duce the American commercial body to acquiesce in the arrangement, whilst the storm lasts, but when fair weather appears, then the danger will also show itself

[From the London News (City Article) Oct. 14.]

The money market continues unsettled, and the pressure for accommodation at the bank was to day almost as heavy as yesterday and on Saturday. The rates of discount current in the open market are generally above those of the bank, and in most quarters there is an indisposition to touch long-dated paper, unless in the shape of advances for short periods. These circumstances combine to maintain a feeling of uncertainty and anxiety, and to keep alive the fear that the bank directors may ultimately decide upon a fresh rise in the rate of discount. Upon the whole, however, the apprehension of a further immediate advance has somewhat subsided to-day, an impression having gained ground in many quarters that the bank will pause until the weekly court on Thursday. To morrow the dividends will be payable, but, as we have before pointed out, little relief is anticipated from this source, owing to the magnitude of the repayments due at the bank, commencing with to morrow. Apart from the severity of the recent pressure for money, *the bank's metallic stock must have been greatly reduced during the last ten days*, for, in addition to the remittances to the Continent, those in course of despatch to New York, and the withdrawals of coin by country bankers, the steamer Celt took out yesterday £105,000 in specie for the Cape of Good Hope, and the Australasian £30,390 for Alexandria. Payment must also be made for the large quantities of silver in course of collection on the Continent. On the other hand, a most important point in our favor is a general and decided rise in the continental exchanges, consequent upon the advance in the value of money here. There were no withdrawals of bar gold from the bank to day, and owing to the more advantageous medium of remittance now presented by bills, coupled with the arrival of a large sum from Australia and Russia, it is hoped that the drain of gold from the bank to the Continent is, for the present at least, stayed. Coupling with this feature the fact that the extraordinarily high rates now allowed for deposits have attracted a more liberal supply of money for employment in the open market, we think that the general aspect of affairs may be considered more satisfactory than has presented yesterday. One of the most encouraging features of the moment is that, although such high rates of interest prevail, there is no foolish indisposition to lend.

It was announced this morning by telegraph that the Bank of France have raised the rate of discount from 5½ to 6½ per cent. A movement in this direction was inevitable, and the announcement, therefore, excited no surprise here.

The funds opened this morning with increased heaviness, and at one period prices showed a reduction of fully one per cent compared with the four o'clock quotations of yesterday. At this point numerous influential purchasers came forward; parties who had effected speculative sales hastened to buy back; a number of *bona fide* investments were effected; and the aspect of the market experienced a decided change for the better. At four o'clock the quotations were equal to those current at the same hour yesterday. Some support was given to the market by the appearance of the government broker as a buyer of exchequer bills on account of the Sinking Fund, for although his purchase was limited to £10,000 (effected at 8s. discount) it was thought that further operations in the same direction may be in reserve. After four o'clock, however (at which hour the recognized business may be said to terminate), the funds gave way again. One of the features that chiefly tends to discourage operators for the rise is the superabundant supply of stock in the market, coupled with the general belief that this supply will hereafter be further increased by a government loan

[From the London Herald (City Article) Oct 14.]

The disturbance visible in the position of money affairs has not diminished, and it is still thought that the bank may have to adopt further measures of restriction. An unsettled feeling prevailed in business circles throughout the day, the increase in the rate of discount by the Bank of France to 6½ per cent, and the intimation of commercial embarrassments in London and the provinces having caused a variety of unfavorable rumors. There seems now but little doubt but that large remittances of specie will take place to America and India within the next few days; *and insurances having already been effected on about £800,000 for New York, the expectation is that the drain will augment in severity.* The fluctuations in public securities were constant and extensive, and consols were at one period of the day as low as 86¾, the sales of the speculators having forced them to that depreciated point. The intelligence from Calcutta presented in the despatches of the East India Company produced little influence, and attention is almost wholly directed to the nature of the advices from America, expected by to-morrow's packet. Although the bank authorities, should the advices be delayed, may in the meanwhile be compelled to advance the rate, there will be less fear of a continuance of the stringency if they seem more favorable. The panic symptoms which have been apparent, and which have been stimulated by the operators at the Stock Exchange, are sure not to experience relief while endeavors continue to be made to impress the public with the notion that a general crisis is at hand. *It is discouraging enough to know that the period of pressure through which the trading community will have to pass is likely to be productive of serious effect*, without attempting to promote sombre views, which only serve speculative objects. The revival of the rumor that a loan is about to be contracted for the assistance of the East India Company, the bank directors—so it is alleged—not being in a situation to afford them much further indirect aid, created increased distrust, and sufficed to augment the demand for money. The preparations for the arrangement of the consol account, and the results attending the late severe fall, were points which attracted some consideration, and the one suspension announced in the course of the day is believed to be the precursor of others, the settlement being extremely heavy, and the differences to be liquidated representing a more than ordinary amount. The range in discussion has been rather more than 1 per cent, but a recovery took place, leaving at the official close little variation from yesterday. Another change, it appears, then came over the quotations, which again descended nearly a half per cent. The arrival of Australian gold, although telegraphed early in the day, only slightly affected the market, but the improvement was not long maintained.

The failure of Messrs. Macdonald & Co., of London and Glasgow, was officially announced to-day, and the liabilities are variously estimated at from £500,000 to £700,000. They are stated to have been the largest firm engaged in the embroidery and sewed muslin trade, and besides possessing a branch in Scotland, had houses at Manchester and in Ireland. Their connections with Canada, America and Australia have involved them in difficulties, and although the estate, it is believed, will exhibit favorable assets, the estimate of 20s. in the pound formed in some quarters is not likely to be realized. The suspension of Messrs. Monteith & Co., of Glasgow, will, it is expected, be attended with serious results, the liabilities being extensive, and the assets comparatively limited. In both cases it is anticipated that several smaller firms will be compromised, as the old system of accommodation paper has, it is asserted, been extensively resorted to. The Western Bank of Scotland will have the entire control of the investigation of the Glasgow estates; but it is considered that the London firm of Messrs. Macdonald & Co. will be submitted to the process of liquidation if it is not eventually transferred to bankruptcy.

[From the London News, Oct 13.]

A commercial crisis has fallen upon us somewhat suddenly, aggravated by the monetary pressure existing in every part of the Continent, by the extent of disasters in America, and by the serious derangement of our commercial operations consequent on the Indian outbreak. We have latterly taken every occasion to point out the inevitable tendency of the various causes in operation to create for a considerable period a stringency in the money market, and we have inculcated a caution which was of the utmost consequence, notwithstanding the general soundness of commerce. It is our duty now to show that, although unforeseen circumstances have increased the anticipated pressure in a most alarming manner, and have brought about calamities more extensive than we could have calculated on or guarded against, the greatest peril of the present moment arises from the danger of the public misunderstanding the true bearing of the recent measures taken by the Bank of England and by their yielding to a panic fear and forgetting the history of past seasons of commercial pressure.

The failures in America, by depriving those houses which have large dealings with that country of their expected remittances, and forcing upon them the necessity of nevertheless providing for their other engagements, have created a great and sudden demand on their parts upon the disposable capital of the country. This demand has arisen, moreover, at a season of the year when the amount of unemployed capital is usually at its minimum, when the public deposits in the Bank of England are at their largest, and just before the payment of the October dividends has again put some six millions of money into circulation through its ordinary channels. The returns of the Bank of England are now anxiously looked for, and it is from these returns, if properly understood, that the public should derive the confidence which, more than anything else, will not only mitigate the existing pressure, but will cause it to pass away with the greatest rapidity and with a minimum amount of injury. Ten years ago, when at the same period of the year a similar crisis occurred—which the very coincidence of dates will force upon people's minds, tending to lead them to overrate the present danger—we stood in a very different position. We have no longer to dread, as we did then, the efflux of bullion, for since that period a sum variously estimated from 12 to 20 millions of gold, has been put permanently into circulation in the country, and forms a last resource which was not available in 1847. It is worth while to look back to that period, to compare the bank returns of that date with those just issued, and to see how rapidly the state of the bank accounts, which led to a panic having such fearful results, rectified itself by a natural movement of money which we shall show to be periodical. On October 2, 1847, the reserve of notes in the Bank of England amounted to £3,409,300, and the amount of "other securities" to £21,259,929, the rate of discount being then 5½ per cent. On October 3, 1857, the reserve of notes was £4,066,040; the "other securities" £21,835,843, and the rate of discount also 5½ per cent. It must also be borne in mind that of those "other securities" £1,000,000 is represented by the bonds recently lodged by the East India Company, which had proportionally reduced the amount of the reserve. The payment of the dividends in 1847 reduced the reserve of notes to 2,680,118; on the 13th of October, and on the 20th they had fallen to 1,176,140; the rate of interest having at the same time risen to eight per cent. A panic had set in, for the public, anticipating an entire exhaustion of the reserve, hoarded its disposable capital, and credit for the time was annihilated. The rate of interest in the money market consequent on this holding back of capital was enormously exaggerated, and unnecessarily so, as events immediately demonstrated. The celebrated letter, so much canvassed, was issued, authorizing the bank to extend its issues; but it never became necessary to act upon it, for in the natural course of events the notes and bullion began to flow back to the bank through the government deposits, and within a month of the date above quoted, the reserve of the bank had risen from £1,176,140 to £4,228,095, an increase of £3,051,955. By the end of the year it had reached £7,766,189, and the rate of interest had fallen to five per cent.

The circumstances attending the panic of 1847 may not be familiar to many of our readers, but all must remember the monetary pressure of 1855 and 1856, when exactly the same phenomena occurred, minus the intensity of alarm and the calamities which were evidently attributable in a great measure to that cause. The following table will show the movements of the bank accounts at the two periods referred to:—

	Reserve of Notes.	Other Securities.	Rate of Discount.
Oct. 18, 1855	£4,567,495	£19,280,446	8½ per cent.
Oct. 11, 1856	3,821,929	21,049,117	6 and 7 per ct.
Oct. 27, 1855	4,962,660	18,434,600	6 and 7 per ct.
Nov. 1, 1856	2,943,865	19,055,445	6 and 7 per ct.
Dec. 1, 1855	5,905,845	18,866,767	6 and 7 per ct.
Dec. 6, 1856	5,151,580	17,389,715	6½ per cent.

It will be seen that the reserve reaches its lowest point just after the payment of the dividends, and that it rapidly increases during the next two or three weeks from natural causes, even when the rate of interest remains very high, and might be supposed to indicate that an extremely active demand for money, amounting to a pressure, was going on. There is no doubt that had a panic existed last year at this period, the consequence would have been most calamitous; but we trust that both the public and the bank have profited by the experience of the past. That the bank has done so we believe by the promptitude with which it has taken very decided steps, the purport and effect of which ought not to be misunderstood. By its sudden increase of the rate to 7 per cent, it effectually checks the tendency to export bullion created by the movement in foreign exchanges; and this measure, instead of creating alarm, is ominently calculated to inspire confidence, and exhibits a determination on the part of the bank to maintain a reserve proportionate to its liabilities, until in the course of a few weeks the six millions of dividend money shall have been distributed through myriads of channels, and shall have become once more at the disposal of the mercantile community.

That the large failures in America must of necessity entail heavy losses on many of our merchants and bankers, or that the general state of European finance will maintain for a considerable period a great tightness in the money market, it would be folly to forget or to treat lightly. We cannot, however, see that there is anything thus far to create alarm as to the power of the Bank of England to maintain its credit, and to assist largely the financial world in bearing that pressure, or in the general state of our commerce to induce a belief that there are any elements existing, like the overtrading of 1847, to render such calamities as then ensued probable. It is not, however, to be wondered at that the occurrence of the American panic in 1857, and our own in 1847, should, by a singular coincidence of decennial periods, weigh heavily on unreflecting minds.

THE EFFECT IN MANCHESTER.

[From the Manchester Guardian (City Article) Oct. 14.]

The commercial storm, reaching us from the United States, is producing a serious effect. Instead of goods, money flows to that quarter where it may be very profitably used in buying up depreciated securities. This, added to the previous causes of drain, has led the Bank of England again to raise the rate of interest; an advance of one per cent having been determined upon at the meeting of directors yesterday morning. The increased difficulty of effecting discounts and of obtaining remittances, which this action, together with the enhanced risk which cannot but ensue, would alone restrict the operations of merchants. This consequence is, however, aggravated by the heavy failures that monetary difficulties have already occasioned in Glasgow; and the business of to-day has, therefore, been altogether insignificant. Very prudently, all classes of buyers deem it necessary to narrow their engagements. There is a sufficient sense of danger to induce a wholesome caution, but we have amongst us nothing akin to panic. That some weak parties may be upset (as some have already been) is expected; but no heavy and wide spread mischief is apprehended in this city or district; and so the crisis is met with general calmness. There is no pressure to sell, and prices are nominally but little affected.

What effect a continued diminution of demand for yarns and goods may have upon production remains to be seen. As contracts run out stocks will begin to accumulate, and if the mills go on working full time, cotton will maintain its value or become dearer from scarceness. Will spinners and manufacturers pile up their products at so high a cost? This is scarcely conceivable. It would clearly, then, be the wisest course for the whole cotton trade to resort to short time at once. In no other way can the complicated difficulties and dangers of the position be effectually dealt with. The trade have to bear the pressure of a demand for money to carry on the war in India, and of a curtailed demand for yarns and goods for that country, in addition to the pressure from the one circumstances above pointed out.

The failures in Glasgow, to which allusion has been made, are the following:—J. and D Macdonald, very extensive muslin manufacturers, whose liabilities are variously stated at £500,000, $600,000, and even a still higher sum; J. Monteith & Co., calico printers, having liabilities given in some letters at £380,000, and in others at £600,000; William Smith, calico printer, whose debts are not stated, and William Wardlaw & Co., agents, owing, it is said, £60,000. In reference to a rumor of the sum owing by J. Monteith & Co to a Manchester firm, we can state, on the best authority, that it is immensely exaggerated. We are glad to say that the alleged failure of G. Pattison & Co., of Glasgow, announced to this city by telegraph, and stated in the *Times*, is authoritatively contradicted. In Manchester, Hugh Ferguson, stuff merchant, has informed his creditors, by circular, that he is unable to meet his undertakings, which somewhat exceed £40,000. This amount will fall chiefly upon Bradford. Mr Ferguson is said by the Leeds *Mercury* "to have been engaged in speculative transactions to a considerable extent."

A meeting of the creditors of James and John Beard has been held to-day at the Clarence Hotel, Messrs. Sale, Worthington and Shipman being the solicitors to the estate, and Mr. Broome accountant. The debts and liabilities were stated at £61,000, the assets at £33 800. The latter consists of stock, £13,000; good debts in England, £800; and balance upon consignments to foreign markets, £50,000. Sixty creditors were present or represented; and a committee was appointed to investigate the affairs, and report to an adjourned meeting next Tuesday. There has also been a meeting of the creditors of Edmund Whitehead, silk manufacturer, at Middleton. He offers 8s. 9d. in the pound, upon £20,000, which the principal creditors have accepted. Affleck and M'Kerrow's accounts are in course of preparation for a meeting.

THE PANIC ON THE PARIS BOURSE.

[Paris (Oct. 16) Correspondence of London Post.]

It is not remarkable that a considerable fall has taken place in the value of all securities this week at the Parisian Bourse. The gloomy news from America—the financial crisis in Austria—the uncertainty of the effects the next Indian news may produce—the raising of the price for discounts in London, Berlin, Amsterdam and elsewhere, together with consequent increasing tightness of the money market all over the world, are causes which have found their echo in Paris. To these events must be added the decline in the metallic reserve of the Bank of France. Discount accommodation shows a considerable augmentation in Paris, namely, 28¾ millions; there is also an increase in the branch banks, though only to the extent of 2¾ millions. With such facts before them, buyers hold off, and a very large amount of money is at the present moment unemployed, because a further fall is anticipated. But for external events the position of the French money market would be favorable. The slightest alarm and hesitation must of necessity be ever felt in a country which, like France, has so many heavy liabilities on hand, originating in the speculative mania of the day. We must not expect any improvement in French securities for the present. The following table shows the decline on the week's quotations:—

Name of Quotations.	Oct 2. Fr. C.	Friday Oct. 9. Fr. C.	Difference. Minus. Fr. C.
Rente 3 per cent	68 35	67 60	0 75
Rente 4½ per cent	91 50	91 40	0 10
Consolidés	90¾	89¾	0 ¾
Banque de France	3000 0	2960 0	40 0
Comptoir d'escompte	630 0	670 0	10 0
Crédit foncier	560 0	560 0	—
Crédit mobilier	890 0	810 0	80 0
Orleans	1395 0	1355 50	40 0
Nord	895 0	885 0	10 0
Est (Ancien)	695 0	690 0	5 0
Est (Nouveau)	680 50	680 0	0 50
Lyon et Méditerranée	875 0	855 0	20 0
Midi	635 0	615 0	20 0
Ouest	717 50	685 0	32 50
Grand Central	607 50	606 25	1 25
Genève	667 50	665 0	12 50
Chemins Autrichiens	685 0	673 75	11 25

[From the London News, Oct 14.]

The return just issued by the Bank of France is chiefly interesting as indicating that the monetary disturbance which is going the round of the continent has now extended to the French market. The consequence is seen in the rise in the rate of discount in Paris from 5½ to 6½ per cent. We believe that the drain of gold, which has led, during the last month, to a reduction of nearly £900,000 in the bank's metallic stock, did not assume serious proportions until a few days ago. There can be no doubt that this exportation of gold from France is intimately connected with the increase of more than a million now presented in the bills discounted. Of this increase nearly the whole has taken place in Paris, where a large amount of bills have been created, and the proceeds remitted to other continental States in the shape of hard cash. Additional evidence that such is the nature of the operation in progress is afforded by the fact that the influx of bills into, and the withdrawals of gold from the bank, set in simultaneously.

The feature which excites chief surprise in English observers is that at the very time when this adverse movement was setting in—when symptoms of financial perturbation were palpably arising in several parts of Europe, and when the severity of the American panic was engaging universal attention—the Council of the Bank of France stepped forward to announce their readiness to extend their advances on government and railway securities. As a matter of course, nearly all the French journals who set themselves up as financial authorities, clamorously applauded the step, and, at first, even importuned the bank to lower the rate of discount to 5 per cent. We, on our part, see in this indication of the policy of the bank a proof that the spirit of the late respected Governor, the Comte D'Argout, no longer presides over their councils. The rumor that the decision to lend more freely on Bourse securities was adopted in deference to an expression of opinion from a high quarter, tends to confirm the suspicion generally entertained as to the real motives of that gentleman's withdrawal from a post which he had filled with so much credit during more than a quarter of a century. True to its policy of constantly egging on that most numerous class, the speculative public, into fresh ventures, the French press has eagerly reiterated the assurance that the recent announcement from the bank formed only the commencement of a series of measures tending to the material relief of the overloaded market. To recognise the fact that the previous excess of speculation was the real cause of the prolonged stagnation lately witnessed, and to point to the necessity of caution until the effects of that excess are materially mitigated, would not suit the views of our Paris contemporaries, or of the larger than speculators by whom many of them are inspired. Thus in one quarter we see it seriously stated that the Bank of France proposes to set apart for employment in loans on Bourse securities a sum of 150 millions of francs, or six millions sterling. As the amount at present employed in this way does not exceed £4,320,000, a fine time is predicted—in the teeth of facts—for the Bourse, and many are the eulogies lavished on the administration of the bank for their enlightened policy. Occasion is at the same time taken to impress upon them an earnest warning that whatever facilities they now accord must be permanent, and to point to the mischief which was inflicted upon numerous interests last year, when the loans on stocks and shares, after being largely extended, were suddenly contracted. In our opinion, the primary cause of the mischief complained of was the extension, not the subsequent contraction. It would be next to madness for the Bank of France, under existing circumstances, to make advances to anything like the amount named. Indeed, the probability is that the council will be compelled to persevere during a lengthened period in the more stringent policy which has just been inaugurated by the rise in the rate of discount to 6½ per cent. The motives which prompted them on former occasions to injudiciously increase their loans to speculators no longer exist—i. e., there is at present no great French loan to be "facilitated." The Paris press may refer with reasonable congratulation to the important advantage which the country now owes in the shape of an abundant harvest, but the result already proves how absurd was the inference that whilst the rest of the Continent, as well as England and America, are involved in the anxieties of a monetary crisis, France can preserve her financial condition undisturbed. At the corresponding period of last year, when the value of money was likewise rising throughout Europe, the bullion in the Bank of France fell to £6,688,700, the return for the single month ending the 9th October, showing the alarming decrease of £2,778,000. It is true that this sudden drain was partly owing to the deficiency in the harvest of 1856, but it was also greatly promoted by the rise in the rates of discount in Germany and Holland, and the latter feature is witnessed now in a degree equally important. Last year the movement imposed upon the French Bank the necessity of adopting the most extraordinary measures. The expenditure in premiums on bullion during a period of two months averaged £25,000 per month, or at the rate of £300,000 per annum, and public anxiety was extreme. And here we would remark that but for the imprudent extension of the bank's issues, resulting in great part from the large advances to the Bourse, the requisite measures, instead of seriously aggravating the derangement of the neighboring markets, might have been carried out with comparative ease. But in September, 1856, when the drain of bullion began to grow serious, the Bank's advances on government and railway securities reached the large sum of £5,830,000, and the reduction of these required careful management and time. In October the total was still £5,718 000, but by November, when the crisis in the money market was pretty well over a reduction to £3,382,000 had been effected, and by December the bank had curtailed them to £2,357,000. Warned by experience, however, the directors wisely persevered in a restrictive policy until the middle of March, when the total loans stood at only £1 839,000.

If the French press would read the present financial circumstances of Europe by the light of experience, they would see ample ground for preaching caution. But it is a melancholy, though natural, consequence of the gagging system adopted in France, that the pen of the journalist has, in too many instances, fallen from the hands of man of elevated views and patriotism into those of a class whose ambition seems to be confined to picking up the crumbs that fall from the speculative millionaire's table.

[From the London News, Oct. 14.]

We have already pointed out the circumstances which lead us to believe that, serious as the existing monetary pressure is, there is no apparent ground for panic, and that the natural course of events will in a few days materially relieve the present excessive stringency of the money market. As a natural consequence of the increase of the bank rate to 7 per cent here, the Bank of France has also raised its rate to 6½ per cent, a measure which, it is said, would have been adopted earlier, although not to so great an extent, had not the higher powers strongly objected to such an act of prudence. In face of the recent return of the Bank of France, showing a heavy increase of bills discounted, and a large diminution of the bullion, notwithstanding purchases which we may estimate at above two millions, it is difficult to understand on what grounds the bank extended the margin of its loans on stock and shares. It may have had reason to believe that this concession would be little acted on, and it is certain that the increase of the advances on those securities was but of trifling amount. It is, nevertheless, certain that money has for some time past been less and less abundant in France, notwithstanding the excellent accounts received of the wine and grain crops in general. The traffic on the railways has diminished, and although the commercial returns published by the government are, on the whole, very satisfactory, there is undoubtedly a state of things existing which causes serious anxiety.

It was one of the weaknesses of Napoleon I., as it has been that of his nephew, to believe that by administrative action, by edicts and orders in council, prosperity might be maintained in a country unhampered by parliamentary bodies or a free press. The quotations of the funds under the uncle, and of the Bourse securities in general under the nephew, were regarded, and are still regarded, as exponents, not only of the national prosperity, but of the individual skill and popularity of the sovereign. Every measure, therefore, however wise, tending to diminish the activity of Bourse operations—those, at least, which are admitted to be legitimate ones—has been viewed with disfavor, as evidently tending to produce a fall in quotations. On the other hand, measures of questionable prudence and propriety have been initiated or winked at by the ruler, when they promised to give at least an appearance of reviving prosperity and confidence. *The visit of the President of the Credit Mobilier to Châlons, and the rally in prices which followed it, were at the least singular coincidences;* but although very active measures have been taken by those who are supposed to be somewhat overjealous of the shares, the Paris Bourse has only been galvanized, and the reaction is not healthy. So long as those measures told only on the operations of those who sold what they did not possess, they were to a certain extent successful, but a new element has been introduced. Our advices inform us that *bona fide* sales are continuing and increasing, as a consequence of the general extension of the demand for money. *Within the last few weeks several failures have taken place among bankers, and more than one firm of high standing formerly is indebted to the assistance of the great capitalists connected with it for extrication from its most pressing difficulties.* It is impossible to disguise the fact—France is suffering under a weight of floating securities, representing undertakings rashly entered upon, and of which the other monetary centres of Europe are unfortunately unable to relieve her.

We look upon France financially as eminently an example of "unstable equilibrium," and we dread every event which may throw the balance on the wrong side. We deprecate it not only from the inevitable reaction which it would cause in other parts of Europe, but from the check that would be given to the rapidly increasing prosperity of a country with which we have been so intimately allied, and whose well being is of such general interest to us. *We wait, therefore, with great anxiety the effects of this commercial catastrophe in America upon the manufacturers of the South of France more especially, of whom the United States were notoriously the largest customers*, as they were to a numerous class of the producers in Paris. The Lyons houses are beginning already to feel severely the fall in silk generally, and the difficulty of finding purchasers for goods manufactured from raw material at an excessively high price increases from day to day. It is only by the facilities that exist for obtaining credit that they are enabled to pass through this difficulty, aggravated to an extent as yet unknown by the failures in the United States; and we sincerely hope that the sort of crisis through which we are passing may not produce most disastrous effects in France.

The two countries are in very different financial circumstances as regards their disposable capital, after making every allowance for the absorption of our floating means by the war loan. We have at any rate avoided excessive speculation, and the course in England has kept an active watch over the monetary signs of the times, and has never hesitated to sound the note of warning, regardless of the effect it might have on the stock and share lists. France, on the other hand, meets a general demand for capital throughout Europe, burthened not only with a vast amount of floating investments, but with liabilities in the way of calls attached to them to an amount which, though not alarming in ordinary times, may in days of severe pressure prove to be the feather that breaks the camel's back. And we must again call attention to the fact that the press of France in general has diligently encouraged this perilous speculation, and has kept out of sight its dangers. Even now any one who should form an opinion from the financial articles of the French journals would conclude that the present depression was temporary, and of little importance, and that any precautionary measures on the part of capitalists were utterly unnecessary. If they have for months, and in the face of such unmistakeable facts, voluntarily fostered the delusion that no day of reckoning would overtake a community that had over speculated, or that had invested its floating capital with a perilous rapidity, they have grossly mistaken the responsibilities and duties of public writers. If, on the contrary, they have done it because to speak truth and to warn would bring down upon them the Imperial wrath, for daring to insinuate that all was not perfectly sound and wisely managed—why, *tant pis* for France. We have no voice in the matter, and hardly know whether to pity or to condemn our fellow journalists over the Channel. We do, however, trust that the folly of such a system will become at length apparent, and that those who are capable of pointing out, not only the evil, but its causes and remedies, may be encouraged to speak out plainly. Some vanities will be wounded, some idols will be overturned, some obstinate prejudices shocked; but unless this be the case, we have little hope that France will escape the bitter trials which have heretofore been so severely felt by ourselves.

[From Galignani's Messenger, (City Article) Oct 13.]

Some important purchases were made at the opening of the market, as the Indian despatches were considered as of a more cheering tenor; but as the English consols arrived with a further decline of ⅛, it was supposed that they had been regarded in a different light by the London Stock Exchange. A despatch announced that the board of the Bank of England had raised the rate of discount to 7 per cent, and it was thought that the Bank of France would raise its own discount to 6 per cent. Threes, after having been done at 51fr. 15c. and 67fr. 25c, receded to 67f. 5c; Mobilier varied from 805fr. to 810 fr.; Orleans, 1,340fr. to 1,336fr; Northern, 875fr. to 870fr; Lyons, 845fr. to 823fr. 50c; ditto new, 827fr. 50c. to 822fr. 50c; Austrian, 670fr. to 665fr.

The market continued looking down to the close.

TRADE OF PARIS—DIFFICULTY OF COLLECTING TRADE DEBTS.

[Paris (Oct. 12) Correspondence of London Times.]

The manufacturers of Paris are in general doing a considerable amount of business, but they complain of the scarcity of money and of the difficulty they experience in collecting their debts. Many manufacturers, who delivered their goods on an undertaking to be paid at the end of three months, have, at the expiration of that period, been forced to accept a portion only of their demands on account. Others have been compelled to accept in payment bills of exchange, which they find great difficulty in getting discounted. *The scarcity of ready cash is generally attributed to the over speculation of commercial men in railway shares and other public securities*, which they are now unable to dispose of except at an enormous loss. The country shopkeepers in particular having since the establishment of railways, a larger capital at their disposal, as they do not find it necessary to keep up so large a stock of goods, have unfortunately for themselves, been dealing largely at the Bourse, and now that the season has arrived for renewing their stocks, they are unable to pay cash to the manufacturers. The heavy rain and cold wind experienced in Paris last week have produced an active demand for warm clothing, of which the shopkeepers have profited. Many families have returned to town, and are making their usual purchases at this season. Fresh orders for various articles of Parisian manufacture continue to arrive from Spain. Orders for low priced jewelry are likewise received from the French colonies. Flour in Paris has fallen to the price of the most plentiful years; and it has become so abundant in all the markets that it is difficult to dispose of it even at the present low prices.

SPECULATIONS AND SUICIDES IN AUSTRIA.

[Vienna (Oct. 10) Correspondence of London Times.]

Hardly a *day passes without some unfortunate speculator committing suicide here*, and we have just learned that M. Gozdanovich, a merchant at Neusatz, shot himself because he was unable to meet his engagements. His debts are said to amount to 800,000 florins (£50,000).

The morning papers state, on authority, that the Galician Railroad Company will be constituted this year, but the authority may perhaps be mistaken. Before the company can be constituted, thirty per cent must be paid in, and it cannot possibly be the intention of the State to increase the difficulties under which the money market is now labouring. Scores of little men have failed lately, and the turn of some of the big ones will come if things long remain as they now are.

The same correspondent reports great pressure in the monetary and commercial world at that place. Very high rates of discount were being paid. Two large houses had suspended. The great house of Poskowa'z, at Pesth, had failed, many cotton and silk manufacturers were expected to follow.

OUR BERLIN CORRESPONDENCE.

BERLIN, Oct. 7, 1857.

The Financial Pressure in Prussia—Tottering Condition of the Banks—Tremendous Fall in Railway Shares

The money market, at any rate, is not imbued with the hopeful spirit which the government press appears so anxious to diffuse. The banking establishments that sprung into existence simultaneously with the peace of Paris, and were heralded as indications of a new era of commercial prosperity about to dawn upon Germany, are all in a tottering condition, their shares mostly below par, and their operations contracted within the narrowest limits. The financial *coup d'état* of M. Von der Heydt, prohibiting the circulation of their notes in Prussia, has inflicted a mortal blow upon them, from which they can never recover as long as this measure remains in force. Even the Prussian Bank, in whose interest it was enacted, has suffered from the monetary pressure occasioned by it, and was obliged on Saturday to raise its discount from 6 to 6½ per cent. The aspect of the railway market is still more deplorable. There are some shares that have fallen 15 or 20 per cent in the last week or two—for instance, the Cassel and Oderberg, that had dropped in less than a year from 200 to 60, and are now quoted at 45. In this and some other cases the deterioration is caused by mismanagement, depreciations, &c.; but generally speaking, the downward tendency of railway bonds is chiefly owing to the scarcity of money, as the traffic upon the roads is undiminished, and the proceeds sufficient to ensure a fair dividend.

THE MUTINY IN INDIA.

Advance of an English Siege Train and an Assault on Delhi Expected—Serious Defeats of the Mutineers—Lucknow held by the British—Additional Risings of the Bombay Troops and their Suppression—The Great Holiday over and all Quiet.

The dates are Calcutta 10th, Madras 15th, and Bombay 17th of September. From Delhi we have news to the 30th of August. The city was still held by the rebels. A siege train was expected to reach the English camp on the 3d of September, after which the place would probably be immediately assaulted. On the 25th of August a body of the rebels which left Delhi, with the object of intercepting the siege train, was attacked by Gen. Nicholson at Nejafghar, and utterly defeated, with loss of all their guns.

On the 1st of September Gen. Outram was at Allahabad with strong reinforcements, and expected to reach Cawnpore on the 9th of that month.

General Havelock gained his ninth victory on the 16th of August, driving the rebels from a strong position near Bithoor, which they desperately defended. After the battle he retired to Cawnpore, where he awaited reinforcements before advancing to the relief of Lucknow. The garrison at Lucknow held bravely out, and no doubt was entertained of their being able to do so until relief arrived, which was expected to be about the middle of September. The garrison had made a second successful sortie, in which two guns and a large quantity of provisions were captured.

The Dinapore mutineers had again been defeated by Major Eyre, and were trying to make their way to Delhi. At Agra all was well.

The 51st native infantry mutinied at Peshawur, on the 25th August, but by the following day the mutiny was completely crushed. Mutinies of a portion of the 10th light infantry at Ferozepore, and a part of the 55th at Ahmed, had in like manner been promptly suppressed.

At Neemuch part of a squadron of the 24 Bombay light cavalry mutinied, and the troopers were disarmed.

The rebels from Oude were threatening Allahabad and Benares, and those places were being put in a state of defence. Large bodies of troops were marching from Calcutta towards Allahabad.

The remainder of the Joudpore Legion had mutinied, but no further outbreak had occurred in the Bombay army.

The Madras Presidency, the Punjaub, Central India, and the Bundelcund remained tranquil.

The Moharrum (holiday) had passed off quietly in all parts of India.

Lord Elgin left Calcutta on the 3d of September for Hong Kong.

It is stated that the troops at Bhopaul had rebelled. The Begum, who continued friendly, had sent away the Europeans in safety.

Two more regiments had arrived at Calcutta, and more were expected very shortly, several troop ships having passed Ceylon, while a strong force had likewise reached the Mauritius.

A despatch to the London *Post* says:—The British forces, taking the offensive, attacked the batteries at Lucknow Castle, capturing and spiking the guns and inflicting heavy loss on the enemy. *The rebels are dispirited; cholera has broken out fiercely among them, and dissensions and daily desertions from the city were taking place. Hindoos and Mahomedans were quarrelling everywhere.*

The 70th Native Infantry at Barrackpore volunteered for China.

At Calcutta exchange was quoted at 2s. 2¼d., with a downward tendency. Money excessively scarce. The Bank of Bengal refused to make advances against government paper or bills having more than thirty days to run.

Prices had declined in the export market, and the import market continued dull.

At Madras markets generally unchanged. Money easy. Exchange 2s 2¼d., with a downward tendency.

At Bombay money was plentiful. Exchange 2s. 1¾d. Prices of imports continued to advance.

The India mail was expected to reach London on the 18th.

THE VERY LATEST.

GENERAL HAVELOCK'S COLUMN AND LUCKNOW.

[Calcutta (Sept. 9) Correspondence (telegraphic) of London Times.]

General Havelock was still at Cawnpore, waiting for reinforcements, and Lucknow still unrelieved. The 90th Regiment, about half the Fusileers and a 9 pounder battery, in all 1,270 men, were at Allahabad on the 3d or 4th. Six hundred infantry and the battery were immediately pushed towards Cawnpore, and General Outram was to follow with the remainder of the infantry on the night of the 5th inst. He expects to join Havelock on the 11th or 12th, and has directed the latter to have everything ready for crossing the river on his arrival. Meanwhile, we have intelligence from Lucknow up to the 2d inst, when the garrison were in good spirits, and sufficiently provided with food. They had recently repulsed a determined assault, and had disabled the only heavy guns belonging to the assailants.

The garrison have been told to hold out to extremity, and we are now confident that they will be relieved about the middle of this month.

DELHI.

Our latest accounts from Delhi extend to the 26th ult. The Punjaub reinforcements mentioned in last message reached camp on the 14th ult., and more recently an auxiliary force of about 2,600 men from Cashmere has marched to join the force. It is expected to do good service.

A new siege train from Ferozepore is expected by the end of August, and the Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub calculates that by the middle of this month the force before Delhi will be little short of 15 000 men. This estimate may be somewhat too high. There has been the usual skirmishing, with the same result. On the 12th ult. a battery which was troublesome was taken, and on the 24th Brigadier Nicholson attacked the insurgents, who were trying, in a large body, to get to our rear, entirely defeated and routed them, and took 12 guns, with all the ammunition, equipage, and baggage of the enemy.

The troops are in good health and spirits. Wounded doing well. Supplies abundant. It is said that some overtures have been made by, or on behalf of, the King. They will not be entertained. The garrison have been levying contributions in the neighborhood of Agra and the North-Western Provinces.

BENGAL AND BEHAR.

The Rewah troops detached, as reported in last message to intercept the Dinapore mutineers, were not in time to arrest their progress; the latter crossed the Tonse river about the 28th ult., after some detention by high floods, and their march has been marked by plunder. They give out that they are going to Delhi. The rebel Kocer Singh fled from Rohtas about the 27th or 28th ultimo, and sought refuge in the Rewah territory. The Rajah warned him off, whereupon most of his Sepoy adherents deserted him. A column, consisting of a wing of the 53d Queen's, 27th Madras Native Infantry, and some guns, left Ranoegunge on the 27th ult., and will clear the trunk Road. The Nepaul Durbar has given 1,000 Ghoorkas to aid in the occupation of Chumparun and the districts on the left bank of the Ganges, which are endangered by the abandonment of Goruckpore by the civil officers. It is thought that the force stated, which left Katmandoo on the 13th or 14th ult., will suffice to restore order in those districts.

AGRA.

Latest intelligence from Agra to the 25th August. All still in the fort, and general health good. Nothing particular had occurred, except an expedition to Futtehpore Sikri, and another to Hatserras, which latter defeated the insurgents, but was not strong enough to reoccupy Alyghur. The Furruckabad Nawab is said to be on the road between that place and Cawnpore with three regiments of mutinous infantry and one of cavalry. He will be dealt with by General Havelock's column, after the relief of Lucknow. On the deserting of Goruckpore by the civil officers a Ghookedar from Oude took possession. Anarchy and confusion in the district, and Chumparun consequently in some danger, as mentio