treaty of peace, there were also laid upon the table protocols, from which it appeared that the affairs of Italy had undergone some discussion at the Peace Conferences at Paris. The immediate object of his motion was to ascertain what had taken place, in consequence of the representations which had been made by the English and French governments to the governments of the Italian States; and if he were given to understand that no satisfactory answer had been received to those representations, he should then ask what were the intentions of her Majesty's government with regard to their future policy? because he thought he should be enabled to show that unless they were prepared to pursue the course upon which they had entered, and unless it was their intention to take some serious steps with regard to the affairs of Italy, it would be better for the people of that country, and better for the character of the British government, that her Majesty's ministers should at once declare that they meant no more than to make friendly representations, and that those friendly representations having had no effect, it was not their intention to proceed to any further consideration of the matter. This, he thought, would be much better than the only other course which the government could pursue, viz.:—the repetition of ineffectual remonstrances. (Hear, hear.) There might be those who would say that when the war with Russia had ended happily, the powers who were represented at Paris, having agreed to the terms of peace, ought not to have raised any new question, but ought to have been satisfied with the work which had been done. He would not, however, join in that complaint, and it was evident that such was not the opinion of her Majesty's government, and of the government of the Emperor of the French. The house would be aware that on the 8th of April, Count Walewski, who presided at the Conference, thought it necessary to bring before the plenipotentiaries the condition of the Italian States, among other subjects deeply interesting to all European nations; but, so far from the clouds which then obscured the political horizon of Italy having been dispelled by the representations which were then made, it would appear that they had become gradually darker. Count Walewski introduced the subject to the Congress by observing that the pontifical States were in an abnormal state, and that the necessity for not leaving the country to anarchy had decided France, as well as Austria, to comply with the demand of the Holy See by causing Rome to be occupied by her troops, while the Austrian troops occupied the legations. The first French plenipotentiary also made some reference to the state of Naples; and he was followed by Lord Clarendon, in whose declaration the people of this country were more deeply interested, inasmuch as he was the representative of her Majesty at the conference. Lord Clarendon stated that it was most desirable that all foreign troops should be removed from Rome and the Roman States, and then went on to observe that "for the well-being of the pontifical States, as also for the interests of the sovereign authority of the Pope, it would be advantageous to recommend the secularization of the government and the organization of an administrative system in harmony with the spirit of the age, and having for its object the happiness of the people. He admitted that this reform might perhaps offer in Rome itself, at the present moment, certain difficulties; but he thought that it might be easily accomplished in the legations. He also observed that for the last eight years Bologna had been in a state of seige, and that the rural districts were harassed by brigands. It might be hoped that by establishing in this part of the Roman States an administrative and judicial system at once secular and distinct; and by organizing there a national armed force, security and confidence would rapidly be restored, and the Austrian troops might shortly withdraw, without having to apprehend the return of fresh troubles. It was at least an experiment which, in his (Lord Clarendon's) opinion, ought to be attempted; and this remedy, proposed for indisputable evils, ought to be submitted by the Congress to the serious consideration of the Pope." With respect to the Neapolitan government, Lord Clarendon stated that "he was desirous of imitating the example given him by Count Walewski, by passing over in silence acts which have obtained such grievous notoriety. He was of opinion that it must doubtless be admitted in principle that no government had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other States; but he considered that there were cases in which the exception to this rule became equally a right and a duty. The Neapolitan government seemed to have confessed this right, and to have imposed this duty on Europe; and, as the governments represented in the Congress were all equally desirous to support the monarchical principle, and to repel revolution, it was a duty to lift up the voice against a system which keeps up revolutionary ferment among the masses, instead of seeking to moderate it." These representations were followed at the conference by similar representations on the part of other countries—Count Buol, on the part of Austria, having alone declined to enter into the discussion. Count Cavour stated "that the occupation of the Roman States by the Austrian troops assumed every day more of a permanent character, that it had lasted seven years, and that, nevertheless, no indication appeared which would lead to the supposition that it would cease at a more or less early period; that the causes which gave rise to it were still in existence, that the state of the country which they occupy was assuredly not improved, and that, in order to be satisfied of this, it was enough to remark that Austria considered herself obliged to maintain in its severity the state of siege at Bologna, although it dated from the occupation itself. The presence of the Austrian troops in the legations and in the Duchy of Parma destroyed the balance of power in Italy, and constituted a real danger for Sardinia." No doubt the occupation of Rome and of the Roman States was similar to occupations which had formerly received the sanction of the British government, being solely an occupation for the preservation of the integrity and independence of a kingdom. It was, however, a matter of very great importance to Europe to consider whether the occupation of the Italian States by foreign troops should continue any longer. In the first place, he (Lord John Russell) was aware of no instance in which an occupation of this nature had lasted for so long a time. An occupation by foreign troops for the purpose of restoring order was a very modern practice. In every case it had been resorted to solely for the purpose of re-establishing the usual relations between a sovereign and his subjects; and as soon as that object was accomplished, the foreign troops had withdrawn. After the war of 1815 a war which raised all Europe in arms, when a million troops were put in motion in order to depose Napoleon from the throne of France, and when £150,000,000 of money were spent by this country in that year alone, it was considered sufficient to declare an occupation of Paris for five years; and even then the troops were withdrawn two years before the fixed term of occupation had expired. The occupation of Spain by the French, in 1824, only lasted three years; and he need scarcely remind honorable members that the continuance of the occupation, even for that period, created great dissatisfaction. The occupation of Rome, however, commenced in 1849, and had not yet terminated. He would not pause to inquire whether the government of Rome was good or bad. If it was a good government, there could be no need of the assistance of foreign troops; if, on the contrary, it was a bad government and that bad government had been continued for seven years without amendment, he could see no prospect of amending it by continuing the occupation. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord here referred to the declarations made by the French government at the time when the occupation of Rome was decided upon, and then proceeded to allude to the occupation of other portions of the Italian States by Austria. He referred to the particular case of Florence in 1848, which, remembering the mild rule of Leopold the First, rose against its republican rulers after they had continued a short time, and restored the monarchical form of government. The Grand Duke of Tuscany came back, and if he had observed the same course of policy, and adhered to the constitution which he had accepted, all would have gone on well; but upon a slight excuse the Austrian troops were called in, and they remained. He considered that there was not sufficient excuse for this occupation; for it appeared to him that the government of the Grand Duke had originated discontent with the view of effecting this end. The same was the case in Rome; and now it was contended that this state of things had existed so long that it could not safely be altered. Thus the evil propagated itself. Let them, however, look at another portion of Italy. When the allies, under circumstances of great difficulty, engaged in war for preserving the general interests of Europe, a small State nobly stepped forward, and took up her position by their side in a most noble and gallant manner. (Cheers.) Sardinia had suffered heavily in her previous conflict with Austria, and her finances were oppressively burdened; but she had not hesitated, fully relying that her position and prospects in Italy would be considerably ameliorated by the support of the two great allied powers. He might be told that there was no specific arrangement made for this in the treaty with Sardinia; but he contended that in spirit they were bound to lend her this encouragement and support; and it was a question of honor with her Majesty's government and that of the Emperor of the French not to abandon her. He might be told that these governments never had any intention to interfere in the affairs of Italy, but meant to rest satisfied with their protocols. But he considered that, having gone so far, they would be under a deep reproach and humiliation if they remained satisfied with the negative results which had been occasioned by the declarations of the Congress at Paris. If Count Cavour and the energetic government of Sardinia were driven from power because they had relied upon the promises of England and France, if they retired in despair of maintaining the fortunes of Italy, would not these two great Powers undergo great humiliation? They had united in a congress of the great Powers, and they had passed a solemn condemnation upon the state of things in Italy, even sketching out the means of reforming them; but if after this they suffered Austria to resist their objects, and the King of Naples to meet them with open defiance, they must suffer a painful degree of humiliation. He rejoiced in what had been done at the congress of Paris, and he thought it was dictated by a true and sound policy; but he could not think that, if it was necessary to go so far, it could be inexpedient to carry it out. He could not believe that it would be requisite to take such energetic steps as had been lately taken in the defence of Turkey; for he was convinced that if France and England said the state of things was such that they could permit it no longer, Austria would at once withdraw her army. He did not propose to enter into such matters as the secularization of the administration in Rome, and other reforms sketched out by Lord Clarendon. They might be safely left to the Roman people when they were relieved from the incumbus of foreign occupation. What he contended for was, that no foreign power should be allowed to interfere, and to condemn persons to imprisonment for the slightest possible offence. The case of Naples was somewhat different; for, as Lord Clarendon pointed out, it might not be altogether safe to remove the foreign troops in the King's service from that kingdom; but at the same time he should have great doubts that any constitution granted by Naples would be durable so long as they continued. In Sicily, through the interference which had taken place under Lord William Bentinck, great improvements had commenced, but only for the time; for immediately after the withdrawal of the English troops the engagements made with the British government had been violated by the Neapolitan Court, and fresh ones, diametrically opposite to them, were entered into with Austria. The Sicilians complained that England had deserted them, and they made several risings subsequently; but this country gave them nothing but good wishes. This conduct had certainly excited suspicions of England in Italy, because the promises made by Lord William Bentinck were not carried out. Bearing all this in mind, if, after having stepped forward at the Congress of Paris, and excited expectations, this country received satisfied with paper protocols, she would for ever lose the confidence of the inhabitants of that peninsula. In his opinion, it was incumbent upon them to consult with the Emperor of the French, in order to ascertain what they could do further for Italy. He held that it was their imperative duty to uphold the independence of the King of Sardinia at all hazards (cheers); and he believed that a feeling was growing up amongst some of the sovereigns of Italy which led them to look beyond foreign bayonets for the maintenance of their thrones. This feeling ought to be encouraged wherever it was found; and he was glad to see, from the failure of some ecclesiastical prosecutions in Tuscany, symptoms of a spirit of independence and a better state of things. In Parma, too, there was rising up a spirit of resistance to the intolerance of Austria, on the part of the government of that State. The noble lord has also referred to an opinion of the late Emperor Napoleon, that Austrian domination was so hated in Italy because it ruled with the stick, not with the sword. He (Lord J. Russell) believed this was the true secret of Austrian power in Italy; and it would be easy to compel Austria to withdraw her troops by a firm declaration on the part of France and England. He had heard a surmise that France would not assist this country in this matter; but he could not believe that an ally who had behaved so loyally and gallantly during the war would desert us after her own minister had brought the question forward in the congress at Paris. He was glad that the French Emperor had himself taken this step. It was not for him to suggest what steps should be taken by her Majesty's government in this matter; but he trusted that they would communicate with the government of the Emperor of the French, and see what could be effected on behalf of Italy. In conclusion, the noble lord strongly appealed to the government to make a declaration of their opinions, and of the course they intended to pursue.

Lord PALMERSTON said he could not be surprised that his noble friend had considered that it was his duty to draw the attention of the House, and through it the attention of the country, to the interesting and important matters which he had just brought under their notice. It was impossible to overrate the importance of these matters in the present condition of Europe. They had just witnessed the termination of one of the greatest, although one of the shortest, wars in which this country had ever been engaged. That war had been happily terminated; and, although the questions which gave rise to it had threatened to result in consequences most calamitous to Europe, they had now been settled in a manner which, he trusted, would effectually remove any apprehension from that source for a long time to come. A Congress had assembled at Paris to discuss the conditions of the peace; and it was only natural that the representatives of the great Powers of Europe should not separate without having directed their attention to other matters of European interest beyond the immediate objects for which they had been called together. It would have been a reproach to the representatives of the great Powers if, when they had been called together for the great purpose of European pacification, they had shut their eyes to circumstances which might bring about future complications, as dangerous to the peace of Europe as those which it had been their gratifying duty to put an end to. The affairs of Italy, therefore, naturally attracted their attention. His noble friend had well remarked, that occupations of independent States by foreign troops was such a departure from the ordinary course of affairs that they were only to be justified by an immediate and pressing necessity, and that they ought not to be continued after the necessity which gave occasion for them had been removed. If they were, the power which continued them beyond that period became deeply responsible, and was bound to show the reasons upon which it acted. The occupation then of several of the Italian States by foreign troops, naturally attracted the attention of the Congress of Paris; and no one was more fitting than the representative of the Emperor of the French, whose troops participated in these occupations, to bring the subject under the notice of that Congress. It was most honorable to the Emperor of the French, that he should have instructed his representative to take this course, and by so doing signify his desire to put an end to this state of things, if he could obtain the concurrence of Austria. The discussion, however, did not lead to any result. The representative of Austria held out no hopes that his government would take any steps in this direction; and he professed to be without instructions on the subject. His noble friend (Lord J. Russell) therefore wished to know what were the intentions of her Majesty's government; whether they meant to let the matter drop altogether, or whether they felt it to be their duty to continue to press the matter on, and what steps it was their duty to take in so doing. He (Lord Palmerston) thought that both his noble friend and the House would feel that when her Majesty's government, in conjunction with the government of the Emperor of the French, had made themselves a party to an official representation, with a view of inducing a cessation of these abnormal occupations, it was no momentary result that ought to be expected, and that no failure for the time should induce the governments of the two great countries to desist from any endeavors which they might think would produce results greatly to the advantage of all Europe. What steps her Majesty's government might think it their duty to take, his noble friend, of all men, must feel that it would be unbecoming for him to state; but he had no hesitation in saying that the question was one of the greatest importance, and that he entertained the strongest hope that the objects which the Congress at Paris had in view might be eventually realized. (Hear, hear.) It was said, on one side, that if the occupations were put a stop to, scenes of revolution and disaster would ensue. It would be unbecoming in spectators at a distance to express an opinion on the validity of this objection; but, reasoning on a great principle, he could not bring himself to think that the anticipations of these evils were not exaggerated, or that a government like that of the Pope, for instance, with an enlightened man at its head, would not be able to administer its affairs so as to remove any causes of discontent which would render convulsions probable. He then referred to the concessions granted by the Pope on his accession, and again on his restoration in 1849, and stated his opinion that if they had been carried into full effect, they would have removed all causes of discontent, and rendered foreign occupation unnecessary. He could not help thinking that if the Pope was well advised by those whose counsels he followed, even the liberal concessions which he had formerly made would have had the most satisfactory results. Her Majesty's government felt that the cessation of occupation in Italy by foreign troops, and the prevention of them for the future, were one of the most important objects which they and the French government could accomplish. With respect to Naples, their representations had not as yet been attended with any satisfactory result. His noble friend had expressed an opinion that a departure from the ordinary principle which restrained a foreign power from interfering in the domestic affairs of another country, was justified by the state of things in that kingdom. He (Lord Palmerston) fully agreed in this opinion, and he would beg the house to bear in mind the important results which might ensue, affecting the peace of the whole Continent. Suppose the injustice and severity of the King of Naples should lead to an outbreak, and he should find himself unable to maintain his position, he would immediately apply for assistance to Austria; and then it would be a question for the other Powers to say whether they would allow this additional interference. This question would then have a serious effect upon the peace of Europe and the interests of other countries; and that fact was a sufficient justification for a friendly interference on the part of England and France, for the purpose of inducing the King of Naples to prevent by his own means the occurrence of events which might lead to such great complications and embarrassments to the interests of the other European Powers. Although the government of Naples had looked with suspicion upon the advice from France and England alone, ministers did not despise that advice of the same kind which might reach the Neapolitan government from other quarters, whence it would be received with more entire confidence and cause an effect which England and France had failed to produce. Therefore, with regard to Naples as well as with regard to Rome, they did not despair. They saw a state of things which threatened the best interests of Europe; but he did not mean to say that the British government had given up all hope of producing an improvement. (Hear, hear.) His noble friend would feel that he could not go further into particulars. But on one point he had no hesitation in giving his full assent to his noble friend's observations. His noble friend had stated that the King of Sardinia, having nobly associated himself with England and France, had established a right to rely on the protection of England and France from any danger not brought about by any provocation on his own part. The proposition, he was sure, the King of Sardinia would be too wise to give; and therefore the two countries were bound by every tie of honor to assist him. (Cheers.) He was satisfied that the knowledge that such ties existed would of itself be enough to prevent his being threatened. No doubt, also, that as his noble friend advised, it would be desirable to encourage those sovereigns of Italy whose territories were free of foreign troops, like Tuscany, or still occupied, like Parma, in retrieving and maintaining their territorial independence. It was true that Italy was removed from us; but the history of Europe was full of examples of great wars and disturbances commencing in Italy, but spreading much further, and leading to great European wars. He agreed further, in thinking with his noble friend, that the most urgent attention should be given by the British government to the affairs of Italy. And the interests of Europe and of England would be best secured by giving perfect independence to the States of Italy within their own limits. With regard to the production of papers, he was sure his noble friend would be satisfied with the assurance that in the present state of things, with the correspondence still going on, it would not be conducive to the public service to lay them on the table. He could only say, therefore, that, concurring with the general views which his noble friend had so well developed, he reserved to her Majesty's government the discretion of pursuing those objects in a manner which they deemed the best suited to accomplish their purpose. (Cheers.)

Mr. DISRAELI said the noble lord had called their attention to a most momentous subject. Remembering what they owed to Italy, that in the olden time it gave us our laws, and in the latter time our arts, the condition of that country must always be a matter of interest. But there was a way of viewing the question which the noble lord had called the "poetry of politics;" and he could not help thinking that in a discussion which might lead to the gravest consequences to this country, there was danger in being led away by the mere poetry of politics, or by the very vague speech which they had just heard from the noble lord. However, he had referred to the poetry of politics had made some practical suggestions, and in referring to the treaty of Paris, had shown that our plenipotentiary there had committed this country to a very grave line of politics. If it was only intended to use the routine arguments which the noble lord at the head of the government had urged, it was hardly necessary to have introduced such a subject at the conferences, and thus to have roused the passions of the people of Italy. What, he asked, were they to infer from the questions of one noble lord, who had been the Prime Minister, and the answer of another noble lord who was now the Prime Minister? Whilst he listened to the noble lord, the member for London, he thought at first he was about to counsel measures of the most decisive and energetic character. He could hardly suppose, after what the noble lord had stated, that the noble lord contined his meaning to the communication of a note, through our minister, to the courts of Tuscany or Naples. The noble lord had also said it was their duty to prevent the suppression by Austria of the liberty of the press in Italy. *But the papers showed that it was not Austria, but our great allies the Emperor of the French, who had interfered to prevent discussion in Italy.* (Hear, hear.) From those papers it also appeared that the responsibility of introducing the Italian question at the Paris Conferences rested with the French Plenipotentiary; but the further papers which had been produced showed that it was not Count Walewski who was responsible for introducing this question. These papers showed the means by which the consideration of the conferences at Paris was directed to these extraneous and extraordinary circumstances. Count Walewski's introduction of the matter took place on the 8th of April; but on the 27th March, the Sardinian Minister had placed in the hands of the French and English governments the communication which had been published, containing the charges against the Austrian government. At the conferences, Lord Clarendon said that, on principle, it was not right to interfere between a State and its subjects; and that there were exceptional cases, in which it was justifiable. He asked if Lord Clarendon would have made such a statement if he had not received instructions indicating a more decided policy than what had been stated by the Prime Minister that evening. The noble lord (Palmerston) had said that the state of affairs at Naples was dangerous, as it might result in the armed interference of Austria, which would probably lead to the most serious calamities to Europe; but he also stated that, though England and France had not succeeded in their remonstrances with Naples, he did not despair that another Power would succeed by its friendly interference. He (Mr. Disraeli) understood that Austria was the Power referred to, and he concluded that the noble lord was inconsistent in stating that there was fear of an Austrian invasion, at the same time that he was holding out hopes that the peril might be ended by the beneficient interference of Austria. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord must also have felt the awkwardness of asserting that, with the assistance of our great ally, we should be enabled to get rid of the occupation of Italy by foreign troops, when that great ally was occupying the very capital of Italy itself. What, he asked, was the use of the noble lord thus rousing the passions of the people of Italy unless he was prepared to interfere effectually, and unless he had also the feeling of the House and the country with him? It might be well, so far as the poetry of politics were concerned, to discuss the matter; but were they prepared to go farther than the mere discussion, and to commit the country to a line of policy which might be attended with the most serious consequences? There were two ways of dealing with the question. They might go to war with Austria, and send a fleet to Naples and the Adriatic. They could also send ships and convey the troops of their ally to any part of Italy; and after engaging in a war, perhaps as long and devastating as the Punic war, they might, in the course of a generation, change the whole constitution of Italy. If such was their plan, he called on the Ministers to state it to Parliament, and appeal to the opinion of the public. There was another mode by which they might attain their object. In 1848 it was his (Mr. Disraeli's) part to lay before Parliament the affairs of Italy. He remembered well what the government of that day had done, and believed their conduct had been so dangerous to the interests of Italy that he viewed with pain and fear any attempt at pursuing a similar course by sending missions to give advice to the people of Italy. That second method might be accomplished by rousing the passions of the Italian people. They need not declare war; but they might set Italy in flames, and produce consequences which all would deplore. Turning aside, however, from this topic, he would first ask what was the state of Naples? The government ought, he thought, to state what the condition of Naples was. But, assuming all these tales of ruthless imprisonment to be true, he believed that it was caused by the panic fear of the sovereign of a small State, subject to perpetual insurrections and conspiracies fomented by foreign States. The same statements had been made years before with reference to the Austrian patriots imprisoned in Austrian dungeons; but had they interfered in favor of them? Had they not all heard of the banishments to Siberia; but had they declared war with Russia on that account? They had not ventured to declare war for these causes against great and powerful states; and why, he asked, should they adopt a different policy with a state small and comparatively powerless? People believed that the perils of Italy arose from all liberty being crushed and overpowered by its occupation by foreign troops; but he conceived that the great peril of Italy arose from secret societies. It was useless to deny that all Italy, the greater part of France and Germany, and very much of the rest of Europe, were covered by a network of secret societies who wanted, not constitutional governments or reforming Popes, but a transfer of all the lands from their present possessors, the overthrow of the church, and still more extreme changes. They would have a republic in Naples, formed on extreme opinions, which would be followed by the Pope becoming a fugitive; in which case, perhaps, his Hon. friend behind him (Mr. Spencer) would say there was no great harm. (Laughter.) The triumvirs would be re-established in Rome, and the cardinals and priests would be banished. What of that? it might be said, let the cardinals and priests go; for no republic can be as great a tyranny as that which had been overthrown. But did they think that that would be the end of it? Italy would be occupied by the forces of the two great Catholic powers, France and Austria. The red republicans would be conquered; but the suffering of the people would be dreadful; nor would the mischief even end there. The secret societies of France would be on the alert. With all respect for the great prince who now so ably ruled France, and had so powerful an army devotedly attached to him, he (Mr. Disraeli) could not forget that another great prince had at no distant period sat on the French throne—a prince, whose sagacity was powerful, who, like the present Emperor, had also been schooled in adversity, whose name was never mentioned in that house but in terms of panegyric from each side, who also was surrounded by an army flushed with conquest, yet who fell suddenly from the machinations of secret societies. That catastrophe was precipitated by the scarcity of the previous year; and he reminded the house that France was now also suffering from a great calamity. It might be that the sagacity of the present ruler would succeed in mitigating its consequences; but he would be very careful in his policy to avoid strengthening the secret societies, which were a source of such danger to his throne. He believed that if the advice of the noble lord, the member for London, were followed, the progress of civilisation and improvement in Italy would be retarded; and he therefore expressed his satisfaction that, notwithstanding all the pomp of the conferences, and all the detail of the protocols, it appeared to be the calm and well considered solid determination of her majesty's ministers, as regarded the affairs of Italy, to do nothing. (Hear, and a laugh.) He believed that the noble lord (Lord Palmerston) had remembered the experience of 1827 and 1848, and that he had made up his mind not to enter again into a position as difficult and dangerous as he then occupied. He had also such confidence in the wisdom of the Emperor of the French as to feel persuaded that, as regarded the affairs of Italy, his majesty was of the same opinion and determination as the noble lord at the head of the British government. He (Mr. Disraeli) could feel as highly for the condition of Italy any gentleman in that house, and he believed that the time would come when in Italy there would be neither secret societies nor crowned despots. These, however, were subjects for the closet, and not for the discussion of a practical popular assembly. He felt firmly persuaded that if they were to raise up an agitation against Austrian rule, without having a clear conception of the object at which they aimed, they would only arrest the progress of civilization in Italy. It was impossible to conceal from themselves that the great power of Italy was Austria; and unless they were prepared to enter into an interneciene struggle with Austria, their object should be to render Austrian rule mild and beneficent, and not to encourage those who were prepared to conspire against it. He had himself visited Italy, in 1848 and 1849; and though he did not find the country under a rule like that beneath which poetry, the arts and civilization flourished, he had found that under the rule of Austria there had been an immense expenditure of imperial money upon great public works, that the people had been lightly taxed, and that there had been a progressive material improvement in this country. The noble Lord, the member for London, said, although there might be no formal treaty with Sardinia, binding us to support it against other powers, yet, after the adhesion of Sardinia to the great alliance against Russia, we were bound in honor to come to the support of that country if attacked. The noble lord also ridiculed the notion of Sardinia attacking Austria; but the noble lord forgot that in 1848 it was Sardinia that attacked Austria, and not Austria that attacked Sardinia. He (Mr. Disraeli) trusted that the King of Sardinia would profit by the experience of 1848, and that he would continue to pursue that policy which had earned for him the respect of Europe, and which would secure him against any unjust attack. (Hear, hear.) It was to the interest of the King of Sardinia to preserve peace in Italy; but if he were to follow the advice of the noble lord the peace of Italy would be endangered, and the throne of Sardinia would fall, not by Austria or by foreign occupation, but by the efforts of men who had other objects in view than those political improvements which wisely occupied the consideration and attention of the King of Sardinia. For the sake of civilization, it was to be hoped that nothing would be done to stir up the passions of the people of Italy; and he felt satisfied that the House would never sanction the course recommended by the noble lord, the member for London. If they were to interfere in Italy at all, let it be a real interference; but if they were not prepared to accomplish their policy by force, the best thing they could do would be to remain silent, and not endeavor to lead the people of Italy into an enterprise, the consequences of which might be most disastrous to the whole of the people. (Hear, hear.)

Lord JOHN RUSSELL explained of the misrepresentations which the right honorable gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) had put upon his observations. He (Lord John Russell) had referred only to occupations by foreign troops, and he did not propose to interfere in other States which acquiesced in a despotic form of government of their own free will. He had only suggested that the governments should either abstain from all interference in Italy, or should proceed in the line marked out by the protocols of the Congress of Paris. He had desired to ascertain the intentions of the government; for he wished to know whether Austria's occupations were to continue in Italy until she had obtained a title to the States she occupied. He expressed his satisfaction at hearing that the government did not intend to abandon the views expressed in the Congress at Paris. He had not presumed to dictate the course which they should pursue, and he was glad to think that there was some ground for the favorable anticipation of the noble lord at the head of the government, that the Italian Powers might be induced to adopt the necessary reforms themselves.

The motion was then negatived without a division.

The Danish Sound Dues.

LONDON, Friday, July 11, 1856.

The select committee appointed to inquire into the Sound dues assembled in London at one o'clock, Mr. C. P. Villiers in the chair. The other members present were Mr. T. Milner Gibson, Mr. Liddell, Mr. Duncan, Mr. Mitchell, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Hutt, Mr. Bramley Moore, Mr. Cardwell and Mr. R. Phillimore.

Mr. BUCHANAN was the first witness called. He said he was the minister representing this country at Copenhagen, and was acquainted with the desire of the Danish government to meet the views of other countries with regard to the abolition of the Sound dues. The representatives of different countries had been invited to meet the Danish government and discuss the question; and, at the conference, tables were produced showing the sums paid by each nation. Generally speaking, he was enabled to confirm the evidence already given as to the inconvenience and dangers arising from the detention of vessels in the Sound while the duties were being collected. He thought that the dues ought to be abolished altogether, and that the British government should pay a fixed sum annually to Denmark, and levy it upon the commerce of this country with the Baltic. He believed that the abolition of the dues would give an impetus to trade, and would lead to a great increase in the commerce of this country and the Baltic. At present, there were numerous agents at Elsinore, who obtained a considerable profit from the Sound dues. The officers of the Sound Custom house were chiefly paid by fees. Probably the Danish government obtained about 80 per cent of the dues levied. Witness had resided in Elsinore, but left it in 1819. At that time, it possessed a population of from 7,000 to 8,000.

In reply to Mr. Bramley Moore,

The CHAIRMAN stated that he proposed to adjourn the committee till Tuesday, when he would be prepared to examine a witness connected with a Russian house, and to take the opinion of the committee upon their further course of proceeding.

The committee then adjourned till Tuesday at one o'clock.

Lord Palmerston and the United States.

[From the London Morning Star, July 15.]

Nothing can be more erroneous than the notion that Lord Palmerston's imperious and swaggering demeanor is directed only against the heads of arbitrary governments. If he makes any distinction at all, it is that implied in the cutting sarcasm addressed to him by Montalembert, in his recent letter on Italy, when he speaks of "his prudent longanimity" toward the powerful. Most certainly the character of the governments with which he has to deal has no influence on that braggart and bumptious temper in which he delights to indulge. He has shown the same alacrity to quarrel with the constitutional monarchy of France under Louis Philippe, and with the democratic republic of America, as with Russia and Austria. M. Guizot and Mr. Webster have complained as bitterly as Prince Schwarzenburg or Count Nesselrode of the difficulty of conducting any negotiations with a man of such a porcupine snout. Miss Martineau, in her "History of the Peace," after describing the change of administration in 1841, by the accession of Sir R. Peel to office, remarks that the appointment of Lord Aberdeen as Foreign Secretary was peculiarly fortunate at that crisis, in consequence, among other things, of the alarming state in which Lord Palmerston had left our relations with America. She then adds, in allusion, it is supposed, to a conversation between herself and Mr. Webster, "It seems strange," observed an eminent American statesman to an English traveller, "that we republicans should be glad when you tories come into power. One would think that our sympathies should be with your reform governments; but the truth is, we cannot get on with your whig ministers. They do not understand business, and they do not understand official good manners. Your tory Ministers are able and attentive and courteous, and when we do not agree we are not likely to quarrel. But with the whigs we have to forbear, and nothing goes on smoothly." In like manner, when the debates about the right of search took place in the French Chambers in 1842 it was openly declared by Guizot and Soult that all the difficulties on that question had occurred during Lord Palmerston's term of office, and that when Lord Aberdeen succeeded him none had arisen.

And, we confess, that so far from feeling any assurance on the ground of liberal sympathies, we look with special anxiety to the prospect of abandoning, at the present critical moment, our relations with America to the unchecked caprices of the Prime Minister. Symptoms are not wanting to warrant the darkest apprehensions. We believe it is no secret in political circles that Lord Palmerston was bent upon the summary dismissal of Mr. Dallas, and would have succeeded in that determination but for the opposition of his colleagues, and probably the significant hints of Mr. Hayter as to the state of feeling in the House and in the country. Every one must have remarked the suppressed bitterness which he betrayed towards the American government in the debate on Mr. Crampton's motion; and if he feels, as it is impossible for him not to feel, that he stands humbled and rebuked before the Great Western republic, we believe he is just the man to look for an opportunity to wreak his grudge against her. For, let it be observed, that no successor to Mr. Crampton has been appointed, that no intelligence has been communicated to the country as to the state or prospects of the negotiations respecting Central America, and that additional naval forces continue to be sent out to the West India waters. Is there no man in the House of Commons that has the courage to insist upon some explanation being given on these points before Parliament is prorogued? Will the representatives of the people be content to disperse themselves over the four points of the compass without making an attempt to ascertain, at least, for what purpose are these enormous reinforcements of our maritime armaments in the West?

Scarcity of Breadstuffs in France.

[From the Paris Constitutionnel, July 14.]

We consider it useful to offer to the public certain positive facts afforded by history with respect to the natural causes of scarcity, in order to destroy the popular prejudice, which has existed for centuries, that attributes to the avarice of speculators and to the hoarding of corn the occurrence of famine. Scarcity is no less natural an event than abundance, that is, there exists in the regular course of events a succession of circumstances connected with the climate that are respectively favorable and prejudicial to the production of corn. The earth has its periods of abundance and sterility. It has appeared to us advisable to consult the sources of history containing secrets so useful to the population, and we place before the public a series of eighty-four years of scarcity, which historians have recorded within the last four centuries.

From the list given by our cotemporary we extract the most memorable instances of scarcity that have occurred in France:—

From the year 1829 to 1834 a continual scarcity existed, which was due to excessive and permanent heat. During these six years it did not freeze two days in succession. The earth was covered with weeds and insects. In 1565 an extraordinary scarcity occurred. In 1573 Paris was invaded by the population of the rural districts, driven in by famine. In 1587 the fields were not cultivated in consequence of the wars of the League. All strangers were driven out of Paris. In 1626 there was a general scarcity over Europe. In 1684 the wheat perished in consequence of inundations. In 1692 a famine followed eight years of abundance. In 1698 the crops were destroyed by rains. The most terrible instance of scarcity in modern times took place in 1709. The previous autumn had been rainy; in the night of the 6th January there arose a north wind of a severity hitherto unknown to man. The earth was frozen two feet in depth. All the wheat perished, and not a single ear of corn was produced. In the spring the whole country was like an immense field. In 1764 a general famine is recorded. In 1795 took place the Prairial insurrection. Bread was sold in Paris at three hundred francs, in assignats, the pound. In the provinces the pound was disposed of at 50 to 50 sous in silver. In 1800, 1801, and 1808, partial scarcities occurred. In 1812 bread was worth 7 sous the pound in Paris. This dearness delayed for two months the departure of the army which invaded Russia; these two months changed the face of the globe. In 1817, the price of bread in Paris was 9 sous the pound; and in 1829, 5½ sous; in 1847, 6½ sous; and in 1855, 6 sous the pound. This list proves that in general eighteen years of scarcity occur in the century, or more than one year of want per 6 years of abundance. These are undeniable facts, and to doubt their significance would be puerile. They prove that the produce of a century comprise thirty-two seasons of abundance and eighteen insufficient or bad harvests. Scarcity is therefore a normal scourge, or rather it is a regular feature of the general production. Are we certain that the periods of sterility, during which vegetable life appears at a standstill, do not contribute to the energy of the fruitful periods? Who is the landowner that does not possess fruit trees which bear only once in two years? * * * * The best solution of the problem of scarcity will always be that which combats the scourge with the greatest number of possible means. The reduction of railway transport charges on provisions, the improvement of cultivation and drainage, a more extensive production of cattle, which diminishes the consumption of bread, the introduction of tropical tubercles, and the more general usage of genuine wine, which keeps up the strength—nothing in a word must be neglected. It would be, however, a great error to be alarmed by the idea that France does not produce in a regular manner the necessary quantity of corn for home consumption. It is only in poor or weakly populated countries that a surplus of wheat exists, such as Poland, the Ukraine, the Danubian provinces Hungary, Turkey, Egypt, Spain, Algeria, and the United States. Rich and populous countries never sell corn, because they consume it. England always, and France often requires corn. But there always exists corn to be sold in some direction or another, and it only requires to be in possession of naval material in order to transport it with celerity, and of railways to distribute it with economy. It is only necessary to be rich enough to pay for it.

Notices of New Publications.

BOOKS RECEIVED TO JULY 29.

Life and Adventures of James P. Beckwourth.

The Tongue of Fire, or The True Power of Christianity.

The Last of the Foresters.

LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF JAMES P. BECKWOURTH, MOUNTAINEER, SCOUT AND PIONEER, AND CHIEF OF THE CROW NATION OF INDIANS; by T. D. Bonner. Harper Brothers.

The subject of the present biography was one of the early pioneers of our Pacific settlements, and is well known to the officers of our army who have been stationed out there. Long resident amongst the Crow Indians, he acquired such popularity and ascendancy amongst them that he finally became their chief. A personal witness of most of the events which extended our conquests in those regions, and of a restless, daring spirit himself, there are few careers which present so many features of interest as that of Beckwourth. Mr. Bonner, who obtained the story of his life from his own lips, has properly deemed the life of such a man a fitting companion for those of the worthies whose courage and energy paved the way for the spread of civilization on our continent. He has given the narrative as nearly as possible in Beckwourth's own words—thereby preserving its spirit and originality—which of course form the main value of the story.

THE LAST OF THE FORESTERS; OR, HUMORS ON THE BORDER; A Story of the Old Virginia Frontier. By John Esten Cooke. Derby & Jackson.

A pleasantly written and genial story, with occasionally a slight tendency to caricature, which, however, is never so broad as to mar its general truthfulness. The tale is one of the best that Mr. Cooke has written, and will add greatly to his reputation.

THE TONGUE OF FIRE; OR, THE TRUE POWER OF CHRISTIANITY. By William Arthur. Harper Brothers.

This volume is the result of the meditations of an earnest and simple minded man, desirous of lessening the distance which he felt to exist between his own life and ministry and that of the early Christians. As may be expected from the strivings of such a soul, it breathes a spirit of deep conviction and passionate zeal, which is rarely to be met with amongst modern Christians, and which, perhaps, only finds its true parallel in Apostolic times.

Interesting Narrative, by Philip Toohey, Second Lieutenant in the Nicaraguan Army—His Capture by the Costa Ricans, and Release.

TO THE EDITORS OF THE NEW ORLEANS DELTA.

NEW ORLEANS, July 9, 1856.

On or about the 27th of February last, with a company of those destined for Nicaragua, I, with many citizens of Louisiana, left on the steamship Prometheus for San Juan del Norte, to join the filibusters, as they were then called, in Nicaragua. We landed in Granada in time to find the country at war with one of the neighboring States—that of Costa Rica—and my company, with four others, were ordered to Guanacaste, which is claimed by Nicaragua. After four or five days' march we were met and defeated at Santa Rosa by three thousand two hundred of the Costa Ricans. We killed 173, and wounded 80 more, although they gave the number as very small. I can certify to the truth of this, as I was wounded and taken prisoner on the field of battle, and saw everything that transpired that day. Our loss in battle was 17 killed and 60 missing, out of a battalion 260 strong leaving San Juan del Sur. I cannot account for more than 25, whom I saw most barbarously executed by the order of the President of Costa Rica.

I was the only one that was saved, from the fact that they found in my possession a note book, giving a description of the country, its climate and general productions, as I had promised to favor the *Delta* with anything which might be of interest to the many readers of your valuable paper; and another reason for saving my life was to give a chance to a young, inexperienced doctor to practise on the wounds of a condemned *filibustero*. After having my arm amput