ADDITIONAL FROM EUROPE.

More Details of the Battles in the Crimea and the Siege of Sebastopol.

INTERESTING REPORT ON JAPANESE MONEY, &c., &c., &c.

THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL.

THE DEAD AND WOUNDED OFFICERS OF ENGLAND.

[From the London Globe Nov. 26.]

The following general order, appointing a successor to the deceased Brigadier-General Strangways, was issued on the 6th inst.:—

GENERAL ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS, before Sebastopol, Nov. 6.

In consequence of the death of Brigadier-General Strangways, which the commander of the forces deeply deplores in common with all who were acquainted with him and his distinguished services, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Jones Dacres, of the Royal Artillery, will assume the command of the Artillery with this army, and undertake all duties connected therewith; and the officers of Artillery will report to him accordingly.

By order, J. B. B. ESTCOURT, Adjt General.

General Strangways was struck in the leg by a round shot, and not as reported, by a piece of shell. The leg was completely crushed, and the poor old general expired under the shock. His last words were: "I die at least a soldier's death." His remains lie next to those of Sir G. Cathcart. Poor Gen. Fox Strangways was killed by a cannon ball, which, after passing through the horse of Captain Paulet Somerset, carried off his leg. He was at the time close behind Lord Raglan, and fell from his horse into the arms of General Estcourt, who had accompanied Lord Raglan to the field. General Strangways was immediately removed to the hospital tent near Balaklava. On the way to the rear the gallant officer was perfectly calm, and did not appear to suffer much. He seemed to think more of the feelings of his family than of his own state, and he requested one of his aids-de-camp, who had kindly accompanied him, to write to Mrs. Strangways to say that he was only slightly wounded. The Duke of Cambridge, his aid-de-camp, Major Macdonald, and Lord Balgonie, aide-camp to Gen. Bentinck, had horses shot under them.

Sir George Brown is recovering. There is no truth in the report that the gallant General had his arm amputated. He was struck on his sword by a musket ball, which glanced off and passed through his arm. Fortunately, the bone of the arm was not touched, and the wound itself is so slight that the brave old General flattered himself that within a fortnight he would be able once more to resume the command of his beloved Light Division.

Col. Thorn, of the 20th, is acting Brigadier in the 4th Division, in place of Gen. Torrens, and Maj. Gen. Codrington commands the Light Division during the absence of Sir George Brown.

The command of the brigade of Guards has devolved upon Colonel the Hon. George Upton, who is himself wounded slightly.

The *Globe* adds:—We deeply regret to announce the death of the Rev. John Wheble, one of the Roman Catholic chaplains to the army, which took place from the Crimea. Mr. Wheble was endeared to all who knew him by his thoroughly good and amiable disposition, and we doubt whether those of his own faith, who loved him for his devotion to it, were not equalled by his friends of other persuasions, who admired him for his genial, frank and tolerant mind. With the army he was principally attached to the Second Division, and we are told that, from Sir De Lacy Evans to the youngest drummer, every man mourns him as a friend. Mr. Wheble was a young man, well off as regards the goods of this world, and when, last spring, he volunteered to leave his quiet curacy at Chelsea to encounter the hardships and dangers of the war, he made, perhaps, as great a sacrifice to duty as any one of the gentlemen of England who have left fortune, home, and friends to fight for their country in the East.

The Kilkenny (Ireland) *Moderator* of Nov. 25 contains the following romantic and melancholy incident:—It is with regret that we read in the nominal return of officers killed in the battle of Inkermann that Captain Stanley, of the 57th Regiment, is amongst those who have died nobly in the service of his country. Captain Stanley was a native of Dublin, and was connected with the family of the late Sir Edward Stanley. When very young, being fond of a military life, he entered the service of the Queen of Portugal, and distinguished himself in action at Oporto in July, 1833, where he received a severe wound in the arm. He continued to serve in Portugal and Spain until 1835, when the order of the Tower and Sword (of Portugal) was conferred on him as a reward for his gallantry. The following anecdote connected with his appointment to the British army is authentic:—Prince William Henry, when a midshipman, was present at a ball at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and being struck with the charms of a young lady present, selected her for his partner in a country dance, at the conclusion of which he laughingly told her that if he should ever attain power she need only send him a copy of the music of that dance, accompanied by a request, and that he would, if possible, attend to any demand so authenticated. Years rolled on; the lady married, became a widow, and a grandmother. Prince William Henry became King William IV.; and on the return of Mr. Stanley from Spain in 1835, he expressed a wish to enter the British army, in which his grandmother forwarded a copy of the music to his Majesty, accompanied by a letter reminding him of his promise, and concluding by asking for an ensignacy without purchase, for her grandson. In a very few days she was honored with an autograph letter from the King, stating his perfect remembrance of the dance and the promise referred to, and his intention to accede to her wish with respect to the nomination of her grandson to an ensignacy, which accordingly took place in May, 1835. Captain Stanley joined the 57th Regiment at Madras the same year, and served with it ever since. Had he survived this battle, he would have succeeded to a majority without purchase. A man of refined tastes and elevating pursuits, he became a member of the Kilkenny Archæological Society, whilst amongst us, and took a deep interest in that institution up to the period of his untimely death.

The Newcastle (Eng.) *Guardian* contains the following notice of the north of England officers engaged:—Ensign J. Clutterbuck, 63d Foot, who is returned in the list of killed, at the glorious battle of Inkermann, on the 5th inst., is, we regret to say, a son of Major Clutterbuck, of Warkworth. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Bradford, Third battalion Grenadier Guards, returned as wounded slightly, is a relative of J. H. Atkinson, Esq., of Angerton, Morpeth. Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. H. Percy, of the same corps, also returned as wounded slightly, is a relative of his Grace the Duke of Northumberland. Lieutenant H. Butler, 7th (Royal) Fusiliers, returned as wounded severely, is brother of Thomas Butler, Esq., late of Beunton, Hexham; and Lieutenant Vane, 23d Foot, returned as wounded slightly, is a son of Sir F. T. Vane, Bart., of Armthwaite Hall.

The *Western Times* notices the Devonshire men thus: The news from the Crimea, though all glorious to the country, has cast a heavy gloom over many a family circle in this county. The death of the young and gallant Sir Robert Newman overshadows, with a painful bereavement, a united and erst happy family. The late gallant General Strangways, whose heroic death is recorded elsewhere, deprives the worthy rector of Rewe, near this city, of an attached brother, and several of our country families of a friend. The wound of General Buller brings affliction to the house of Poltimore, whose noble lady is sister to that gallant soldier. The kind hearted squire of Peamore and his worthy family have received the sad tidings that young Lieutenant Kekewich fell wounded in the field of Inkermann. The gallant Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith, who was dangerously wounded whilst leading on the 68th on this memorable day, has a venerable mother in Exeter, his sister (Mrs. Abraham) residing at Heavitree. Cornet Archibald Cleveland, of the 17th Lancers, is also among the slain. He was son of the late A. S. Willes, Esq., and nephew of the late Sir Bruce Chichester, and heir to the Tapley estates, North Devon.

A Dublin paper says—The sad intelligence of the severe bereavement sustained by his excellency the Lord Lieutenant and the Countess of St. Germans, in the death of their gallant son, the Hon. Captain Eliot, of the Guards, who fell in the battle of the 5th, reached Dublin Castle yesterday evening. The melancholy event has occasioned deep and general regret.

The Galway (Ireland) *Vindicator* states that when the news of the release of Lord Dunkellin by the Czar reached Portumna, on Saturday, public rejoicings took place, and the town was illuminated the same night.

The Hon. Captain Annesley, who was so severely wounded at the battle of the Alma, has recently arrived in London from the Crimea. Captain Annesley is rapidly recovering from the injuries he sustained in the mouth, one of his teeth and a portion of his tongue having been carried away by a bullet.

Colonel Lord Arthur Fitzroy, severely wounded at the battle of Inkermann, whose arrival at Marseilles was telegraphed, was expected to reach London very soon.

LIST OF RUSSIAN OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED IN TURKEY AND THE CRIMEA.

A correspondent of the London *Chronicle*, writing from St. Petersburg, on November 27, says:—From the silence generally maintained in Russian reports as to nominal casualties, it is difficult to ascertain the names of killed and wounded officers even of higher rank. Nevertheless, the following list, extracted and successively noted down, since the campaign on the Danube, from Russian and other trustworthy reports, may be regarded as approximating to correctness:—

Prince Paskiewitsch, wounded at Silistria, and invalided.

Lieut. General Schilder, died of wounds at Silistria.

Lieut. General Selwan, killed at Silistria.

Lieut. General Dreschern, died at Jassy.

Lieut. General Chruleff II., wounded at Giurgevo.

Lieut. General Soimonoff, wounded at Giurgevo, killed Nov. 5.

Lieut. General Luders, wounded at Silistria.

Admiral Korniloff, killed at Sebastopol.

Admiral Nachimoff, wounded at Sebastopol.

Lieutenant General Kalsenski, wounded at Alma.

Major General Pehtschelkanoff, wounded at Alma.

Major-General Gogincoff, wounded at Alma, prisoner.

Major-General Kurtjanoff, wounded at Alma, prisoner.

Major-General Popoff, wounded at Silistria.

Major-General Stalpakoff, killed at Silistria.

Major-General Meger, killed at Silistria.

Major-General Oubinski (or Dubinski,) dead of wounds.

Major-General Babutoff, wounded on the Danube.

Major-General Buturlin, wounded on the Danube.

Major-General Orloff Denisoff (Hetman,) wounded on the Danube.

Major-General Chaletski, wounded at Balaklava.

Major-General Villebois, wounded on the 5th of Nov.

Major-General Ochterlone, wounded on the 5th of Nov.

Major-General Kiezhinsky, wounded on the 5th of Nov.

Major-General Prince Menschikoff, wounded on the 5th of Nov. (not the general-in-chief.)

Here, then, is a list of twenty-five generals and admirals who have been put *hors de combat*; and strong grounds exist for believing that four or five others have been omitted in the divers reports furnished to the journals of St. Petersburg.

AFTER THE BATTLE OF INKERMANN.

[Correspondence of the London Herald.]

On the evening of the battle I went over the field. I think I have said over and over again that it was a sight which could never be described. A considerable number, some 800 to 1,000 Russians killed and wounded were lying among our tents, and here also were many, too many, corpses of Zouaves and French infantry of the line. All our wounded have been removed, and the wounded of the enemy were being gathered in. The kindness and attention of our fellows to their helpless enemies was beyond all praise. They brought them water, got knapsacks to put under their heads, and borrowed blankets in which to cover them from the raw night air; here and there small groups of them stood absorbed in pity round some prostrate foe to whom their kindness came too late, and who, shot either through the head or lungs, gasped out his existence in painful sobs, or terminated it in a horrible convulsion which made your blood curdle to hear. A little above the line of tents was the brow of the hill overlooking Inkermann Lights. Here was the spot where the allied artillery engaged that of the enemy after the retreat, and here the sight was sickening indeed. There is nothing so awful as the spectacle of the bodies of those who have been struck down by round shot or shell. One poor fellow of the 96th had been struck by two 24 pounders in the head and body. A shell afterwards burst on him and tore him to pieces, and it was only by the fragments of cloth with the regimental buttons adhering, that you could tell that the rough bloody mass which lay in the road had ever been a human being. But it is useless to dwell on these sickening details; suffice to say that here, among the carcasses of some two hundred killed and wounded horses, lay the bodies of our brave English and French artillerymen, all more or less frightfully mutilated. Some had their heads taken off at the neck as if with an axe; others their legs gone from the hips; others their arms, and others again who were hit in the chest or stomach, were literally as smashed as if they had been crushed in a machine. But it was not alone the allies who lay here; on the contrary, there were ten Russian corpses for one of theirs, but the latter were all killed by musketry before the artillery came up. On this spot the Russians kept dropping shells the whole night, but their vindictive efforts were in vain; all who lay in reach of their missiles had suffered the last which they were to endure on earth. Passing up the road to Sebastopol between heaps of Russian dead, you came to where the Guards had been compelled to retire from the defence of the wall above Inkermann Valley. Here our dead were nearly as numerous as the enemy's. Across the path, side by side, lay five Guardsmen, who were all killed by one round shot as they advanced to charge the enemy. They lay on their faces in the same attitude, with their muskets tightly grasped in both hands, and all had the same grim, painful frown upon their features, like men who were struck down in the act of closing with their foes. Beyond this the Russian Guardsmen and line regiments lay thick as leaves, intermixed with dead and wounded horses. The latter, with fractured limbs, were now and then rising, and after staggering a few steps rolling over among the corpses, snorting and plunging fearfully. Up to the right of the wall was the way to the two gun battery. The path lay through thick brushwood, but the path was slippery with blood, and the brushwood was broken down and encumbered with the dead. The scene from the battery was awful—awful beyond description. I stood upon its parapet at about nine at night, and felt my heart sink as I gazed upon the scene of carnage around. The moon was at its full, and showed every object as if by the light of day. Facing me was the valley of Inkermann, with the Tchernaya like a band of silver flowing gracefully between the hills, which, for varied and picturesque beauty, might vie with any part of the world. Yet I shall never recall the memory of Inkermann Valley with any but feelings of loathing and horror; for round the spot from which I surveyed the scene lay upwards of 5000 bodies. Many badly wounded also lay there; and their low, dull moans of mortal agony struck with terrible distinctness upon the ear, or, worse still, the hoarse gurgling cry and vehement struggles of those who were convulsed before they passed away. Round the hill small groups of men with hospital stretchers were searching out for those who still survived; and others again, with lanterns, busily turning over the dead, looking for the bodies of officers who were known to be killed, but who had not been found. Here also were English women whose husbands had not returned hurrying about with loud lamentations, turning the faces of our dead to the moonlight, and eagerly seeking for what they feared to find. These latter were far more to be pitied than the inanimate forms of those who lay slaughtered around. The ambulances, as fast as they came up, received their load of sufferers, and even blankets were employed to convey the wounded to the rear. Outside the battery the Russians lay two and three deep. Inside the place was literally full with bodies of Russian Guardsmen, 55th and 20th. The fine tall forms of our poor fellows could be distinguished at a glance, though the grey great coats stained with blood rendered them alike externally. They lay as they fell, in heaps; sometimes our men over three or four Russians, and sometimes a Russian over three or four of ours. Some had passed away with a smile on their faces, and seemed as if asleep; others were horribly contorted, and, with distended eyes and swollen features, appeared to have died in agony, but defying to the last. Some lay as if prepared for burial, and as though hands of relatives had arranged their mangled limbs, while others again were in almost startling positions, half standing or kneeling, clutching their weapons or drawing a cartridge. Many lay with both their hands extended towards the sky, as if to avert a blow or utter a prayer, while others had a malignant scowl of mingled fear and hatred, as if indeed they died despairing. The moonlight imparted an aspect of unnatural paleness to their forms, and as the cold damp wind swept round the hills and waved the boughs above their upturned faces, the shadows gave a horrible appearance of vitality; and it seemed as if the dead were laughing, and about to rise. This was not the case on one spot, but all over the bloody field.

The Russian soldiers, I have already remarked, were infinitely inferior in appearance to those we met at Alma. In all that relates to discipline and courage our late antagonists were far superior. They were all clean, but ragged in the extreme. None had knapsacks, but merely a little canvass bag of that disgusting nauseous-looking stuff they call their bread. No other provisions were found on any. The knapsacks, I presume, were left behind, in order that they might scale the heights on our right with greater facility. Every man wore strong well-made Wellington boots, of a stout but rough looking brown leather. On none that I have heard of were found either money or books. On many were miniatures of women and locks of hair. They appear to have been veteran troops, as a large number bore the scars of previous wounds. The dead officers, as at Alma, were with difficulty to be distinguished from the men. Their officers behaved well.

Two hundred and eighty prisoners, not wounded, or only merely grazed, fell into our hands. One among them is now about the largest and most powerful man in the camp of the allies. He stands nearly six feet six inches, and is broad in proportion. He surrendered when pursued without attempting resistance. Our allies appear to have been taken completely by surprise in the sortie made by the enemy upon their trenches. The Russians had got possession of Nos. 1 and 3 batteries, and spiked the guns before the French were in a condition to oppose them. They were then attacked, and, after an obstinate defence, driven off with much slaughter. The French followed up their victory into the centre of the town, but having no reserve, and not knowing the result of the attack on our lines, they retired again.

THE CLIMATE OF THE CRIMEA.

[From the London News, Nov. 29.]

One of the most interesting topics at present to the greatest number of people is the climate of the Crimea. The most contradictory statements are put forth, and the opposite reporters find immense fault with each other, as if no such thing as a parti-colored shield had ever been heard of. Yet, who thinks of laying down the law about the climate of Switzerland, or any other mountainous country, without saying what region, in the earth or the air, he is talking about? A man, talking about the St. Bernard Convent, will give a very different account of the climate of the Alps from a summer resident at Interlacken; but both are right, and we do not hear that they call one another romancers. Yet when one man tells of the Crimean blasts and frosts, and another of the Crimean fruits and flowers, the vine, pomegranate, myrtle, and other delicate productions, it seems not to occur to either that both may be right. The truth of the matter will be welcome at such a time; and here it is.

The Crimea is remarkably diversified in climate for its extent—and its extent is considerable. Its widest stretch between east and west is above 200 miles, and from north to south it measures 120 miles. In a peninsula of such an extent as this the winter or summer prospects of any army depend on where they are to be placed within its area. It would be so, even if the surface were as uniform as such an extent of sea-side country can possibly be; but when, as in this case, there are more varieties than we can find from the shores of Lake Lucerne to the top of Mount Pilate, the one great question is what locality we are thinking of when we talk of the winter prospects of our troops in the Crimea.

There is no doubt about the cold over the larger proportion of the area. There is no doubt about the icy character of the winds which blow, without being intercepted, from the Arctic Ocean to the higher houses and gardens of Simpheropol. There is no doubt that from Kertch to Simpheropol, and onwards to above Sebastopol, the steppe is exposed to these intolerable winds; nor that the rising ground from Perekop to Simpheropol is the last place that any commander would think of for encamping his soldiers, either in tents or huts. This is the very ground of our constant assurance that the enemy cannot be further reinforced for some months to come, and that the recent reinforcements are not of a kind to be dreaded, after they have been (as they have been gloriously) once or twice repulsed. Nothing can be plainer than the accounts that have reached us of those reinforcements—that they were brought very rapidly *à la poste*, which means in the light carts of the country, which are the very latest kind of carriage that can traverse the steppe in autumn and spring, and which, from the very lightness which enables them to do so, are incapable of carrying stores. That bullock wagons were not used we know—not only because they cannot pass the mud of the Taurida steppe, but by the speed with which the troops were conveyed from Odessa. The accounts, in fact, all agree that the Russian troops are in a state of torment, if not dissolution, from cold and hunger; to which is added, with every appearance of probability, that they are very short of ammunition.

At another season anybody might say that the Czar's way of making war is to shove away his dead, and pour down fresh masses; but, at this season, not even his iron will can drive on that business. The mud at Perekop, and the north and south of it, is no ordinary mud. It is so viscid that carriages are brought to a complete stop; and the heaviest the soonest. As to its depth—it is commonly called "bottomless." And when it gets frozen, the surface is still impassable, because the snow is not, like that of the interior steppe, hard and smooth, but so hillocky, shifting, and unequal in hardness, that it rarely becomes fit for traffic; and never, in any degree, before January. Throughout the winter, the peril from tempests and snowdrifts is such that the idea of sending troops and ammunition is too wild to need consideration at present. That the one force or the other must conquer, there is no doubt; there is no doubt that the alternative to the Russians is unconditional surrender. Reason surely decides that, at this season, the only question about which it shall be hangs on the fact whether there is or is not ammunition enough in Sebastopol for all Russian purposes this winter. All the evidence that has reached us seems to show that there is not. The enemy have discovered pretty clearly that they cannot take ours. We, then, holding the sea, have the means of conquest by reinforcements of men and materials, and, at the same time the means of retreat, if the season were as much against us as it is, in fact, in our favor. Our army has suffered much, and is no doubt suffering much at the present moment; but a rational judgment of the circumstances seems to show that the chief danger is over, and that the 5th of November will prove to be the date of our gradual ascendancy over the evils of our enterprise in the Crimea.

To return to the matter of the climate there. True as it is that the heights on which our armies are entrenched are barren and stony, with only thistles and a scarcely visible grass at best, it is also true that the valley of Baida, near at hand, is one of the most fertile and temperate in Europe. It is an oval basin, sheltered by hills, wooded to the top; and in that valley lie, in time of peace, twelve thriving villages, embosomed in orchards, and surrounded by corn lands and vineyards. It is true, indeed, that the cold winds lose their power when they reach the precipice (from hundreds to thousands of feet high) with which the steppe terminates. Under the whole range of these precipices, from Balaklava to the Bay of Kafa or Theodosia, the productions of the coast, and the nature of the residences, speak for the climate better than any other testimony. The inhabitants of the towns and villages—Yalta, Alushta, and others—will bear testimony to the rarity of any frost whatever; and they are borne out by the evidences of their own vineyards, olive groves, and even orange and citron groves—for there are places where these fruits grow in the open air. Besides this renowned south coast, where storms are scarcely known but as a spectacle in the offing, and where the thermometer rarely sinks below 40 degrees, there are lateral valleys which are, though not so genial as to climate, well sheltered from the blasts of the steppe—valleys enough to harbor more troops than the belligerents will ever have in the Crimea at one time. Such is the truth, we say with confidence, about the climate of the Crimea.

What follows? The allies must take Sebastopol, as soon as their reinforcements permit. Considering the want of water there, and the alleged failure of ammunition to the Russians, the speedy and successful storming of the place seems to be a rational expectation. The heights above it are no place for our soldiers to spend December in. Whether there or in the town, we earnestly wish they could have the assistance of a large body of our stout navvies, for whom there is plenty of work in either place. In camp, they might do the work of housing the troops, if all the trenching is finished; and in the town they would have only too much to do in removing the dead, and otherwise purifying the place, in restoring the water supply, and clearing away the *debris* of the siege.

On such an occasion as the critical point of a virtuous war, we should not think of saying anything but the plain truth, according to our view of it. Our view is what we have given, and we know it to be the same that is held by military authorities, whose opinion must be respected on all hands. We are as much grieved as anybody at the suffering which attends the struggle, but we have all the confidence that the case admits of that the issue will be good, and we therefore say so. About the vital importance of that good issue there are no two opinions.

RUSSIAN FORCES IN AND AROUND SEBASTOPOL.

We are enabled to lay before our readers a detailed statement of Prince Menschikoff's disposable force, both for the defence of the fortress and for offensive operations outside. These details are drawn up with great care, and are in most instances confirmed, as far as names of regiments are concerned, by Russian official reports from the Crimea, and by statements in the *Invalid* and *St. Petersburg Journal*.

The following is a detail of the forces at the disposal of Prince Menschikoff, after being joined by the remainder of Gen. Dannenberg's corps on the 3d of November:—

FOURTH CORPS (GEN. DANNENBERG.)

INFANTRY.

10th Division (Lieut.-Gen. Soimonoff.)

Brigades.	Regiments.	Battalions.	Bayonets.
1st	Ykaterinburg, 19th line	4	*2,400
1st	Tobolsk, 20th line	4	2,400
2d	Tomsk, 19th light	4	2,400
2d	Koliwan, 20th light	4	2,400
11th Division (Lieut.-Gen. Pauloff, or Popoff.)			
1st	Selenginsk, 21st line	4	2,400
1st	Yakutsk, 22d line	4	2,400
2d	Oschotz, 21st light	4	2,400
2d	Kamschatzka, 22d light	4	2,400
1st	Asoff, 23d line	4	2,400
1st	Dnieper, 24th line	4	2,400
Ukrain, 23d light		4	2,400
Odessa, 24th light		4	2,400
4th Rifles		1	600
		49	29,400

CAVALRY.

4th Light Division (Lieut. General Nierod).

Brigades.	Regiments	Squadrons.	Sabres.
1st	Bug Lancers, 9th	8	800
1st	Odessa, 10th	8	800
2d	Ashtirsk Hussars, 9th	8	800
2d	Alexandroff ditto, 10th	8	800
		32	3,200

ARTILLERY, SAPPERS, AND TRAIN.

One division—4 brigades, 14 batteries of 10 guns each, equal to 140	2,800
Sappers and miners, 1 battalion	800
Train, ambulances, &c.	800
	4,400

RECAPITULATION.

Bayonets	29,400
Sabres and lances	3,200
Artillery men	2,800
Sappers, train, &c.	1,600
Total	37,000

FIFTH CORPS (LIEUT. GENERAL LUDER, WHO IS IN BESSARABIA.

14th Division† (Lieut.-General Moller.)

Brigades.	Regiments.	Battalions.	Bayonets.
1st	Volhynia, 27th line	4	2,400
1st	Minsk, 28th line	4	2,400
One brigade of reserve battalions		8	4,800
		16	9,600

ARTILLERY.

1 brigade, 4 batteries, equal to 40 guns, 800 gunners.

RECAPITULATION.

Bayonets	9,600
Gunners, &c.	800
Total	10,400

SIXTH CORPS (GENERAL PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF.)

INFANTRY.

16th Division (Lieut.-General Kwitinsky.)

Brigades.	Regiments.	Battalions.	Bayonets.
1st	Wladimir, 31st line	4	‡2,400
1st	Sudalski, 32d line	4	2,400
2d	Uglitski, 31st light	4	2,400
2d	Kasan, 32d light	4	2,400
1st	Moscow, 33d line	4	2,400
1st	Butirsk, 34th line	4	2,400
2d	Borodino, 33d light	4	2,400
2d	Tarutin, 34th light	4	2,400
6th Rifles		1	600
Total		33	19,800

CAVALRY.

6th Division (Major General Chaletski.)

Brigades.	Regiments.	Squadrons.	Sabres.
2d	Kieff, 11th Hussars	8	750
2d	Ingermannland, 12th Hussars	8	750
Total		16	1,500

ARTILLERY.

3 brigades, 10 batteries, equal to 100 guns, 2,000 gunners.

RECAPITULATION.

Bayonets	19,800
Sabres	1,500
Gunners, &c.	3,000
Sappers and train	1,400
Total	24,700

CAVALRY DESIGNATED OF RESERVE.

Division of Lancers, (Lieut.-General Korff.)

Brigades.	Regiments.	Squadrons.	Lances.
1st	Archduke Leopold	8	900
1st	Archangel	8	900
2d	Novgorod	8	900
2d	Grand Duchess Ekaterina	8	900
Combined, (Lieut. General Ruifsoff.)			
1st	1st	8	900
1st	2d	8	900
Total		48	5,400
Don and Ural Cossacks, 8 pulks, 48 sotnias			5,000

RECAPITULATION.

Reserve Lancers	5,400
Cossacks	5,000
Gunners	960
Total	11,360

HORSE ARTILLERY (LIGHT AND HEAVY.

5 batteries, equal to 48 guns, with 960 gunners.

MARINES.

The force of this arm allotted to the two divisions of the fleet at Sebastopol, amounts to 8 battalions of 1,000 each on paper, but they do not muster more than 550 each	4,400
A battalion of Black Sea line of Rifles has also joined, and is about 600 strong	600
Total	5,000

RECAPITULATION.

INFANTRY.

	Div's.	Brigd's.	Reg'ts.	Bat'ns.	Bay'ts.
4th corps	2	6	12	49	29,400
5th corps	1	2	4	16	9,600
6th corps	2	4	8	33	19,800
Black Sea (Tchernamora) Rifles				1	600
Marines				8	4,400
Total muskets					65,800

CAVALRY.

	Div's.	Brigd's.	Regt's.	Sqd'rns.	Sabres.
4th corps	1	2	4	32	3,200
6th corps	0	1	2	16	1,500
Reserve—					
Lancers	1	2	4	32	3,600
Combined—					
Lancers	0	1	2	16	1,800
Cossacks	0	0	8	48½	5,000
Total sabres					15,100

ARTILLERY.¶

	Guns.	Gunners.
4th corps, 14 batteries	140	2,800
5th corps, 4 batteries	40	960
6th corps, 10 batteries	100	1,920
Cavalry and Cossacks, 5 batteries	48	960
Total	328	6,640

SAPPERS AND TRAIN.

	Men.
Sappers, 3 battalions	2,400
Train	2,400
Total	4,800

GENERAL RECAPITULATION.

Bayonets	65,800
Sabres and lances	15,100
Gunners, &c., with 328 guns, subject to be reduced to 248, if Dannenberg's eight batteries have not arrived	5,400
Sappers and train	4,800
General total of all denominations	90,100

* Averaging battalions at 600 effective bayonets.

† The 14th division is in Asia Minor. Half of the 14th and the 15th, and the whole of the 4th division of cavalry, and 4th Rifle battalion, are in Bessarabia.

‡ The 2½ divisions of this corps were the principal sufferers at the Alma, and we overrate the numbers in giving them at 600, as the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* affirms that no battalion on that day had more than 700 men.

¶ It is not quite certain whether a brigade of the reserve Dragoons drilled to fight on foot, have or have not joined. If they have, 2,800 sabres must be added.

¶ We give the amount of guns and men approximatively as they belong to corps and divisions; but there is every reason to believe that the batteries belonging to Dannenberg's 10th and 11th divisions—that is, eighty pieces—have not yet arrived.

MILITARY UKASE OF THE CZAR.

This ukase is dated Gatschina, Oct. 23, (Nov. 6,) and is addressed to the Privy Councillor Count Perowsky. It is as follows:—

Count Leo Alexejewitsch! In the face of the imminent danger which threatens our beloved fatherland from the attacks of our enemies, our heart finds consolation in the zealous endeavors of every class of our subjects to contribute to the defence of the country.

For this sacred purpose we have permitted the crown peasants, at the express wish of our imperial family, to form themselves into a regiment of sharpshooters as long as the war lasts.

The orthodox population of Russia has from time immemorial ever distinguished itself for its attachment to the true belief, its devotion to the Czar, and its patriotic defence of the empire. In calling on the crown peasants through you to enrol themselves for the sacred defence of the country from the unjustifiable attacks of our common enemies, we give them an opportunity of sustaining untarnished—like our other brave troops—the reputation of our arms and the courage of Russian soldiers.

In empowering you to execute this measure and to organise the regiment, we are sure of its being done in an effective manner, and remain your favorably inclined

NICHOLAS.

VISIT OF THE SULTAN TO PRINCE NAPOLEON.

The *Journal de Constantinople*, of November 13, contains the following account of the Sultan's visit to Prince Napoleon:—

As soon as the Sultan heard of Prince Napoleon's arrival at the embassy of France, he sent to know if the Prince would receive a visit. This the Prince was obliged to decline for a day or two on account of the state of his health. On the day appointed the Sultan, accompanied by several of the officers of his household, went to the French embassy. His Majesty was received at the gate of the hotel by M. Benedetti, the chargé de affaires at the head of the whole staff of the embassy, in full costume of ceremony. The Sultan, on entering the room where the Prince was reclining, shook hands with him most warmly, and expressed to him the deep regret which he felt at the state of his health, and his hope that the Prince would speedily recover. During the visit which lasted half an hour, the Sultan spoke in the warmest terms of France and her magnanimous sovereign and of the value of the allied armies, whose services he said he would never forget, and for whom he would do everything asked from him as long as they should remain in the East. His Majesty afterwards said to Prince Napoleon that he placed the utmost confidence in the loyalty of his allies; that, feeling the full value of their noble assistance, he would endeavor to do everything to place his government on a level with the situation; that having entered resolutely on the path of complete reform, nothing should induce him to turn back; and that with the aid of his allies, he would surely attain the object which he had had in view when he ascended the throne. The Prince having with emotion thanked the Sultan for his visit, and expressed his sincere satisfaction at the language which he had just heard, the Sultan left the Prince, again shaking hands with him most affectionately. His Majesty was then conducted back to the gate of the hotel by M. Benedetti and the whole staff of the embassy.

CONVERSATION OF NAPOLEON AND LORD PALMERSTON.

The Paris correspondent of the London *Chronicle*, writing on November 25th, says:—In political circles here a great deal is said of a conversation which has taken place between the Emperor of the French and Lord Palmerston, on the subject of the end which France and England ought to propose to themselves in the present war. The opinion here is that if the four guarantees could be obtained, both Powers would be satisfied; but it is difficult to see how they can agree to accept terms which, though fair and equitable at the period they were proposed, would at the present day certainly not satisfy either the one country or the other. *It is believed here, however, that peace, or, at all events, serious negotiations for the conclusion of a peace, would be possible if Russia would accept, and accept sincerely, the four guarantees.* But Russia has no intentions of the kind. The Western Powers now know and are able to appreciate M. de Nesselrode's despatch to the Prussian government, by which Russia appears to adhere to the four guarantees. They know that the adhesion is merely apparent. M. de Nesselrode acts with regard to the four points as he did with regard to the protocol of the 9th April. He put such an interpretation upon them that they in fact revived all the pretensions of Russia—pretensions which are the origin of the present war. With the four guarantees, as interpreted by M. de Nesselrode, Russia would find herself precisely in the *statu quo ante bellum*. But neither at Vienna nor at Paris or London has that despatch, much as it has been commented on, been considered as the basis of a negotiation which could lead to a favorable result.

NEW AUSTRIAN NOTE.

The following, says the *Independance Belge*, is almost textually the despatch addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, Austrian ambassador at Berlin, in reply to the Prussian note of October 30:—

VIENNA, Nov. 9, 1854.

The Cabinet of Berlin replied to our communication of the 22d of last month by a despatch, communicated to us by M. d'Arnim, of which a copy is subjoined. The communication of the 22d expressed the sincere desire of Austria to obtain for herself and the German confederates guarantees which only the decided union of Austria and Prussia, both in will and act, can assure to all Germany. It is in that spirit that we have examined with the most scrupulous attention the note of Baron de Manteuffel.

We are glad to see that the elements of a common understanding and agreement contained in the preceding declarations of the Prussian cabinet have a more clear and pronounced form. Like ourselves, Prussia shows herself inclined to confine to the past divergencies of opinion which had for too long a time compromised the value and effect of the treaty of the 20th April, and to take those resolutions which actual circumstance may claim, in consequence of her participation in the alliance (offensive and defensive) of the 20th April.

It is in consideration of that disposition of Prussia that we recommended in the instructions to Baron Prokesch, and communicated in substance to the cabinet of Berlin, to avoid as much as possible sterile discussions on the point of the obligations already contracted in virtue of the treaty of the 20th April. But at the same time we proposed, in three points, the project of a federal decision, as it seemed to us, necessitated in an urgent manner by the common interests of Germany in the actual state of affairs. It is, therefore, with very great satisfaction that we found, in the propositions made by the cabinet of Berlin in reply to its above-cited communications, that the three points in question are reproduced in their essential dispositions.

We are happy to see in this agreement an assurance that the efforts by which the two German Powers apply themselves to obtain the solution of the serious complications of the moment are directed to the same end. But the more value we attach to our accord with Prussia, the more do we hope that the Prussian cabinet will not insist upon conditions and restrictions of pure form which would very probably diminish the chance of the speedy establishment of peace, and might even in the course of events compromise the most important interests of Austria and Germany.

We have not the slightest desire to enter into discussions of pure form when the situation is so serious. We therefore think it of very little consequence to examine whether it is better to select, for the dispositions to be taken, the more simple form of a federal decision, or that Austria and Prussia should first come to an understanding between themselves on the disposition to be taken; and then submit them to the Diet, although the adoption of this last form does not appear necessary, since the treaty of April, in consequence of the accession of the Confederation, has taken a greater extension, and has become, as regards its execution and a new eventual extension, the object of the decisions which the Diet may take conformable to the federal constitution.

But, on the other hand, imperious considerations prevent us from accepting, under any form whatsoever, contract engagements binding in the sense of the additional dispositions proposed by Prussia.

According to the Prussian project, we ought to engage ourselves by a formal convention to address, conjointly with the great contracting parties, a new invitation to the cabinet of St. Petersburg, to accept the bases of peace, and it should only be the result of such a step which should decide whether Germany should bind herself or not, to defend our position in the Principalities, and whether she would leave us or not full liberty of action towards Russia.

Neither the conditions upon which it is wished to make the promise of a common defence dependent, nor the restrictions which there may be an intention to put upon our eventual resolutions, appear to us sufficiently justified.

Why should the assistance of the Confederation only be assured in the case Russia should once again reject the bases of peace? Supposing Russia accepts them, but that the Western Powers refuse