the Ottoman dominions would receive no encouragement from Russia.

With regard to France, Count Walewski assured me that the imperial government was most anxious that no cause of embrage should be given to her Majesty's government on any question regarding Turkey. M. de Thouvenel had received orders to return to his post sooner than he had intended, with the sole view of giving greater weight to the Emperor's intentions in this respect. He would receive the most positive instructions to act in complete concert with Sir Henry Bulwer; to consult him on every question which might arise; and on no account to separate himself from her Majesty's ambassador. He was to discourage and, as far as he could, control all attempts to set the Sultan's authority at naught; and special instructions of a similar nature would be furnished to all French agents in the East. M. de Thouvenel, moreover, would take Athens in his way to Constantinople, with the exclusive object of impressing upon the Greek government the necessity of abstaining from all intrigues to excite rebellion among the Greek subjects of the Porte.

I cannot doubt, from Count Walewski's tone and language, that it is the sincere wish of the imperial government to prevent any question arising which could in any way occasion differences with her Majesty's government.

I took this opportunity of calling Count Walewski's attention to the language reported to be held by certain of the French representatives abroad. *They already began to talk, I said, of the treaties of 1815 being at an end.* Such proceedings, I observed, were not calculated to inspire confidence in the Emperor's intentions, and must necessarily cause great alarm in Europe.

Count Walewski expressed surprise at what I told him, as he had lately sent circular instructions inculcating the greatest soberness of language.

VIEWS OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY TO EARL COWLEY.

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 5, 1859.

MY LORD—I have already transmitted to your Excellency a copy of Count Walewski's despatch of the 25th ult., which was communicated to me by the Duc de Malakoff on the following day.

In this despatch, Count Walewski claims for France the same credit that he allows to England for the endeavors in which both have concurred for the maintenance of peace; and he counts, therefore, on a continuance of a good understanding with this country, whatever may happen. His Excellency then refers to the motives which must induce France to assist Sardinia; to the constant endeavors of Austria to acquire for herself a preponderating influence in Italy, to which she has no claim; to the meritorious conduct of Sardinia in resisting these endeavors; and to the mischief which would ensue if Sardinia were overcome. He alludes to the claims which Sardinia has on the sympathy of England and France, in consequence of the political system which she upholds, and on the good will of those Powers for her zealous co-operation in the late war against Russia; and on all these grounds he appeals to her Majesty's government whether England and France should not seek to come to an understanding between themselves; and he declares that the government of the Emperor, disclaiming all ambitious views, and having nothing to conceal, is prepared to concert with the British government for the attainment of an object which he assumes to be common to both governments.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to Count Walewski that her Majesty's government have received the communication of this despatch in the same spirit of friendship as that by which they are convinced it was dictated.

You may assure his Excellency of the great value which her Majesty's government place on the alliance which has so long subsisted between this country and France, and which it is their earnest desire may long continue to prevail. It has existed throughout the calm of peace and the vicissitudes of war, to the mutual benefit of both countries; and her Majesty's government, believing that the events now passing in Italy, and the interruption of peace, will act injuriously upon the material interests of their ally, as well as upon the common cause of civilization, have, on these grounds, labored earnestly to induce all parties to maintain it.

Her Majesty's government believe that it was never intended by Europe, when recognizing the Lombardo Venetian kingdom as a portion of the dominions of the House of Austria, that Austria should, as a consequence of that recognition, be at liberty to extend her moral and material sway over all other portions of the peninsula. It never was intended that Austria should constantly and systematically interfere beyond her frontier; that she should at will influence the internal administration, and occupy by her armies the territories of other Italian States, whose independence was recognized by the same treaties. It never was intended that the progress of freedom and of social improvement in the Italian States should be left in the control of Austria.

But if her Majesty's government do not shut their eyes to the defects of the system upon which Austria has acted in Italy, and which could hardly fail, sooner or later, to entail upon Austria a fearful unpopularity, and upon Italy the concomitant miseries of a social or of a foreign war, neither can they hold Sardinia blameless for the course she has pursued in these latter times, and which has now produced its certain and lamentable results.

Her Majesty's government have hitherto always looked with satisfaction on the progress which Sardinia was making, as affording a bright example, to be imitated hereafter by other Italian States, of the benefits which result to the Sovereign and to the subjects from the adoption of a wise and liberal system of administration.

If Sardinia could have contented herself with the improvement of her own material prosperity, by developing the natural advantages of her position, and with the liberal system of administration which she so wisely adopted, and which she has so consistently maintained, she would have been a landmark to the rest of Italy, and respected by the whole world, and would by her moral force have been unassailable. Under those circumstances, and with such a policy, her Majesty's government have no reason to believe that she would have been molested by her powerful neighbor.

It was in an evil hour for herself, and for Europe, that Sardinia lent herself to dreams of ambition and aggrandisement, and forgetful of the little sympathy shown in 1848 by the Milanese for her cause, and their ingratitude for her gallant actions, she has provoked the war in which she is now engaged.

By violating her treaties of extradition with Austria, by fostering deserters from her army, by rallying in Piedmont the disaffected spirits of Italy, by menacing speeches against the Austrian government, and by ostentatious declarations that she was ready to do battle as the champion of Italy against the power and influence of Austria, Sardinia invoked the storm, and is deeply responsible to the nations of Europe. Her Majesty's government saw this dangerous policy with apprehensions which have now been realized, and they cannot forbear from remarking that the first and immediate effect of the war which it has caused has been the suspension of constitutional government in Sardinia itself.

It was with these forebodings that on the 10th of January last her Majesty's government directed your Excellency to explain clearly and frankly to the imperial government the anxiety which they felt at the unsatisfactory state of the relations between France and Austria, and to point out the mischief which must ensue if a better understanding could not be established between them. They offered the co-operation of this country, as far as it could be afforded with advantage, for bringing about an improvement in the social condition of Italy. To the sincere regret of her Majesty's government—a regret that has been increased by subsequent events—Count Walewski informed your Excellency, on the 14th of January last, that he did not think the moment a favorable one for executing their purpose.

Her Majesty's government, on the 12th of January, directed her Majesty's Minister at Vienna to make a similar communication to the Austrian government, and they appealed to the Courts of St Petersburg and Berlin to aid them in their endeavors to promote a good understanding between France and Austria, to which Prussia at once acceded; Russia replying that she could not give any advice that was not solicited by the parties at variance.

Her Majesty's government then spared no pains, by the most impressive language, to convince the Sardinian government of the danger which it incurred by arousing the expectations and inflaming the passions of the Italian people, and thereby provoking a war of opinion; the consequences of which could hardly fail to act injuriously on the political interests and constitutional principles of the House of Savoy.

Her Majesty's government could give no better proof of their earnestness in the maintenance of peace, and of their confidence in the Emperor of the French, than by directing your Excellency, towards the end of February (having first obtained the concurrence of his Imperial Majesty, and a full knowledge of his wishes and objects), to proceed to Vienna to endeavor to ascertain whether a common understanding on the affairs of Italy might not be established between the two Courts.

The position was peculiar, and hardly admitted an official interference, or an official offer of mediation, for there was no substantive controversy between the governments of Austria and France, and no positive case upon which to mediate between them. For some time the relations between those two States had been daily becoming less friendly, and all that appeared feasible to her Majesty's government at the moment was to sound the lurking causes of a jealousy which threatened Europe with disaster.

It was, therefore, in a purely officious character that your Excellency undertook your friendly mission to Vienna; and the expectations of her Majesty's government were not falsified, for your Excellency ascertained exactly by what mutual course of action it would be possible at the same time to remove the sources of ill will, to establish good relations between the two empires, and to improve the condition of Italy.

If no immediate result ensued from your Excellency's mission, it was in consequence of the intervening proposal of Russia that a Congress of the great Powers should be convened for the discussion of the Italian question—a proposal which Russia has since stated to have been made with a view to meet the wishes of France.

Notwithstanding this, the government of the Emperor of the French will do your Excellency and her Majesty's government the justice to admit that your interposition was not unavailing, and that, in point of fact, it prepared the ground for those bases which her Majesty's government, on receiving your reports, laid down for the deliberations of the Congress. These were recognized and admitted by the French government, no less than by the other Powers, as well calculated to lead to a permanent settlement of the Italian question.

Deeply as her Majesty's government deplore that circumstances which, notwithstanding all their endeavors, they could not control, should have prevented the negotiations, begun with so much promise, from being continued, they still have the satisfaction of feeling that for a time at least they have tended to avert hostilities; and they feel sure that the government of France, no less than that of Austria, will admit that in all these matters they have acted the part of impartial friends and allies, and that all their counsels and representations have invariably tended to inculcate in all quarters moderation and peace.

I will not recapitulate in all their details the various efforts that her Majesty's government subsequently made for this object, either singly or jointly with other Powers. Her Majesty's government found that one of the most difficult questions upon which they could obtain unanimity was that of disarmament. At first, for the sake of obtaining a Congress, they would have agreed to postpone its accomplishment until the Congress had met, but the common dictates of reason indicated that the only real security for obtaining a peaceful result from its deliberations lay in the fact of its being an Assembly of unarmed States.

It was evident that prejudices and arguments supported by a million of soldiers were not likely to be defended with either moderation or logic.

Furthermore, an armed Congress would have seemed to acknowledge a case of war as between the principals who composed it; whereas, in the opinion of her Majesty's government, no case of war existed between any of them respectively.

It was with these views that her Majesty's government pressed all the Powers, and finally obtained their most anxious consent to a general, simultaneous and preliminary disarmament.

I now pass to the formal proposal made by her Majesty's government on the 18th ult., which declared that measure and the eventual admission of the Italian States as substantive members of the Congress, and I am desirous of giving full credit to the government of France for acceding to that proposal. It will be ever a matter of regret and disappointment to her Majesty's government that the Cabinet of Vienna, after agreeing with all the other Powers on a general, preliminary and simultaneous disarmament, should have been so ill advised as to reject this last opportunity of averting a war on the insufficient ground of its unwillingness to admit the participation in the Congress of the representatives of the Italian States, although it is a matter of history that such representatives were, on the common instance of Austria and other great Powers, invited to take part in the Congress of Laybach.

Her Majesty's government have still more deeply lamented the precipitate conduct of Austria in calling upon Sardinia to disarm on pain of immediate invasion of her territory in case of her refusal to obey. They lost not a moment in expressing their strong disapprobation of this proceeding; and her Majesty's Minister at Vienna has since delivered to the Austrian Cabinet a formal protest on the part of the British government.

Her Majesty's government had full reason to hope that the peace of Italy might be secured by following up in some form or other the negotiations which your Excellency had placed on apparently so sound a footing during your stay at Vienna. Whether those negotiations should be carried out by themselves alone, or in a Congress with other Powers, they trusted that the result might put an end to a state of things in Italy of which they had long disproved, and which they agree with the government of France in considering to be inconsistent with the spirit of European treaties.

Animated by true friendship and frankness, her Majesty's government cannot refrain from expressing their opinion, that if the government of France, which possesses so great an influence over Sardinia, had warned her as to the danger of her policy, at the time that her Majesty's government protested against it, those complications might have been avoided which, in virtue of their promises, have obliged the French government to seek their solution in the entrance of a French army into Piedmont.

Her Majesty's government do not presume to constitute themselves judges of the course which France considers herself bound in honor to pursue in this last and fatal period of the controversy; but it will ever be a source of regret to her Majesty's government that their advice tendered to her in my despatch of the 10th of January was not followed. It is evident to her Majesty's government that from that moment Sardinia believed that the difficulties of Italy would not be solved by a concert of the two great empires which in 1857 had considered the problem, but that she might hope for the material assistance of France, not only to obtain the liberties of Italy, but even the fulfilment of her long cherished hope—the expulsion of Austria from Lombardy.

Viewing impartially the conduct of both Austria and Sardinia in regard to Italy, and lamenting most deeply the spirit by which both have been actuated, her Majesty's government can, nevertheless, have no doubt as to the course which it befits them to pursue in the present emergency.

The British government have always recognized as a sacred rule of international obligation, that no country has a right authoritatively to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign State, or, with a sound policy, long withhold its acknowledgement of any new form of government which may be adopted and established, without territorial usurpation or absorption, by the spontaneous wish of its people.

The British government have shown, for a long series of years, how steadily they have observed these principles, and they certainly cannot depart from them on the present occasion, however earnest may be their desire to secure the freedom of the Italian people, and to maintain the treaties which confirmed the independence of their respective States.

The government of the Emperor of the French appears to anticipate that, notwithstanding the abhorrence with which her Majesty's government contemplate the coming war, and the value which they attach to the principle of non interference, they will yet be brought to co-operate with France on the present occasion.

The imperial government has had too many proofs of late years of the anxiety of the British government to act together with them in all measures calculated to lead to the general advantage of nations, to suppose that it is otherwise than with sincere *regret that her Majesty's government feel themselves precluded, by every consideration, from associating themselves with France in the present struggle.* They believe that that struggle will be productive of misery and ruin to Italy, and, so far from accelerating the development of freedom in that country, will impose upon it a heavier burden of present ruin and future taxation. They feel that the war, on whatever principles it may be commenced, and whatever objects it may contemplate, will infallibly become a war of extreme political passions and opinions. They cannot but dread that the events in Italy may react on other nations, and that at an early day all Europe will be involved in the conflict.

Your Excellency, who has taken so active a part in the efforts of her Majesty's government to avert these results, will, more easily than any one, understand the bitter disappointment of her Majesty's government that all these efforts have proved unavailing. Nevertheless your Excellency will assure the French government that her Majesty's ministers will not be deterred by difficulties, past or future, from entertaining hereafter any overture which may be made to them by either of the contending parties, indicating a disposition to avail themselves of the good offices of England. Nay, more; her Majesty's government will watch with the utmost attention the various phases of the war; and if an opportunity should present itself for pleading the cause of peace and reconciliation, they will not wait to be invited, but will at once tender themselves as mediators, in the sincere hope that their offer may be accepted and lead to peace.

They will do so with the fixed determination to carry out such a mediation in a spirit of fairness and impartiality, and with an earnest desire to establish and secure a well balanced and real independence of the Italian States, and a general improvement of the administration throughout the peninsula of Italy.

The Emperor of the French may be assured that if this opportunity should present itself, her Majesty's government will zealously co-operate with his Imperial Majesty, and will rejoice most sincerely at again finding themselves placed on the same line with a most valued ally, by acting cordially with France in every work of peace and civilization.

These are the things for which the people of England love to labor; and, attached as they are to constitutional principles, they believe that if military glory may be the *apanage*, it must not be the object of constitutional monarchy. A war without an imperative and evident necessity is repugnant to their feelings, and no British Minister would escape their condemnation who advised his Sovereign to seek or to share such a conflict.

The almost unanimous feeling of the British nation at this moment is one of disapprobation of the present war, and an anxious desire to avoid any concurrence in its progress, and an earnest hope that it will be confined within the peninsula.

Her Majesty's government have, therefore, received with sincere satisfaction the expression of the sentiments of the French government upon this latter subject, as stated in its despatch to the Duc de Malakoff, of the 27th ultimo.

In these sentiments her Majesty's government cordially agree. Maintaining without reserve the most frank relations with the French government, they will be ever ready "to combine with it, as circumstances arise, to preserve the Continent of Europe from the effects of the conflict which may rage at one of its extremities."

Your Excellency will read this despatch to Count Walewski, and furnish him with a copy of it

MALMESBURY.

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY TO SIR J. HUDSON.

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 20, 1859.

SIR:—The excitement which the expectation of hostilities breaking out between Austria and France gave rise to in Germany has been increased to such an extent by the actual commencement of war between those two Powers that there is every reason to apprehend some overt manifestation on the part of the Germanic Confederation of its determination to make common cause with Austria for the defence of her Italian possessions.

The governments of Germany have had no occasion to inflame the passions of the people by appealing to their sympathies in favor of a kindred Power engaged in a deadly struggle with France for the maintenance of the territories secured to it by treaty, but have, on the contrary, merely gone with the current of popular feeling, which imperatively calls for decided action on the part of the Confederation.

Independently of the sympathy with which the fortunes of the Imperial house are regarded, a deep conviction is entertained by almost all classes of the German community that the safety of the common country is closely connected with the ability of Austria to maintain herself against the hostilities of France. It is felt that success in Italy, followed as it would be by the breaking up of those great fortresses which form a bulwark to all Germany on the Tyrolese frontier, and of the territorial arrangements of 1815 applicable to that country, will be but an inducement to France to make a further attempt to subvert those arrangements on the Rhine; and that the probability of success in the latter course will be greatly in favor of France if she does not enter upon it until she has paralyzed the power of Austria in her more vulnerable possessions.

For this reason Germany considers that her future destiny is in a great measure involved in the result of the Italian war; and that it would be a suicidal policy on her part to stand aloof, and allow Austria to be subdued single-handed, and thereby incapacitated in the contingency which all Germany looks upon as certain to arise from contributing to the defence of the common country.

The Cabinet of Berlin has alone, of all the German governments, resisted as far as possible the popular feeling. It has been wisely anxious not to precipitate matters, although it has not shown itself backward in making such preparations as will enable it, when the time arrives, to play the part in the defence of German interests which the great resources of Prussia and the position that she holds in the Confederation qualify her to perform. But the public feeling in Germany generally, and even in the Prussian territories, which is daily acquiring more force, will scarcely permit Prussia much longer to maintain her expectant policy; and there is every reason to anticipate that not many days will elapse before some decided indication is given by the Confederation of its determination to look upon the cause of Austria as vitally bound up with the general interests of the whole German race.

Her Majesty's government have done their utmost, within the bounds of friendly representation, to calm the excitement prevailing in Germany, but they have not felt themselves called upon or authorized to dissuade the German States from taking such measures as those States considered to be necessary for the maintenance of their several interests; for they could not assume the responsibility of even morally guaranteeing them against the eventualities of the Italian war.

Her Majesty's government have distinctly declared that Germany must not be influenced in arriving at a decision on the momentous question now under the consideration of the Diet by any hope of succor from this country.

Her Majesty's government, in accordance with the commands of the Queen, and with the universal concurrence of the British nation, as displayed at the late elections, desire to maintain the strictest neutrality in the present war between Austria and France. They are determined to keep themselves unfettered by any engagements, expressed or implied, which would restrict their freedom of action in any circumstances that may arise. They will judge for themselves, and they will not embarrass their policy by any previous declarations or by any previous expression of opinion.

This language which her Majesty's government have held to Germany with reference to the prevailing excitement in that country, they hold also to the Powers now engaged in active hostilities; and you will give the Sardinian government clearly to understand that as regards the questions now at issue her Majesty's government will abstain from all interference, direct or indirect, whatever.

MALMESBURY.

THE "DECISIVE" BATTLE OF THE ITALIAN WAR.

[From the London Times, June 18.]

General Count Schlick, who succeeds Count Gyulai in the command of the Austrian army, is an officer whose name was familiar to Europe ten years since, when the Hungarian war was raging. He played a part of no in considerable importance in that contest, and is now not more than 60 years old. If we are to understand that he succeeds to the active command instead of Marshal Hess, who had been previously named for it, the Austrian government may be suspected of having imbibed some radical notions on the subject of the age of military commanders. The young Emperor may possibly have made the age of Marshal Hess, who is now 72, an objection to his employment in the active duties of the campaign, and may think his great experience better utilized in planning than in executing the future operations of this war.

That there will be much to plan and much to execute is, we apprehend, tolerably certain. Time may be required to repair the *morale* of the Austrian soldier, and to restore that confidence which the affairs of Montebello, Palestro, Magenta and Malegnano must have somewhat shaken; *but that Austria will retire from Lombardy without some more decisive defeat than she has yet sustained cannot be expected or hoped for.* Milan may be hung with flags and lit with lamps; the Scala may exhibit its capacious area thronged with emancipated Italians, joyous in their enthusiasm; the Emperor and the King may receive the felicitations of the Lombards in their capital without a thought of danger from that vast Austrian army which a few days ago occupied every military post in the country, and the recollection of which must lie heavy on the memory of all those shouting citizens; but the permanent possession of Milan is far from being yet secured. Continuously as the Austrians retire, and steadily as they are followed up by the Allies, no one ventures to prophesy that this retrograde movement has no limit. We are all curious to know where that position is which Francis Joseph has designated as his next battle ground, and to which he has now recalled his troops. It certainly is not on the Sesia or the Mella, for the country watered by these tributaries is already abandoned, and Brescia, which was in former times contested, is already in the hands of Garibaldi, who seems to act still as the pioneer of the allied army in their advance. The Austrian is now getting near to his fortresses. He has probably crossed the Chiese, for, if he had intended to defend this river, he would scarcely have allowed Garibaldi to occupy Brescia. His next halting place must be upon the banks of the Mincio, where, if he should turn and await his pursuers, he will rest with his right wing upon Peschiera and his left upon Mantua. *Our correspondents seem to hold the opinion that this is the position chosen by the Austrian Generals for their decisive trial of strength.* It would, undoubtedly, appear to be well chosen, for a battle lost by the French upon this ground would be disastrous, whereas the Austrians might reasonably hope to draw off, if hardly pressed, under the cover of their fortresses. In 1797 the possession of Mantua alone enabled the Austrians to arrest Napoleon for six months before its walls, and gave them time to raise four large armies, and bring them into the field for its deliverance. In 1848 Charles Albert did not attempt to advance beyond this terrible triangle, even after Radetzky had passed through. Disregarding the rash counsels which urged him to pursue his retiring enemy through this military trap, he set himself to work leisurely to reduce the fortresses one by one. While he was besieging Peschiera Radetzky was awaiting the reinforcements of Count Nugent and the army of reserve, and, about the time that Peschiera could hold out no longer, Radetzky was ready to assume the offensive. No game can be fought out with precisely the same moves, *but no doubt seems to be entertained that the Austrians have not for a moment abandoned the hope of ultimate success in this war. "Reculer pour mieux sauter"* is still their principle of tactics. In that land of etiquette and that council of many precedents the authority of former campaigns will go for much in the formation of new plans, and the machinery which has secured a previous success is very likely to be put into motion again with the hope of the same happy result we expect from Marshal Hess and General Schlick a repetition of the plan of campaign devised and executed by Hess and Radetzky eleven years ago. Military tradition is everything in Austria. Radetzky served under Melas and Suwarrow, and Hess served under Radetzky. It is almost impossible that these men can fail to resort to those old Fabian tactics which so remarkably succeeded in restoring credit to the Austrian arms in 1849. When Radetzky retreated before the army of Charles Albert, and through a country in full insurrection, he fell back at once. He avoided battle, much as the Austrians now seem to have done their best to avoid it, and, although he was unwillingly forced into a fight at Goito, just as Gyulai was at Magenta, yet he continued his retreat until he reached his fortresses; nor did he even stop there, but retired behind the district they commanded, and there awaited the arrival of Count Nugent and the army of reserve. Then came his advance, the celebrated countermarch to Vicenza, the armistice, the renewal of hostilities, and that decisive short campaign which ended with the victory of Novara.

But, although we think it highly probable that the general character of the Austrian tactics in 1848 will be followed in 1859, the general opinion appears to be that in one important respect these precedents will be disregarded, and that the Mincio will now be the scene of a decisive battle. Well informed persons assure us that all that has yet happened is but the prelude to the real war; and there are not wanting Austrians so confident as to believe that Mantua will be the Capua of Napoleon III. Austria will very much astonish the world if anything like this should happen. General Schlick may be a very different commander from Count Gyulai, but public expectation is not yet tutored to the idea that any Austrian can be beaten. If the Austrians fit a pitched battle upon tolerably equal terms; and, although the French Emperor and the Sardinian King are just now listening to concerts at Milan, their troops are steady in their progress, and perhaps Milan is the best position whence to direct the consolidation of the allied force upon that difficult country which has now to be penetrated. *The Allies, however, have a sufficiency of work still before them. They have this great battle of the Mincio yet to win,* if it shall please the Austrian Emperor to gratify the desires of his enemies and make a stand upon that river. They have then to take three fortresses which have been elaborately strengthened and supplied with every engine of defence that modern warfare has discovered. Against the more numerous forces and the rifled cannon of the French of 1859 Peschiera will oppose much more perfect fortifications than those with which she resisted the Sardinians in 1849. Mantua is stronger than when Napoleon I. knocked at her gates; *and Verona has all the resources of the Austrian empire at her back. But, on the other hand, military critics are awaking to an estimate of the danger which Austria runs of being taken in the rear of her fortresses by an army landed on the coast north of Venice.* The French are undisputed masters of the sea, and neither the old Napoleonic campaigns nor those of 1848 and 1849 are adapted to such a contingency. To the Austrian the sea is always an enemy on her flank, and no position is strong which can be turned by Napoleon's fleet of men-of-war and transports. We have in the resources of these belligerents all the elements of a sanguinary battle, perhaps for protracted sieges, and even for a long drawn war. *It is probably hopeless to think of accommodation while both the combatants are strong and feel no exhaustion; but we cannot think that, fight as she may, Austria can ultimately win.* How many millions of money and leagues of territory, and how much of military reputation will she waste in protracting for a short time what, sooner or later, after constant defeats or alternate triumphs and reverses, is at last inevitable?

NEWS FROM THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

[Milan correspondence (June 12) of London Times.]

Decidedly there is to be no new edition of the famous attack on the bridge of Lodi. The Austrians, wiser than their forefathers, or perhaps made wiser by their own experience at the Ponte di Buffalora and Ponte di Magenta, have taken the precaution of destroying the bridge. Well, where there is no bridge, no bridge can be taken. Had this been done to General Bonaparte, as was intended, in 1796, it would have been a serious inconvenience to him, for it would have delayed his following on the heels of the retreating Austrian army. As for us, "*Nous nous en moquons.*" The circumstances are widely different. The passage of the Adda might have offered some difficulties to the army of the French republic, which was scarcely so large as one of our *corps d'armée*, but it is no obstacle worth mentioning for an army like that of the Allies, and then we have not the same interest to press back the enemy's forces as General Bonaparte had. In his time the Austrians had, militarily speaking, little or no hold in Upper Italy. Once or twice beaten in the open field, they had to make the best of their way to the Tyrol and Carinthia; all they could do was to leave a few thousand men in Mantua, and the war was ended until they could collect in the mountains fresh forces, and attempt to regain the lost ground. *Now this is all changed. The Austrians have in the heart of Upper Italy a kind of Sebastopol, connected with the rest of the empire, not by long, inhospitable steppes, but by excellent roads, and in many parts even by railways.* Austria can thus, even better than Russia, concentrate all her force at this extremity, which has been prepared for the purpose by the work of years and the expenditure of millions. Any pressure on her retreating army would only bring it nearer to its stronghold, from which it ought never to have come out; and no pressure would be sufficient to get into the stronghold together with the retreating army. *In one word, General Bonaparte ended his campaign at the Mincio; we have to begin there the second and more serious phase of it.* It is well known that the Austrians are preparing on a grand scale for this decisive phase of the Italian campaign. They have changed their commander, who has contrived to lose at least 50,000 or 60,000 men in less than a week.

The King left last night, the Emperor this morning—a sign that the campaign is about to begin again. The sooner the better. The distances are so small that we may hope to be in time to take advantage of the demoralizing effect of the first blows, and anticipate the reinforcements expected by the Austrians from the interior.

Milan, to him who saw it during the presence of the allied sovereigns, seems almost a city of the dead. It is as if the burst of enthusiasm had exhausted the vital power of the city, and as if it required some repose to recruit its strength. The communications, which had been interrupted by the war, are being gradually re established. The railway from this to Como has already begun to run; that to Magenta will very likely be opened to the public as soon as it is no more required for the army. *When this is done there will be, with the exception of the little distance from Magenta to the station of San Martino, an uninterrupted railway communication to Turin and France. What an advantage for reinforcements and stores.*

On the Venetian line the Austrians have carried away the locomotives and most of the carriages, but the deficiency will be supplied as we advance; as for damaging the line itself, they could do little, except here and there a bridge, which can be restored in a very short time.

The new Governor of Lombardy scarcely appears in the foreground, so quietly and smoothly does the organization of the country go on. As you saw from the decree which I sent you yesterday, as little as possible has been changed, the object being not to devise the best possible government, but one that should be ready for the emergency. All that has been done, therefore, is to remove the number of foreigners whom the Austrian government employed in the public offices, and to concentrate the government in the hands of responsible persons with considerable power, instead of the collective body which had been such a nuisance in the late Austrian administration.

In the financial organization of the country the same system has been followed as in the political one. Here are the two decrees which relate to it:—

VITTORIO EMMANUELE, ETC.

Seeing our decree of the 8th inst., considering the necessities of the national war, and in virtue of the extraordinary powers conferred upon us by the law of the 25th of April last, on the proposal of our Council of Ministers, we have ordered and we order as follows:—

1. The direct and indirect taxes which exist at present in the Lombard provinces are provisionally maintained, excepting what is changed by the following articles:—

2. As to all that concerns the sale of articles belonging to the Regia Privativa [monopolies of the government such as salt, tobacco, gunpowder, &c.] the posts, telegraphs and custom houses, the taxes, laws and regulations now in force in the other parts of the royal states will be applied in Lombardy by special orders of the Governor.

This assimilation completed, the custom house line between Lombardy and the other provinces will be suppressed.

We order that the present decree, provided with the seal of the State, be inserted in the archives of the government, calling on every one whom it concerns to respect it and make it respected.

Another decree orders as follows:—

1. Henceforth, during the war, the municipalities, or those who enforce the excise duties, can exact no tax from or lay any obstacle in the way of the importation and exportation, deposit or consumption of any kind of provisions which may be furnished for the service of the national and allied troops, either directly through the instrumentality of the military administration or by private enterprise and requisitions.

2. If hereafter it should be proved that, by the dispositions of the preceding article, the community has received a much smaller revenue from the excise and octroi than the average of the last two years, it will receive an equitable compensation for the losers.

3. Any law or disposition contrary to the present one is abolished.

VITTORIO EMMANUELE.

MILAN, June 9, 1859.

Thus, with very few exceptions, Lombardy will be governed for the present by the same forms which have existed hitherto; the Lombards will have to pay the same taxes, and you will see the strange spectacle that *what was insupportable under the Austrian rule will be, and is already, cheerfully submitted to under a self-chosen government.* Every one thinks it natural, and, should there be greater sacrifices, they will bear them equally well. Here lies the whole Italian question, turn it as you like. Let the foreigner, like Jerome Paturot, go and search after the best, not of republics, but governments, and find it, too; he will not be less detested than he has been under the spirit killing bureaucratic system which has been kept up hitherto in Lombardy. It is a matter of feeling, or call it instinct—animal instinct, if you like—but so it is. As the gray and red partridge will not dwell together, so it is with some races, and more especially with the German and Italian. Nothing can ever conciliate them.

As the two cannot dwell together, and neither will yield, they must fight for it. The proclamations of both the Emperor and the King say clearly enough that the thing is not done yet, and that the Italians keep themselves as far as they can. *The appeal has not been in vain, for within the last two days above 4,000 volunteers have entered from this town alone.* The display of military splendor during the presence of the allied sovereigns has, no doubt, contributed to attract the youth, but even without it there would have been a fair contingent. A proof in this respect is the success of Garibaldi, who, in spite of what he had to pass through, and in spite of the little attraction which a small body of men, with great cost for uniforms, and often scanty fare, presents, still contrived to recruit largely on the road. It is on the peasantry in the north and the cities, both in the mountains and in the plains, that we may chiefly reckon for active co operation.

THE DUCHY OF PARMA AND THE CONDUCT OF THE DUCHESS REGENT.

[From the London Times, June 18.]

The Duchess Regent of Parma is the only one of the Italian magnates whose fate can excite even momentary sympathy or commiseration. This lady has done well at a time when many men have done very ill. We defy the most prudent or far sighted statesman to suggest anything which the late Regent of Parma has left undone which she should have done in order to preserve the inheritance of her children, to maintain her own good faith, and to save the little duchy which she has now ruled very wisely for some years from the horrors of civil war and foreign invasion. It is but a small sovereignty, after all, this one of Parma; for the two duchies of Parma and Piacenza, even if the province of Lunigiana be thrown in, contain a population of barely half a million souls. Still, though but a small section of the Peninsula, it is one which has been subjected to great political vicissitudes. These two duchies which, according to all probability, seem destined before long to be incorporated with Lombardy under a common government, were part of it in historic times. It was grim old Paul III. who first dismembered Lombardy for the benefit of Pietro Luigi Farnese, his son, and in that family these two duchies remained until the extinction of the male descendants of the line. They then passed to the Spanish Bourbons, and a descendant of that house was actually reigning in Parma when the first Napoleon, at the head of the French revolutionary armies, burst into Italy, and with a turn of his sword upset arrangements which had been planned at the Escurial, and received the sanction of the diplomatists of Aix-la-Chapelle. We next find the two duchies appearing as two departments of the kingdom of Italy. Then Napoleon fell, and the two "departments" were reconstituted duchies, and held to be a kind of dowager's easy chair for his widow during her life, with reversion to the descendants of the Parmesan Bourbons. In 1847 Marie Louise died, and the reversioners came into possession of their rights under the settlement. Charles II., of Bourbon, reigned in Parma for a couple of years, and then, being disgusted with his regal or ducal trade, and desiring to lead a vagabond life, according to his fancy, in Paris and elsewhere, abdicated in favor of his son. This was the Duke who was stabbed by the hand of an assassin in Parma in the year 1854. The wretched creature while still extant in this upper world was known as Charles III., or more frequently by a *sobriquet* which, as he is dead, we will forbear to mention more particularly—at any rate to ears polite—leaving a widow and several children. This lady was the late Regent of Parma, and is the sister of the Duke of Bordeaux. For the last five years she has shown more sense, more determination, more courage than any of the latter day Bourbons with whom we are acquainted or of whom we have read.

For in truth her fate has been a very hard one. It was no very brilliant preface to a royal career to be the exiled daughter of the elder branch of the French Bourbons. Those years of banishment must have been full of bitterness to the young girl. Whatever professional philanthropists may say to it, the *porphyrogeniti* have their troubles just like the distressed shoeblacks. There came a time when she was compelled to regret the dull, sombre monotony of her youth. In the twenty-sixth year of her age, and in the year 1845, Louise Marie, of Bourbon, was married to a young profligate, Charles III., of Lucca, whom it is charity to think of as a madman. What she must have endured between the years 1845-54 can be only known to this poor lady herself; but then she was relieved of the presence of her most abominable husband, and since then, as we have said, has governed the duchy for her children. It was no ordinary task that was set before her, because the dignity of her own mind and the sense of what was due to the half million of people over whom her sway extended, impelled her to free herself from the degrading protection of Austria. But Austria would "protect" her in spite of herself. Austria was in easy and comfortable possession of that citadel of Piacenza from which her troops have just been withdrawn without firing a shot. Austria could at any moment throw her legions across the Po from great Lombardy into little Parma, and overwhelm any puny resistance which the Duchess Regent might have attempted to set up. Still she did all that could be done and more than any one would, before the event, have thought could be done by a petty Italian Prince. True, Louise Marie could not get rid of the political ascendancy of Austria; as well might the Isle of Wight have attempted to discard the political authority of England; but at least she contrived to get the control of her little army into her own hands, and to free her duchies in all commercial matters from the despotic system of Austrian administration in Italy. The wonder is not that she did no more, but that she could accomplish so much. Independently of the steps absolutely taken to free the duchy from Austrian control in all municipal affairs, the Regent invariably called to her Council the most patriotic statesmen she could find. As far as it was possible, the government of Parma under her sway, and since the year 1854, has been an Italian government in the proper sense of the word. With all this it was not to be supposed when once the Battle of the Giants began in Upper Italy that the patriotism, or virtues, or courage of the Duchess Regent would long stand in her stead. Parma could not but be drawn ultimately into the great war maelstrom which was whirling round under the shadow of the Alps, and the ruler of the little State must needs accept the fate of the weak when mixed up with the quarrels of the strong. For a time Louise Marie struggled resolutely against destiny, but she has been beaten at last.

When these Italian troubles, which are now resulting in fierce battles at Magenta bridge and elsewhere, first came to a head, the Duchess endeavored to maintain an attitude of neutrality. She would not take part openly against the Austrians, for she had been bound to them, both she and her predecessors—rulers of Parma—by the faith of treaties. Neither would she act against the Allies, for that would have been to fight against the cause of Italian independence. She permitted her subjects to take their own way, and, as we are informed, some 3,000 volunteers from this little duchy made their way into Piedmont just before and after the declaration of war. It did not, however, suit the purpose of the extreme section of the malcontents to leave the government in possession of the field, nominally or otherwise, and accordingly a fortnight or so back they rose, drove the Duchess and her adherents out of the town, and set up a provisional government. *Now mark the difference between the conduct of this lady and that of the runaway Grand Duke of Tuscany. Even in the midst of the tumult, and although she was absolutely driven out of her capital by the insurrection, she remained close at hand to defend the inheritance of her children.* Within thirty-six hours of the time when she was first driven away the Duchess Regent was back in Parma, by the help of that portion of her little army which remained well affected to her rule. The Provisional Ministry fell, and Louise Marie was again reinstated in her honors. She had previously sent her children away into Switzerland, but for their sakes she remained in person to affront any danger that might merely threaten her own life. It soon, however, became obvious to the Duchess and to her councillors that she and they could not restrain their own adherents from abusing the victory they had just gained; and the hour of retribution was sure to follow. For the sake, then, of the people of Parma, and for the ultimate benefit of her children, she resolved to yield at once to the strength of a current she was unable to stem, and to leave behind her in Parma only recollections which would be favorable to her name in case she or her children should be thought of when the ultimate settlement of Italy takes place. She has withdrawn from a struggle in which her aid can be of no avail to either party—not into the camp of one or other of the combatants, but into a neutral county. Before departing she set her house in order, and made such arrangements as would enable the people of the duchy to establish a settled order of things without injury to any interest and without delay. It is quite refreshing, in the midst of the miserable chronicles of Italian misrule, to come across such an instance of courage, humanity and good sense as this one of the Duchess of Parma. It would be idle to speak of what fate may await her and her children in the end, but certainly Louise Marie of Parma has shown herself worthy of empire.

The Important Political Revolution in England.

[From the London Times, June 18.]

Seldom or never has a change of government been attended with so complete a change of persons and places as that which this week has witnessed. In considering this part of the subject we may leave out of the question altogether the government of Lord Derby, and institute our comparison between the