and after securing the just objects of the war, we can retire leaving the Mexican people in the enjoyment of their independence, with a salutary conviction that it is better to provoke our friendship by justice, than to provoke our enmity by insult and aggression.

The returns show that we have less than 20,000 men, rank and file, which exclude officers, in the midst of a hostile population of eight or ten millions differing from us in race, in language, in religion, in institutions, in prejudices, and indeed in all the characteristics which constitute national distinctions, and separate the great families of mankind from one another. This is exclusive of our forces upon the Rio Grande, amounting to about 6,000 rank and file, and which is hardly large enough to hold that region in peaceable possession and to guard against the irruption of the Mexican troops. And it may be that it will be found necessary to concentrate with a view to onward operations, either directly upon San Luis, or by the more circuitous but less difficult route of Zacatecas, to the central countries of Northern Mexico.

He was believes that the principal force of 23,000 men, and this auxiliary force of 6,000, including the sick, invalids and disabled, are amply sufficient to hold in subjection the people already reduced to obedience, to carry the war further the longer it is protracted, and to meet its casualties, whether they are found in the battle field, in the climate, or in popular tumults, may well vote against this bill, and refuse the augmentation it proposes. But those who, like me, believe that this government, founded by all, for the good of all, is bound to the most sacred obligations, not to expose its citizens to unnecessary peril, nor to push their exertions to the very limit of human endurance, but to make the most liberal arrangements for the prosecution of the war, and to hold the treasure of the nation light as dust, when weighed in the balance with the life blood of its sons, will cheerfully vote for this proposition, and hail its passage not only as a necessary measure of public safety, but as a tribute to gallantry and patriotism.

[Wherever * * * * appear the copy was so bad that it was wholly impossible to decypher it.—HERALD.]

When Mr. Cass had concluded,

Mr. Crittenden moved to postpone the further consideration of the bill till to-morrow.

Mr. Cass—I have no objection.

Mr. Crittenden.—Is it to-morrow or the day after, the Senator from South Carolina wishes to speak?

Mr. Calhoun—To-morrow.

Mr. Cass—It is understood that after the Senator from South Carolina shall have spoken, his resolutions will give way to the bill.

Mr. Calhoun said that in a conversation with the chairman on Military Affairs, it had been agreed that he (Mr. Calhoun) should have an opportunity to speak upon his resolutions to-morrow, and that was all the understanding that was had upon the subject.

Mr. Crittenden—I would move, then, to postpone the bill till day after to-morrow.

Mr. Cass would not consent that the bill should be laid over or deferred longer than to-morrow. It was important to pass it at once. He would hear the Senator from South Carolina with great pleasure, as he always had done; but if his resolutions were after that persisted in, he would have to call a vote of the Senate upon them.

After some further conversation—

Mr Crittenden hoped the bill would be postponed till the day after to-morrow.

Mr. Foote, after a hearing of the Senator from South Carolina should be had, earnestly pleaded the return to the consideration and immediate action upon the bill; and unless there was a distinct informal understanding that after the remarks of the Senator from South Carolina the bill should be taken up again, he would oppose the motion of postponement now.

Mr. Atchison moved that the Senate go into executive session

The Vice President—There is a pending motion to postpone.

Mr Cass—I trust the Senate will not go into executive session. It is important that the bill should be acted upon, and I hope it will go on, if the question of postponement is deferred. We have yet an hour (to three o'clock) for the consideration of the bill.

Mr. Atchison—I make the motion to go into executive session; the question of postponement can be decided upon to-morrow.

Mr Crittenden—As the Senator intimates, we can leave the question of postponement till to-morrow.

Mr. Calhoun—I am certainly desirous of knowing in advance whether I shall have an opportunity to speak to-morrow or not. I shall, of course, give way if the Senate says so. But I regard this as certainly very extraordinary that the Chairman on Military Affairs should have anticipated me by a bill, which the Senator from Ohio (Mr Allen) has said was intended as a parliamentary advantage over me. It is an advantage that has no precedent of anything of the kind that I have ever known. I do not choose to speak upon the bill. It does not afford scope enough for the remarks which I desire to make; but I now only wish to understand whether I am to speak to-morrow or not.

Mr. Cass explained. He would not do injustice to the Senator from South Carolina—no discourtesy. He had given notice, however, that he should move to take up this bill to the exclusion of all other business. He should be glad to hear the Senator from South Carolina; but could not consent to a longer postponement of the bill.

Mr. Westcott was opposed to anything that would arrest immediate action upon the bill. He would oppose anything that hindered the passage of the necessary measures for the succor of the army situated as it was in the midst of a population of eight or ten millions of hostile people. In three weeks the army might be surrounded and cut off to some of its details; and if any disaster of this kind should happen, he did not wish their blood to be upon his hands. He was prepared, for one to sit here until this bill was passed.

Mr. Badger said that a fortnight ago, the resolution of the Senator from South Carolina were made the special order for to-morrow; and that on the last sitting day of the Senate, up to that time, but one, the chairman on military affairs had moved and urged the discussion of this bill, to the exclusion of the previous order. This, in my opinion, sir, exhibits a want of courtesy to the Senator from South Carolina, not in accordance with the usages of this body. Nothing but extreme public necessity would justify such a course. What is now the necessity that this bill should be urged through in such hot haste? The argument of the Senator from Florida overleaps itself; for if any serious disaster could be immediately apprehended, is there a way, by any possible human agency, that by the necessarily slow process of the passage of this bill, and the slow details of enlisting and organizing the troops these ten regiments could be sent down to avert such disaster? The general subject of the war would have to undergo a general discussion, and that discussion could as well be had on Mr. Calhoun's resolutions as upon this bill. He hoped, therefore, the Senate would at least postpone the bill till the day after to-morrow.

Mr. Cass, in reply to the Senator from N. Carolina, disavowed any intention of discourtesy to the Senator from South Carolina. He had given an early notice of this bill, and that he should ask for its consideration to the exclusion of all other business. The afflicting hand of Providence had arrested our business proceedings in those last offices of respect that are due to the dead, and this was the very first day which had been afforded for the consideration of the subject. He was opposed to a general discussion upon Mr Calhoun's resolutions. He would cheerfully agree to postpone the bill one day, to allow the Senator to express his views; but beyond that he was opposed to any further debate in advance of the action of the Senate upon the bill.

Mr. Butler had no favor to ask for his colleague. It was a simple question of justice. There was an ascertained majority here for the bill. It was for them to decide when it should be postponed, and when taken up; but why could they not as well make that decision after to-morrow, as in advance of the resolutions of his colleague? Mr B was not disposed, like the Senator from Florida, to take counsel from consternation. There was no ground for apprehending any immediate danger to the army.

Mr. Foote, in reply to the Senator from N. Carolina, (Mr. Badger) disclaimed any idea of discourtesy to the Senator from South Carolina, and he thought the former Senator had made the charge without being able to sustain it by the evidence in the case. There was an uniform disposition in the Senate, for the most perfect courtesy, especially toward the Senator from South Carolina; there was a fraternal good feeling towards him, an almost filial respect; and where, then, was the ground for a charge of a want of courtesy? From the silence on the other side, Mr. Foote was disposed to think there might be some scheme in this movement for the postponement of this bill, as one of the measures for sustaining the war; and with great earnestness, he pleaded the necessity of immediately succoring our soldiers in the field.

Mr. Badger disclaimed any intention of charging a design of discourtesy upon the chairman on military affairs. It was quite possible, however, that a gentleman might exhibit a want of courtesy, without being aware of it. It was quite possible there might be different opinions on the subject. Nor was there any scheme in this matter, as suggested by the Senator from Mississippi. He (Mr. Badger) came from a part of the Union where scheming was not practised, and where it was not held in very high repute; and not being schemers themselves, they were not in the habit of suspecting others of scheming. He could not go into an informal understanding that when the gentleman from South Carolina is heard, the bill shall take precedence of the resolutions.

Mr. Cass did not wish to be held responsible for a remark of the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Allen), that the motion to take up the bill was a parliamentary move to cut off the resolutions of the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. Sevier would be glad to hear the Senator from South Carolina; but he thought that, after that, the question is, shall the bill come up? After the Senator had spoken, if none else should do it, he should move to lay the resolutions upon the table.

Voices—Certainly, certainly—that's the better way.

Mr. Dickinson reminded the Senate that his resolutions had precedence by priority of those of the Senator from South Carolina. He should not, however, press them upon the Senate; but would wait a favorable opportunity, when, at some proper interval of relief from business, he might call them up for consideration.

Mr. Mangum declared against any intention of arresting the measures of the administration on the war bills, in urging the propriety of allowing the resolutions of the Senator from South Carolina, first to come up for discussion.

Mr. Foster rose to an explanation and a vindication. He meant no disrespect in what he had said. He agreed with the Senator from North Carolina in what he had stated in defence of the people of his State, against any idea of scheming; nor do I believe that the State intended to intimate that I came from a State whose acts have been discreditable. If I had thought so, I should have shown some promptitude, and some heat, perhaps, in repelling the imputation. But if the Senator did mean it, I can say, that so high is the reputation of Mississippi in the estimation of the civilized world, that she is even above the reach of the Senator from North Carolina. She is so far beyond his aim, that he has not the strength to bring his arrows to the mark.

Mr. Badger said he did not even think of past reminiscences in the history of our country, in the remarks which he had made, which seemed so strongly to have excited the suspicions of the Senator from Mississippi. (Laughter.) He meant no disrespect to the Senator of Mississippi. It was largely composed of citizens from North Carolina; and if the Senator and his State, shall not be assailed till assailed by me, he will have a quiet senatorial career. In charging a scheme upon this side of the House, I am willing to admit that the word might have slipped from him—that he did not mean it, and be ing aided powerfully by a clear conscience, I do not know that I should have felt it, even if he had meant what he said.

Mr. Foote said that while the explanation of the Senator was exquisitely graceful, there was evidently something yet behind.

Mr Badger—I have disclaimed any disrespect to the Senator and his State. I can go no further, nor make it a matter of discussion.

Mr Foote rejoined, that while the explanation was apparently conclusive, he wished to say one word.

Mr. Badger—Was not the disclaimer sufficient?

Mr. Foote—Yes, it was exquisitely beautiful; it was graceful, and agreeable, and done in a most charming manner; but still there was one portion of it which excited painful emotions, and that was, that the Hon. Senator did not know that any past circumstances in the history of the country would have excited my suspicions.

Mr Badger said he had distinctly declared that he did not think of any past circumstances in the history of the country in connection with the remark in question. He did not even think of them at the time.

Mr. Foote expressed himself as satisfied with the Senator's explanation.

[The point in question, we suppose, was the question of those bonds.]

Mr. Douglass appealed for the bill. He was, with all respect, opposed to giving any abstraction, whether from the Senator from South Carolina, or the Senator from New York, or any one else, a precedence over the legislature of the country. He was opposed to setting aside the hour bills and the supply bills, to discuss what he considered the idle question whether we should annex Mexico or not. He wished to see the speeches of Senators made upon practical measures, which involved some responsibility.

Mr. Westcott was proceeding to state that he meant not the immediate danger of the army, when he spoke of the necessity of immediate relief, whereupon,

Mr. Badger rose and said—Oh no, the Senator did not say immediate danger; but three weeks hence.

Mr. Westcott, rejoined at some length in favor of action upon the bill; and as Mr. Calhoun's resolutions (declaratory against the annexation of Mexico) and the bill were not antagonistic, there was nothing in the two measures to prevent his giving his sanction to both, if it were necessary

Mr. Calhoun expressed his willingness to adopt the suggestion of the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr Jefferson Davis urged the necessity of immediate action upon the bill. Immediate action was required to get the troops to Mexico before the yellow fever should set in. The Senator from Florida was therefore right. It was tardy legislation in the supply of troops which had led to the necessity of so many bloody battles. It was from this cause that the battle of Buena Vista had to be fought; and if, after the battle of Cerro Gordo, Gen Scott had been at the head of a large and sufficient army Santa Anna would not have had time to reorganize at Orizaba, or to fortify the Mexican capital, but, on the other hand, Gen. Scott could have marched on to the city, and occupied it without firing a gun. What led to the battle of Buena Vista, but the fact, that the enemy knew that Gen Taylor's troops were withdrawn, and thought that he would fall an easy prey, and that every depot to the Gulf would be the succeeding plunder of the expedition. We must either expend our money or our blood. As to the resolutions of the Senator from South Carolina, there was no antagonism between them and the bill. Who was for annexing Mexico? Is there one man in the country? But was this an argument against relieving the army? He hoped the bill would receive a prompt consideration.

Mr. Sevier moved that the bill be postponed till Wednesday, at one o'clock, and that the Senate now go into executive session.

Mr. Crittenden—One remark. The Senator from Mississippi was mistaken if he supposed that any of the disasters of the war were attributable to tardy legislation. They had voted all the men and money asked. In the outset, there were 50,000 voted for the war in a single day, and they were not exhausted till a day or two ago, and then they were called out to serve during the war. Whatever might have occurred, it was not chargeable to tardy legislation.

Mr. Davis replied that there was often, in the service, not money enough on hand to get a tent, or a camp kettle, or forage, or supplies of any kind.

Mr. Crittenden said there was not a dollar asked for that had not been granted. Not a single appropriation had been reduced. This had been peculiarly the case, that every man, and every dollar asked, had been granted.

Mr. Davis had intended to refer to one item not allowed.

Mr. Crittenden—I do not recollect it. What is it?

Mr. Davis—It was garrison equipage.

Mr. Crittenden—That was not here.

Mr. Davis—It was in the other house.

Mr. Crittenden—Ah, yes, but even that does not apply to us

And, on motion, the bill, as understood, was postponed till Wednesday, (the ten regiment bill,) and then the Senate went into executive session.

[Of course this is but a sketch of the many columns required to fill up the discussion of the day; but the reader will discover that we have secured the strong points, throughout]

House of Representatives.

[In consequence of the crowded state of our columns, by the press of important matter, we are compelled to leave over the proceedings of the House of Representatives on Monday last.]

Affairs in the City of Mexico.

[Cor. of the New Orleans Delta, Dec 24]

The following letter from a Mexican, dated Mexico Nov 27th, was sent to a friend at Vera Cruz:

"Every time I take the pen to write to you, it recalls to my mind the days we have passed in happiness. It seems to me that I still hear the voice of those friends with whom every evening I enjoyed a few hours—friends who I will, perhaps, meet no more. It seems as though I still hear the music of that charming Rosa, who, alas! was a victim of that terrible bombardment whose horrible crash still sounds to my heart

The vengeance of God has fallen upon us, and we must bear the heavy weight of the punishment we are condemned to suffer. Our countrymen have too long been in the path of crime, and now we must suffer with resignation, the will of our God. We cannot ask when his vengeance will be appeased; but still, we hope! We hope that months will not elapse before we may at the altar of his church sing a *Te Deum* of thanks to his holiness, for his kindness in freeing us from the yoke of a stranger—the greatest of evils.

We are all so thunder-struck here by the late victory gained over our arms, that indeed we look upon the handful of North Americans who conquered us, with astonishment and respect—for they are considered as the tools which the Almighty uses against us. My poor countrymen try to throw all the blame upon their officers, and the most eminent among them have been called "traitors!" But, my dear friend, do not believe that—the field of battle answers that it is a lie!

You ought to have been there to count the brave fellows lying here and there—some pierced by five or six balls, others by the cold iron of the bayonets! There you would have seen how guilty are those who call our officers "traitors!"

The government, now in Queretaro (if it can be called a government, for at present we have no government), has nominated commissioners to meet Mr Trist. They are expected here to-day, if they have not yet arrived, which I did not learn. But what will be the result? Can they accept the conditions which will be imposed by the United States? Will they have enough energy to cede an inch of our territory? If they do, they will be called by the ignominious name of "traitors"

This is not the worst; it is rumored that Mr. Trist has been recalled by his government, and that the powers with which he was clothed have been withdrawn from him. If this be the case, there is no possibility of making peace—for the present, at least. One hope, the last, the last!—is, that the Congress of Washington, tired of victories, will withdraw its armies; at least, from a portion of our territory, and abandon to us a small space, where we will be able to breathe our last, separated from the rest of human beings. A new President has been elected—Sr. Don Pedro Anaya. Will we be more happy under him than under the other Presidents? I am afraid not. What can he do? Nothing! I fear my letter will be too long; I will, therefore, terminate, promising you another by the first opportunity.

ALBANY, Jan. 3, 1847.

The Organization of the Legislature—General Events in Albany—Political Curiosities, &c. &c.

There is a terrible hubbub in relation to the organization of the two Houses, and particulary of the lower House. Greeley has come hither from Washington, (at the suggestion of Weed,) to assist in making a suitable organization. The whigs are at swords points—the radical section, headed by Greeley, are pledged to expunge Prindle, the prince of clerks, and to put Mr. Seth C. Hawley, of Erie county, in his place. There is thus a prospect of a refreshing row in the whig caucus, which will be held at the capitol to-night. The struggle will be between the Greeleyites and the anti-Greeleyites, and it is asserted that the latter gentlemen are in a decided majority, in both Houses. The power of Weed is waning; it is at the point of dissolution, and he seems to have made the most desperate efforts to procure a radical organization; if he fails his chance at the treasury will be poor. Mr. Hawley was a candidate for the clerkship of the Senate; but lately he has abandoned his claims to that office, and is now engaged in furious efforts to oust Prindle from the clerkship of the House. This course was adopted because there are already several competitors for the clerkship of the Senate, the most prominent of whom are Bogart, of New York, and Beers, late member of Assembly from Westchester, with a large proportion of the Senators pledged to sustain one or the other of these gentlemen. Mr. Hawley's election was, of course, out of the question. His friends could, therefore, sit upon no other expedient than to drop Prindle and run him for the clerkship of the House. This was hard, but it was better than to provoke the wrath of such a man as Hawley. In old Erie, is said, his influence and popularity are tremendous, and he has represented her in the Assembly. It was therefore an awful apprehension that Hawley would push Erie from her moorings if he was not elected clerk, that induced the radical whigs to undertake so desperate a game as the expulsion of Philander B. Prindle, the popular and esteemed clerk of the last House. We shall have some fun before the thing is settled.

Everybody is in town, and there are hundreds of applicants for the offices of sergeant at arms, door-keepers, assistant clerks, pages, &c. &c.

We have a bland and beautiful day, with a bright sun, and we saw the new comptroller taking a morning walk. All the members are in town.

Stock Markets.

BOSTON, Jan. 3.—*Brokers Board*—2 shs Western Railr 104; 5 do. do. 103¾; 3 do. Eastern Railroad, (N. H.) 104¾; 10 do Reading Railroad 29¾; 13 do. National Ins Co 51¾; 50 do. East Boston Co. 13¾; 200 do. do. do. b o 5 ds 18¾; 50 do. Norwich and Worcester Railroad b o 10 ds 37½; 14 do. Cheshire Railroad 96; 25 do. East Boston Co. Dividends, No. 4, 5 1-10; $2000 Reading R R Bonds, 1850, 66½.

MARITIME HERALD.

Port of New York, January 5, 1848.

SUN RISES.....7 24 | MOON RISES.....6 19
SUN SETS.....4 36 | HIGH WATER.....8 25

Cleared.

Ships—Columbia, (pk) Cropper, Liverpool, C H Marshall; Gladiator, (okt) Williams, London, Grinnell, Minturn & Co; Utica, (pkt) Swan, Havre, Boyd & Hincken; Brooksby, (Br) McEwen, Glasgow, Woodhull & Minturn.

Barks—Albers, Wawick, New Orleans, Hicks & Bailey; Geo Henry, McCobb, do, Maitland & Ford.

Brigs—Marian Gage, Reed, Belize, Hon. B Blanco; Isabella, Mitchell, St Marys, Ga. Nesmith & Walsh; Arabian, Griffin, Baltimore.

Schs—W W Wyer, Snow, Demerara, H Underwood; Jas A Morse, (Br) Boyle, Halifax, B McEwen; Lynchburg, Gould, Richmond; Virginia, Hoffman, Philadelphia; Emeline, Martin, do.

Arrived.

Bark Lucilla, (of Salem) Ropes, Analaboo (Sumatra), 105 days, and St Helena 45 days with 2500 picula pepper, to T Doland, of Salem. Left no Am vessels at St Helena. Dec 21th, lat 37 10, lon 63 30, spoke bark I Forbes, of and from New Haven for Porto Rico; 27th, lat 29, lon 67 30, spoke schr Bengal, of Thomaston, for St Domingo, Maitland & Ford.

Brigantine Bark Amorita, De Boninge, Valparaiso, 97 days, to E Bartlett & Co

Bark Jane, Witham, St Martins, 23 days, with 7500 bushels salt, to J Durand & Co.

Hamburg brig Hansa, Martins, Rio Janeiro, Nov 3, with 2070 bags coffee 581 cal skins 35 pkgs indse 3 S Skins & Ironside. Nov 26, lat 21, lon 29, spoke British ship Stag, from London for Point Philip.

Brig Pedraza, Dorritis, Nassau NP 9 days, to A G Benson & Co. Sid in co with bark Gen Harrison, for Alexandria, she having repaired.

British brig Planet, Bryan, Salt Key, 13 days, with 2800 bushels salt, to J & G Laurie. Dec 30, lat 25 47, lon 73 46, spoke schr John Polk, from New London for Charleston. 3d inst, off Bonegat, in a gale from ENE sprung foremast, carried away head of mainmast, &c.

Brig Elsworth, (of Calais) Johnson, Maragoane, 12 days, with logwood, to master.

British brig Manila, O'Brien, Halifax, 14 days, with fish, to Nicols & Miles

Brig Ava, (base Calais, via New London, 2 days, with lumber, to Brett & Voss

Schr Ocean, Burditt, Ports Cabello, Dec 15, to G Whitaker. Spoke, Dec 31, schr Pallas, from Bucksport for Virginia; same time, schr Mary, 8 days from Boston for Wilmington, Cape Henlopen bearing N ¾ W, distant 17 miles.

Schr Leopard, Hunt, Cleveburg, 30 days, to master.

Schr Canary, Mansworth, Machias, 30 days.

Schr Orellana, Rich, New Haven.

Schr Monterey, Stubbs, Delaware City.

Schr Eagle, Jones, Sag Harbor.

Below.

2 brigs, unknown.

Sailed.

Packet ships Columbia, Liverpool; Gladiator, London; ships Cristoval Colon, Havana; Jessore, New Orleans; Charleston, Charleston; barks Hudson, Bremen; Swan, Cole Reury, St Marys; brigs Cordelia, Ponce; Erato, Porto Cabello; Haidee, Harbor Grace; and others.

Herald Marine Correspondence.

PHILADELPHIA, Jan 4, 4 P M—Arrived—Schs Mary George, Watts, Wilmington, NC; William Henry, May, Bridgeport; Asher C Havens, Barrett, New York; Reaper, Myers, do; Frances Esther, Nash, do; Brookhaven, Burdick, do; Adeline, Seely, Bridgeton, NJ.

Below—Barks Elizabeth J, Gallagher, Havana; Hope, Lane, Port Spain.

Cleared—Schs Charles A Hannam, Thomas, Barbadoes; Increase, Westcott, Boston; Reaper, Myers, New York.

Miscellaneous Record.

PACKET SHIP UTICA, for Havre, will sail this morning. Letter bags at the usual places.

SHIP CHARLEMAGNE, of this port, and formerly one of the Havre packets, was lost on one of the Bahamas on the 17th ult. She was an old ship, built in this city nearly 20 years ago, of 446 tons register. She was valued at about $12,000, insured in Wall st. The following letter from the agent of the underwriters to Mr Tappan, secretary of the board, received yesterday, gives the particulars.

NASSAU, N. B, Dec 22.

A small vessel arrived this morning from Spanish Wells, near Harbor Island, with the crew and some of the passengers from the wreck of the packet ship Charlemagne, Packard, 9 days from New York, which left Harbor Island on the morning of the 17th December, about 4 o'clock, and in a total wreck. We understand most of the goods were saved between decks, but how much damaged, have not been informed.

The brig Fedraza has been wind bound since one of the 22nd inst, and we are enabled to inform you that Captain Packard has arrived with the most of the goods saved from the Charlemagne, and we regret to learn that all, with the exception perhaps of fifteen or twenty boxes of hats, are more or less damaged. All the cotton goods had to be sold immediately, they smelt so bad. The vessel bilged in about two hours after she struck, not saving the provisions belonging to the ship, that were perishable by being wet with salt water. The salvage has been settled this morning at forty-five per cent, a great portion of the goods having been dove up." [She had an assorted cargo of no very great value]

SHIP TENNESSEE, Pray, of Boston, from Bremen for New Orleans got ashore on Orange Keys about 19th Dec, but was got off and taken into Nassau, NP. The captain has concluded to forward on the passengers to New Orleans, and wait instructions from Boston. The estimated repairs amount to over $10,000. The ship was valued at $4,467, including 7,800 bags, the only cargo. The wreckers, for getting off the vessel and bringing her into port, were allowed a salvage of 40 per cent. While lying off the harbor on the night of the 14th, there was an attempt at mutiny by the crew, but the energetic measures of Capt Pray soon quelled the disturbance.

BRIG WALTER R JONES, JR, from Turks Island, with salt, for Norfolk, is reported by telegraph ashore a few miles South of Cape Henry. The dispatch is dated 4th inst, and states that she had two feet water in her hold. She belonged to the U S Government. She went ashore on the morning of the 31st, in a dense fog, and at