And in the meantime no one knows what the despots of Eastern Europe may do in behalf of their discomfited brother. They feel that any one of them coming to grief takes away some of the power from their order. They are no doubt correct. The fact is, the blind despots of the day forget that railways, and steam power, and telegraphs, and printing presses, and the spread of intelligence, have upset the old order of things and put every man on his mettle, whether he be king, kaiser, peer, composer or peasant. The simple difference between the plodding, commercial, manufacturing, colonizing English, and the amiable French in this, now the normal state of things in peace, the accumulation of wealth, the growth of the nation, and the expansion of its power; but France lives in a distracting state that is alternately war, depredation, revolution and backsheesh. The French nation, individually and collectively, has not earned an honest living since 1789, and every single day finds it poorer and poorer, simply because they spend more than they earn. And while the state is growing poorer, the race is deteriorating, growing smaller in stature, less intellectual, and virtually weaker numerically. For seventy years neither France nor the French have had their own. If a country goes along no better than this, how fare the fugitive kings and princes? There seems to be an uncommonly large sprinkling of them, of late years, on leave of absence. There are the Dukes of Modena, Parma; John of Bourbon, son of Don Carlos; the entire family, children and grandchildren, of the late Louis Philippe; the Dictator Santa Anna, of Mexico; ex-Royal Blackness Faustin the First, some time Emperor of San Domingo; and now there are two more about ready to join the crowd—Francis II. of Naples, and his Holiness Pius IX. The London *Daily News*, with a feeling of democracy, or rather commercial facetiousness, suggests that they had better form a grand "Anthold Association of outlawed Kings and Pretenders (limited)," and form schemes and conspiracies for their own good, against the spirit of the age and the well being of mankind. The worst of it is, they would probably find members not heretofore, too many for them. Still, there is nothing like trying. The company, if not very responsible or responsible, might have some little capital in seeing over their former power and greatness, if they were to set themselves to write books, or go to work and start a journal. They might enlighten and instruct the world with some profitable reflections, drawing a good moral from glorious opportunities neglected and privileges misused. The career of Timon of Athens, I fancy, would be a good model on which to base their meditations. I have no doubt if they would select their best man, he might have a place on the staff of the New York Herald as one of their foreign correspondents. If he would make a clean breast of it, be as like honest and frank, and do his best, very likely he could find sufficient profitable matter to write about for one or two years. At any rate I should vote to have the government stock company formed. New members would be joining the board from time to time and in time it might get to be a very respectable concern. If it went off well it might be worth while for some of your defeated candidates for the Presidency to look in on them and perhaps join their board. There need not be the slightest fear that the success of the association would be so great as to get up a monopoly, or even a dangerous competition, with the respectable "crimped" monarchies, unlimited despotisms or democratic republics that have long been prosperous commercial concerns.

The Social Science Association is now in session at Glasgow, with Lord Brougham at the head of it, as active and green as ever. So far, I believe, their discourse has been as utterly idiotic as that of Gratiano—"an infinite deal of nothing," "one grain of wheat to two bushels of chaff." Perhaps they might propose something for the relief of the exiled monarchs.

The wreck of the Lady Elgin steamer, with the death, among others, of Mr Herbert Ingram, one of our members of Parliament, has created a profound sensation here. I know of no great accident in America, among the long catalogue of your terrible disasters by steam and rail, that has ever produced more feeling in this country. Really it seems true that there should be laws, and these laws enforced, to establish a proper inspection, sufficient boats, life preservers, &c., to save life on the water when accidents do occur. In a majority of cases there is some warning when a vessel goes down, and when there are no appliances for saving the passengers they must sink. Where one of our people is lost there are fifty Americans, and yet our units make a great sensation here, from the consideration that the lives are needlessly sacrificed. Let captains and owners be held both penitentiarily responsible to the families of survivors, and as an act of manslaughter if there are not the requisite number of boats and means to preserve life. If new laws are needed, let them be passed. Really, the Americans owe it to the good opinion of the world, even if they have little sense of self preservation themselves.

While other states are unceremoniously kicking their sovereigns off of their thrones, the English public, of all classes, are gratified at the honorable reception that is given to the princes of their royal house. They are also deeply gratified at seeing the thorough good sense, good humor and ease of the world style with which both Prince Alfred and the Prince of Wales meet their kindred both in their mother's dominions and in foreign countries. Prince Alfred has just been receiving the homage of the Brazilians, at Rio Janeiro, and now is at the Cape of Good Hope, being fêted by all classes, even to the hairy Caffres, who seem profoundly conscious that they have among them an illustrious individual. The receptions to be given to the Prince—I beg pardon, to the Baron Renfrew—at Washington and at New York, are looked forward to here with an interest that you have little conception of, and far ahead of anything connected with his journey through Canada. And what more nature? There are some sixty millions of the British race, or races, throughout the world, and one green half of these live under the stripes and stars. Now, by giving a splendid national reception to the heir to the British throne, you show yourselves superior to all those prejudices and jealousies that naturally exist in a country like yours, that sprang from this one as a parent State, and was torn from her with violence, it is true, but which was, after all, but a natural result. You now stand among nations as the equal, not only of this, but of the two or three other first class Powers of the world, and in receiving the boy Prince with honors you only show a proper and becoming respect to a great State, one that has long taken the lead in the progress of science, civilization and Christianity throughout the world, a State that you are bound to by the nearest and strongest ties of blood, language, literature and extensive trade. If the journey and reception of the Prince of Wales are gratifying and honorable to all parties, it is more likely than not that the Queen herself, with some of the junior members of the royal family, will take a start some fine summer day and go across the ocean to be a guest of the President for a brief period; take a ride by Niagara and look across the St Lawrence, and find out if her Canadian subjects will flaunt Orange flags in her face, or demean themselves like people of sense. But enough of this; the Prince will be near your doors when this arrives and you will be able to meet face to face, if not to shake hands with royalty, and show the English schemers the demeanor of your merchant princes, and the lovely array of your princesses.

Our Paris Correspondence.

PARIS, Sept 28, 1860.

The Rupture Between Cavour and Garibaldi—Spread of Mazzinian Influence in Sicily—Garibaldi's Rashness—Friendly Counsels of His Friends—The Papal and Venetian Questions—The Pope Determined to Leave Rome—He Thinks the World is Large, and He is Determined to Seek a Home Elsewhere—The Imperial Conference at Warsaw, &c., &c.

I am sorry to announce that the Mazzinians have succeeded in widening the breach between Garibaldi and Cavour, and that the struggle between them has now assumed proportions that bid fair to injure the cause which both of them have at heart—Italian unity. Garibaldi is now acting in open defiance of Victor Emanuel's will, and has actually made demonstrations that prove that ere long he will be as much an enemy of the King of Sardinia as of any who may oppose him. He has reiterated his threats of attacking Rome and Venetia, although he is aware that to prevent such catastrophes Victor Emanuel will oppose him with his armed forces. What a dreadful ending for so noble a commencement. In Sicily the people clamor for annexation, although their desires is opposed by Garibaldi, who has just visited Palermo and issued decrees and appointed a new Pro-Dictator that are not to the taste of the Sicilians. At Naples he has confiscated property, disbanded soldiers and issued decrees, such as none but a settled government or king should attempt to carry out; in fact, he is now acting in direct opposition to the best interests of Italy. Even the Neapolitan journals blame his course. His letter to Bruneo has called from even his most devoted followers great censure.

The *Nazionale*, the most respectable of the Neapolitan journals, says of Garibaldi's letter to Bruneo:—

It is with profound regret that we have read the letter of the Dictator, in which he openly manifests the opinions he entertains of Count Cavour, and thus breaks up the union of Italy. The fact is too important to be passed over in silence. Its inevitable consequences are too grave for any honest Italian to refrain from expressing his opinion. * * * * If the publication of this letter has caused exultation to some friends of Garibaldi, it cannot but have caused grief to others, who love him none the less truly. And certainly the friends of France II. are not those who will grieve thereat.

Garibaldi openly states that he will not act with Cavour; he says that he alone is guilty of having sold Nice and Savoy, and he expresses for him the greatest hatred, making his dismissal from office a condition for allowing the annexation of Sicily and Naples. He is in error here, for Cavour is powerful and has the good of Italy at heart; besides, he is protected by Victor Emanuel, who is as popular in Italy as Garibaldi, if not more so. Garibaldi has no knowledge of statesmanship; that I asserted long ago, and now he is in the hands of the revolutionists, who pander to his feelings of personal ambition and wounded pride; for after all, Garibaldi no doubt well remembers that the French drove him from Rome years ago, and he would like now to return the compliment; but he were insane did he attack Rome. Napoleon III. has promised to protect the Pope, and he has sent enough troops to do it. They are able to defeat all forces that Garibaldi could bring against them. Austria looks on patiently. She now sees a chance for her to remain quiet. Garibaldi has to change his programme ere she is brought into the field. He affirms he will first attack Rome and then Venetia; so Austria can wait until her turn comes. She knows that ere it does the Dictator must have levelled great obstacles and conquered France and Sardinia, for both of these Powers are determined he shall not attack Rome. Pius IX. has promised General Goyon all sorts of future blessings for having returned to protect him, and says he will not leave Rome. It is thought here, however, that his Cardinals will induce him to do so, in which case he would go to Spain. Should such a course be adopted by the Pope, the French troops would at once leave Italy.

Garibaldi might then march into Rome "from the top of the Quirinal proclaim Victor Emanuel King of all Italy," and then attack Venetia. But in no other way can he accomplish his purpose. He has not as yet done with Francis II. Bembino is yet alive, and with twenty five or thirty thousand troops to back him. La Moricière is in Ancona, which place has been attacked both by sea and land, contrary to first intentions. At first it was intended to reduce the place by cutting off its supplies; besides, it was thought that Lamoricière had entered the city with but a few followers, and that it would yield readily. Afterwards it became known that Lamoricière had a considerable force with him when he entered the town, and that its supplies were very great. So it was decided upon that it should be attacked by sea and land; both the fleet and the besieging army began at once bombarding it. We hear that the Piedmontese have entered the outskirts of the place after a terrible struggle, and now the town must soon yield or be taken by assault.

P. S.—I have just heard that the Pope would certainly leave Rome, and that very soon. He is reported to have said to the Duke de Grammont, French Ambassador at Rome, "the world is large"—meaning thereby, as is supposed here, that he intended trying his chance in some other portion of it than Rome. His leaving that city would greatly simplify the Italian question.

The following information regarding the new Sicilian Ministry may be of interest to your readers:—

M. Mordini is a Tuscan, who in 1848 was a member of M. Guerazzi's Cabinet, in which he held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs for a short time. In 1859 as a member of the Tuscan Assembly, he voted against the annexation of that province to Piedmont—a proof that he belongs to the advanced party. He is a clever man here, and of polished manners. M. Peranni, Minister of Finance, was a clerk in the ministry; he is merely an administrator, and of no political importance. M. Parisi, Minister of the Interior, was formerly a clerk in the Interior at Modena, but being dismissed from his post, he commenced business as a travelling dealer. Crispi, on coming into office, made him one of his confidants. He now represents Crispi's principles in the ministry. MM. Tamajo and Fabrizzi, Ministers of Police and of War, were Mazzini's agents at Malta—a fact which plainly shows what they must be. M. Orlando is a Genoese, who has made money as a manufacturer, in partnership with his brother, at Genoa. Their establishment was the very hotbed of Mazzinianism, and their men nearly all belonged to Mazzini's party. Lastly, M. Ugdulena is a Canon, who was a member of Crispi's first ministry, and holds the same opinions as his chief.

The long talked of interview of royals and imperials at Warsaw is again deferred. Owing to the illness of the Emperor of Russia the meeting will not take place until after the 20th of October.

Our Paris Correspondence.

PARIS, Sept 28, 1860.

The Sagacity of Louis Napoleon—The Treaty of Villafranca an Instance—His Mysterious Policy—The Neapolitan and Papal Questions—The Relations of France with the Great Powers—The Policy of Russia and Austria—Affairs in the East, &c., &c.

The time seems approaching when the foresight which dictated the sudden cessation of hostilities with Austria will be evident. Forseeing men at the peace of Villafranca said Napoleon would effect more by the Fabian policy of simple vigilance than by the most glorious feats of arms. They said the initiation he had given was all sufficient and would prove the little leaven that should leaven the whole mass. Well, it is certain that things so far have wonderfully confirmed their prognostications. The Great Napoleon, in that celebrated Italian campaign which alone was sufficient for his immortality, was never more successful than his nephew with his legions at home and when making a peaceful progress throughout his empire. One after another, State, and duchy, and principality, and now a whole kingdom, have tumbled down like a house of cards, and Italy lies before him a type of that universal chaos out of which the Creator produced light, and order and harmony.

"Amidst all the darkness in which Napoleon loves to dwell, and difficult as it is to penetrate the mystery with which he surrounds his schemes, one fact is at least apparent, namely, that his favorite means of accomplishing his designs is assuming the character of conservator of the peace. Himself the offspring of revolution, he pretends to be the champion of order, and, like Edward the First of England, or the succulent lawyer who swallowed the oyster while he left the shells to the disputants, it is from the quarrels of others that he secures his own immediate advantage. We already begin to see symptoms of this policy in the altered tone of the French press—the semi special part of it—adopted in respect to Garibaldi, who is now termed the celebrated *condottiere*, not exactly a "brigand," but a thoroughly incapable dictator, and a very mediocre general if opposed to regular troops. The King of Naples, in fact, was not "conquered, but abandoned," and the result is that while in Sicily "there is neither army, administration nor church," this creature of Mazzini has managed matters so badly that at Naples, which he entered only with five men at his back and amidst the rejoicings of the citizens, a royalist reaction is already existing. And yet this man has the audacity to speak to Victor Emanuel as equal with equal, and to talk of attacking Austria, who for fifteen years stood at Solferino against the might and majesty of France; nay, even of assaulting France herself, whose legions are at Rome, and through whose serried ranks he must pass ere he can reach that Quirinal from which he proclaims his intention of announcing the redemption of united Italy. Well may Milan, Genoa and Turin exclaim against this image of clay, and the Powers of Europe shake their ambrosial locks indignantly; it is high time, in fact, that France should prevent any further disturbance of the peace.

Such is almost verbatim the recent language of the *Constitutionnel*, et id genus omne. With regard to the Pope himself the opinion gains ground that, notwithstanding all that is being said to dissuade him from quitting Rome by the French governmental organs, the mission of General Goyon, as I stated in my last, is to get him away. Once the Holy Father out of Rome, the French course is easy. Italy, thus abandoned, will soon require the strong hand of the great peace preserver, and then the Italian question is to gradually receive its legitimate denouement, for it is not to be supposed that Victor Emanuel, any more than the Mazzinian Garibaldi, is to have the lion's share of the spoil.

In the meanwhile everything is being done to show that Napoleon is to the best accord with his brother potentates. Yesterday General Schouvaloff and his brother, two aides-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia, were received at St. Cloud, in order that Napoleon might be presented with our magnificent horses of the renowned Orloff breed. It was entertainingly put forward that the Emperor Alexander had himself made the selection, and Napoleon, while enthusiastically admiring the beauty, strength and perfect symmetry of these remarkable animals, takes especial care to testify to the brothers Schouvaloff his sense of the perfect understanding which exists between two sovereigns like the Emperor of Russia and himself. All sorts of compliments are forthcoming, too, to Austria, who is the Emperor's powerful ally, &c., &c.

With regard to Austria, however, a very strong disposition exists in Paris to believe that many days will not elapse without her making some intimation of the role she intends to enact. Only a few days ago a hoax was practiced on the Bourse. M. Cotin, syndic of the agents de change, received a letter having the impress of official origin, stating the Austrians had crossed the Mincio. As some doubts existed, recourse was had to M. Bihault, in the absence of M. Fould, and the hoax was made apparent. But, as Napoleon said of Marmont, when speaking of his defection followed by that of so many others, "His watch only went ten minutes too fast," so I heard it pretty generally said on the Exchange with regard to the occurrence in question, "It may prove an ill or true tale at last." No one expects that Garibaldi will be put down by anything short of force. He believes implicitly in his mission, and will do it or die. Whose shall be the hold hand that shall withstand him remains to be seen. If Austria can do it she is in her right to do so, for she has always been his severe enemy; but is France or Sardinia prepared to such a step?

Letters from Constantinople seem to show that affairs are by no means over smooth with the Sultan and Sir Henry Bulwer. The pretended error of the Ambassador in going to the Sultan's brother's yacht instead of that of the Sultan is known to have been no error at all; but a significant indication on the part of the English representative that English influence might be directed against his majesty. High words had passed between Sir Henry Bulwer and Reza Pacha, the Minister of War, respecting some double dealing relating to a contract for a supply of clothing, provisions and other necessaries for the army. The worse for *pauvalapet* of ex role—this waste and those thefts—had been used respecting Reza Pacha's department, who complained to the Sultan, who, on the English Ambassador's demand for the minister's removal, was greatly indignant, and talked of Sir Henry's own removal as being the more agreeable alternative. It was after this that the pretended error of the yacht took place; in other words, that Sir Henry paid a visit to Aeig Effendi, the Sultan's brother, whom no man out of his own suite is permitted by the Sultan to approach. The last revolution was an attempt to place this brother of the sultan on the throne. So, when the visit of the English Ambassador became known, the ordinary apathy of the poor Sultan was roused beyond all bounds, and, to Sir Henry's astonishment, he poured upon him, through his dragoman, such a torrent of Billingsgate as has not been heard since the days when Napoleon I. assailed Lord Whitworth, the English Ambassador, immediately before the rupture of the peace of Amiens. Squabbles of this nature read awkwardly at a period when the French have an armed force in Syria, and are notoriously bent on supplanting the English in the East by fair means or foul.

I am sorry to say that the prospects of the vintage seem quite blighted. Both with regard to quantity and quality, the produce of this year will be the worst on record. The grapes change their color, certainly, as by a sort of instinct, and assume an aspect of maturity; but they are, nevertheless, perfectly unripe. They are large and have often a specious appearance, but the flavor of the more advanced is insipid, washy, and wanting in sweetness. Already there is a rise in Paris of twenty five per cent on last year's wines.

The disordered state of Italy seems to hold out the promise of a rich harvest to Paris in the approaching season. Formerly many families took up their residence for a short sojourn at the hotels, and then moved forwards to the milder climate of Italy. This will not, it appears, be the case this season. Spaniards, Portuguese and Italians themselves are eagerly on the lookout for apartments, and most especially Americans. These last, with their boundless purse, were in the habit of speeding onwards with an eagle's flight towards the city of the Seven Hills; but applications are now pouring in from them for apartments for six months, no matter what the price; indeed the most favorite foreigner in Paris is now always an American. He takes the most expensive apartments, pays the most generous sums for his wine, purchases most largely for home consumption in the various magazines, and, in a word, is what the *mauvais sujets* are formerly. That valuable member of the travelling public seems to have become totally extinct, and of all foreigners the Englishman is now considered the most calculating and prudent.

The Empress since her return from her progress repairs daily to the church at Rueil to pray over the remains of her deceased sister, the Duchess d'Alba.

Our Berlin Correspondence.

BERLIN, Sept 26, 1860.

Financial Embarrassments of Prussia—The Venetian Question—Renewed Endeavors to Persuade Austria to Give Up Venice—Affairs in the Austrian Provinces—The Relations of Prussia with the German States—Sale of Humboldt's Library, &c., &c.

At one of the Cabinet councils held previous to the departure of the Prince Regent for the Rhine, the subject of discussion was the proposals that are to be made by government at the next session of the Chambers. It will be recollected that last session a vote of nine and a half million thalers was demanded to meet the expenditure contingent on the reform of the military system, and that it originated by the House of Deputies, with the proviso that it should only be employed to increase the effective strength and improve the organization of the army, but without introducing the changes contemplated in the ministerial project, by which the landwehr institution was virtually abrogated, and which were disapproved of by the majority of the House. No sooner, however, had government got possession of the *res ornata* than they proceeded to carry out their scheme of reorganization to its full extent, and their arrangements are now so far completed that it will be impossible to revert to the former system without throwing the whole establishment into a chaotic state, which must be productive of the gravest consequences. In a military point of view they are right, for it is certain that the Prussian army stood in need of a thorough remodeling, in order to place it on such a footing as was demanded by the exigencies of the times; but it is no less true that they have acted in diametrical opposition to the wishes expressed by, and the pledges given to the second Chamber, and the liberal majority of that assembly—who look upon the landwehr as the popular element that serves to neutralize the aristocratic character of the army—a superstition, be it said *en passant*, that has never been borne out by facts—very naturally feel aggrieved and indignant at such conduct on the part of a ministry to whom they have always afforded a cordial and disinterested support against the machinations of the feudal party. To aggravate the difficulty in which government will find themselves at the opening of the Legislature, it appears that the expenses attending the reorganization have so greatly exceeded the estimates that something like eight millions will be required to defray them, over and above the sum granted last session; and M. Auerswald and his colleagues will therefore be under the disagreeable necessity of applying to the chambers for a second vote of money, after rendering themselves obnoxious to the charge of having misappropriated the first. Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that they are in no particular hurry to face their irritated adherents in the House of Deputies; and it has been decided, accordingly, that the meeting of the Legislature is to be postponed till the very latest period allowable by law—that is to say, till the middle of the month of January. By that time it is presumed that the troubled horizon of European politics will either have cleared up sufficiently to warrant a reduction of the military budget, or what is more probable, that affairs will have arrived at a crisis when the patriotism of the chambers will induce them to overlook the precedulos of the government in order to assist them in providing for the safety of the country. In fact there are few persons sanguine enough to imagine that the complicated questions now agitating Europe admit of a peaceful solution. At the camp of Wittstock nothing was talked of but the campaign on the Rhine, which is to take place next spring, and which the young officers especially look forward to with an impatience inspired by the hopes of promotion and the desire to escape from the monotony of garrison life; and although the public in general are far from partaking of this martial order, the conviction is slowly gaining ground that the passive attitude maintained by Prussia during the two last years has become untenable, and that if another great struggle should ensue, it will be almost impossible for her to avoid being drawn into it.

The British Cabinet are now engaged in endeavoring to persuade Austria to sacrifice herself for the peace of the world, and to relinquish Venice to the Italians "for a consideration;" but even if the Kaiser were to agree to such a compromise—of which, however, there is not the slightest chance—it would only deprive him of whatever moral influence he still possesses, and inspire the malcontents in the rest of his dominions with fresh courage. There would be outbreaks in Hungary, Croatia, Galicia and half a dozen other provinces. Trieste and Istria would feel an invincible attraction towards free and united Italy, and Prussia would be called upon, as a member of the Germanic Confederacy, to defend the integrity of its soil. Matters have come to a pass when Austria has no choice but to hold out, though with ruin staring her in the face, and whether she be victorious or defeated in the conflict, the result will be pretty much the same. If she route the Italians she will pursue them into Lombardy, and thus provoke the intervention of Louis Napoleon which in its turn will lead to that of Prussia; if vanquished by them they will hardly stop short at the imaginary line that separates them from German territory, which Prussia is bound to protect, but in the execution of which duty she is sure to become embroiled with France.

It is rather strange that two Powers, whose political antagonism is notorious, and a war between whom seems only a question of time, should be actually engaged in negotiations for a commercial treaty, which are carried on with as much apparent zeal and activity as if they were on the most friendly terms in the world, and had a long vista of peace before them. The proposals made by France to this government have been communicated to the other States included in the Zollverein, and meet with a favorable reception, accompanied, in some instances, by counter proposals referring to branches of German manufactures on which a reduction in the French scale of duties would be peculiarly desirable. A more liberal system of commercial policy would undoubtedly tend to approximate two nations, who are at present divided by mutual antipathies and grudges of long standing, and at some future period the labors of the commission which has been appointed to report on the subject may not be without practical fruit, if they point out the real disadvantages to which both France and Germany subject themselves by the heavy protective duties levied on each other's productions, but for the moment there is little prospect of their arriving at a successful termination. The useful pursuits of trade cannot flourish in an atmosphere redolent of brimstone and saltpetre.

No better success than is to be anticipated from those efforts has attended a treaty of commerce and navigation attempted to be negotiated between the Zollverein and the republic of Venezuela so late back as the year 1854. The stumbling block was a proviso that the subjects of the German states are to look to the government of the Republic of Venezuela to make good any losses occasioned by revolutions or civil commotions in that country, but which the Venezuelans would only concede in respect to such losses as proceeded from measures taken by the legal authorities. Now, as revolutions are constantly occurring in these South American republics, and the victorious party invariably decline to acknowledge the legality of the governments established by their predecessors, this arrangement was not considered satisfactory by the Prussian Minister representing the Zollverein, and the treaty was not ratified. It is stated that negotiations entered into by Venezuela with England, France and Denmark have failed for the same reason, but that the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck, have concluded a treaty at Caracoas on the basis insisted upon by the republican government. The Berlin paper from which I extract the above particulars, the *Commercial Archive*, is of opinion that the Prussian government acted prudently in not agreeing to such terms, and that the Hanseatic cities were to blame for submitting to them; but it may be supposed that the mercantile communities know their own business, and are more apt to be correct in their views than a country like Prussia, where commercial affairs are subjected to the control of bureaucratic functionaries whose ideas of trade are often of a very vague and dubious nature.

The auction of the literary and artistic remains of Alexander von Humboldt came off last week; but, owing to the want of publicity, the attendance was very slim, and there were scarcely any purchasers from England or from beyond the Atlantic. Many valuable articles were sold for a mere song, and the unique series of medals was bought in, no more being offered for them than the value of the gold. The splendid colossal bust of ice deceased by David d'Argas was knocked down to Messrs. Asher, booksellers of this city, for 2,001 thalers, the Corporation of Berlin having bid 2,000, and their agent not being authorized to go a cent beyond that sum. Humboldt's writing desk, at which he had composed the "Cosmos," and many other works, only fetched 150 thalers, and his curious collection of diplomas from all the learned societies of Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australia, about 500 thalers. The entire proceeds are estimated at under 10,000 thalers.

Our Florence Correspondence.

FLORENCE, Sept 24, 1860.

Unpopularity of European Royalty—Lamoricière's Vice—The Papacy a Critical Position—Napoleon on Italian Affairs—Military Activity in the Adriatic Provinces—The Cause of Italian Liberty Endangered—Mazzini's influence in Italy, &c., &c.

In the Ninth, Francis the Second and General Lamoricière seem to be quite out of favor, both with the divinities and with men. Both saints and subjects are deaf to their appeals, and lend no helping hand, but leave them to shift for themselves in the hour of their most pressing need. Before leaving Naples Francis II. went to the shrine of the most sacred of all the images of the Madonna, and there made a vow that if she would save him this time he would make her a present of his late mother's regal cloak. To Our Lady of Loretto Gen. Lamoricière promised to give his sword, if first she would enable him with it to win victories. To various miraculous carved and painted images of the Madonna and of saints his Holiness promised to make compensation for favors received, but up to this time not one of them has lifted a finger to render him the slightest aid. Apparently, they all have either accepted the doctrine of non-intervention, or are disposed to wink at the enemy, in consideration of the very moderate and sensible manner in which he at present conducts affairs.

Except Lamoricière, shut up in Ancona, Antonelli and the Pope, with the French garrison in the citadel of Rome, and a fringe of unimportant towns on the south side of the provinces of the church, the Papal power is no longer exercised within the limits of those ancient dominions. His Holiness, yielding to a certain pressure, and ready to imitate the example of the other princes of Italy, decides to abscond, and thus, by withdrawing the light of his sacred presence from this rebellious country, make the most solemn protest possible to the Catholic world against its heretical iniquity. His appeal to the Powers of Roman Catholic Christendom to come and help have thus far been vain. They have only sent him a handful of ragged mercenaries for his army, and these have already been flogged and sent home. The Italians only ask him to renounce entirely his temporal authority and remain in peace in his capital city, under the protection of the elected King. But if he persists in running away, so much the worse for him and all the better for them. France now clearly says, "If you will go, Holy Father, you will find it will only prove a fatal step. We besieged Rome once to bring you back, but it is barely consistent with our duty to besiege the Vatican now to keep you in it. If you go, there will no longer be any need of a French garrison in the Eternal City; and when we are gone, our places will be taken by the soldiers of Italy."

The changed tone of the French press upon the course of Italian affairs gives more and more ground for the belief that a compromise has already been arranged to be made to France for the free and easy complacency with which the increasing power of the Italian kingdom is to be viewed. Cavour has already shown himself to be a capital negotiator, and why should he not give such islets as Sardinia and Elba, of no great value to Italy, in exchange for advantages received. Savoy, which gave the name to the dynasty of his sovereign, went without compunctions, and why should not the island which gives its name to the kingdom go with as little scruple? The pretty island of Elba has associations connected with the family of the present Emperor of France. This is a very matter of fact age, and it is becoming more so every day. It was only a little while ago that these European States were laughing at, or blaming, the trading propensities of the American government and people, for buying territory of neighboring States, instead of filching it without compensation, after a "glorious war," according to the plan of England and the Continental Powers. What a vulgar idea it was to think that proud, impoverished Spain would be guilty of the nasty transaction of taking one hundred and fifty millions of dollars for the island of Cuba! But now what do we hear? Fifty millions of dollars are to be given to buy Austria out of Venetia, and the proposal is sustained by journals of the most "aristocratic" countries. The Hapsburgs are to turn tradespeople, and strive to keep up appearances a while longer by vending in the market the rich old tapestry which they have worn threadbare, or their battered golden plate.

In the liberated provinces of the Marches and Umbria, there is great activity in enrolling and organizing the new National Guard. In the city of Perugia alone they have already put in tolerable condition nearly a thousand men. Thus the people will soon be prepared to maintain the freedom which has so suddenly been won for them.

At the moment of apparently its highest triumph, the cause of Italy is perhaps exposed to its greatest perils. The breach between the North and the South seems every day to widen, rather than diminish. Garibaldi see no more and more resolved to bring Piedmont to Naples, rather than carry Naples to Piedmont. The two parties are speaking plainly to each other, and so far as that goes, there is no reason why each should not be understood. The hero of the South says to the King, dismiss Cavour and Farini—the two ablest men in his Cabinet, if not in all Italy, in diplomatic affairs—and then it will not be difficult for us to have a perfect understanding. Garibaldi is sincere and sound, his infidelity to a principle which he has once declared it is impossible for us to conceive him to be charged with. He is still entirely for annexation, but annexation according to conditions, not imposed wholly by a ministry whose policy he does not approve. In the Palace of the Quirinal he would meet his sovereign, and there annex, not Naples to Piedmont nor Piedmont to Naples, but both provinces to the new Italian kingdom. With the loss of Savoy and Nice, Sardinia forms but a fraction of the kingdom already united. What consistency is there in attempting to bind the whole to a fragment, instead of making the fragment accommodate itself to the whole.

Garibaldi is now surrounded by many of his old and staunch republican friends, and their influence upon him, if they are disposed to exercise it, must be great. It would be strange if he were not exposed to temptations, not less alluring than hazardous. Mazzini is at his side—the man who thus far has shown himself but a plausible enthusiast, although, without doubt, of the purest and highest aims. The condition of the public mind in Sicily, as well as at Naples, is represented as growing more and more unsettled every day. The delay about organizing some system of means by which the union may be effected is the cause of the increasing confusion. As fast as one or two great definite ideas lose their hold upon the public mind, new and distracting notions find a place. Italy has nothing so much to dread as the influence of factions at a moment like the present. They cannot help, while they have the power, to ruin suddenly her pure and noble cause. If anybody were inclined to doubt this, proof sufficient could be found in the example of 1848.

Garibaldi's Position.

[From the London Times September 29.]

The impending conflict of political elements is not the only point of interest in the Italian revolution. That wonderful drama enchains our attention as a military spectacle, the like of which has never in modern times been presented to the eyes of Europe. Many of the questions recently propounded respecting the best organization of armies and the most effective developments of national strength are receiving a practical solution in Garibaldi's campaign. Can irregular levies be relied upon against regular battalions? Will courage, intelligence, and self confidence be more than a match for mechanical discipline and professional appliances? Garibaldi is trying the experiment. His army resembles no other European force. It represents the perfection of individual effectiveness as distinguishes from collective power. His troops have neither the costume nor the appliances of ordinary soldiers. They are hardy, bold and enterprising, but they have few guns, no commissariat, and only a very rude and loose organization. From the Generals downwards they are dressed like navigators, and go about their work like Californian volunteers. As yet their progress has been most surprising, but it has not been equally instructive. They have been conquerors, but not by the usual methods of conquest. They have escaped the severest tests of military efficiency. They have captured kingdoms but not fortresses, and have made a triumphal exposition without winning a pitched battle. Last week, for the first time, they met with what was announced as a check, and it will be interesting to observe the circumstances under which this event occurred. To the eyes of civilians, as will appear from the letter of Mr. Edwin James, the affair on the Volturno assumed all the features of a panic; and though the authentic report which we published on Thursday does not look upon the reverse in so disastrous a light, still its details are too important to be passed without further remark.

The King of Naples retired, as will be recollected, to the maritime fortress of Gaeta, but the main body of his troops remained in position within twenty five miles of his late capital. This force, comprising, it is thought, about 14,000 men of all arms, was posted behind the Volturno, on the left or southern bank of which stands the fortified town of Capua. The Neapolitans, therefore, were not only protected by a considerable stream, but had the advantage of a steep *tête de pont* on the hostile bank, and were further assisted by excellent communications in their rear. Altogether it was a good position—not by any means impregnable, but such as, if held by good troops, and resolutely defended, would give an assailant some trouble. Garibaldi had pushed his outposts pretty close to Capua, but as he had no considerable body of men nearer than Naples the royalists took heart and began to make sorties from Capua, and to threaten some towns on the road to the capital. On receiving this intelligence Garibaldi ordered up General Eber's division on the spot, and ultimately—that is to say, on the 19th inst.—General Turr assumed the command of the whole force, and determined to make an attempt on the Neapolitan line of defence by crossing the Volturno. The history of the operations which ensued is exceedingly instructive.

The Volturno, though a stream of some magnitude when measured by the Neapolitan standard, is not such a river as would give much embarrassment to good military engineers. It is in some places only fifty and in none above one hundred yards wide; its banks are low, and of equal height on both sides. Nevertheless, the operation of crossing it in the ordinary manner was judged to be beyond the capacity of Garibaldi's troops. Science was their weak point, pontooning was out of their way, and the less they exposed themselves on level ground to the play of artillery the better they were likely to fare. Accordingly, it was decided not to force the passage of the Volturno or to assault the enemy in front, but to ascend the stream to a point where it might be crossed without opposition, and in this manner to turn the left flank of the royalist army. Another motive also is candidly alleged for this manœuvre. By throwing themselves on the point in question the Garibaldians would get into the mountains, where, as our correspondent expresses it, "their strength lay." In short, as the Neapolitans were greatly superior in artillery and cavalry, and as they might possibly stand at bay behind their chosen line of defence and show some fight at last, it was resolved to encounter them, not in regular combat, but with the weapons and manœuvres which had proved so successful before. For this purpose about 600 men were detached to the right to cross the Volturno, capture the town of Cajazzo, a few miles to the northeast of Capua, and excite insurrection and disturbance on the left flank of the Neapolitans. In the meantime, to mask this movement and to attract the attention of the enemy from the menaced point, a general demonstration was ordered along the whole river front, and the manœuvre was duly executed by three columns of the liberating army, under the eyes of Garibaldi himself. As this manœuvre had no object beyond that of creating a diversion, and as it was in this respect completely successful, the Neapolitans have little to boast of—much less, indeed, than their own reports announced, but the sequel showed that good judgment had been exercised in avoiding the more regular form of military action.

The Neapolitans did fight, and with considerable determination. Their troops were well posted, their artillery was well served, and they were, apparently, well commanded. Independently of the town of Capua itself, they had some detached posts on the southern side of the river; in particular a farm house, which they held with two companies. This position, however, was at first soon carried by one of the Garibaldian columns, and some of the troops even forded the stream and exchanged shots with the enemy on the opposite bank, though not without loss; but at other points the movement was less fortunate. One column found itself in a road so commanded by a Neapolitan battery that it became expedient even here to take to the hills, while another was lured within range of the guns of the fortress, and then suddenly attacked by artillery and cavalry. For a short time, indeed, the Neapolitans actually had the upper hand, and even recovered the farm house, which they burnt, but in the end Garibaldi remained master of the field—the southern bank of the river being cleared, and the enemy being driven once more into the woods under the glacis of the fortress.

The total loss on the side of the patriots was about 160 men.

It cannot be pretended that the Neapolitans had much advantage in this affair. They were enabled for a few moments to avail themselves of their superiority in guns and horse, and to inflict some loss on an enemy whose own courage had carried him rather too far, but they were eventually beaten even on the field, while the real object of the engagement was successfully attained elsewhere. Still, the details of the occurrence serve clearly to indicate the difficulties which regular troops and determined opposition might throw in the way of the patriots, and to confirm the apprehensions we have repeatedly expressed of the possible results of a collision between Garibaldi and the Austrians. The courage, the confidence, and even the skill of the Garibaldian levies can hardly be overpraised, but it scarcely seems credible that troops which were stopped by the Volturno should not be brought to a stand by the rivers of Northern Italy, or that brigades which instinctively "take to the mountains," even in the face of a Neapolitan division, should succeed in the plains of Venetia, against an Austrian army. True it is that Garibaldi finds his way out of difficulties with uniform success, and that, as a matter of fact, he won the day even on the banks of the Volturno; but the affair showed that the aspect of the campaign might be modified if the enemy should really begin to fight. Some, though not all, of Garibaldi's strength has obviously lain in the weakness of his adversaries, and if they should now take heart they may tax the energies of an army which, though full of intrepidity and confidence, is deficient in technical training, ill provided with artillery, and principally exercised in the arts of guerilla warfare. Perhaps he who has done so much can do more. He may call pontoon trains and parks of artillery into being, just as he has evoked battalions and brigades, and we sincerely trust that whatever is necessary for the success of the Italian cause may be eventually accomplished. It would be useless, however, to shut our eyes to the fact that an army of irregulars has weak points of its own. In rapid marches, in sudden surprises, in hand to hand combats, and in all that concerns the personal daring of soldiers it may be insurpassable, but when encountered by fortifications well manned and battalions disposed to fight it may feel the necessity of better appliances and more elaborate organization.

The Reverse at Capua.

The following is an extract of a letter from Mr. Edwin James:—

SANTA MARIA,