THE GREAT EUROPEAN PROBLEM.

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The Eastern Question is again involving the peace of Europe, and awakening the interest of all Christendom. It was but yesterday that this same question was mooted, and its merits discussed at the cannon's mouth, at the expense of innocent blood and treasures untold; and it was natural to suppose that with the close of the war a definite solution had been arrived at; but, on the contrary, the subject is again revived, the tranquillity of the world once more threatened, and commerce menaced with impediments.

The ostensible form it assumed in 1853 was that of a religious enthusiasm, viz: the protection by Russia of the Christians of Turkey in their religious liberties. Now the question is mooted under a philanthropic guise, or the maintenance of the civil rights of the same peoples; anon it may be roused by the power of an unmasked despotism.

In view of the importance of the subject, the following historical resumé of this hydra-headed question is presented to our readers —

RISE AND PROGRESS OF TURKEY.

Early in the ninth century a tribe of Turkomans crossed the Caspian mountains and invaded Armenia. They were bravely repulsed; but the alluring prospect of that country induced them to renewed attacks, until, with an army of 300,000 men, they overran and devastated the whole of that region.

The present Turkish empire was established in the year 1300, by Osman, or Othman. The first capital was Heapolis, the second Brousa, and the third Constantinople, which was taken May 29, 1453. Thence they extended their conquests into Europe as far as Vienna, becoming a gigantic political structure.

The prince of statesmen and paragon of diplomatists has drawn a corollary from historic facts, which has been emphatically demonstrated in the actual experience of the Turkish nation, viz:—"Ease begets indifference; indifference, misrule; misrule, anarchy, and anarchy, ruin."

The Turks, who were only encouraged by rapine, and instigated by religious frenzy, when the rage of war was at last checked, having no other incentive to action, relaxed into supineness, or rather a barbaric luxury. Although in their onward march they came in contact with civilization, yet they profited not, and neglected the science of government, so that, in time of peace, instead of husbanding their immense property and wealth, like spendthrifts they lived upon their capital, believing that their swords, hitherto so successful, had only again to be drawn to be all-conquering. They were so elated by conquests, their acquired territories so fertile, and their subjects so useful, that they easily became arrogant and insolent, and they came to consider themselves a people of princes, lords of the realm.

CAUSES OF DEGENERATION.

Instead of ameliorating the condition of the heterogeneous peoples whom their arms had conquered, or blending them into a common nationality, they fostered reciprocal animosities among them, regarding them severally as adjuncts to their own glory, and the means of their own prosperity, the while treating them as rayahs, or subjugated people, who ought to be thankful for the mere boon of life itself. Accordingly they denied them the rights of citizenship, and imposed upon them many other indignities. They were not allowed to hold any office, nor to give their testimony in the courts of justice against a Mussulman, nor to carry arms, even in self defence. The only road to preferment or social equality was to embrace Islamism, outside of which all were compelled to bear the burden of taxation, and in reality become the menials of the conquerors. The legitimate consequence has been that they have been and still are the tillers of the soil, the artisans, the mechanics, the merchants, in fine, the bone and sinew of the land, while the Mussulmans themselves considered it beneath their dignity to be employed otherwise than as rulers or soldiers.

WHO WEAR THE DERE BEYS.

In every despotic government the main essential of national greatness is military power; therefore, whoever of the Mussulmans contributed to that power was permitted to assume the dignity of Déré Bey, or feudal chief. To these Déré-Beys the sovereignty of the provinces was consigned.

These Déré-Beys naturally abused the prerogatives of their positions, assuming a power absolute, like that of the potentate they represented. They not only exacted the dues of the government, but added thereto their own demands, which, of course, fell heavily upon the rayahs, whose only resource, having no appeal, was to hide their possessions and assume the semblance of poverty. But this would not save them, for persecution, imprisonment, and even death itself, were resorted to to extort their possessions.

There was no escape from these Déré-Beys or their subordinate officers, for the people were chained, as it were, to the soil. The taxes being shared among the inhabitants, no one family or any member of it could be spared in the distribution. Hence the people became spies upon each other, for the withdrawal of any one from the community would increase the weight of the taxation upon the others.

This consignment of the provinces to the arbitrary control of the Déré-Beys was not without desirable results; for a certain degree of awe and ready submission was thereby inspired towards the central government, which could at pleasure and option punish, with one fell blow, the very ruler who was regarded as omnipotent in his own territories.

It was also with ulterior designs that such a degree of laxity was tolerated. The distant and provincial authorities, in grasping all within their reach and oppressing the people under their control, were able to amass great possessions for themselves; but they were amenable to the supreme power, which availed itself of its prerogatives to judge and condemn upon the slightest accusation, and to confiscate and appropriate the spoils, with the semblance of justice itself, as if avenging the wrongs of an injured population.

THE JANISSARIES.

A new soldiery was also instituted in opposition to the old Turkoman warriors, whose restlessness of spirit rendered them turbulent and unmanageable. It was at first composed of young prisoners of war, who were brought up in the Moslem faith, and in contradistinction to the then existing army were denominated Yeni-tcheris, or new soldiers.

From their earliest years these Christian slaves, snatched from the bosom of their families, were inured to all sorts of hardships, and to perfect resignation to the will of their superiors. They were diligently trained in the art of war, and every trace of their parents and native country being obliterated from their minds, their only aim was to promote the interest and glory of their lord and Sultan, and they were for many centuries justly distinguished for the excellence of their discipline, and for their indomitable courage.

But the many immunities which were granted them in order to increase their popularity, by time induced a degeneracy almost equal to that of the old army, and by degrees they became insolent, and respected neither the laws nor even the Sultan himself. They became, in reality, the ruling power in the country, persecuting the helpless rayahs, taking the heads of ministers at their will, and even dethroning Sultans. Nothing was sacred in their estimation. Even the royal harem was not safe from them, and neither life nor property was secure from their depredations. Their pay was small, but they had no difficulty in increasing their personal revenues; for, like the government they served, they also had their system of taxation, which, as usual, was exacted from the rayahs, and woe to him who dared to refuse. Assassination was a matter of frequent occurrence, and the assassin could find a secure asylum in their barracks, from which no power or an hostile could claim him.

With such an administrative government, and such an army, it is no wonder the empire gradually decayed, and seemed a fit prey to neighboring nations, especially to Russia, whose designs upon Turkey have rapidly accelerated its ruin.

RISE AND PROGRESS OF RUSSIA.

Until the eighteenth century Russia had but little political importance. The hordes of barbarians which over-

hope! this empire began to be dispelled when the genius of Peter the Great rose like a star in the horizon. He was determined to render himself illustrious by the aggrandisement of his nation. He first established reforms among the people, and then turned his attention to war and the extension of his territories. The neighboring nations on the southern frontier being too formidable, he naturally directed his ambition towards conquering the smaller States on the north. His first attack and defeat at Narva by the Swedes only excited him to greater energy in developing the resources of his country. Having established St. Petersburg as a commercial capital, he attracted the commerce of all parts of the world. But notwithstanding the immense loss of life and treasure which that city cost his people, Peter saw that it could not satisfy the demands of his growing empire, nor gratify his ambition for maritime power. The Baltic was not only frozen more than half the year, but its entrance was guarded by other nations. He therefore cast his eyes southerly, toward the Black Sea, the possession of which required not only the acquisition of Crimea, but of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. These were in the hands of the dreaded Turks, over whom he knew it was impossible for a long while to have any supremacy. Nevertheless, conceiving

THE POSSESSION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AS INDISPENSABLE,

he directed his energies to its attainment. Accordingly he established agents secretly to intrigue with the Christians of Turkey. On this account the Turks were forced to declare war with Russia.

The Czar excited the fanaticism of his soldiers by the idea of a religious war, giving them new standards for the occasion, bearing on one side a cross, with the inscription of the *Labarum* of the Greek Emperors of Constantinople, "*en touto nika*," and on the other the motto, "In the name of God and Christianity."

THE REVERSES OF PETER THE GREAT AND THE TREATY OF PRUTH.

The war was commenced in the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, because Peter, knowing that he had partially gained over those populations, hoped to make them the basis of future invasions into Turkey. But he was surrounded by the Turkish army on the banks of the Pruth, and placed completely in their power, so that he was obliged to sue for peace. Whether by the bribery of Catherine, the wife of the Emperor, or some other unaccountable stratagem, the Grand Vizier, Mehemed Baltagy, the commander of the Turkish army, instead of taking the Czar captive, was induced to consent to the famous treaty of Pruth, which liberated Peter and his army. Had the Grand Vizier refused peace on any terms, the Czar and his army would probably have perished, and Russia relapsed into her former insignificance, and the world would have been spared the solution of the present difficult problem. But, as Thornton has said, "The genius of the Ottoman empire slumbered when the treaty of Pruth was signed."

Undaunted by these reverses, the Czar never relinquished his designs upon Turkey, to which was now added the desire to be revenged for the ignominy he had suffered. He consequently continued to augment the military, and to worry the Turks by constant aggressions.

POLICY OF PETER.

He bequeathed his policy to his successors in a celebrated State memorandum, of which articles 11 and 15 are as follows:—

Article 11. The House of Austria must be interested in the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and in the event of the taking of Constantinople, its jealousy must be neutralized, either by exciting the other States of Europe to make war with it, or by relinquishing a share of the conquered territory, to be taken again at a later period.

Art. 12. All the Greeks in Hungary, Turkey, or Southern Poland, now divided into parties, must be rallied around Russia as a central point; Russia must be their support, and, by means of a certain ecclesiastical supremacy, must prepare the way for complete sovereignty.

How faithfully and patiently the successors of Peter the Great have endeavored to fulfil his will is recorded in all the subsequent history of Russia.

Constant aggressions were kept up in the regions about the Euxine and the borders of Turkey under some pretence or other—sometimes actuated merely by a spirit of revenge for their own disgrace at the battle of Pruth, at others as champions of the Cross.

WAR IN THE CRIMEA AND THE TREATY OF BELGRADE.

In 1734, the Russian army being numerous and well disciplined, and the artillery very effective, the government concluded that the time had arrived to put their policy into action. According to the instructions of Peter the Great, Austria was induced to join with Russia against the Turks—Austria in Servia and Bosnia, and the Russians in the Crimea. The war in the Crimea was marked by the most atrocious cruelty and the most savage spirit of devastation. No mercy was shown by the Russians to age or sex; towns and villages were fired, the inhabitants slaughtered, even when no resistance was offered to the Russian troops. Turkey wished for peace, but the terms which Russia proposed were too dishonorable to accept; indeed, Marshal Munich, who headed the army, was violently opposed to peace, and endeavored to induce the government to strike boldly for the conquest of Constantinople itself. "He proposed to effect this, not merely by Russian arms, but (in accordance with the principles of Peter) by raising the Christian subjects of the Turk against their master. He pointed out to the Court of St. Petersburg what was the true state of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, with its Mahomedan population so many times outnumbered by the millions of rayahs who had been oppressed for centuries, but who had ceased to hate their conquerors, and who were now watching with anxious joy the progress of the Russian power. He told the Czarina that all the Greeks regarded her as their legitimate sovereign, and that the strongest excitement prevailed among them. 'Now,' said he; 'now is the time to take advantage of their enthusiasm in our cause, and to march upon Constantinople while the effect which our victories have produced is fresh and vivid; such an opportunity may never again be offered.'" But the Austrians sustained heavy defeats on the upper Danube, and were glad to negotiate for peace with the mutual enemy, stipulating that Russia should also cease hostilities. The Turkish army being too powerful and elated by victory over the Austrians, Russia was obliged to close in with the treaty of Belgrade just as she was on the eve of accomplishing the dearest scheme of her ambition. By this treaty it was specially stipulated that "Russia should not, either upon the sea of Azoff or upon the Black Sea, construct or have a fleet or any other ships." This being diametrically opposed to the policy of Russia, it is not to be supposed she intended so faithfully to relinquish her designs.

ATTACK ON POLAND AND TREATY OF KAYNARDJAH.

The next aggressions of Russia were through Poland, where she had stirred animosities among the Christians by her own emissaries until a civil war was produced, and she had a pretext to step in as mediator. The Porte protested against the occupation of Poland by Russian troops without avail. On the contrary, the Russians carried their aggressions even into the Turkish territories, claiming forts which were not designated as theirs in the treaty; consequently the Turks were provoked to a declaration of war.

At this time (1768) England and other European Powers were blinded to the danger of the success of the ambitious schemes of Russia by the desire of forming a powerful alliance of the Northern Powers of Europe against France and Spain, so that no important measures were taken to restrain Russia. In this war Crimea was lost to the Turks, and hopes were entertained of also gaining the Morea, Egypt and Syria. The Russian emissaries had been so successful in the Morea that the Greeks had sent repeated assurances to the Empress Catherine of their readiness to revolt; consequently a large number of Russian vessels of war left Cronstadt for the Mediterranean, of which fact the Turks could not be convinced, since they thought there could be no communication between the Baltic and the Mediterranean; but notwithstanding the occupation of the Morea by Russian troops, and the rising of the Greeks, the Ottoman supremacy was maintained there. These difficulties were, however, brought to a termination in 1774, by the treaty of Kaynardjah, which entirely changed the relative position of the two empires, and has been the source of innumerable troubles to the European States.

The most important articles of this treaty were as follows:—

Article 3. All the Tartar peoples—those of the Crimea, &c.—shall, without any exception, be acknowledged by the two empires as free nations, and entirely independent of every foreign power, governed by their own sovereign, of the race of Ghengis Khan, elected and raised to the throne by all the Tartar peoples; * * * * * neither the Court of Russia nor the Ottoman Porte shall interfere, under any pretext whatever, with the election of the said Khan, or in the domestic, political, civil and internal affairs of the same.

Article 7. The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches; and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favor of the new church at Constantinople—of which mention will be made in article 14—as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighboring and sincerely friendly power.

[This is the clause on which Prince Menschikoff, in 1853, founded the claims of Russia to the general protection of all the inhabitants of the Turkish countries who were members of the Greek church.]

It was stipulated by a clause of article 11, * * in order to be consistent throughout, the Sublime Porte also allows the residence of consuls and vice-consuls in every place where the Court of Russia may consider it expedient to establish them, &c.

But no such clause gave Turkey the right to have consuls in Russia. She was merely allowed to carry on commerce in Russia. And by a secret article the Sublime Porte had to pay four millions of roubles for the expense of the war, &c.

POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

Yet it was a difficult matter to change the policy of England with regard to Russia, who, when pressed by the French to restrict the encroachments of Russia upon Turkey, answered, through Fox, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, that "it was too late to interfere; the annexation of the Crimea was now a *fait accompli*. Besides, England had engagements with the Empress which were inconvenient to break." But the French diplomatists of the time pronounced the progress of Russia in Turkey to be fraught with trouble without end for all the other States of Europe. Mons. De Thogut says:—

"The position of the two empires has been totally changed by the treaty of Kaynardjah; and, consequently, if it were possible to save the Porte, entirely new measures must be resorted to. By the skilful combination of the articles of this treaty, the Ottoman Empire, from this day, becomes a sort of Russian province, whence the Court of St. Petersburg may draw money, troops, &c. In fine, as for the future, Russia is even to dictate her laws; and since she has in her hands the means of forcing the Sultan to accept them, she will, perhaps, be content, for some years yet, to reign in the name of the Grand Seignieur, until she judges the moment favorable to take definitive possession."

The disastrous consequences of this treaty seem to have been fully realized by the Turks themselves; for shortly after, anticipating fresh encroachments on the part of the Russians, they prepared to put themselves on a footing to resist or at least to repel any new attempts.

Notwithstanding the stipulations of the treaty regard-

ing the Crimea, as above quoted, by which Russia bound herself solemnly to regard and treat the Crimean Tartars as an independent nation, and not to interfere in their government or civil polity, by actually producing a state of disaffection and revolt, and then stepping in as a mediator, she succeeded in 1783 in annexing the Crimea. The commission of this highhanded robbery naturally produced great indignation among the Ottomans, and recourse was had to another treaty, which suspended hostilities for a while. But Austria and Russia combined in making renewed aggressions. The policy of Russia was steadily pursued, and insurrections were the consequence. Before the war broke out in 1787 Catherine sent manifestoes to all parts of Greece, inviting the inhabitants "to take up arms and co-operate with her in expelling the enemies of Christianity from the countries they had usurped, and regaining for the Greeks their ancient liberty and independence." So well did these efforts succeed, that in 1790 a general deputation of the Greeks was sent to St. Petersburg "to implore the aid of the most magnanimous of sovereigns, and to beseech that she would give to the Greeks for a sovereign her grandson Constantine." This address was graciously received by the Empress, who promised them the assistance which they requested. They were then conducted to the apartments of her grandson, where they paid homage to the Grand Duke Constantine, and saluted him as Emperor of the Greeks.

DESIGNS OF CATHARINE II.

The fury of this war was stopped by the remonstrances of Prussia and England. The threat of an English fleet in the Baltic induced Catherine II. to postpone her project of placing her grandson Constantine on the throne of Constantinople, and the treaty of Jassy was concluded, doubtless to give breathing time for new attacks on the part of Russia. But death prevented the Empress from executing her plans, when everything seemed ripening for the consummation so ardently desired. One of the principal results of this treaty was to make Turkey grant the dominion of the Caucasian and Georgian provinces to Russia.

In 1805 the Czar, owing to the state of affairs in Europe (Russia being about to join England and Austria against Napoleon), demanded that Turkey should enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, and moreover that all the subjects of the Sultan who professed the faith of the Greek church should thenceforth be considered under the protection of the Emperor of Russia. While these demands were pressed upon them, which would have made the Sultan a mere vassal of Russia, the French persuaded the Porte, in violation of their pledge given in 1802 to Russia, to depose the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, without consulting Russia. Without any warning, the Russians invaded these Principalities, compelling the Turks to declare war, which was terminated in 1812 by the treaty of Bucharest.

This treaty restored the two Principalities to Turkey, and generally confirmed the former treaties. A temporary fear of France induced Russia to conclude this treaty, and the ambiguity of its terms was such as would afford Russia pretext for intervention on future occasion.

RUSSIA OPPOSED TO REFORM IN TURKEY.

Russia's diplomacy was next directed to counteracting the military reforms of Mahmoud, which seemed to demand prompt hostilities, lest the renovation of the Ottoman empire should frustrate her designs. On his accession to the throne Nicholas renewed the policy of supporting the Christians of the Greek church against their enemies, which had been somewhat dormant during the time of his predecessor, and the Sultan, owing to the unprepared state of the country at that crisis, was obliged to submit to the demands of Russia, which were ratified by the treaty at Akkerman, 1826. The tenor of this treaty conferred still greater privileges on the Principalities and Servia, greatly reducing the Ottoman supremacy over them.

WAR AND TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE.

The Sultan was soon again provoked to declare war, because Russia would not give up the Asiatic fortresses, according to treaty stipulations. This war was most disastrous to Turkey, on account of the unorganized condition of the army. Since the recent destruction of the Janissaries it had been composed of young men, little trained in military tactics, having the single virtue of obedience. Notwithstanding its very great reduction, the Russian army, owing to the pacific policy of its General, Diebitsch, in protecting both Christian and Moslem population along the route, was enabled to advance as far as Adrianople. There was, of course, a great panic at the capital, as it was supposed that the Russian army consisted at least of sixty thousand men. The European Ambassadors, together with the Sultan's Ministers, all urged Mahmoud to save the empire from utter destruction by negotiating on any terms. Much against his own judgment, the Sultan concluded the treaty of Adrianople, 1829. It is said that Sultan Mahmoud's firmness failed him for a time when he signed that treaty, which he had still more reason to regret when he learned that the invading army scarcely numbered thirteen thousand men. By this treaty Russia obtained the sovereignty over part of the Lower Danube, so that she could control that river. A mere nominal sovereignty was allowed to the Porte over the Principalities; the Dardanelles were to be open to Russian commerce; £5,000,000 sterling were to be paid to the Russian government for the expenses of the war, Greece was to be an independent kingdom, &c.

The unfavorable footing upon which the Turkish empire stood at the conclusion of this treaty excited the ambition of Mohammed Ali of Egypt, who, after having taken Syria and Asia Minor, seemed ready to pounce upon Constantinople itself. In this emergency the aid of England was refused to the Sultan, on the ground that she had not the means of supplying the needed assistance; but Russia was on the *qui vive* and had her ships and her soldiers ready at Sebastopol and Odessa, and when Mahmoud expressed a wish for her protection, she landed 12,000 soldiers at the foot of the Giant's mountain, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. Mahmoud was thus rid of his enemy; but before he could induce his Russian friends to go home, he had to sign, in 1833, the treaty of Hunkiar-Iskelessy, by which he was bound to an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, and, when the Czar chose to demand it, to close the Straits of the Dardanelles against the armed vessels of all other foreign Powers. Fresh disturbances broke out again in 1839, because Mohammed Ali refused to comply with the conditions imposed upon him.

DEATH OF MAHMOUD AND ACCESSION OF ABD-UL-MEDJID.

But Mahmoud, whose whole object was the regeneration of his empire, being thus baffled by constant foreign aggressions and internal dissensions, could no longer resist the anxiety and toil which were undermining his constitution; he died on the 1st of July, 1839, and was succeeded by his son, Ab-dul-Medjid, who was only seventeen years of age.

Russia was prevented taking advantage of the youth of the present Sultan, because Turkey was now sustained by the European Powers, and the Ministers of the Porte adroitly avoided any occasion for an outbreak till 1849, when, after the Hungarian war of independence, the Sultan extended his hospitality to many Magyar chiefs who had escaped into Turkey, from which country Russia and Austria demanded their extradition or expulsion. Upon the refusal of the Sultan to comply with these terms, diplomatic relations were suspended, and war seemed inevitable. But the appearance of the English fleet at the Dardanelles induced Austria and Russia to abstain from hostilities, and the matter was compromised by allowing the Hungarians to take refuge in America. Russia, thus baffled, tried to excite revolt in the provinces, the result of which was the recent affair of the Montenegrins. She also took advantage of the interposition of France in behalf of her Catholic subjects in the East; pretending that this was a claim for the whole Latin church, Russia renewed her old demand of a protectorate of the Turkish subjects belonging to the Greek church, and at the same time, according to the policy of Potemkin, that "Turkey could not be conquered without the acquiescence of England," negotiations were instituted through Sir Hamilton Seymour, the Emperor himself, during his visit to England in 1844, having already broached the subject to the Duke of Wellington. The Sultan, of course, having refused to make over thirteen millions of his subjects to Nicholas, war was declared.

From the foregoing historical sketch, it will be perceived that Russia has never swerved from the policy of Peter the Great, to dismember the Turkish empire by means of its Christian subjects, and ultimately to possess Constantinople, willing, as Catherine boasted, to find there "a capital for her empire, even if the Western Powers were to drive her from St. Petersburg."

Such, then, being the policy of Russia, it remains to be considered whether Europe can or will permit the realization of her "Oriental project."

As early as 1758 Oliver Goldsmith endeavored to display to England the rising power and ambition of Russia. He says:—

"I cannot avoid beholding the Russian empire as the natural enemy of the more western parts of Europe; as an enemy possessed of great strength, and, from the nature of the government, every day threatening to become more powerful. This extensive empire, which both in Europe and Asia occupies almost a third of the Old World, was, about two centuries ago, divided into separate kingdoms and dukedoms, and from such a division consequently weak. Since the time, however, of Johan Basilides it has increased in strength and extent, and those untrodden forests, those innumerable savage animals, which formerly covered the face of the country, are now removed, and colonies of mankind planted in their room. A kingdom thus enjoying peace internally, possessed of an unbounded extent of dominions, and learning the military art at the expense of others abroad, must every day grow more powerful; and it is probable we shall hear Russia, in future times, as formerly, called the *officina Gentium*.

"It was long the wish of Peter, their great monarch, to have a foot in some of the western parts of Europe; many of his schemes and treaties were directed to this end; but, happily for Europe, he failed in them all. A fort in the power of this people would be like the possession of a floodgate; and whenever ambition entered, or necessity prompted, they might then be able to deluge the whole Western World with a barbarous inundation. I cannot sufficiently condemn the politicians of Europe, who make this powerful people arbitrators in their quarrel. The Russians are now at that period between refinement and barbarity which seems most adapted to military achievement; and if once they happen to get footing in the western parts of Europe, it is not the feeble efforts of the sons of effeminacy and dissension that can serve to remove them. The fertile valley and soft climate will be ever sufficient inducements to draw whole myriads from their native deserts, the trackless wilds or snowy mountains. History, experience, reason, nature, expand the book of wisdom before the eyes of mankind, but they will not read."

ENGLAND AND THE BALANCE OF POWER.

After great opposition on the part of Fox and his party, Pitt and Mr. Jenkinson (afterwards Lord Liverpool) splendidly demonstrated that "the principle by which the foreign policy of this country (England) should be directed was the fundamental principle of preserving the balance of power in Europe; and that the true doctrine of the balance of power required that the Russian empire should not, if possible, be allowed to increase, nor that of Turkey to diminish."

Apart from this "balance of power," the principle of the "divine right of kings" is too obsolete in Europe to permit the domination of Russia. The technology of powers is phenomenal—"*Par la grace de Dieu*," or "*le salute du Peuple*"—would be just intolerable the moment the Czar should presume to dictate from his throne at Constantinople. Kings and Powers might negotiate in vain—the people would rise in rebellion. The peculiar geographical position of Constantinople would enable any potentate who possessed it to make it the capital of the world. Consequently it is evident that neither the interests of Europe nor the liberal spirit of the age will permit any of the Powers, especially Russia (the embodiment of absolutism), to usurp its sole possession.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

The question, then, is: what is to be done with Turkey? And this, in reality, constitutes the famous Eastern question.

The latest solution of this question, which has been so long on the tapis, is contained in a recent pamphlet entitled "La Syria et l'Alliance Russe," in which we are informed that France and Russia have arrived at "an intelligent system of policy," which is founded upon "the want of expansion" of both countries. Russia is to be bribed, by the offer of Constantinople, to assist France in the revendication of the Rhine frontier. Prussia is to receive a portion of Austria by way of compensation, and Syria is to be turned into a fief for Abd-el-Kader. If England should object, Malta, Gibraltar and the Ionian Islands are to be taken from her as securities for her good behavior, and then, the legitimate "wants of expansion being satisfied," Europe may be allowed to enjoy the blessings of peace. The pamphlet in question inform us "that two nations are especially interested in defending the Cross on those distant shores—France and Russia. What would be the probable consequence of the union of their arms, and the result for the ulterior organization of Europe? The Czars, meditating for the last 135 years over the will of Peter the Great, have not ceased to cast covetous glances on European Turkey. Must France continue to protest against the pretensions of the Czars to the decaying empire of the Sultan? We think not. If Russia lent us her co-operation for the revendication of the Rhine frontier, it appears to us that a kingdom would not be too high a price for her alliance. We know that we are not alone in having plans of aggrandizement. Now, if Russia regards Constantinople in the same way as we look upon the Rhine, can one not turn these analogous pretensions to some account, and force upon Europe the acceptance of a combination which would allot Turkey to Russia; to France the Rhine frontier, which Napoleon I. considered in 1814 as a *sine qua non* condition of his existence as a sovereign. There are only two millions of Turks in Europe, whereas there are thirteen millions of Greeks, whose spiritual head is the Czar * * * The Greek insurrection, which lasted nine years, was but the prelude of the movement which is preparing in those regions, and which the massacres in Syria may act upon as a signal to break out. The Greek Christians are only waiting for an order from their chief at St. Petersburg, or their patriarch at Constantinople, to rise against the infidels; and there are but few far-sighted politicians who do not anticipate a solution of the Eastern question in a sense favorable to Russia, and that at no distant time. It is not therefore surprising that at the call of their co-religionists, and encouraged by the predictions of Stalezanew, the Russians should be prepared to cross the Pruth at the first alarm."

RUSSIAN CRUSADE AGAINST TURKEY.

By late advices from Europe we are informed that great agitation against Turkey prevails in some parts of the Russian empire, and particularly at Moscow. The Greek clergy are preaching up a holy war, and crying out for the Russians to march at the same time as the French to avenge Christian blood. We have despatches from St. Petersburg which speak in terms of the strongest confidence that the intervention of the foreign Powers must be extended to the European provinces of Turkey. A corps of 30,000 men is at present in Bessarabia; other corps are within reach, which would raise an army on the Pruth to 75,000 or 80,000. Luders is already named as the commander. The soldiers are well disciplined, but burning to avenge Christianity and the repute of the Russian army.

It cannot be credited that the present Emperor of the French will jeopardize the interests of his empire by ceding so much to Russia, nor utterly disregard the example of Napoleon I.

PARTITION OF TURKEY.

When Napoleon I. and Alexander discussed the famous scheme by which they were to form a duumvirate of the world at any sacrifice to other friendly nations, the various plans proposed were as follows:—

"Spain was to be abandoned to the French Emperor in return for his leaving Turkey at the mercy of the Muscovite. It was formally provided by a secret article of the treaty of Tilsit that if the Porte did not comply with the private recommendations of France and Russia, her European provinces, except Roumelia and Constantinople, should be withdrawn from the vexation of Turkish government; and it was arranged between the two Emperors that the provisions in the public treaty for the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russians should be practically disregarded."

Afterwards Napoleon sought to effect a dismemberment of Turkey, in which some of her best provinces should fall to his own share. Two plans were discussed, by one of which the Turks were to be allowed to retain their Asiatic and part of their European territories; by the other, the Ottoman empire was to be annihilated. The first scheme assigned to Russia the Danubian Principalities and Bulgaria; the Balkan was to be the boundary. France was to have Albania, Greece and Candia; Bosnia and Servia were to be transferred to the Austrians, as a compensation to them for seeing the Russians established at the mouth of the Danube. According to the second project, Austria was to be bribed by receiving not only Bosnia and Servia, but Macedonia also, except the town and harbor of Solonika. France was to take (besides Albania, Greece and Candia) all the islands of the Archipelago, Cyprus, Syria and Egypt. Russia's portion was to be Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, Thrace and the Asiatic provinces nearest to the Bosphorus. The Turks, thrust back beyond Mount Taurus, might still worship Mahomet on the banks of the Euphrates.

CONSTANTINOPLE A KIND OF HANSEATIC TOWN.

This last scheme of national robbery involved the cession of Constantinople to Russia, and to this Napoleon would not consent. His Minister (M. Caulaincourt) proposed to obviate the difficulty by making Constantinople and the shores of the straits a neutral territory—a kind of Hanseatic free State, like Hamburg or Bremen. The Russian negotiator, M. de Romanoff, was tenacious as to Constantinople, the city of St. Sophia, the true metropolis of the Greek church and the natural capital of the empire of the East. Caulaincourt hinted that Constantinople might perhaps be given up by France, but only on condition of her occupying the Dardanelles and the coasts of those straits as the proper means of passage for her armies into Syria by the old route of the Crusaders. The Russian would not yield the Dardanelles, and stated that the Czar would prefer the first—the limited scheme of partition—to any arrangement that would give France the keys of the passage between the Euxine and the Mediterranean.

Seeing that Russia and France were leagued together against the integrity of Turkey, Austria persuaded England to interfere, and the treaty of the Dardanelles was concluded with Turkey in 1809.

A second discussion about the partition of Turkey took place in 1853, between the late Emperor Nicolas and Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg, when the Czar observed, "Stay, we have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man; it will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune, if, one of these days, he should slip away from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made. * * * * In a word, the Emperor went on to observe—"As I before told you, all I want is a good understanding with England, and this not as to what shall, but as to what shall not be done; this point arrived at, the English government and I, I and the English government, having entire confidence in one another's view, I care nothing about the rest." * * * The Emperor went on to say "that, in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, he thought it might be less difficult to arrive at satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed. The Principalities are, he said, in fact, an independent State under my protection; this might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of government. So again with Bulgaria. There seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent State. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say that if, in the course of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objection to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia; that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession."

NICOLAS DOES'N'T GIVE UP CONSTANTINOPLE.

But when it came to the real bone of dissension, Constantinople itself, the Emperor said, "Now I desire to speak to you as a friend and a gentleman. If England and I arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest, it matters little to me. It is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly, if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute these intentions to you, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly. I will not tolerate the occupation by the Russians. Having said this I will say that it never shall be held by the English, French or any other great nation."

On the part of Great Britain her Majesty's government renounced all intention or wish to hold Constantinople.

TURKEY NOT DIVISIBLE.

The division of Turkey being impossible, it is the desire of England and France to maintain the Ottoman empire as it is, or, diplomatically speaking, the "integrity of Turkey;" while Russia persists in her own policy of bringing about a speedy dissolution. The Emperor Nicholas observed, "Turkey has by degrees fallen into such a state of decrepitude, that anger as we all are for the prolonged existence of the man (and that I am as desirous as you can be for the continuance of his life, I beg you to believe), he may suddenly die upon our hands; we cannot resuscitate what is dead. If the Turkish empire falls, it falls to rise no more. Is it not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency then to incur the chance, confusion and the certainty of a European war, all of which must attend the catastrophy if it should occur unexpectedly and before some ulterior system has been sketched?"

NICOLAS AS OCCUPIER OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

The Emperor assured Sir H. Seymour with regard to Constantinople:—"For my part I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to establish myself there—as proprietor, that is to say; for, as occupier, I do not say. It might happen that circumstances, if no previous provision has been made—if everything should be left to chance—might place me in the position of occupying Constantinople."

But the English Cabinet naively insinuated:—"The position of the Emperor of Russia as depositary, but not proprietor, of Constantinople, would be exposed to numberless hazards, both from the long cherished ambition of his own nation and the jealousies of Europe. A great influence in the affairs of Europe seems naturally to belong to the sovereign of Constantinople, holding the gates of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea."

Nicolas I. would not be tempted into making Constantinople a free city, nor would Alexander yield the Dardanelles to France; neither could England be tempted or cajoled by Nicholas. It cannot be suspected that Napoleon III. could shut his eyes to the book of nature, reason or policy, and consent to an arrangement with Russia which would ruin his own empire and involve all Europe in war.

LOUIS NAPOLEON ON TURKEY.

Indeed, we have antecedent proofs of the Emperor Louis Napoleon's ideas on the subject, and the line of policy which his government followed since.

An article of the very greatest importance appeared in the Paris *Pays* of the 4th of May, 1853, which, after criticising with some severity the conduct of M. Thiers in 1840, proceeded thus:—"Our national pride is much flattered, no doubt, at hearing it constantly said that the Mediterranean is a French lake. Unfortunately, the treaties of 1815 have changed into a dream that expression of a great man. In consequence of these treaties the Mediterranean is not, and cannot henceforth be, other than an European and international lake. It is to maintain for it that character that Egypt ought not to be either English or French, and that Turkey cannot be Russian. Let us speak in good faith. Could we permit England, for instance, to establish herself in the Balearic Isles to intercept our route to Algeria, which is henceforth united to France by indissoluble bonds? And could England suffer that by making Egypt French we should take from her the Bay of Suez, which is to her the gate of the Indies? * * * * The independence of Greece was won and settled by Europe. It was also the whole of Europe which intervened to settle the interests at stake between Egypt and Turkey. The day that the Eastern question loses this European character the peace of the world would be disturbed for a long time. Let this be believed."

There is no reason to suppose that England would not interfere with the realization of the new project. The recent issue, entitled "La Syrie et l'Alliance Russe," coolly informs the world, that "with Russia at Constantinople, France on the Rhine, Austria diminished, and Prussia preponderating in Germany, where can any cause of disturbance or revolution be found in Europe? Would England dare to contend single handed against Russia, Prussia and France? We cannot admit such a thing. If, however, it did happen—if Great Britain should venture to commit such an imprudence, she might receive a severe lesson. Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, are a security for her keeping quiet; those are the weak points of her armor. But though she will be reduced to a sterile agitation in her island, and be compelled to be a passive spectator of what takes place on the Continent, she will barely be permitted to offer her opinion, thanks to the five or six thousand men she will send to Syria." But if such are the projects by which France is to be cajoled by Russia, it is high time to think of a remedy. The partition of Turkey is an impossibility, since it involves the possession of Constantinople; and its maintenance is a political necessity.

HOW CAN TURKEY BE DISPENSED OF.

If Turkey remains in the hands of the Turks there will be no end to the renewal of difficulties, for there is no doubt "that empire contains many elements of dissolution within itself." In order, then, to promote the regeneration of the Ottoman empire and preserve the peace of Europe, the form of the Turkish government must be entirely remodeled, so that the Christian population will be on an equality with the Mussulman. The following mode of effecting this has been suggested by a correspondent who has passed some years in Constantin