pany of Austria and Prussia, but when I add that Russian intrigue has been unusually active this week at Paris, endeavoring to bribe the French Ministers and frighten Louis Napoleon into a vacillating position, it is explained.

LONDON, Friday, Feb. 3, 1854.

Rupture Between the Western Powers and Russia—Departure of the Russian Ambassadors—Debate in Parliament—The Eastern Question—Prince Albert—The American Ambassador Absent—American Subjects in Austria—Count Orloff's Mission, &c.

The crisis has come at last. Baron Brunow at London, and Baron Kisseleff at Paris, have demanded their passports, and left London and Paris simultaneously. That great she diplomatist, Princess Lieven, has also packed up her bonnet boxes, and is gone to Brussels; but, if report speaks true, cannot remain long there.

The reason why the two Russian Ambassadors demanded their passports is because the reply to the Emperor's demand of explanations relative to the entrance of the fleets into the Black Sea was not satisfactory. In my last communication I made you acquainted with the nature of the explanations demanded. As yet the Czar has not thought fit to give any answer whatever to the last proposition of the Porte, (the so called Redcliffe ultimatum,) so that there is still an outlet for him. The Queen's speech still talks of prospects of peace; but everything denotes war. This opinion is shared by all parties. The next step will be the recall of Sir H. Seymour and General Castelbajac from St. Petersburg, and then a formal declaration of war.

On the night of the opening of Parliament the Eastern question was at once brought forward. I will give you a brief analysis of the debate. In the Lords, the Marquis of Clanricarde attacked the policy of the government and complained that in the speech itself it was not stated whether we were at war or not. We were on the brink of a great war, which a firm attitude on our part might have prevented. He then entered into a narrative of the Menschikoff mission and the aggressive course pursued by Russia. He saw no prospect of peace now, and if Russia was silly enough to go to war with the Western Powers, it certainly should not be for the renewal of treaties which had led to the present difficulties.

Lord Clarendon said that until the papers were laid on the table he deprecated a discussion. He could say, however, that if Russia did not accept the terms that were now proposed by Turkey, she would be the sole obstacle to peace, and on her would rest the whole responsibility of war. He hoped that when the correspondence on the question had been read, it would be found that nothing had been done inconsistent with the honor and dignity of the country.

The Earl of Malmesbury called their attention to a very remarkable omission in the Queen's speech. No mention was made of England acting in concert with Austria and Prussia.

Earl Grey thought that the whole policy of the government stood in need of full explanations.

Lord Derby made a very long speech against the government. He said that whilst we professed to be at peace we were actually at war. The Earl of Aberdeen defended himself against the charge of being a tool of Russia, and declined giving any explanations on Palmerston's resignation and resumption of office.

In the Commons the debate was not warm. There seemed to be an understanding to wait till the Parliamentary papers on the subject had been presented. Lord John Russell thanked the House for its moderation. He said that the conduct of Prince Menschikoff had shown that Russia had added to an unjust and unprincipled invasion, conduct which he could not but characterise "as fraudulent." Both in the Lords and Commons considerable pains were taken to whitewash Prince Albert of the charges brought against him. Palmerston did not speak.

The gallant Sibthorp observed that he regarded the speech from the throne as a contrivance of Ministers to cover their own iniquitous practices.

Two enormous "blue-books" of the correspondence on the Eastern question between all the diplomatists at Vienna, London, Paris, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople, were yesterday laid upon the tables of both houses and copies sent to each member. The great debate will come off shortly, unless actual war cuts it off.

The mission of Count Orloff—the bosom friend, the *alter ego* of Nicholas—is still the great topic of the day. He has had various interviews with the young Austrian Emperor, and the most contradictory rumors are afloat as to the real object of his mission. It is quite clear to sensible men that his object is to induce Austria and Prussia to join Russia against the Western Powers. It is difficult to say what Austria will do. Her own interests ought to induce her to reject the Russian propositions. I fear she will not; and yet the Austrian journals have now taken a view more favorable to adhering to France and England than formerly. The Prince of Prussia is said to be decidedly against Prussia joining Russia. It is impossible for these Powers to remain neutral in case of a European war.

A few days must now decide the question.

The American Ambassador was not present at the opening of Parliament, as only "full dress" was admitted. See an article on this question in this day's *Daily News*. That same journal of yesterday contains the correspondence relative to the incarceration of an American subject by the Austrian authorities, to which I alluded on a former occasion.

As a play-off to Count Orloff's mission, Louis Napoleon has sent his cousin, Prince Napoleon, on a special mission to Brussels, where he has been received with great honors. King Leopold will, it is said, join England and France in the coming struggle. Denmark and Sweden are actively arming.

A telegraphic despatch has just been received here from undoubted authority from Constantinople. It is dated January 23d. It announces the return to the Bosphorus, to their old anchorage at Baycos of the combined fleets from the Black Sea. Their return had created the greatest astonishment at Constantinople. Why they have suddenly returned no one knows here. Perhaps they feared the Russian fleet intended a *coup de main* on Constantinople. This is simply conjecture.

A telegraphic despatch from Vienna, dated last night, says that it is reported there that the Emperor of Austria has declared to Count Orloff that if the Russians cross the Danube he will consider it a declaration of war. Austria adds the report, insists on the adoption of the last propositions. I do not wish you to believe more of this report than is digestible; still it comes from a well informed quarter.

Consols are at 90¾.

Our Paris Correspondence.

PARIS, Feb 2, 1854.

The Eastern Question—Missions of Prince Napoleon to Brussels and Count Orloff to Vienna—Adhesion of Changarnier, Lamoriciere, and Bedeau to the Bourbon Princes—Arrests—Health of the Empress—Mr. Fould Rewarded for Paying the Bills of the Royal Household—Interview between the Emperor and M. Ravignon, the Jesuit.

At the date of my last letter war was certain;—it is now official. M. Kisseleff exchanged yesterday with M. Drouyn de l'Huys the last word, and received the last answer, that decides his immediate departure. The Minister of Foreign Affairs did not conceal from the Czar's representative that orders had been given to protect the Turkish convoys and to stop those of Russia, which formed the principal points of the explanations demanded by the Czar. These instructions were to have been renewed again on the 15th, and I learn, moreover, that they are already in progress of execution. A convoy of Russian transports, which was conveying supplies to the army of Asia, has been compelled to turn back to Sebastopol, under an injunction from the Anglo-French fleet. This fact, no doubt, served as an answer on the part of M. Drouyn de L'Huys, and as a rule of conduct to M. de Kisseleff, who leaves Paris this morning. In addition to this, the English feeling evidenced at the meeting of the British Parliament in the reception, mingled with impatient hisses, which greeted the Queen, points inevitably to war.

There are at this moment two conciliatory facts that occupy a good deal of the public attention here, namely: the journey of Prince Napoleon to Brussels, and that of Count Orloff to Vienna. The following details have transpired respecting the objects of the first of these missions. According to the version I have heard, the Prince is commissioned to secure at any price the support of Belgium, (to assure it until the opportunity arrives to seize upon that country;) and he is instructed to offer as compensation for this support the restoration of that portion of the Orleans property which was taken from King Leopold, the husband of a princess of that house, by the decree of the 22d of January, 1852. The Prince is also to make overtures for a future marriage between himself and the daughter of King Leopold, who is now about fourteen years of age, and in the event of a successful issue to these negotiations, he is further instructed to invite the Duke and Duchess of Brabant to come to Paris, and then to continue their route to Berlin, Vienna, and even Stockholm, in order to try equally to rally these courts to French influence. The correspondence of the different papers, and even the semi official journals, begin to regard as possible the departure of Prince Napoleon for Berlin.

With regard to Count Orloff, the following are the most serious statements put forth respecting his presence in Vienna. The Count will offer to treat on the basis of the Vienna protocol of the 5th of December, but on the condition that the matter shall be negotiated directly between Russia and Turkey, which condition has always been a *sine qua non* on the part of the former Power, and which does not seem likely to be accepted by England and France. This ultimatum of the Czar has, therefore, no chance of success. Count Orloff is said also to be the bearer of a project of a grand alliance between Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, the German Confederation, and other States which are not likely to take any part in the struggle, in order to consolidate and cause to be respected, if necessary, their neutrality, and endeavor in common to crush any revolutionary movement that it might lead to—a movement against which the Czar, (who thinks himself able to cope with Turkey and its allies, but who cannot divert any part of his forces from the contest,) cannot personally aid in repressing. This plan is very able on the part of Russia, as it does not appear that she demands of those Powers anything except a strict neutrality. However, she forces the intermediate Powers to declare themselves sooner or later for her. By the suppression of revolutionary movements fomented by France, or supposed to be so, it becomes necessary for these governments to join with the Czar, and present a hostile front to France and England. Upon this subject all communications, even official, arriving from the south of Europe, confirm the existence of organized conspiracies, ready to overturn the Italian governments, which are so unpopular; and as an index of the understanding of France with the revolutionists of that country, an interview—which has been noticed in the Italian papers—between M. Bonier, charged with a secret mission by the French government, and General Pepe, who was mixed up in the revolutions of the Peninsula, has been very much remarked.

It is said positively that the three celebrated exiled generals Changarnier, Lamoriciere and Bedeau, have been to Prague, to call on the Count de Chambord to assure him of their adherence to the Bourbon fusion. If this fact is not perfectly authenticated, there is at least no doubt of their actual adhesion to a reunion of the Princes of the house of Bourbon. Mlle la Terrodaay, returning from Frohsdorf, has informed the Princess some time ago of this errand.

There are still a great number of arrests. The last work of Victor Hugo "*Les Chatiments*," has been found with many persons, who were in the act of circulating it.

The health of the Empress continues to be very delicate. However, she is resolved, with the aid of the Chamberlain, M. Tascher de la Pageric, to keep up the "*bals travestis*" in the Tuileries. They will take place on the 18th and 27th. The *Moniteur* has itself felt the necessity of excusing these feasts, and has devoted an article to the influence they will have upon trade.

A letter written by the Emperor to M. Fould, and sending him the Cross of the Legion of Honor, has been found. The reason of this favor having been bestowed upon Mr. Fould is, that the Emperor's household is kept in good order, and the bills are paid up regularly.

An interview has been spoken of between the Rev. Mr. Ravignon and the Emperor. The former came to protest against the suppression of the Jesuit College of St. Michael, where tumults have lately taken place, and which has been closed in violation of law. M. Ravignon attempted to prove that the Jesuits were calumniated. The Emperor asked him why, since the reign of Henri IV., the Jesuits have always been opposed to royalty. Ravignon answered that the Church has itself been attacked by the temporal power. The Emperor then complained of the seditious tendency of the Jesuits in the south, and he promised M Ravignon to send him the reports of the Prefects to prove it, which he has done. The Emperor treated M. Ravignon with great kindness, and assured him that when he found it necessary to adopt similar measures he should send for him first and ask his advice.

Our Italian Correspondence.

MESSINA, Jan. 23, 1854.

Another Koszta Affair—Arrival of the Steam Frigate Saranac—The Immediate Release of the Captive—Affairs in Turkey—Trouble in the Combined Fleets—Annexation in the Mediterranean.

An affair, somewhat resembling the Koszta matter, recently occurred here. It seems Mr. ——, a Sicilian by birth, but now a naturalized citizen of the United States, came to visit his native island; he was immediately seized and imprisoned—accused of being here for the purpose of concerting with those inimical to the government—the republicans, as they style themselves. All correspondence of our Chargé d'Affaires at Naples, Mr. Owen, for his liberation, proved ineffectual; he could get no answers from the government to his communications. But the opportune arrival of the United States steam-frigate Saranac in the Bay of Naples put an entire new phase upon the question. A letter was immediately received by Mr. Owen from the government, but it stated nothing concerning his release. Notwithstanding this the government sent directions to Messina to have him liberated, thinking the arrival of the Saranac at Naples was for the purpose of inquiring into the matter, the government, well knowing the character of her gallant commander, Captain J. C. Long, from his course at Palermo some three years since, while commanding the Mississippi, when he insisted, and successfully, too, upon the unconditional release of two American seamen, imprisoned for no good cause, without evidence, by an partial court.

On the arrival of the Saranac at Messina it was found that Mr. —— was liberated, the orders having arrived a day or two before the coming of the Saranac. The citizens of the United States can see by this what influence our ships of war have with these petty, tyrannical governments. How long is the United States to submit to such outrages upon its citizens by such Powers? In this case, Mr. —— had with him his naturalization papers. The reason the government gives for his release is, that he was mistaken for another man by the same name.

The following is information from Constantinople I gather from Mr. Marsh, our late Minister:—

There can be but little doubt but that the "last note"—the one annulling all former treaties, and placing Russia upon the same footing with other nations—will be accepted by Russia. The Turkish sultan and government are favorable to peace, but so certain as peace is declared a revolt among the Turkish population is inevitable. They are fanatical in their desire for war. The English admiral has given notice to all English residents that they must be ready to embark on board the ships of war within twenty four hours notice for such is the state of feeling that all Christians will suffer alike.

The officers of the English fleet speak doubtingly of their ability to cope with the Russian navy, such is the state of their navy; that is considerable for Englishmen to say. But all hands agree in saying that the French fleet is in a much more perfect state of discipline than the English. The French navy at this time was never in a more warlike state than at present, and in a general European war, if it should happen, is it not likely that France and England sooner or later will be brought antagonistic? Already differences of opinions have sprung up between the respective admirals at Constantinople. They are so jealous now one of another that if one fleet receives an addition of a vessel the other fleet is sure to receive a similar vessel—but at the present time the French fleet exceeds by about a hundred guns that of the English. In the event of a peace between Turkey and Russia, will not both England and France desire to be paid for the immense expense they have been at in defending Turkey? And will not Egypt, in the eyes of each, seem a sufficiency to compensate them for their expenses. I consider that the end is not yet. War is likely to spring up somewhere in an unthought of quarter.

A curious proposition has sprung up in these waters, that throws completely in the shade Cuba, Sandwich Islands, or Japan. It is no less than the proposition submitted to the embassy at Constantinople, by the vice consul at Crete, to annex that island, together with the island of Candia, to the United States. Ha, a short time ago, had a difficulty with the French consul concerning a pew in a church, which he considered a *casus belli*, and insisted that it should be made a government matter of.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

Official Correspondence Presented to the British Parliament.

M DROUYN DE L'HUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI.

[Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski.]

PARIS December 15, 1853

I propose to order Vice-Admirals Hamelin and Dundas to declare to Prince Menschikoff, or to Admiral Kornilloff, that the governments of France and England are resolved to prevent the repetition of the affair at Sinope; that every Russian ship met with at sea by our ships will henceforth be invited to return to Sebastopol; and that any act of agression which, notwithstanding this notice, may be attempted against the Ottoman territory or flag, will be repelled by force.

As a consequence of this declaration, we shall find ourselves, in conjunction with Turkey, masters of a vast basin which washes the provinces of the Russian empire, at once the most important and the most exposed; and to the occupation of Walachia and Moldavia, so long as that shall last, we shall oppose a corresponding occupation, of which the consequences will assuredly be more serious for the Cabinet of St. Petersburg than the taking possession of the Principalities can be for the Porte. Either the army commanded by Prince Gortchakoff will repass the Pruth, or our vessels, as far as the season will admit, will cruise in the Black Sea, and will interrupt all the maritime communications of Russia with her Asiatic Provinces. We should thus retain the Black Sea as a pledge until the evacuation of the Principalities and the re-establishment of peace. Meanwhile, the influence of the West, almost unknown in those quarters, will penetrate there; the dangers to which our presence will expose a rule badly settled, the new relations and interests which it may develope in countries lost to the commerce of the world; such, M. le Comte, are the serious grounds for reflection which such a demonstration, executed with vigor, is calculated to inspire the cabinet of St. Petersburg.

The attitude of that cabinet, the pretensions which it has announced, the invasion of Moldavia and Walachia in full peace, the bold aggression of which Sinope a few days ago was the scene—all these circumstances taken together, announce views and resolutions which Europe can only alter by adopting in its turn an energetic course; and at present I see no one more efficacious than that which I have just pointed out. France and England, by the independence of their policy, and by the means at their disposal, are called upon first to come to a decision. It is a duty, M. le Comte, which the Emperor's government, for its part is ready to undertake, if her Britannic Majesty's government, on its side, is disposed to bear with it. It is accordingly his imperial majesty's pleasure that you should give this assurance to Lord Clarendon, while delivering to him a copy of this dispatch. Receive, &c.,

DROUYN DE L'HUYS.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO LORD COWLEY.

(Extract.)

In my despatch to Lord Stratford of the 20th Dec, I have also stated that it was only by obtaining a complete command of the Black Sea that the policy of the English and French governments could be effectually carried out, and the occurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope, could be prevented.

These instructions are in accordance with the instructions that Count Walewski told me would be addressed to the French Ambassador at Constantinople; but the French government now propose to us, in addition, that the Ottoman flag, as well as the Ottoman territory, should be protected by the combined fleets, and that all Russian vessels, other than merchantmen, met in the Black Sea, should be required to return to Sebastopol.

Her Majesty's government having clearly announced that the recurrence of a disaster such as that at Sinope must be prevented, and that the command of the Black Sea must be secured, would have been content to have left the manner of executing those instructions to the discretion of the admirals, but they attach so much importance not alone to the united action of the two governments, but to the instructions addressed to their respective agents being precisely the same, that they are prepared to adopt the specific mode of action now proposed by the government of the Emperor.

Instructions to that effect will accordingly be addressed to Lord Stratford.

* * * * *

Her Majesty's government have not hesitated to adopt the course which the honor and dignity of this country prescribe, but at the same time they do not disguise from themselves that it may at no distant period involve England and France in war with Russia, and they consider it equally for the honor and dignity of the two powers not to allow the peace of Europe to be dependent upon that national spirit in Turkey, which, however admirable in its itself, and however useful against the aggressor, is now evidently beyond the control of the Turkish government. Her Majesty's government would therefore propose to the government of the Emperor that, in making known to the Porte the course which the two governments are about to pursue, the English and French Ambassadors should at the same time be instructed to demand, in the event of the answer to the proposal recently sent from Vienna having been unsatisfactory, that the terms on which a treaty of peace between Russia and Turkey shall be negotiated may be left to the decision of England and France, on the distinct understanding that nothing shall be proposed on her part to which she has already officially objected.

SIR G. H. SEYMOUR TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.

ST. PETERSBURG, Dec. 26, 1853.

Your lordship's wishes as to the frankness to be observed towards the Russian government, at a juncture of this importance, are so well known to me that I have not hesitated to state to Count Nesselrode the feelings excited in England by the intelligence of the destruction of the Turkish squadron at Sinope.

The language which I held to his Excellency when I waited upon him, the day before yesterday, was as follows:—

Dismiss, I entreat of you, from your mind the unfounded notion of the existence on the part of her Majesty's government of a desire to humiliate Russia; no feeling of the sort exists. Do not imagine, either, that it can be for our interests that Russia should be injured—quite the contrary. Her Majesty's government consider that they have reason to complain of Russia; that the unlimited confidence placed in her assurances has been ill repaid; but the feeling does not alter their policy, or inspire the government with the wish of returning evil for evil. The case is plainly this:—Her Majesty's government have a British interest and an European interest in maintaining the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and they hold that the first would have been virtually destroyed, if Prince Menschikoff's demand had been successful; and that the second is placed in great danger by the occupation of the Principalities, which is, moreover, a precedent and example against which it behoves all the great powers of Europe to enter a protest. Her Majesty's government accordingly have duties to perform—duties not voluntarily undertaken, but imposed on them by Russia; and from the discharge of these duties her Majesty's government cannot and will not shrink. Turkey must be defended from aggression; her Majesty's government are pledged to defend her, and the obligation must be discharged. Now as to the application of this. The victory over the Turks has produced a very painful effect in England it may be regarded as an intentional insult to the maritime Powers, for the statement which has been made respecting the affair is incorrect. It is not true that the Turkish squadron had on board troops destined to attack Sescoum-Kale; these ships were charged with provisions for Batoum, and they have been destroyed in a Turkish harbor, which is Turkish territory, which England is bound to protect.

Before I had concluded this last sentence, Count Nesselrode interrupted me by strong assurances that nothing could be more unfounded than the supposition of its having been the wish of the Russian government to offer any affront to England and France; that which had happened was, he observed, the unavoidable consequence of the position taken by the two Powers and of that assigned to Russia. Turkey, said Count Nesselrode, declares war upon us; she opens the campaign before the term laid down by herself; she invades our territory; she takes a small fortress, which she still holds, and then you find fault with us because we oppose hostilities by hostilities; but remember, I beg, that we are at war with Turkey, and that no one ever heard of a war which was not attended by such acts as you complain of; our attack, too, was a defensive act—the Turkish ships were notoriously laden with military stores, intended for the tribes who are fighting up war on our border.

As to the last point, M. le Comte, I said, it is a question of fact, and our two versions differ; I am prepared to maintain, as I before stated, that the Turkish ships were conveying stores to a Turkish town. As regards what you say respecting the practices of war, I must repeat what I once before observed—if the present war is anomalous, it is not we who brought about this extraordinary state of things. However, I am now not so much complaining as I am pointing out what is to be expected, and I do not wish to conceal from you that whilst great forbearance as to the entrance by our ships of the Black Sea has been observed, and might have been continued, this, after what has lately occurred, is no longer possible.

The Chancellor only replied that, as he had before stated, he could well understand the public feeling excited in England and France that his intelligence gave him no reason to believe that her Majesty's ships had entered the Black Sea, or even that their dispatch thither had been finally resolved upon; and that as to the intended bombardment of Varna, which had been spoken of, no such intention had existed on the part of the Russian government.

After this, as I believe, salutary notice had been given to the Russian Minister, we spoke of other points.

Count Nesselrode complained of the conduct which was pursued towards the Russian Cabinet: it was unheard of; the Sultan was consulted as to the conditions upon which he was disposed to make peace and when these were ascertained and arranged, of course with exclusive reference to Turkish interests, he supposed Russia would be asked upon to sign what had been prepared for her. Then, again, the idea of asking Russia to send a plenipotentiary to meet a Turkish plenipotentiary under the auspices of the allied ministers was perfectly novel—was an indignity which would be offered only to one of the smallest of the European States—was a course which during the last hundred years Russia had never submitted to in her intercourse with Turkey, and to which she could not now be expected to lend herself.

I entreated Count Nesselrode to bear in mind that, if her relations with Turkey were of importance to Russia, our interest in Turkey was not less important; that her weakness and decrepitude, of which so much had been said, were but additional motives for the support of her friends not being withheld. Then, I added, as to the feeling which you profess of being humiliated by our policy, although, as you admit, it may not be our wish that you should be humiliated, I protest to you that it is in vain that I endeavor to comprehend the statement. Here is a question of avowed general European interest, and you are to be hurt because Europe chooses to attend to that interest. I must again say that I find it quite impossible to understand the objection which you are raising.

This comes, replied Count Nesselrode, from your not choosing to put yourselves in our situation.

On the contrary, I said that is the way in which but to little purpose, I am endeavoring to judge of your objections; I suppose England engaged in an altercation or a war with Turkey, and I can easily understand other European States desiring to take part in the settlement of the affair; what I cannot realize is the idea of England feeling insulted by the wish of other States to participate in an adjustment in which their interests should be immediately concerned.

Count Nesselrode would only ask what the feelings of England would have been if some of the great Powers had come forward to take part in the settlement of her difference with China.

It appeared to me, I said, very easy to understand what the English policy would have been; in the first place the question was one in which no great European interests, other than our own, were engaged; and secondly, any such offer on the part of the leading Powers to assist in the promotion of a settlement of differences would have been gladly received by her Majesty's government.

The above, my lord, is a correct outline of my last conversation with the Chancellor.

SIR G. H. SEYMOUR TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.

ST PETERSBURG, Jan. 13, 1854.

I received a note yesterday from the Chancellor, whom I knew to be ill, to say that he should be ready to receive me at half-past twelve o'clock. I found his excellency very imperfectly recovered, and evidently still weak and unfit for exertion.

I expressed my regret at having a painful communication to make to him, observing, however, that what I had remarked, as soon as I heard of the disaster at Sinope, as to the feeling which that event would produce in England, would have prepared his excellency for what I had new to state.

Her Majesty's fleet, I said, had been sent to Constantinople, not with the intention of attacking Russia, but certainly with that of defending Turkey. Her Majesty's government would have been well pleased that no necessity for naval exertion should have presented itself, and this very probably would have been the case but for the catastrophe to which I had alluded.

The intimation which I had made to his Excellency on the 27th October would have had, it had been hoped, the effect of preventing an attack upon the Turkish coast—an attack which, had it been made when the English ships had been at hand, they would have assisted in repelling. These hopes were found to have been illusory; an attack upon a Turkish squadron, anchored peacably in a Turkish port, had been made, and a dreadful slaughter had ensued.

I here entered into some particulars of the horrors of Sinope, and dwelt upon the effect which the account of these misfortunes must have produced upon the public mind in England; the upshot, I said, was a conviction on the part of her Majesty's government that more stringent measures were required. Sufficient account had not been taken of the conciliatory dispositions of her Majesty's government, of the notice which had been given in an amicable spirit, and it had been determined to take measures which should guard against the recurrence of such scenes as Sinope had witnessed.

Her Majesty's ships, and those of the Emperor of the French as well—for there was an entire uniformity in the orders sent to the two fleets, as in the intentions with which they had been drawn up—will, I said, enter the Black Sea, and will require (*requiere*) every Russian ship which they may meet with to re enter a Russian port. It is painful to me, I continued, M. le Comte, to make such an allusion, but if the summons is not attended to it will be enforced (*on aura recours a la force*). On the other hand, as her Majesty's government are not less intent than then they were before upon effecting a peaceful settlement of the difficulties, measures will be taken for preventing Turkish ships of war from making descents upon the coasts of Russia.

Are you sure, Count Nesselrode said, that this intention is expressed in your instruction? I was, I replied, quite sure; if I were not I should certainly not have made the statement. In fact, M. le Comte, I said, I like truth, and should feel to be wanting in duty, both to her Majesty's government and to yourself, if I either held back any part of the communication which I am charged with for you, or endeavored to give it another color.

In proof of this, I continued, I was about to remark to you that my instruction dwells more upon the coercive measures which will be employed towards Russian vessels than upon those which will be used against those of Turkey.

In a word, I said, England has promised assistance and support to the Turkish government, and she will keep her engagements with fidelity. Her ships have been ordered into the Black Sea for the protection of the Turkish territory and of the Turkish flag.

Count Nesselrode inquired, whether I had been directed to make any written communication to him upon the subject. I replied that I had not; that I had been ordered to communicate to him the substance of your lordship's despatch, had endeavored to do so faithfully, and was quite ready to clear up, as far as I was able, any point which might appear doubtful.

His Excellency desired to read me a despatch which had reached him from Baron Brunow, in which he gives an account of a conversation which he had held with your lordship as to the instructions which had been sent to her Majesty's admiral in the Bosphorus. I could only say that I felt sure that Baron Brunow's was a very faithful one, as the language ascribed to your lordship corresponded closely with that of the despatch which I had received.

After a short controversy respecting the right of her Majesty's government to feel aggrieved by the affair of Sinope, Count Nesselrode said that he felt obliged to observe that it was most unfortunate that her Majesty's government should have determined upon taking measures of so decided a character at the precise moment when strenuous efforts were being made at Vienna for coming to a peaceable arrangement.

This opinion, I replied, was entirely shared by her Majesty's government, and, as I had before stated, nothing of the sort would have happened but for the attack upon Sinope, and the dreadful incidents by which this attack had been attended. her Majesty's government were, nevertheless, still intent upon peace, if it were attainable.

As I saw that Count Nesselrode was too ill to carry on a longer conversation, I rose to take leave of him, when he said that he could not at present make any reply to my communication beyond this—that it would be his duty to bring it as soon as possible to the Emperor's knowledge, and to take his Majesty's orders upon the subject.

Speech of Lord Clarendon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the House of Lords, Jan. 31.

The Earl of CLARENDON—My lords, I think that my noble friend the noble marquis who has just sat down, might, perhaps, have acted more fairly towards the government, though not as conveniently to himself, if he had waited for the production of those papers which her Majesty has assured the House there shall be no delay in laying before your lordships, and which on a future evening I shall make a point of laying before you (Hear, hear.) I must say I think my noble friend would have acted more fairly to us if he had waited for this information; but this is only another proof of that of which I have seen so many in the course of the last few months—I mean the inconvenience which has arisen from our not having had the opportunited of laying more perfect information before the country. (Hear, hear.) Nobody can more have regretted than myself that such information should not have been produced. Nobody can be more aware than myself that many misrepresentations might have been prevented, or certainly corrected, by the production of greater information; but we thought it right not to depart from the established practice of this country. The government here is amenable to Parliament alone for its conduct; to Parliament alone could it give full and complete information; and we therefore thought it right to abstain from following the example which had been held out to us for imitation—the example of other countries who have no Parliament to account to. We thought it better to abstain from producing from time to time the information in our possession, although it might have satisfied the public anxiety, and, to a certain degree, been just to ourselves (Hear, hear.) It might, however, at the same time have been disadvantageous to the cause of peace, and, although I fear I may by the confession stand still lower in my noble friend's estimation than I now appear to do, I am not either afraid or ashamed to say that the maintenance of peace has been the great object to which our labors have been directed (Cheers.) My noble friend seems to think that we have shown an abject determination to avoid war. My lords, we have not done that, but we have felt it our duty to stop short of no sacrifices except that of national honor and of not fulfilling our engagements to maintain peace. We felt it a duty we owed to humanity, we felt it a duty we owed as professors of Christianity, we felt it a duty to those numberless social, political and commercial interests that have grown up, and have been extended to every part of the world during a peace of unexampled duration; we have felt it as a duty to other countries who, like ourselves, turning to account the blessings of peace, have, perhaps, more than ourselves to dread from the dangers of war. (Loud cries of hear, hear.") For, my lords, it must be remembered that if this peace, which is of unexampled duration, be once broken, it may be followed by a war alike without a parallel in modern history. Besides the tearing asunder of those bonds of reciprocal interests which now bind the different countries of Europe as one family, it must be remembered that those doctrines and opinions which convulsed Europe in 1848, are still cherished by millions, that they have lost nothing of their intensity by their forcible repression in that year of struggle and that they are ready now to explode again if the opportunity be given them (Hear, hear.) A war now, my lords, would be no ordinary war, and attended by no ordinary consequences. (Hear, hear.) Europe would be the battlefield not alone of contending armies, but of contending opinions; and we felt that we should have shown ourselves utterly unmindful of the claims both of humanity and of religion, and of all those mighty interests involved in social order, while, in the event of war, we should have disqualified ourselves from the support of the Parliament and of the people of this country if we could not have shown that we had both exerted and exhausted every effort to maintain peace—the blessings of which we may perhaps learn to estimate still more highly after the calamity which threatens it its maintenance has passed away. If, however, we are not destined to be spared this calamity—if it is appointed that we are to embark in war, I must say that never was the tranquillity of the world more wantonly disturbed—(cheers.—never was there a moment when it was the duty of England and of France to stand forth more firmly to oppose aggression, and to support the cause of the weak against the strong. (Renewed cheers.) My lords, my noble friend has said that we have placed a most undue confidence in the assurances of Russia upon this question. I admit that we did place confidence in those assurances, because they were not only more than we asked but all that we could desire. My noble friend says that whenever he got an answer from Russia it was always of a direct character, and all says one upon which he could rely. Such answers we received from Russia. I beg to observe that, in my humble opinion, a policy of suspicion is neither as a system a wise one, nor was it expedient in the present instance. (Hear.) On this occasion, however, there was no ground for suspicion. The Emperor of Russia has certainly, during a long reign, offered abundant proofs that he desired peace. I am not inquiring now by what means he obtained it, and for what purposes desired it, but the policy of the Emperor was eminently calculated to maintain the peace of Europe. Over and over again he has affirmed that the Ottoman empire was a fundamental principle of European policy; and, certainly, if the Emperor had made up his mind to overthrow the Ottoman empire and to aggrandize Russia at the expense of Turkey, it might have been supposed that he would have availed himself of the opportunities he had in 1848. The past, therefore, offered some guarantee for the future, and gave an additional value to these assurances, which, during the two first months that I had the honor of holding the seals of the Foreign Office, I can assure your lordships were frequent, solemn, and complete. (Hear.) I say, my lords, that to have taken any precautionary measures against assurances so given, would have partaken of the character of a premeditated insult, or a measure of wanton provocation to the very conduct which it was sought to prevent. I can assure your lordships that, whatever my noble friend may think, up to the end of April last, we had no reason whatever to believe that there existed any other cause of difference between Russia and the Porte except that connected with the Holy Places—a question which closely concerned France, and in which the Porte, by endeavoring to please both powers, had given some cause of complaint to both. The matter only indirectly affecting England, her Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople was directed to offer his good offices, in order to settle the existing difficulty. Those good offices were accepted; they were successful, and a settlement of the matter was made, apparently to the satisfaction of every power. It was only after that settlement that we, for the first time, became aware that other and ulterior objects had been insisted on by Prince Menschikoff. It is perfectly true that during the time of his negotiation rumors of various kinds reached us that treaties had been proposed under menace, that large Russian armaments were preparing, that more than one large army was on the march towards the south, and that Russia was determined to have the appointment of the Patriarch; but any persons who are aware of the great secresy which is observed in Russia with regard to public affairs, and of the rumors which, from time to time, obtain currency in Constantinople respecting them, must be aware also of the caution with which all such rumors should be received. The fact, indeed, of the small force that has ever yet been in the Principalities against Omar Pasha, and of the great length of time which has been occupied in bringing up reinforcements, proves how great must have been the exaggeration of those reports, that even in the month of May last these mighty armies were collected on the frontier. But, my lords, these rumors—true or false, probable or improbable—were all made known, as soon as they reached us, to the Russian government, and we asked for a categorical answer. We received a plain and distinct one. We met with a most unqualified denial of all the rumors and reports. We were again assured that the mission of Prince Menschikoff had reference to nothing but the Holy Places, and that great latitude had been given to him in his instructions for settling that question, amounting in fact to this—that he might settle it in any way he thought most proper. I must say that subsequent circumstances prove, to a great extent the correctness of that answer, because, although Prince Menschikoff as the head of the great orthodox Russian party—and I have reason to believe he was so considered in his own country—endeavored to extract unusual concessions from the fears or the weakness of the Porte, yet most of his earlier demands he abandoned. Thus, he abandoned his proposals for a separate treaty, upon the representation of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. He abandoned after that, the ultimatum he had handed in, and, at last, consented to accept a note, in which his terms were greatly reduced, but which yet could not be accepted by the Porte. Prince Menschikoff then quitted Constantinople under circumstances menacing to the safety of the Porte, and it was impossible for us to tell whether some of those armies which we heard were collecting on the frontiers of Turkey might not have crossed those frontiers and marched upon Constantinople. We heard of the news of Prince Menschikoff's departure by the telegraph; we waited not for more official details, but immediately ordered the fleet to proceed from Malta to Besika bay, where it was joined by the French fleet. Your lordships are aware that Count Nesselrode, after Prince Menschikoff had withdrawn, sent back to Constantinople terms, for the acceptance of which only eight days were allowed, under a threat that otherwise the Principalities should be occupied. The Sultan refused to comply with the demand, which had thus been rendered more degrading than it was before, and there upon the threat was carried out. My noble friend seems to think that if at that time the fleets had been ordered up to Constantinople when the first Russian soldier crossed the Pruth, the invading army would have been withdrawn. My lords, I shall not endeavor to prove a negative, but I shall simply state the course pursued by Her Majesty's government. In entering the Principalities Russia was either sincere or insincere in the pretences upon which she justified that act—she was either sincere in the assurances she gave to the powers of Europe that the occupation of the Principalities would be only temporary, that they would be held as a pledge for the satisfaction of the demands made upon Turkey; or she was insincere and had ulterior objects in view, in intending to overthrow the Ottoman empire. Now, I think, in the first case I have assumed that it was evidently in the interest of peace, and, what is more, in the interest of the Sultan, to have endeavored, at that moment, to reconcile the differences then existing. The Emperor of Russia demanded that the *status quo* in religious matters should be enforced, and the Sultan declared that the *status quo* in religious matters was what he intended; so that all that seemed necessary was to devise a form sufficient to carry into effect the desires so expressed. It was found that Austria and Prussia entirely agreed with us as to the act of Russia in occupying the Principalities. They considered that act unnecessary, unjust, fatal as a precedent on the part of a powerful towards a weaker State, and dangerous to themselves as limitrophe powers: they were most ready to enter with us into negotiations for settling the question, if possible, by amicable means, and they earnestly deprecated any declaration of war on the part of the Sultan until all peaceable means of settling the difference had been exhausted. Whatever my noble friend may think of the matter, I am sure your lordships generally will be of opinion that it was of the highest importance at that time that the Four Powers should be united in the question; that it was of the highest importance that Austria and Prussia should join with England and France in isolating Russia in her wrong, (hear, hear) and in letting her know that she would not be able to count on that support from Austria which, for more than one reason, she had been so ready to count upon. Her Majesty's government never for a moment doubted that the occupation of the Principalities constituted a *casus belli*, or that it afforded the Sultan a clear right to declare war, to announce the treaty of 1841 at an end, and to summon the ships of his allies from Besika Bay to his support; but we did not advise him to act upon this right, on the supposition that Russia might be sincere, and that, consequently, a peaceful issue of the difference might still be effected. But let us take the other case—that Russia was not sincere, that she did intend to cross the Danube and to march on Constantinople—a declaration of war at that time would have furnished to Russia the very excuse for acting upon those intentions which she desired. (Hear, hear.) The Emperor might have said fairly enough—"I have occupied the Principalities only as I have occupied them before, declaring to you that it was only for a short time; that I did not desire or seek war, and that I was ready to take any practicable course to effect a peaceful result. My assurances have been disbelieved, war has been declared against me, and I now consider it inconsistent with my honor and dignity not to accept the challenge." (Hear, hear.) I don't say that such arguments would have borne the test of inquiry under the circumstances, but I do say that, under the circumstances, it was exceedingly undesirable that they should be put forward as a ground for greater activity of operations on the part of Russia, seeing that at this moment Turkey was wholly unprepared for hostilities. (Hear, hear.) Her fortresses were ungarrisoned, she had no supplies or stores collected