fed and clothed those who called on me while flying to a land of liberty. To others who were pursued I have given arms to defend themselves, and have constantly spoken of these things in public and in private, by the wayside and by the fire side. I am opposed to taking human life, except in defence of life or liberty. In such cases I believe it a duty. In these opinions I think a large portion of our people of northern Ohio concur. We do these things when we can do them without violating any enactment; but all will see that the place cannot change the moral character of the act. On feeling thus, men may become so excited as to go even as far as our government did with the Algerines. I would not; I have not the heroism to do it. My friends have requested me to state my own knowledge of Brown and his designs; and for this episode in my lecture they must be held responsible. I do not think "the inquisitive gentleman" from my State has been very faithful. He ought to have found a letter of mine addressed to Brown; at least I wrote him one, directed to West Andover, Ohio, saying we should be glad to see him at Jefferson. He had been at Cleveland, had lectured there. Our people had felt a great desire to see him, and we were a little surprised that he did not call at our village (which is the seat of justice for the county), as it was said he had visited a son who was living in that vicinity.

I am entirely unable to state the time he was at our place, but have no doubt Brown was correct in his statement. When I came to this city I would have said I never saw Brown but once. Upon reflection, however, I am of the opinion that he came to Jefferson on a Saturday afternoon, and that, so far as I am informed, his object was to make arrangements for the lecture.

On Sabbath, after the regular service, he spoke in our church. The ministers of the church and of other churches, I think, attended the lecture. Ladies and gentlemen were present. Republicans and democrats all listened to his story with attention. It is impossible for me at this time to give an abstract of the lecture. If any one desires knowledge on this point, I would refer him to Hon. Jonathan Warner, a democratic leader of that county. He was present, and one or two of his sons, and being very pro-slavery, he would be more likely to recollect particulars than myself. He spoke of his Kansas troubles, of his expedition into Missouri and bringing off some twelve or twenty slaves, and he urged it as a solemn Christian duty to assist slaves to obtain their freedom. He gave us clearly to understand that he held to the doctrines of the Christian religion as they were enunciated by the Saviour. I am not aware that he spoke of going into slave States to aid slaves in escaping from bondage, but I had the impression that he would do so if opportunity should present. I think, however that I inferred this from the fact that he had done it in Missouri, rather than from what he said. After he closed I addressed a few words to the audience in favor of a contribution, referring to his condition, to the death of his son, and the fact that in his situation he had no business which he could follow for his support. I believe every democrat as well as republican present gave something.

After the close of the meeting I cordially invited him to take tea at my home. While there, at the fireside, I inquired as to the particulars of his Missouri expedition. Mrs. Giddings also put questions. I fully expressed my own opinions as to the crimes of slavery, the right of a slave to his liberty at all times and under all circumstances. I did not express as radical views as I had done in Congress. Such is not my habit. This I presume is the conversation which Brown delicately refused to make known to the "inquisitive gentleman" from Ohio. While we were thus engaged his carriage came, and he left me.

These are the only times I ever saw him. Neither in his lecture nor in his conversation did he say one word as to his having any associates or assistants, or arms, nor did he speak of Virginia, or Harper's Ferry or of an organization, or of a provisional government; nor do I believe that any men, save his associates, had information on those subjects; nor do I believe he had any established plan of action when he was in Ohio; but this is opinion merely. I see the telegraphic despatches represent that some one informed Mr. Brown or somebody else that "J. R. G." had taken three hundred dollars stock, &c. It will hardly be supposed that I would reply to such an intimation from an anonymous writer, directed to an anonymous person. This report will gain no favor where I am known. No man will there believe I ever gave three hundred dollars to Capt. Brown or any other man. I did, however, understand that Brown was in the West; that he led the party which rescued Doctor Doy, who had been kidnapped in Kansas and taken to Missouri. That was a subject in which I took a deep interest, and understanding that he was in want of money, I gave three dollars to his son. I think there was not a day from the time that Brown's son was murdered in Kansas to that of his capture at Harper's Ferry, that I would have hesitated to give him whatever money I had if assured that he was in want. But I little dreamed that this three dollars was to fit out a military expedition with arms, ammunition and men, capture Harper's Ferry, effect the conquest of the Old Dominion, strike terror to the Executive, and imperil the government. Of Stephens, who was said to refuse giving answers relating to me, I have no recollection or knowledge whatever. He may have seen me often, may have spoken to me. When I left home the capture of Brown had been known some few days, but I had heard no intimation that any man from that county was with him. And now, having stated the facts, I would say that if Gerrit Smith and other men contributed money and arms for Brown and his party, with the full knowledge that his intentions were just as Brown himself states them to have been—that is, the liberation of slaves without the shedding of blood otherwise than of those who endeavored to hold the slaves in bondage—they certainly offended against no law of Ohio, or, so far as my knowledge extends, of any other free State. Mr. Smith is an intelligent Christian gentleman, who knows his rights and understands his duties to God and mankind; and if he does not know them better than his assailants, he ought to be sent South and hanged when there. I have been pained at seeing the efforts of editors and sensation committees representing Mr. Smith as guilty of crime, and about to be sent for by Governor Wise, of Virginia, to be taken to that State for trial. These things have exhibited an ignorance in this Christian land that I little dreamed of. Indeed, the idea that a man, if guilty of a violation of law in New York, must be sent to Virginia for trial, is but an illustration of those minds who, though living in the free States, look to the South for religious, moral and political direction. They had better study, and know their own rights before assailing those of their fellow men. To them I would say the lovers of liberty are informed on this subject. The time for frightening men has gone by forever. Such men are behind the age. They may be compared to those whom Swedenborg says he met in the spirit world, who, although they had been there twenty, thirty, and some of them forty years, had not found out they were dead.

Having disposed of these extraneous considerations, I recall the attention of the audience to the remote and proximate causes of the recent *emeute*. These causes consist of a series of despotic acts on the part of those who have wielded the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers of the government during the last twenty-five years. These acts are not laws—they are violation of law. They are not constitutional—but violations of the constitution; not in favor of life, liberty and happiness, but destructive of their rights. These despotic acts have aroused the spirits of the people, and there is in serious truth an "irrepressible conflict" now in progress. It is that irrepressible conflict between freedom and slavery, which has been progress for centuries. It is one of those revolutions which never go backward. Our statesmen have misapprehended the philosophy of free governments. They have attempted to rule a free people by brute force instead of a just administration of legitimate powers. They have preferred the crime of slavery to the God-given rights of liberty. They have trampled upon the rights of our free States to obtain political favor with the slave power.

They have stained the soil of our free States with innocent blood; men are captured in our Northern villages, their limbs manacled, and they are carried to slavery, as though our territory lay upon the African coast, subjected to the pollution of slave dealing pirates, while the stars and stripes—those emblems of liberty—are prostituted to the protection of an execrable commerce in human flesh. The indignation of our people is awakened, in some localities it is intense. Let no man mistake or belittle that feeling. It has long been foreseen. All reflecting men knew it must come. For fifteen years I have constantly pointed it out to Southern men, and to Northern men. Recent events will increase and strengthen it. Let those in power understand it cannot be trifled with. Let timid men keep silent. Let demagogues no longer sneer nor threaten. The time for intimidation is gone by. All must see that if the cause of the excitement continues the excitement will not cease. But of the future I will no longer speak. It is written upon the tablet of Heaven. It is read in every countenance around us. All must see that the men now in power are incompetent to the duties of their stations. If they continue longer to guide the ship of State all must be lost. Let them retire. Let the past policy of the government be abandoned. Let the despotic act alluded to be repealed. Let the free States be placed upon an equality with the slave States. Let our territory be consecrated to freedom. Let us cease to maintain a piratical commerce in the bodies of men and women. Let our federal government be purified from the contagion of slavery. Let us leave that institution where the constitution left it—"with the States" in which it exists. I repeat, the people of the free States will not support it. They will not be involved in its crimes or its disgrace. Our emancipation from the slave power must come; and, in the words of my illustrious and lamented friend, John Quincy Adams, let me say, "it will come—whether in peace or in blood I know not; but, whether in peace or in blood, let it come."

Population of Arizona.

Dr. Machebeuf, the Vicar-General of Santa Fé, having been applied to by the delegate to Congress from Arizona Territory, to give an estimate of the population of the county of Dona Ana, which forms the proposed Territory, writes as follows, under date of September 18:—

On the east side of the Rio Grande, in Dona Ana, Las Cruces, the new settlements of the several farms on the river, the population cannot be less than two thousand inhabitants.

Of La Mesilla and all other villages on the west side of the Rio Grande, for a distance of about forty miles, according to the estimate of the very reverend Dr. Ramon Ortiz Vicario and Cura of El Paso, who had spiritual jurisdiction over the whole of the Mesilla Valley for nearly twenty years, the population is over seven thousand inhabitants.

From the Rio Grande to the Colorado, counting besides Tucson, Tubac &c., all the families and men engaged in the several flourishing mines of the Territory, the new farmers settled on the Gila river, the San Pedro, in the valley of the Santa Cruz, and in the vicinity of the stations of the Overland Mail Company, the number of inhabitants must be about two thousand; making in all the Territory a whole population of over eleven thousand; and should there be a sufficient protection from the depredations of the Indians, the population would increase very rapidly.

THE "BURIAL OF EUCLID" ABANDONED.—It will be seen by the following paragraph, says the New Haven *Courier*, that the present Sophomore Class of Yale has voted to abandon the old college burlesque of the Burial of Euclid. Last year it was only preserved by a small majority; and now it is gone, for ever, probably. So long as the faculty threatened its performances with pains and penalties it flourished, but since the college officers have adopted the policy of letting it contemptuously alone, the students look at its absurdities in another light, and voluntarily turn their faces from it:—

YALE COLLEGE, Oct. 15, 1859.

At a meeting of the Class of 1862, held this day, the following resolution was adopted:—

Resolved, That we, as a class, do hereby abolish the college institution known as the Burial of Euclid.

FOREIGN WAR AND HOME DEFENCE.

Reflections Suggested by Recent Military Events.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD.

We live in a fast age—an age of progress. By the aid of steam and electricity the press spreads before us every morning intelligence from all parts of the world in such abundance that it is no easy matter even for a man of leisure to keep up with the news of the day. Events—many of them wholly unlooked for—occur, are reported and discussed in the papers, form the topic for general conversation for a few days, and are then forgotten or passed over to the future historian as affairs accomplished. This is particularly true of the military events of the last five years.

In 1855 and 1856 the war with Russia was the subject of general interest. All eyes were directed to the Crimea, with an occasional glance at the Baltic. The brilliant battle of the Alma—that rash and ill advised blunder, which was "magnificent, but not war"—the charge of Balaklava, the bloody struggle of Inkermann, the frightful suffering in the trenches before Sebastopol, the storming of the Malakoff and Redan, and the humiliating failure of the British fleet before Cronstadt, filled the public prints, and were the subjects of conversation in every circle.

Scarcely had peace been concluded, when the interest excited by the war with Russia was superseded by the insurrection in India. People forgot the Alma, Balaklava, Inkermann and the Malakoff, in the contemplation of the inhuman butcheries of Lucknow, Cawnpore and Delhi, and the efforts of England to re-establish her ascendency in India, and to wreak vengeance on the brutal cowards who vied in outraging and murdering helpless women and children.

The war in India was crushed out, and the year 1858 closed in peace. There was nothing to indicate that the year 1859 was destined to be made memorable by any great military achievements. But on the first day of this year the political world was startled by a few significant words uttered by the French Emperor to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. Both parties protested that there was no cause for alarm—there was no immediate prospect of war. True, Austria, France and Sardinia seemed to be making warlike preparations on a rather extensive scale; but we were assured that no war was impending—they were merely keeping up their usual and necessary military establishments—nothing more. Nevertheless, in May Austria invaded Sardinia, and "by the act of Austria war existed" with France. Suddenly the French army, equipped and instructed to a degree of perfection never before attained, was thrown into Italy. In the course of a few weeks the Austrians were defeated at Magenta, driven at the point of the bayonet through Lombardy, and defeated and almost crushed at the fearful battle of Solferino. The reading public had become so accustomed to the exciting news from Italy, and looked so anxiously for the reports by the last steamer to give zest to their morning papers, that there was a general feeling of disappointment when it was suddenly announced that the belligerents had concluded an armistice, and we were to read of no more battles for at least a month. The peace of Villafranca, which followed so quickly on the armistice, excited no little indignation, because the two Emperors had seen fit to terminate the war in their own way, and as abruptly as it had commenced. Whether the peace will be durable, or whether the curtain has only fallen on the first, soon to rise on a second and more tragic scene of the drama, time only can determine.

CHANGES IN THE ART OF WAR.

In either event, the breathing time thus allowed may be profitably employed by us in reflecting on the events of the last few years, and in endeavoring to gather from them useful lessons for our own guidance. History has been said to be philosophy teaching by example, and the recent experiments in the military branch of that philosophy are full of instruction for all who will rightly consider them.

The long period of peace between the great Powers of the World which followed the fall of the first Napoleon, had led many visionary persons, numbers of peace societies, and the like, to believe that the time had at length come when wars were to cease upon earth. All questions of dispute between nations were to be settled by negotiation or arbitration. Henceforth the warrior's occupation was gone. The events of a few years have dispelled all such illusions, and shown that nations are as prone now as ever to appeal to arms for the settlement of their difficulties, and that the improvements in the science of war which it was supposed had fallen into decay, as relics of barbarism, have been silently advancing *pari passu* with the improvements in other sciences. "It has taken the world some three thousand or four thousand years to perfect the organization of that strange implement of power, a regular army; but as more intellect has probably been devoted to this purpose than to almost any other that can be named, it is not wonderful that great perfection has been arrived at." The best intellect of France, it would seem, has of late been especially directed to the perfecting of this mighty engine, this "strange implement of power," and has succeeded in making it a tower of strength for her, and a terror to others. Whilst one great Power stands forth so perfectly armed at all points it is not safe for others to be off their guard.

England, more nearly interested than we, did not wait for this pause in the clash of arms, afforded by the peace of Villafranca, to reflect on what it behooved her to do. Is can scarcely be doubted that the question of her foreign policy had quite as much weight as had the question of parliamentary reform, in the defeat of the Derby Ministry. As soon as Parliament met, under the Palmerston-Russell Ministry, we find the latter question postponed to a more convenient season, and the question of her national defences loomed up, and became the question of the first importance. The debates in Parliament, and that more sure index of public opinion, the press, betray, if not fear, a very decided feeling of apprehension and uneasiness at the dangers which threaten them. England has "seen all that France has done" to Austria, and, like Moab and the frightened son of Zippor, she seems "sore afraid of the people who abide over against her." And her prophets of the press, more compliant than Balaam, have not hesitated to come forward and "Curse me this people, for they are too mighty for me." Fortunately, some of the wisest of her statesmen, seeing that the safety of the State is not likely to be secured by cursing whom the God of battles hath not cursed, have spoken out boldly and clearly, and have not gone "beyond the commandment" to say either more or less than prudence and a wise policy dictated. Though they remember the exultations over Trafalgar and Waterloo, they have not forgotten the panic which pervaded the island in 1804 and 1805, when the first Napoleon was concentrating his forces near Boulogne, with the avowed intention of carrying the war into perfidious Albion. Time has more strongly impressed upon them the extent of the danger which then threatened England, and they seem to be fully alive to the fact that the present Emperor of the French is far better prepared than was his great uncle to undertake the invasion, while England is, relatively, by no means so well prepared now as she was then to oppose successful resistance.

ARE WE FREE FROM INVASION?

Is there anything in our position to exempt us from all danger of invasion? Are our means of defence so ample and perfect as to deter any powerful nation from attacking us? If so, happy are we. We may then look with indifference on the gigantic preparations which other Powers have made, and are still making. We may go on to buy and sell and get gain until our wealth is equalled only by our corruption. But if not, it is due to ourselves, and to the great cause of free institutions, to put our house in order. If there is even a doubt on the subject, we should at least give it the most serious consideration. And, whilst doing so, it would be well to divest our minds of all the erroneous and extravagant ideas instilled into us by the vain boasting of our 4th of July orators.

We do not propose at this time to enter fully into the consideration of these questions. To do so would lead us into details and statistics which would extend this article to an unwieldy length. Nor do we consider such an examination necessary, for to us the true answers to the questions we have asked are so clearly in the negative that to assign our reasons would be to enter on the demonstration of what we regard as a self-evident proposition. We only propose to submit some reflections suggested by recent military events, and to assist, if we can, in removing some impressions which we must regard as erroneous.

It is our deliberate opinion that no other nation under the sun, claiming to be a great Power, is so exposed to invasion as the United States. We are not alarmists. We know that we possess vast resources—that our people are intelligent, brave, and hardy, and that many of them are familiar with the use of firearms; and we do not believe there is that nation on earth that can subjugate us. But we do believe that either England or France could deal us a blow which would do us infinite mischief, impede our prosperity for years, and degrade us, for a time, in the eyes of the civilized world. What England and France combined can do, we do not like to contemplate.

STEAM ANNIHILATES DISTANCE BY SEA.

If neither England nor France had recently exhibited their power to make war successfully at a great distance from their frontiers, we might, by contrasting our own naval and military preparations with theirs, easily show that they could make war upon us which would be most disastrous. But both of them have, within the last five years, given signal proof of what they can accomplish. Without any very good and sufficient cause, so far as appeared to the uninitiated, they made war on Russia. For the reduction of Sebastopol alone France transported to the Crimea more than 300,000 men and 40,000 horses, with all the necessary equipments and supplies, including field and seige artillery, siege tools and implements. That vast army was fed, clothed and paid as well and as regularly in the Crimea as if it had been stationed in Paris. So perfect was their means of communication that it is said even the private soldiers received letters from their friends as regularly as if they had been stationed in France. The force which England contributed to that war, though great, cannot be taken as the measure of what she can do now. In the long period of peace which followed the campaign of Waterloo, her military and naval establishments had been greatly reduced, and suffered to fall to some extent into decay. The experience acquired in the war with Russia opened her eyes to the necessity of cultivating more carefully the art and means of war, and she is at this time far better prepared than she was in 1854.

No sooner was peace made with Russia, than England was called on to put down the most terrible and wide spread rebellion that has ever occurred in her Indian empire. The Herculean efforts which she made to stamp out the fires of insurrection in that distant empire, the number of troops and quantity of material she transported to India, and that, too, whilst she was sending a hostile expedition to China, are too fresh in the memories of all to need more than a reference. This year France, though professedly unprepared, in an incredibly short time threw a superb army of 150,000 men into Italy, supported it by a powerful naval expedition, carrying 40,000 troops, in the Adriatic, and we know the result.

The feeling existing between England and France, notwithstanding the *entente cordiale*, is such that it is not at all probable either of them will relax their efforts to perfect their naval establishments. That they are now vastly superior to ours we know, but to what extent they will carry them it is impossible to tell. We are now looking for the arrival, at one of our ports, of an English steamer, which it is said can cross the Atlantic in six or seven days, and is capable of transporting 10,000 troops with their arms and supplies. The practicability of employing ocean steamers of such capacity is even more important in a military than a commercial point of view. If such transports can be successfully employed, the Atlantic ocean is now scarcely a greater barrier to military operations than a wide river was some forty years ago. Indeed the ocean becomes rather a convenience than an obstacle to the Power which can command it by a superior naval force.

With these facts before our eyes, and in view of our own preparations, can any intelligent man doubt the ability of either England or France to land an army on our coast, support it by an adequate naval force, blockade our ports, seize some of our principal cities, destroy our navy yards and some of our forts, and in a short, sharp campaign do us infinite mischief.

In the discussions to which the supposed prospect of an invasion of England have given rise, it seems to be admitted that the ability of France to make the invasion successfully depends on her ability to obtain command for a few weeks of the British Channel. That accomplished, it is admitted that there is little or nothing to prevent the French army occupying London and the principal points on the coast, and destroying her dockyards and arsenals. The subject is ably treated in an article said to have been written by Sir Howard Douglas, published in the London *Quarterly Review* for July of this year. After speaking of the contemplated invasion of England by the first Napoleon in 1804-5, he says:—

CONTINGENCIES OF AN INVASION OF ENGLAND.

"The present proposed plan of campaign is based on precisely the same principles, but so conceived as to avoid the obstacles which prevented the success of the first. It is so simple that a child may understand it, while no man living has yet suggested by what means it is to be defeated. In a few years France will possess forty or fifty sail of the line, all of the first class and all propelled by steam. She will then have available even a larger number of frigates, and from sixty to seventy steam transports, each capable of carrying at least 1,000 persons.

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"If in this contingency she were to content herself by blockading our harbors, destroying our mercantile ports and sweeping our richly-laden ships as prizes into her harbors, she might do us infinite damage, and bring a frightful extent of misery and ruin upon our population. But the blow would not be fatal. Probably within three months, certainly within six, we should be more than a match for her on the ocean. With our trade destroyed and our mercantile seamen idle, there would be no want of sailors. Every public and private dockyard would be at work, night and day. Every engineer's shop would be turned into a gun factory; every ferryboat and river craft would be strengthened and fitted with a gun, large or small; and in some shape or other we could easily put 10,000 guns on the sea, with 150,000 men to man them, and would again be safe. This the French know as well as ourselves, and this is precisely the form of the problem which they are prepared to accept, and believe that they can solve to their own advantage. They are not equal to a lengthened contest on the ocean with us; they know that to be successful the campaign must be short, and they only consider the fleet as the battering-train which is to open the breach through which the troops may march to meet us on the shore. If the French can obtain command of the Channel for three months, or even three weeks, they can easily land 200,000 or 250,000 men on our shores, and this accomplished, there is absolutely nothing to hinder them taking possession of the capital. The question is not so much what we could do when the disaster happened, and we were fairly roused to struggle for existence, as what we are likely to be able to do to prevent so frightful a contingency from occurring.

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"All this reasoning is based on the assumption that France, and France alone, is to undertake the task of chastising the insolence of England; but it is by no means clear that this will be the case. She is not yet quite ready to undertake it single handed; but if the coalition supposed to exist on the 23d of last April between the Emperors of France and Russia, had really taken place, and their fleets had appeared together in the Channel within a month or six weeks from that period, they would certainly have numbered twice as many guns as we could have prepared; and no conceivable amount of either skill or courage on our part could have enabled us to hold the command of the Channel for an hour, or to prevent that army which is now in Lombardy from landing on our shores. In such a case they could certainly have entered London in less time, and with as little loss as they encountered on their entrance into Milan.

"Even if we might have shut our eyes to the fact before, we cannot, after the experience of the last few months, be ignorant of the perfect state of preparation in which the French military establishments always exist. Though there is no doubt Austria precipitated the war before the allies were quite ready to begin, yet in a month from the outbreak of hostilities an army of 150,000 men were brought from the interior of the country, and were actually in possession of the enemy's capital, in spite of the exertions of an army as numerous and better prepared than themselves. What has been done once can be more easily done again; and if any one will take the trouble to sketch out any plan of campaign which 200,000 men could undertake in England, he will easily be able to calculate our chances of successful resistance." (Pages 142, 3 and 4.)

CAN WE GUARD THE ATLANTIC?

No rational man, we presume, will contend that we can guard the Atlantic more effectually than England can the Channel. Probably if we were duly notified of the intended invasion, and allowed time to prepare, we would be roused to put ourselves in a proper state of defence. But war is not now commenced in that way. It is sudden and swift. The thunder follows the flash of lightning—the declaration of war may follow the flash of the cannon. We certainly have no right to expect that we will be warned by a declaration of war before the first blow is struck. We have ourselves given an example of our disregard of that formality. Did we declare war against Mexico? Our troops entered the disputed territory—Mexico resisted—we defeated her in two battles, and then Congress, dodging the formal declaration of war, resolved, that "by the act of Mexico war exists." Who knows when some other nation, following our example, may declare that by the act of the United States war exists? Might not England at this time, for instance, declare that by the act of the United States in taking military possession of the Island of San Juan, the title to which is in dispute, war exists? That, we believe, is not a very probable supposition. We believe that the accomplished and distinguished Lieutenant General of the army, who has been despatched to that distant point, will settle this, as he has other difficulties, amicably, and give another proof that when difficulties arise he is the man on whom the nation can rely. But there are other suppositions less improbable. Suppose, for instance, that England or France, or both, should guarantee to Spain the possession of the island of Cuba (which we are bound to have), not a very improbable supposition, and then suppose that island to be molested by a band of filibusters from our coast—certainly not an impossible event—might not either or both of those Powers declare that by the act of the United States war existed, and send the declaration to us by an army prepared to commence the campaign.

The article in the London *Quarterly Review*, from which we have quoted, goes on to suggest a plan of campaign for the invasion of England. A few alterations in the paragraphs we have extracted, and in the plan suggested—changes of numbers and in the names of places—would render it as applicable to the United States as it is to England. We have no inclination, even if we had the ability, to suggest a plan of invasion for our enemy. There are officers of the government whose especial duty it is to investigate that subject and to suggest the best plan of defence. They are doubtless better qualified for the proper performance of that duty than we are to offer useful suggestions on those points. But we may be sure that our weak points are as well known in London and Paris as they are in Washington. The admirable maps of our coast prepared by the Coast Survey are no doubt carefully preserved in the War offices of England and France. And when the time comes our enemies will, no doubt, find the heads to conceive the plans of campaign and the forces to execute them in a way that we will find it difficult to prevent.

MILITIA IN THE FACE OF DISCIPLINED TROOPS.

Before adopting the paragraphs we have quoted, and the plan which follows them, to the United States, we should make one material change. We should strike out all, or nearly all, that is said of the number of regular troops we could place in the field on a sudden emergency. We say this certainly without any intention to disparage or undervalue our little army. Whenever called, it has done, and is now doing all, and more than all, that could reasonably be expected. But it is wretchedly small, and scattered over a frontier of vast extent. In the event of war, we must of necessity rely chiefly on the militia, volunteers and new levies. No doubt they would in time make admirable troops, but long before that could be accomplished we would have suffered greatly. Many a home would be made desolate, because of the loss of men fresh from the pursuits of civil life shot down in an unequal struggle with troops thoroughly disciplined and trained to war, or who died of diseases contracted by exposures to which they were unused. Many of the most distressing scenes of our war with Mexico were the deaths of hundreds of brave and gallant men who rallied under the standards of their country, eager for the fray, but who, ignorant of and unused to the hardships and exposure which awaited them, sickened and died, and were tumbled by scores into long trenches for their final resting place on earth.

In one very essential element we should be wofully deficient. We mean in engineer and artillery troops. These arms are, we believe, regarded by military men as specialities requiring long and careful training. And it so happens that this is precisely the description of troops we should greatly need. We have an extensive coast, dotted with numerous forts, some completed, others in the course of construction, and others again only planned. The mode of arming and defending these forts has undergone great changes within a few years. Indeed that branch of the art of war may be said to be at present in a transition state. It is of the utmost importance that we should arm them with the most efficient weapons, and guard them by troops thoroughly trained in all that pertains to their defence. But we have at present no well instructed troops to guard and defend them. We say none, because if we have any their number is so small in comparison to what we would need, that they may be omitted in the estimate. We know that we have by law four regiments of artillery. When our army was much smaller than it is now, President Monroe, whose experience at home and abroad had taught him the importance of having a comparatively large force of well instructed artillery, insisted on having at least four regiments of those troops, and we have them now by law. But that law, like some others, is a dead letter. Those regiments are artillery only in name. More than four fifths of the companies are armed and equipped as infantry, and serve as such on the frontier. Many of them have never seen a fort, or fired a heavy gun. Without proper garrisons our forts, which have been constructed at vast expense, and which we have been taught to regard as our strongest, would in truth be our weakest points—curses rather than blessings. If unguarded in time of war, perhaps the best thing we could do with them would be to blow them up. For, once in the hands of an enemy who commanded the sea, it would cost a fearful expenditure of life, money and time to retake them; and if we succeeded in dislodging the enemy, the forts themselves would probably not exist—they would be masses of ruins—and our coast, so to speak, would be left to us desolate.

OUR HARBOR DEFENCES.

There is, for instance, at Newport, R. I., an admirable work—Fort Adams—commanding the entrance to perhaps the best harbor on our Atlantic coast. It is at present occupied by one company—probably sixty men—and that company, we understand, is under marching orders for some distant post in the West. That fine work will then be, like others, unoccupied, and in a sudden war might easily be seized by the enemy. No one who has ever examined the work, and has read anything of the art of the attack and defence of permanent works, need be told how difficult would be the task of retaking it. We have selected this work at random; there are others which we might have instanced. The harbor of New York is, we believe, but little, if at all better guarded than the harbor of Newport. There are, probably, but few among us who really know how very small is the regular force which the United States government maintains on its coast. Our weakness in that respect was strikingly exhibited in the winter which followed the financial crisis of 1857. It will be remembered that during that winter many laborers in our cities were thrown out of employment, and there was much suffering. New York city was in a very disturbed state—long processions of laborers paraded the streets demanding bread or employment, and they were excited to acts of violence by inflammatory speeches. The Assistant Treasurer of the United States, believing there was danger that the Custom House and Treasury would be sacked by the mob, called upon the President of the United States for a guard of regular troops. The President could only send on that service an officer and fifty men, drawn from a recruiting depot. If the distress had been as severe as was pretended, and there had really existed any design of sacking the Treasury, such an inadequate guard would only have excited the mob to the attack, and that handful of men would have been massacred as wretchedly as were the unfortunate Swiss grenadiers who attempted to defend the Tuileries and the royal family of France. We cannot believe that the people of this country are unwilling to provide a more adequate guard for our coast and Treasury than we now have.

What would be the success and ultimate fate of a hostile army landed on our coast must remain for the present a matter of speculation. Our own views in regard to it are no doubt widely different from those entertained by a large majority of our fellow citizens. There is an abiding faith in the country on our ability to hurl from our shores and utterly destroy any and every enemy who may dare to place his foot on our soil. If a doubt is expressed on this subject, the examples of North Point and New Orleans are as constantly appealed to as the disgraces of Bladensburg and the burning of the capital are ignored. But we may rest assured that the blunders of North Point and New Orleans will never be repeated. We wish we could say the same of Bladensburg and the capital, but we cannot. We are not at all sure that we are relatively better prepared now than we were in 1814 to defend the capital of the United States. There is little or nothing to bar the passage of a fleet up the Potomac to Washington. There is, we believe, a small fort opposite Mount Vernon, but we saw it stated in a Washington paper some weeks since that the fort had been long since abandoned and was falling to decay. When war is next made on us it will be on a very different scale from that of 1812. We may then learn, when too late, what a powerful and well disciplined army, directed by a competent head, can accomplish. The people of this country have indeed no adequate conception of the power of a great army. The article in the London *Quarterly Review*, from which we have extracted, contains some remarks so pertinent to this point that we are tempted to quote them—indeed the whole article is well worthy of careful study.

POWER OF A GREAT ARMY.

"Many persons seem to have an indistinct and undefined idea that because we are a brave and patriotic people, and never have been invaded, such an army could be shot down or destroyed by some process or other by an equal number of unorganized riflemen, for instance, or by the mere rising of the country *en masse*. Those who indulge in such fancies have a very imperfect notion of what an army really is. It has taken the world some three or four thousand years to perfect the organization of that strange implement of power; but as more intellect has probably been devoted to this purpose than to any other that can be named, it is not wonderful that great perfection has been arrived at. In a completely disciplined army the minds and bodies of one hundred thousand men have been moulded into the form of one great giant of one hundred thousand man power, obedient to one will and acting with the unity and force of a single organization. It spreads its antennæ everywhere, so that nothing can approach it without being felt. It can throw the whole or any portion of its power on any point attacked, and when fighting it can use just such weapons as are most effective, and can reserve such powers as are requisite to insure victory at last. Such a giant can move anywhere and over anything opposed to it, and can only be stopped by a giant as powerful as itself. An unorganized mob may tease, but they cannot hurt it; and unless in very superior numbers and in very favorable circumstances, there is no instance in history of anything like an equal number of guerillas contending successfully with disciplined troops in the field. While the invading army are fresh and in junction, and there are no material obstacles to give advantage to the defenders, it is in vain to look for a successful resistance, except from superior discipline or vastly superior numbers. This it is in vain to hope we shall possess for a long time to come. The nation that could put half a million of men in motion in 1812, for the conquest of Russia, may do something nearly similar for the accomplishment of a far dearer object of ambition; and neither our habits nor our institutions render it at all probable that we shall make the sacrifice, and undergo the inconveniences involved in such a process."—Pages 145, 146.

If we are told that these are the views of a foreigner, a subject, who has no conception of what a free people can do when fighting for their country, we can only support the views of the subject by the authority of a perfectly competent citizen of the United States. During the Crimean war the President of the United States despatched three highly accomplished officers of our army to Europe, for the purpose of obtaining and reporting such information on military matters as might be useful. The report of but one of these officers (Capt. Geo. B. McClellan) has been published. It was printed by order of the United States Senate, on the recommendation of the Executive, and is, therefore, given to the public with all the weight of official approval. No one well acquainted with the accomplished author of that report needed any endorsement to give weight to his opinions. He says:—

"It is believed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:—

"1. That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and proper one, which ought to be completed, and armed with the least possible delay.

"2. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in a European war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and directed by that consummate and mechanical military skill which can only be acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose and by long habit.

"In the day of sailing vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol would have been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared to sustain a siege.

"This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and these fortifications must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists. To repel the advance of such an army into the interior it is not enough to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can bring to bear against it.

"An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers, but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Moscow campaign.

"Our regular army never can, and perhaps never ought to be, large enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase, and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops."

And such, we believe, will ever be the opinion of those best qualified to judge.

DO CITIZENS EVER RESIST A VICTORIOUS ARMY?

Very crude, and we think erroneous notions, are entertained by many persons as to the course that would be pursued by our citizens—those not regularly drafted into the military service—in the event of an invasion of this country. It is supposed that if any one of our cities were occupied by the enemy, there would exist an "irrepressible conflict" between the citizens and the enemy's troops; that the citizens would pursue a system of non-intercourse with the invaders—withhold from them provisions and other supplies; that scenes of disorder and violence would prevail, until the people, driven to desperation, would rise *en masse* and expel the invaders. That has not been the teaching of history. We have innumerable instances of foreign capitals and other cities being occupied by hostile armies. What has been the general result? When the French army, under the first Napoleon, entered Madrid, there was at first some panic and alarm; places of public amusement, shops and private houses were closed for a time; but the inhabitants were assured that they were in no danger, that strict order would be maintained, and life and property protected. A French soldier for robbing a jeweller of a trinket was sentenced to be shot, the sentence was promptly executed, and the next day business and pleasure were resumed, and Madrid wore its usual aspect. The inhabitants of Vienna offered no resistance to the French army which occupied that capital in 1809. And subsequently, when the French Emperor with his army was hemmed in on the island of Lobo, and it became necessary to employ much labor in his preparations to extricate himself from his perilous position, he found no difficulty in procuring laborers in abundance among the inhabitants of the Austrian capital. It was absolutely necessary that the people should have money to procure subsistence. They could not obtain it without employment, and they very readily worked for him who could pay them, and thus assisted in the preparations for the subsequent defeat of their own army at Wagram. Our own army occupied the capital and other cities of Mexico. It is well known that the best feeling existed as a general thing between the inhabitants and our troops, and the departure of the army gave much greater concern than did its entrance into the city. These are but a few of the instances we might cite. It may be said that these instances occurred in despotic governments, that the people possessed no patriotism, and that in our own free country the case would be different. Happily for us our own country affords no recent instance from which we can judge. But we need not look back over a period of many years for an example. In September, 1777, Philadelphia was in the possession of the Revolutionists. The Declaration of Independence had been first proclaimed in that city, and there sat the Revolutionary Congress. No doubt a large majority of the people were friendly to, and many of them enthusiastic supporters of the Revolution. Before the end of that month the state of things was materially changed. Congress had fled to Lancaster, Philadelphia was occupied by the British troops under Lord Howe, and the American army under Washington occupied the adjacent country. Did the patriotic people of the Revolution withhold provisions and other supplies from the enemy, or in any way seriously molest them? It is well known that during the winter and spring which followed the Americans endured the utmost privations at Valley Forge. Notwithstanding that Congress gave to the American General authority to seize by force from the inhabitants the necessary supplies for the army, to be paid for as we best could, it was impossible to procure the scantiest supplies. Congress at the same time passed a law subjecting to "military law, and death" all who, within thirty miles of Philadelphia, or any city or town in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, occupied by the enemy, should supply the enemy with provisions. The American troops, half starved and half naked, were employed and unsuccessfully employed, in attempts to enforce that law, and "intercept those persons who were indifferent to whom their provisions were sold, provided payment was received in specie. Their patriotism could not resist the temptation, and, notwithstanding the danger to which they were exposed by the vigorous laws enacted against the practice, and the vigilance of the troops stationed on the lines, their utmost dexterity was employed in concealing their provisions from those who were sent to impress them for the army, and conveying them privately to Philadelphia." (Marshal's Life of Washington, vol. iii. p. 333.) The consequence was that, whilst the American troops were half starved, half naked, and freezing at Valley Forge, the British were fed, clothed and warmed in Philadelphia. We doubt if our people are more patriotic and self-denying, and less mercenary, now than they were in 1777. We suspect there are many now who could not resist the temptation of payment in specie for provisions furnished the enemy, when their own countrymen could only pay in depreciated paper.

ABSURDITY OF A GENERAL RISING.

As for the people rising *en masse* and expelling the invaders, the idea is simply absurd. When war comes upon us, if it ever does, we trust for the sake of humanity that it will be conducted according to the usages of civilized warfare. We will oppose army to army in the field, and if we are defeated and our cities occupied, the citizens will consult their own interest, as others have done, and conform to the usages of war, by submitting, until relieved from the burthen of a foreign army in the ordinary course of military operations and negotiations. If they should pursue a different course, and rise upon the invaders, they would only bring destruction and ruin on themselves and the unoffending and helpless. For every such rising, whether in town or country, would be looked upon as a riot or insurrection, to be stamped out by military force and "according to the strictest letter of the law that killeth." Nor is it probable that the troops would provoke the citizens to rebellion. A well disciplined army is a model of good order; it cannot exist in disorder. Whilst occupying a particular section of country it would maintain order, protect life and property, and encourage trade and amusements. True, the citizens might, and in all probability would, be made to feel the war by the imposition of heavy contributions, but trade and business of all kinds would be encouraged and protected, if for no other purpose than to enable the people the better to pay those contributions. We are disposed to believe that if the city of Baltimore were at this time in the possession of an enemy, and occupied by a sufficient garrison of disciplined troops, the best citizens would soon admit that good order was better maintained, and life and property more effectually protected, than they have been for some years past, and the troops would hardly permit themselves, even if the inhabitants were disposed to permit them, to starve. Or suppose New Orleans and Mobile were occupied by a foreign army—and that they might very easily be we have no doubt—the entrances to those ports guarded by an adequate naval force, and not a bale of cotton suffered to pass out except when and how the enemy chose, what would be the result? We have not the gift of prophecy, but we have the light of reason and history to guide us to an answer. The first panic over, the novelty of the thing having worn off, and the people finding that order was maintained, life and property protected, and trade encouraged, business would be resumed. If "cotton is king," the producer and purchaser are fellow subjects. It is well known that many, perhaps a majority of cotton planters, are in arrears with their commission merchants, on whom they are in the habit of drawing "on next year's crop." The commission merchants would be under the thumb of the invaders. It would be to their interest to receive cotton from their patrons as usual, and to sell it to whoever would pay highest. If they thought and were disposed to act differently a judicious application of force would probably induce them to change their opinions and action. But we doubt if much compulsion would be needed. We suspect there are many planters who "could not resist the temptation" of a rise of a few cents per pound on cotton; particularly if payment were made in specie. Indeed, it is almost as essential to a cotton planter that he should be able to sell, as it is to the manufacturer to be able to buy cotton. The planters might very readily excuse themselves by the plea of necessity. It would be absolutely necessary that they should have money—they could procure it in no other way than by the sale of their crops, and they would soon send their cotton to market as usual. We make these remarks without the slightest intention of impugning the patriotism of the citizens of Baltimore, New Orleans and Mobile, and cotton planters in particular; they are adduced only by way of illustration. New York, Philadelphia and Boston, and the producers of wheat and tobacco, would have answered quite as well to illustrate our meaning.

SHALL WE BE ALWAYS AT PEACE.

Our country has for so long a time been at peace with all first class Powers that it seems impossible to convince the people, or their representatives, that there is any necessity to prepare for war. Perhaps a large majority believe that the productions of our soil are so necessary to the commercial world that they alone will keep the peace. We do not believe it; for the reasoning by which they reach this conclusion is not very logical. We produce so much that is absolutely essential to the rest of the world, or in other words, we are so rich in what is necessary to others, that we need take no precautions to guard our wealth. Quite a different conclusion may be drawn from the same premises, viz.: Our productions are so necessary to other nations that they must and will have them; therefore we should take every possible precaution to guard and protect them securely, so that we may be able at all times to trade with others on fair and equal terms, and never, by exposing ourselves, tempt others to attempt to impose on us injurious conditions. Nations, like individuals, sometimes allow their passions to get the better of their reason, and lead them to sacrifice their pecuniary interest to the attainment of some other object—the humiliation of a rival—the gratification of ambition—or it may be that baser passion, the gratification of revenge. When no such passions prompt others to make war on us we will enjoy the blessings of peace just so long as it is to their interest to be at peace with us, but no longer; when it is to their interest to make war on us then they will make it. And there are many questions the settlement of which may involve us in war.

The United States is at this day one of the great Powers of the earth. The period of our existence as an independent nation has, so far, been coincident with a period of unexampled progress throughout the world. Within a wonderfully short time our population has increased more than tenfold, and some of the causes which have contributed to our rapid growth have wrought very essential changes in our—we had almost said geographical—position. The application of steam to the purposes of ocean navigation, and the wonderful developement which that application has received within a few years, have as effectually changed our position relative to Europe as if by Omnipotence our Continent had been moved to within a hundred miles of the French and British coasts. This change must soon, if it has not already, effect a very material change in our intercourse with European nations. It has involved our interest more closely with theirs; and no matter how desirous we may be to avoid entangling alliances with foreign States, we cannot divest ourselves of the responsibilities which devolve upon us as the great republic of the world. We are destined to play a greater part in the world than we have yet played, and we should prepare ourselves to perform our part in a manner becoming the great republic. We can afford it—no nation better—and we should do it. Our commerce extends over every sea, and we are bound alike by honor and interest to protect it. The protection of our maritime rights has already involved us in war with England, and may at any time bring us into collision with either France or England, or both. Our policy and interest as regards Cuba, Central America and Mexico may at any time entangle us with other nations. The condition of Mexico, immediately on our borders, is and has long been a scandal to civilization, and calls loudly for friendly intervention. We do not seem disposed at present to undertake the protection of that State. Other Powers, particularly those to whom she is largely indebted, may may not be so indifferent to her fate. But according to our interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, we cannot permit any European power to interfere there. If we will neither interfere ourselves, nor permit others to interfere, it requires no stretch of the imagination to perceive that we may very easily come into collision with the policy of other nations in that quarter.

MANIFEST DESTINY.

Nor does it appear that we are very anxious to avoid collisions. We are an acquisitive people, and have a wonderfully strong proclivity to acquire new territory and extend the area of freedom. Manifest destiny clearly indicates (so we may say) that we should possess Cuba, and perhaps other rich islands convenient to our coast, and we are disposed to hurry up and assist in the accomplishment of our manifest destiny. Nor are we content with acquiring the territory of other nations; we want their subjects also. We delight to proclaim that our land is an asylum for the oppressed of all nations; and we invite them to come to this house of refuge. They can not only help to build our railroads, dig our canals, clear our forests, till the soil, and furnish us with the mechanical skill necessary to enable us to compete with other nations, but more and better than all this, they can vote and help to carry elections. Let them come, then, and be naturalized, or even intimate their intention to be naturalized. No matter what obligations to their native States they may have left unfulfilled, they may return home if they will, it may be to induce others to escape when their governments need their services, but the governments which have nurtured them from infancy to man's estate may not exact of them the performance of their unfulfilled obligations; they are our citizens, and we are bound to protect them. If there were no other question calculated to bring us into collision with other nations, this one alone of the rights of our naturalized citizens, as interpreted by many of our politicians, might at any time embroil us with almost any nation of Europe.

We wish that some of those among us whose especial duty and privilege it is to provide for the common good and welfare of the nation would turn their attention to the careful consideration of the subjects on which we have touched. But we have little hope that they will; they have quite other occupations. The prospect before us is anything but encouraging. Whilst other nations are striving to strengthen themselves, some among us seem to be doing all they can to weaken ourselves by encouraging and promoting internal dissensions. In our section of the Union certain politicians who have solemnly sworn to support the constitution and the laws of the land have discovered a higher law—something above the constitution—which impels them to proclaim an "irrepressible conflict" with the institutions of another section of the Union. Others, by way, we suppose, of applying a counter irritant, insist that the African slave trade shall be reopened. Some are writing endless and intolerably tedious essays on "squatter sovereignty," or discussing the merits and demerits of the "Wise-Donnelly letter" and "the treachery of the Albany Regency." But the great and all-absorbing occupation at present is that of organizing Presidential Conventions, constructing platforms and arranging "the wires" which are to bring about the election to the Presidency of some man of whose very existence it may be nine-tenths of the people of this country are at this instant wholly ignorant. Let us hope that when it becomes necessary to prepare to meet a present danger, a merciful Providence will raise up for us men equal to the emergency.

The Late Northern Elections and their Significant Results.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD.

Upon this question your lucid expositions demonstrating the causes that have produced the decadency of the democratic party, to be followed probably by defeat in the next Presidential election, are incontestible. That "the democratic party in 1856 would have been crushed but for the saving interposition of Mr. Buchanan," no sane man will deny; but, as you say, "the lesson has imparted little wisdom to the various factions and leaders of the party." Southern ultraism and Northern concession by sycophantic politicians, ignoring and neglecting the sage advice and prudent recommendations of our patriotic President, have brought the party to its present deplorable pass. Of all this the reason you assign is the great cause—the slavery question the prominent issue; an issue provoked by designing and ambitious demagogues on the one hand, and on the other by disappointed politicians and office seekers North, and indiscreet, unpatriotic, fire-eating, strict constructionists South. There is not a grain of honesty or patriotism in the whole foul device.

Will you allow me, as a democrat of thirty years standing, and a plain business man, to call your attention to some other causes, which, it strikes me, may have been instrumental also in producing this sad result to the democratic party. You may likely differ from me as to the correctness of their application, but I feel satisfied that your impartiality as a public journalist will accord them a place, if convenient, in the columns of your independent and influential journal. Permit me to premise that I have always been in favor of a low, strictly speaking, revenue tariff. But now, when I come to look at the figures of, and compare, our imports and exports, I confess that I feel startled at the result.

The democratic party of the North has always succumbed upon this question to the democratic party of the South but what is the positive, the actual state of affairs. Look at it:—

Our foreign imports from January 1 to October 3 inst. amount to	$184,889,[illegible]
Our exports of domestic produce for the same period, to	48,161,7[illegible]
Balance of imports over exports	$136,727,7[illegible]

Against this we have shipped, during the same period, in gold and silver, the enormous amount of $56,677,7[illegible], leaving us still in debt upon this year's importations, $80,050,038, with a specie basis below a fair average.

It is useless to blink the question; the facts are patent.

Now, sir, there is not probably a country upon the face of the earth possessing natural advantages equal to ours. With hundreds of millions of acres of the finest lands—a virgin soil of the most prolific fertility—mountains groaning under the pressure of the richest minerals, of coal and iron sufficient to supply a world; but yet, although rich in internal wealth, we are poor in pocket. Devise a plan by which to fully develope our abundant resources, and in less than ten years this nation would be the richest nation on the globe. England has reaped more solid wealth from her coal and iron than from the untold millions extorted from the East. Neither France or England consult the interest of foreign nations to shape their revenue laws; they only consult their own. They levy duty upon all things tending to the protection of their own industry. Judicious and wise laws help to create a demand for their productions, which in return brings the precious metals that enrich both the nation and the people.

Mr. Buchanan, in his inaugural message, recommended an alteration of the tariff to afford the great iron interest of Pennsylvania a slight protection. This would have afforded the iron interest of that State a chance to set its works in operation, and called into occupation thousands of operatives. But the South demurred, Northern democrats caved in, and the President's recommendation fell to the ground. Is it to be wondered that Pennsylvania democracy wavers in its fate! You touch the people's pocket and you touch a tender point; place facts and figures before them, and by the application of a little common sense they will find the correct solution. They care more for their dollars than for niggers. I dare to maintain that if the wise and sage policy of Mr. Buchanan had prevailed, Pennsylvania would have been saved to the democratic party in spite of all the Forneys in creation, for the State is democratic at heart.

Again: The President recommended that the public works commenced upon our lake frontiers be completed. The estimates were made by the Board of Topographical Engineers, and in conformity therewith the chairman of the Committee on Commerce introduced a bill appropriating an amount of about $1,400,000. But, again, the South demurred, fought the bill through both sessions, and Northern democrats caving in, the President's recommendation fell to the ground. Now, sir, all of our Northwestern States are deeply interested in this question. We have a lake trade rivalling in amount our entire foreign commerce. It amounted in 1856 to six hundred and thirty millions of dollars, giving employment to near sixteen hundred steamers and sailing vessels (of over four hundred thousand tons burthen), and thirteen thousand sailors. Mr. Buchanan understood and appreciated its importance. He treated the question upon a broad national basis, and favored a policy that had received the attention and support of former democratic Presidents, but especially and upon the largest scale that of Gen. Jackson. But Southern ultraism, sustained by Northern democrats of soft proclivities, combatted the sagacity of Mr. Buchanan, and the result is a defeat in some of our Northwestern States where heretofore democracy has always prevailed.

I have heard a United States Senator from South Carolina make an eloquent appeal to the Senate in favor of a large appropriation for a Southern Navy Yard. He appeared to be utterly astonished that there should be any opposition to so reasonable and patriotic a request; but yet that same Senator would not vote a dollar to protect the millions of property at stake on our lakes, and the thousands of lives there exposed for the want of proper harbors of refuge. The misfortune is, it strikes me, that these important matters are discussed and treated as party measures, and not as questions of great national import.

We have in our national Legislature more politicians than statesmen—more law than common sense—more abstractions than practical business capacity. One hope remains to the democratic party, and, I may say, to the country, at this juncture of our political affairs, and that is—the common sense and correct feeling of the masses. This is foreshadowed in the wise and patriotic course lately initiated by that respectable body of men, the "Vigilant Association." If sustained, as it should be, by the patriotic and honest men—not alone of the democratic party, but of all parties—it would purge our public offices of roguery and corruption, put an extinguisher upon the dangerous and damnable heresy of "irrepressible conflict," its originator, aiders and abettors, and engender a new era in our glorious republic. This, Mr. Editor, a consummation to be wished, may seem far off; but, sir, industry and perseverance in a good cause may accomplish much.

A NEW YORK MERCHANT.

News from the West Indies.

IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS AT JAMAICA—AN AMERICAN SLAVER IN PORT—THE OLD CITY OF PORT ROYAL—WEATHER AND PUBLIC HEALTH—RELIGION, ETC.

We have received files of papers from the West Indies dated at Kingston, Jamaica, on the 11th of October.

The *Colonial Standard* contains the following interesting summary:—

We are happy to be able to state that the three hundred Chinese laborers—whose presence in Kingston, under the idea that they were entitled to a bonus of ten pounds each in lieu of a return passage, we mentioned in our last summary—have all of them returned to their agricultural employment, and are once more usefully at work. No one paid the bounty demanded by them, and they in no instance insisted on it, thus showing that they were perfectly aware that they were not entitled to it.

The bark Laura prize to H. M. S. Archer, arrived at Port Royal from the coast of Africa, on Sunday, October 2. It is understood that the cause of her having been sent down here is, that when captured she had hoisted Mexican colors, and therefore it has become necessary to send her to a Mexican port for condemnation. She had, we believe, no slaves on board when captured, and is beyond all doubt an American vessel.

Some interesting facts in connection with the destruction of the old city of Port Royal by earthquake, in 1692, have been brought to light by some divers who have lately visited this port, and who have taken occasion to visit the submarine ruins of the venerable and much abused city of old.

The favorable weather last reported continues to prevail in this district of the island, and we believe generally along the south side. We are happy also to learn that some congenial showers have fallen on the north side. In this neighborhood the weather has been remarkably propitious.

The public health, although not as favorable amongst the lower classes as could be desired, has nevertheless not been marked by any very serious fatality.

His Excellency the Governor has issued a proclamation convening the Legislature "for the despatch of business" on Tuesday, the 1st of November.

The Bishop of Kingston has commenced a series of confirmations throughout the Diocese. On Saturday, October 1, the Right Reverend Prelate confirmed 136 young persons in the Cathedral Church of Spanish Town.

Her Majesty's steamer Basilisk, six guns, Commander Phayre, left Port Royal on Saturday evening last for Falmouth. The Basilisk will bring up one company of the Second West India regiment and leave the other company for the protection of that place.

Superior Court—General Term.

SOMETHING ABOUT CITY CONTRACTS—THE EXTENSION OF CANAL STREET.

OCT. 29.—*John S. Giles vs. William B. Crosby and others.*—It appears that in 1848 William B. Crosby, John Beekman, Henry Remsen, William Remsen and Frederick Schouchard petitioned the Common Council to extend Canal street to Walker street, and widen Walker street seventy-five feet to Rutgers street. As an inducement for the Common Council to pass an ordinance for the proposed improvement the above named defendants deposited with the Comptroller their bond for $20,000, on the conditions that in case the improvement was not confirmed by the Superior Court, the $20,000 were to be applied to the payment of the expenses incurred in the matter of the improvement, and the city would be held harmless of expense. Mr. Giles was solicited by the parties to assist in accomplishing the said improvement, and a bond was given by the above named defendants to Giles for $10,000, provided that such was by him necessarily expended in accomplishing the extension and widening, and the improvement made in accordance with a map then on file in the Street Commissioner's Office. Subsequently the Common Council made a slight alteration in the original map, leaving the small gore formed by Centre, Walker, Baxter and Canal streets, as extended, and continuing the street into East Broadway, instead of ending at Rutgers street. The defendants object to the payment of the bond upon the ground that the small gore at the commencement of the extension at Centre street was not taken as shown in the original map. The plaintiff contends he has substantially performed the contract. Decision reserved.