shall uphold the morality of nations and the faith of treaties, he is exactly that man. What is it that Wheaton, a distinguished writer on international law, says on this very question of what becomes of treaties in time of war? He says:—

> There might be treaties of such a nature that war would necessarily put an end to them; but where they contemplated a permanent arrangement of territory, or if their terms were meant to provide for the event of an intervening war, it would be against every principle of just interpretation to hold them extinguished by war.

(Hear, hear.) Dr. Phillimore, an authority whom we can all appreciate, says:—

> The general maxim that war abrogates treaties between belligerents must manifestly be subject to limitation in one case—viz., in the case of treaties which expressly provide for the contingency of the breaking out of war between the contracting parties.

(Hear, hear.) But the case before us is not one of treaty only, because, as I understand it, what was done at Paris in 1850 was not in the nature of an ordinary treaty, but was a general concurrence of the civilized nations of the earth, for the purpose of establishing a new principle, enacting a new law, which should be admitted and accepted in all future time. If you were to adopt the proposition of the honorable member for Liverpool, and agree upon it with the States of Europe and America, you would not require what we commonly term a treaty, but simply an agreement, which I undertake to say, if the Secretary for War and his government ever attempt to break it, would call down upon him and them the condemnation of every intelligent man in every country on the globe. (Cheers.) When the right honorable gentleman addressed us, I thought he was speaking on one side of the question under great disadvantages, and I could not help coming to the conclusion that if he had risen to support the proposition of the honorable member for Liverpool he would have made a speech more comprehensive, more conclusive, and much more unanswerable than the one which he delivered the other night. (Hear, hear.) One point more and I have done. I said at the outset that a great change had taken place in our circumstances and position in the period which elapsed between 1815 and 1856. The tonnage of the United Kingdom, in and out, in 1814, was 3,500,000 tons. During the last seven or eight years it has been upwards of 12,000,000 tons. Our exports, which then amounted to £40,000,000—our imports being about the same—have now arisen to £120,000,000. What was the effect upon the mercantile navy of this country of the short war of 1812–14 with the United States of America? I have looked at a book in the library, published by an American, whose name I forget, which purports to be a history of American privateering during that war. I have also seen other statements which bring me to the same conclusion, viz:—that during that short war, not extending over more than two years, the American privateers captured no fewer than 2,500 English ships. I have heard it stated on American authority that the ships so captured were sold for the enormous sum of $107,000,000, or more than £21,000,000. If such was the loss to the shipowners, the merchants and the underwriters of this country during that short war, when your tonnage was only 3,500,000, what would be your loss, supposing the old system were to prevail, if you had a war now with your tonnage 12,000,000 or 13,000,000, and with the American mercantile marine increased even more largely than your own? (Hear, hear.) The devastation which would be caused would be something enormous, and you could scarcely conceive a question on which it would be worth while to incur such a loss. I ask the noble lord; if this change which was made in 1856 cannot now be recalled, does he believe that for any long time it will be possible to resist the proposition of the honorable member for Liverpool? I hope it may be possible for one hundred years to come; because as long as there is neither war nor rumors of war, of course the calamities which he points out will not happen to the shipowners of this country. But if a strong rumor of war arises, or war itself should take place, the consequences which he describes will come about, and the noble lord or his successor will find the greatest possible pressure brought upon him to abolish that which was done at Paris in 1856—which I believe cannot be recalled—or else to do that which the honorable member from Liverpool and his constituents ask should be done now. I do not think many honorable members take into account the total revolution, both in war and commerce, which has taken place throughout the world during the last fifty years. Your industry is so great, your commerce so wide, and the force of interests so mighty—I will say so omnipotent—that it is utterly impossible the ancient theories and policy of war can be any longer maintained. Now and then I find a member apparently forgetting that war is not the one grand object or purpose of man, and that preparation for war is not the one grand design with which Parliaments are elected. (Hear, hear.) A distinguished American historian, the author of the Rise of the Dutch Republic, speaking of one of his characters—not a character that one would like to copy—Charles the Bold—says he was a man in whose eyes nothing was sacred but war and the way to make it. We profess to be the Parliament of an enlightened age—the Parliament of a Christian country—and I think that we should have other objects. (Hear, hear.) If a man looks only to the chances of war, fills his eyes and mind with them, believes that war is the normal condition of Europe and the world, he will be greatly misled with regard to all the questions which affect the industry of the country. I am of opinion that war, notwithstanding the enormous armaments which are being kept up by the nations of Europe, is constantly becoming more difficult, and any continuous war more remote. And I look forward to a time—seeing the changes that are now taking place in the political condition of Europe and in the commercial condition of all countries—when the commercial interests of those countries will assert the superiority to which they have a right over those tendencies to war which in times past, and even now sometimes, act too strongly on the minds of statesmen and of rulers. In my eyes already the victories of peace have begun. The great men of our age are not your warriors, they are not even your statesmen, but the great men of our country are your engineers, those who make the great industry of the people (hear, hear); and that great industry, before long, you may depend on it, will triumph over much that was thought great and necessary in past times. I think we are now looking from the darkness into the dawn, and that the measure which the honorable member for Liverpool offers the House is one that will recommend itself widely to all the industry, to every manufacturer, to every merchant and every shipowner in this country. I do not ask him now—in fact, if I might offer an opinion for the benefit of the object which he has in view, I would ask him not to invite the House, when the question is comparatively new to it, to come to an absolute decision. (Hear, hear.) The motion was not brought forward in any degree to embarrass or perplex the government, but to afford to Parliament a fair opportunity for free discussion. (Hear, hear.) That discussion has taken place, the subject has been handled with various ability on both sides of the House, but with great candor and fairness. Notwithstanding the declaration of the noble lord at the head of the government, I think he will see from the tone of the debate that he was rather prompt in the expression of his opinion—(hear, hear)—and I should not be at all surprised if before very long we have an unanimous Cabinet, willing, if other governments are willing—and I have the best means of knowing that they are willing—("Oh, oh!")—to carry this matter still further. Some honorable members seem to entertain apprehensions on that score. There is no doubt of the willingness of the United States; I believe there is no doubt of the willingness of Russia; I believe there is no doubt of the willingness of France. *Whenever the people of this country shall have made up their minds on this subject, and Parliament shall be disposed to enable the government to act, I believe they will find no difficulty on the part of any foreign Power.* I may be pointed at—I have been a thousand times—as a friend of peace. I would rather be a friend of peace, in the humblest rank and position in life, than a friend of war in the highest (hear, hear), and I say that, if this House shall now or at any future time accept fairly and frankly the proposition of the honorable member for Liverpool, it will confer on the people great advantages and on itself an endless renown. (Cheers.)

The SOLICITOR GENERAL—I entirely agree with the proposition of the Hon. gentleman who has just sat down, that this debate has been conducted with great fairness and candor; and the speech of the Hon. gentleman is certainly no exception to the tone of the general debate. (Hear, hear.) It has not only been conducted with fairness, but with ability; and none, I think, can disguise from themselves the very great importance of the subject under discussion, or the fact that in any point of view it is attended with very serious difficulties. My Hon. friend the member from Stamford made a very able speech, strongly in favor, as I thought, of the proposition of the Hon. member for Liverpool, but at the same time he showed his sense of the difficulties attendant on the subject when he stated that, notwithstanding all the arguments which he offered to the House, he not only was not able to bring his mind to vote in favor of the proposition, but that he did not accept the proposition himself till he had mastered the difficulties and foreseen the consequences which it involved. Now, after listening carefully to the whole of this debate, it appears to me that the arguments have been founded almost entirely on the Declaration of Paris. Two arguments are drawn from that declaration. In the first place, it is said that there are no reasons in favor of the propositions there laid down which do not equally apply in favor of the present proposition of the honorable member for Liverpool. The other argument is, that the effect of the Declaration of Paris will be to transfer a large portion of the carrying trade to neutrals, and to inflict serious injury on our shipping trade and on our mercantile interests generally. I will endeavor to present the considerations which occur to me, bearing in mind those two points, which embody the sum and substance of almost all that has been said. The first of those arguments it is not difficult to dispose of. It is easy to show that there were reasons, clear and solid, for that portion of the Declaration of Paris as giving up the right to take enemy's goods out of neutral ships, which will not in any degree whatever apply in favor of the proposition to allow enemies' goods on board enemies' ships, or enemies' ships themselves, to go free. Neutrals are in a position which, on grounds not only of common justice but of the mutual interests of belligerents, entitles them to great consideration. The annoyance and disturbance of neutrals by visiting and searching their ships, by interference with their trade, by taking violently away from their ships goods which they had legally and justifiably admitted on board. All these were acts in the highest degree injurious to persons who had the strongest claim on the consideration of nations in amity with them, though at enmity with each other, and at the same time tended in a very high degree to involve those nations in war with neutrals and to draw neutrals, however unwilling, into the contest. (Hear, hear.) Thus there were various reasons why, if it were possible to do so without sacrificing interests of too great importance, concessions ought to be made to neutrals, many of the most important nations of Europe, as well as the United States of America, having, in fact, long previously made treaties bearing on these questions. But it will be seen that these reasons do not in any way operate in favor of making the same concessions to belligerents as to neutrals. (Hear.) The other branch of the argument is much more important, and involves considerations of much greater difficulty—I mean the tendency that it is assumed there would be in time of war to transfer a great part of the carrying trade to the ships of neutrals, to the great detriment of our own merchants. In matters of this kind it must never be forgotten that governments and nations have to deal with a balance of evils and inconveniences. (Hear, hear.) You must consider not only one, but both sides of the question, and if you see that most important and detrimental consequences may follow from the change, it is necessary to submit even to very considerable and serious evils rather than to imperil the great and permanent interests of the nation. (Hear.)

We have heard from several honorable gentlemen, ably and forcibly stated, the particular evils which it is supposed will arise from the operation of the Declaration of Paris in favor of neutrals. I hope and believe these evils are greatly exaggerated, but before I state the reasons which induce me to entertain that hope the House will permit me to put before it the other side of the question, and consider what are the evils that may arise from the adoption of the principle recommended by the honorable member for Liverpool. Now, it has been said more than once in the course of this debate that it is of no use to refer to the old established law of nations, for that we have introduced a new principle by the Declaration of Paris. *But that, sir, I deny. We gave up certain belligerent rights on which we might have insisted, but we have introduced no new principle.* But this motion does ask us to give up principles hitherto of cardinal and fundamental importance in the law of nations. If there be any principle of the law of nations more cardinal than another, it is that in war governments are identified with their people—*that you cannot make war upon the government and have peace with their people—that the people are bound up with the government and the public interests of the nation for better or worse.* All the great writers on the subject have laid down that principle—they have said that the property of the individual, as part of the property of the nation, is responsible for the liabilities of the nation—as against the foreign belligerent; the nation and the individuals that compose it are one and the same and no distinction is made between the aggregate and the individuals. *Our whole system of war, all our doctrine of reprisals is built on that principle—it is on that that the right of maritime capture rests;* on that rests the disability of subjects of the two belligerents to carry on trade with each other, or to maintain actions, and to join in contracts—a principle as to which Mr. Justice Story, a great American authority, has said:—

> "No principle," says Mr. Justice Story, "of national or municipal law is better settled than that all contracts with an enemy, made during war are utterly void. This principle has grown hoary under the reverend respect of centuries, and cannot now be shaken without uprooting the very foundations of national law."

This is not an arbitrary principle. I venture to say this principle involves in itself the very highest and most momentous considerations—the interests of patriotism and the interests of peace. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I dread to think what might be the effect of admitting the principle of a political war and a commercial peace—(hear, hear)—governments at war and their subjects at peace, and carrying on their trade with each other. (Hear, hear.) If anything could sap the patriotism of a nation I think it would be such a state of things. As far as I know, the earliest writer who ably advocated the principle of the honorable member of Liverpool was the Abbe Mablay, about the middle of last century, said:—"The main difficulty to be anticipated would be that the unrestrained communications of merchants would, no doubt, offer facilities to the enemy; but it would be easy to provide against that. The police would manage all that. Merchants are the least patriotic of all the world, and will only regard their own interests." Now, sir, I hold that the merchants of England are not the least patriotic in the world. I quite agree with the honorable member from Birmingham on that point. The merchants of England have on many occasions shown their patriotism. But under what system was the patriotism of English merchants fostered and maintained? Was it under the system of political wars and commercial peace—(cheers)—or under a system that in war bound them up together with their government, which made them fellow sufferers in its reverses—partners in the common stake, and looking to its success as the source or return of their own prosperity. (Cheers.) I venture to say that the patriotism of the mercantile class would be placed in danger if in time of war their interests were separated from the general interests—if they were indemnified against the consequences of war—if they were deprived of their general interest in the maintenance of peace. What must be the effect on the interests of peace of this great principle of subjects and governments being identified in time of war? I yield to no one in my love of peace. I echo the words that fell from the honorable member for Birmingham on this subject, that, under any circumstances, he would rather be the meanest lover of peace than the most honored advocate of war. Except when necessity and self-defence impose on a nation the duty of war, I agree with the honorable gentleman that it is of all things the last to be advocated. But in the interests of peace, it is certainly necessary to be cautious how we sever the interests of the people at large from the policy of its government in the matter of war. What is the greatest check we have against unjust and unnecessary wars? Is it not the burthens they impose? And if you endeavor to introduce a system which will enable you to carry on war without those burthens, which will leave trade undisturbed and make armies march through a country, in the language of the honorable member for Salford, as a peaceful cavalcade—when enemies may come from France to England, and from England to France, pursuing their ordinary occupations during war in mutual credit, loading cargoes and selling them, and in fact carrying on all the common operations of life as if nothing had happened—can you suppose that their interest would be the same as now in preventing war or in bringing about a restoration of peace? (Hear, hear.) Even in this country—although I trust that with the influence it has on its government, unjust and unnecessary wars would, under any circumstances, receive a serious check—even in this country, I can conceive how much the interest of all classes of the people, in the maintenance and preservation of peace, would be diminished, if this system were introduced. I should be sorry to say anything disrespectful of the shipowners; and I agree with the honorable member for Birmingham that in this House, at all events, nothing has been said disrespectful of them. But if the shipowners should suffer—and I should regret if they did—by the present state of the law, they certainly would not have an increased interest in the maintenance of peace, if the system of political war and commercial peace were introduced. They would have the double advantage of high war rates, as they had during the Crimean war, and at the same time the ordinary fruits and advantages of peace. I don't believe the shipowners are an unpatriotic class, but I certainly would not throw such temptations in their way, and diminish the inducements they now have to range themselves on the side of the maintenance of peace. If such be the state of things in our own country, what would be the system in other countries where the governments are arbitrary and disposed to wars of aggression and military ambition? What is now the strongest check to such a system? It is the suffering that must thereby be entailed on their people, and the fear that they will not endure them; but if you make that burden light and easy to the people, do you not think you would be giving very great facilities to the schemes of ambition and desire of aggrandizement entertained by those Powers? The people would become less vigilant, and even the sinews of war on which princes must depend would be more easily supplied by the continuance of trade. All these considerations materially bear on the subject. And then we must remember that it is in the power of any government, on occasions admitting it to be done consistently with the public welfare, to relax the severity and strictness of the rules of war—just as was done in the instance referred to in the Russian war; and now that privateering is abolished, entirely under the control of the government, any excesses of war are more easily restrained. But then it is said that all now asked is to reduce maritime war to the same position into which the progress of civilization has brought military war. This is a total mistake. *What is now asked is that this country and other countries should enter into positive engagements to renounce the power of exercising belligerent rights against merchant ships at sea. Does anything like that exist in warfare upon land?* The observations of my right honorable friend, the Secretary for War, and the Lord Advocate, have been misunderstood. They did not say, as I understood, that the humane practice of modern times had not in a great degree mitigated the severities of war; but they said that the law of nations recognizes these rights, gives those powers, does not debar from the use of them beyond the necessity of war; yet, on the other hand, even acts from which humanity recoils may, without infraction of international law, be done if the necessities of war seem to require them. * * * * * *

For all these reasons I think it cannot be denied that the power of a maritime nation would be crippled and impaired in a most serious degree if she were deprived of the means of dealing upon the seas with the mercantile marine of other nations. (Hear.) Now I come to the point of blockade, which was so tenderly touched upon by my honorable friend the member for Stamford. The honorable member for Liverpool said that he would not interfere with the blockade, and the honorable member for Salford and another honorable member behind me said the same. It would, however, be very difficult, I do not say that it would be impossible, but it would be very difficult, on the principles upon which the proposition is based, to draw a clear and satisfactory line so as to save the right of blockade. I mean the general right of blockade—the right to blockade commercial ports. Because what is it you do by blockading commercial ports? You are obstructing trade, you are interfering with private interests, you are destroying the business of great numbers of persons who trade with those ports, and of the inhabitants of those ports, as far as concerns their intercourse with foreign nations. Is not that the very thing which you do on the seas when you make war against a mercantile marine? *Is not, in truth, the one operation—that is, maritime war carried on against a mercantile marine, a larger sort of operation of the same kind as blockade?* In the case of blockade you deal locally with the trade of the enemy, and you seek to distress and cripple him by those means. On the seas at large you deal generally with the trade of the enemy, and you seek to cripple him and reduce him there by destroying his mercantile power. But besides that, I foresee that as soon as ever you have established this principle, if it should be established, there will spring up an argument against blockades of this kind—what can be the use of blockades when your enemy's ships have nothing to do but to go to any neutral port, and when, if they put into the Scheldt or Elbe, or some port of Prussia, the railroads will carry the goods across neutral countries much easier than ships could convey them? It would be a most idle thing to blockade the ports of France, and seek to shut out trade from them, if French ships could go to the ports of friendly neutral nations and carry on their trade unmolested even with England from those ports. Every one would see that this would be absurd, and the consequence would be that the right of blockade as to commercial ports would be given up. We know, indeed, that some of the ablest advocates of this change look in the face that consequence and do not shrink from it. An able gentleman writing in the *Edinburg Review* has already advocated this result; and I think I see in a pamphlet written by a friend of mine, not a member of this House, in which the views of the honorable member for Liverpool are supported with extreme ability and great candor and fairness, unequivocal signs of a disposition eventually to draw blockades after these other maritime rights. I think, also, that the tone of the honorable member for Stamford would justify me in saying that he, at all events, feels the force of that part of the argument. There are very important considerations. I do not, of course, pretend to be a judge, as those around me are, of all the political bearings of this subject, still less of all its military and naval bearings, but this I or any other man can understand, that a more momentous question, or one involving to a greater extent the interests of the future of this country, never was discussed, never was proposed in this House—(hear)—and that, whatever aspirations after an advanced civilization and an almost universal peace any of us may have entertained in our hearts, or expressed in moments when our hearts came to our lips, it would ill become the government to shrink from telling the House, if so they think, that when they agreed to the Declaration of Paris they did not contemplate those consequences, and that unless they are better satisfied

than they are now that they can be encountered without danger and risk to the maritime supremacy of the country, they will not undertake to recommend them. (Hear, hear.) The question of the Declaration of Paris upon the carrying trade as between us and neutrals is, no doubt, extremely important. I did not understand my right honorable friend, the Lord Advocate, to go to the length which some have attributed to him. I did not understand him to say that he admitted that all the carrying trade would, as a matter of course, go into the hands of neutrals. Even in the Liverpool petition I do not find such an assertion as that. The petitioners use more guarded and more modified language. They speak only of a considerable part of the trade being likely to find its way into neutral hands. I have no doubt that to some extent that would be the case, and no doubt it would be an evil so far as it goes; but in these cases we must encounter evils. We cannot possibly expect to accomplish the objects of war without suffering from serious evils, and I am far from sure, for the reasons which I have advanced, that it would be for the true interests of peace or civilization if we could. But I think that there are many considerations which would lead us to be somewhat more doubtful, and not to expect such absolute ruin to the shipping interest as these gentlemen seem to anticipate. In the first place, if all the trade of belligerents at sea has a great tendency to rush into the hands of neutrals, it is quite manifest that the freights of neutral ships would greatly rise, and that would serve, in some measure at least, to counterbalance the great expense consequent on the war rate of insurance. Then with regard to convoy, I cannot see that because of the introduction of steam navigation convoy should not be as effectual as it was in former times. On the contrary, if privateering is abolished, I should say that that abolition would make it more easy than it previously was effectually to convoy merchant ships. We are told by the honorable member for Sunderland that, since the peace of 1815, there has been a most enormous increase of our trade, our shipping and our commerce; and this is an argument quite independent of the Declaration of Paris. The effect of what my honorable friend said was, that you could not possibly defend that increased trade if you went to war with any great Power. That, at all events, would be a consequence, not of the Declaration of Paris, but of our own prosperity and greatness; and I, for one, do not believe that because we have become greater and richer in resources, therefore we should hereafter be found less able to defend ourselves than heretofore. Sir, these prophecies of evil have many times been brought forward against this country. Nor is it a new thing to hear all that we have heard in this discussion as to the evils of this system of maritime warfare operating against us. The Abbe Mably—to whom I have already referred—argues, as we have had it argued here, that England of all countries in the world has the greatest interest in getting rid of the system of maritime warfare against merchant ships. He alludes to the war of 1798, and states that we lost thousands of merchant vessels and millions of pounds' worth of property, while France could not have lost half as much, she not presenting so great a front to such operations of warfare. He also says that when England took Spanish ships in the war of the Spanish succession she was destroying the property of her own merchants, who were interested in the trade with Spain; and that there was not a case of a French ship being taken in which the loss did not recoil on the London insurance offices. Well, but we have survived all that; the patriotism of our merchants and our people bore us through it; our prosperity remained, as I hope it will remain still. My honorable friend, the member from Stamford, asked upon what we rely. I rely, sir, on the patriotism of the nation, on the resources of the country, and on that elasticity which England has always shown in times of prosperity and adversity. (Hear, hear.) I don't believe that the spirit of our people would desert them—I don't believe that our means of defence would be found wanting. If we began with a naval superiority, I believe that we should maintain it, and I should trust to that superiority being as likely to prove sufficient to defend our merchant ships as it was in former days. (Hear, hear.) As to the declaration of Paris, I may say that we are not likely to go back from it. It can hardly have been supposed that my right honorable friend the Secretary for War meant for a moment that we should think of receding from it. My right honorable friend referred to quite a different thing. He said, what is undoubtedly true, that the effect of war as a general rule and ordinarily is to dissolve treaties between belligerent nations; and that even in the case of treaties made in the contemplation of war, which, he said, they were in honor bound to observe—and I trust that we shall always observe that which binds us in honor—still, when wars, the *ultima ratio* of States, take place, there is no further sanction which can compel them to respect these declarations and treaties. And he was, I think, quite justified in the inference which he drew from that argument—not that we should violate any of the declarations we have made, or depart from any treaty to which we have been parties, but that any engagements of that sort were of the most treacherous kind; that we, adhering to them in honor and good faith, would have no security that, when temptation came upon our adversaries, acting perhaps in combination against us, and thinking that they would be better able to meet us, they would not, upon some one or other of those thousands of excuses which the circumstances of war always present, turn round and say, "Because you have done this, or because you have done that, we hold ourselves no longer bound by that declaration or engagement, and we shall revert to the original, recognized rules of international law." (Hear, hear.) Sir, stranger things than that have been done before now. I hold in my hand one of the few treaties of this kind that have ever been made—the treaty of commerce and navigation between his Britannic Majesty and the French King signed at Versailles on the 26th of September, 1786. What is the second article of that treaty? It is this:—

> For the future security of friendship and commerce between the subjects of their said Majesties, and to the end that this good correspondence may be preserved from all interruption and disturbance, it is concluded and agreed that if at any time there should arise any misunderstanding, breach of friendship or rupture between the crowns of their Majesties, which God forbid, the subjects of each of the two parties residing in the dominions of the other shall have the privilege of remaining and continuing their trade therein without any manner of disturbance, so long as they behave peaceably and commit no offence against the laws and ordinances; and in case their conduct should render them suspected, and the respective governments should be obliged to order them to remove, the term of twelve months shall be allowed them for the purpose, in order that they may remove with their effects and property, whether intrusted to individuals or to the State.

That treaty was broken on the very first opportunity. That article was broken in the very points specially provided for. Not only were our subjects not allowed to remain and trade in France, but they were not allowed to have the twelve months' notice to remove with their property which had been stipulated for. And this was itself one of the grievances against France for which we exacted compensation when the peace was made in 1815. That is not an example that we should imitate, but a warning to us not to trust too much in such engagements which it may be convenient for other countries, when we are more powerful than they are at sea, to obtain from us, but which it may not be convenient for them to observe, if hereafter they should think that their power predominates over ours. And the House must remember that whatever may be the weight of the moral sentiment and public opinion of nations—and certainly I am not the man to undervalue either—yet plausible excuses are never wanting when such acts are to be done. (Hear.) Sir, the armed neutrality is another illustration. The Powers who were parties in that armed neutrality broke all the engagements of it in a very few years after it was made. What is the conclusion that I draw from these considerations? That the government to whom is intrusted the care of the most momentous interests of the greatest empire ever yet known on earth must, in a case in which those interests are imperilled, act with the greatest possible caution, and not be afraid of incurring those calamities which are inevitable in time of war, which we have often endured before, and which the patriotism of our people has enabled us to endure—that they should not shrink from encountering them again in any necessary war, or for the sake of avoiding them expose this country to the loss of its greatness and power. (Cheers.) Before I sit down I will mention another circumstance from which I derive encouragement in this matter. Very lately we were threatened with the danger of war—of a war with a Power not bound by the Declaration of Paris, and which would, therefore, have been at liberty to exert its undiminished rights against our commerce, while with respect to all the nations of Europe which were parties to that declaration we should have been strictly bound by its engagements. Was there, then, among the merchants of this country any flinching from that emergency? Did the people of England look that danger in the face as if they were afraid of ruin? *No, neither from Liverpool, nor Manchester, nor any other part of the kingdom did any such timid accents proceed. We were most desirous of peace, but not because we were afraid of war.* We rejoiced that peace was preserved, but it was because we were bound to those with whom we should have had to go to war by ties which were precious to us, and which we should have been most unwilling to sever. But we did not perceive, nor do I think this House perceived, from one end of the kingdom to the other, the least sign of any craven apprehension *that the moment we entered into the contest, with the declaration of Paris round our necks, our power would be gone and our mercantile marine destroyed.* I believe the merchants of this country who knew best what was the prospect before them looked it in the face with no less bravery than that which distinguished their forefathers in all former times; and I gather from that fact encouragement for the conviction that I am not wrong in placing faith now as much as heretofore, and with the Paris declaration in force as much as before it was in force, in the patriotism, the resources, and the elasticity of the country. (Cheers.)

Lord PALMERSTON—It is generally admitted that nothing can be more inconvenient than the proposal to, or the adoption by, this House of a general abstract resolution; and I think the resolution of the honorable member and the debate which has followed amply illustrate the truth of that position. The honorable member has proposed a resolution excessively vague in words, which points to no specific object, the meaning of which can only be collected from the speeches of those who have supported it in the course of the debate. If such a resolution were passed, and the government of the day were called upon to act upon it, they could only guess as to what course they would have to pursue, and that upon looking at the arguments of the gentlemen who have taken part in the debate. That would in general be a difficult matter, but I confess that in the present case it would puzzle the most sagacious government to know what course to pursue—(hear, hear)—because one-half of those who have supported the resolution, and the honorable gentleman who moved it, have for their object to exempt private property at sea from capture; but the other half concurring have another object—to reverse the Declaration of Paris. (Hear, hear.) Those are two objects totally different, indeed diametrically opposite, and between which the government, if called upon to act as they would be by the concluding passages of the resolution, would be utterly at a loss as to which of the two courses the House of Commons wished them to adopt. I think that is of itself a sufficient reason why this resolution should not be affirmed by this House. If the House has decided upon the line of policy which it wishes to impose upon the government, it ought to embody that line of policy in a resolution, with clear, precise, pointed, definite results, and leaving the government under no embarrassment as to the course which the House wishes them to pursue. Then the government would have to choose whether it thought fit to adopt the resolution or not; and then, if the government thought it was against the interests of the country,

the course any government would have to follow is so plain that it needs no explanation. I will deal, first, with the Declaration of Paris. It has been fully explained that the only new point, as far as we are concerned, in that declaration was that which declared that an enemy's property should be free from capture in a neutral bottom. The other points in the declaration were old established practice. The declaration as to blockades was only recapitulating acts well known and taken as facts. My honorable friend the member for Birmingham very ably and very fully shows that it was a wise and politic measure on the part of the government to adopt the principle that a neutral flag should cover enemy's goods. He has shown that it was the doctrine of every other maritime Power, and that if we had persisted in maintaining the opposite doctrine, and we had gone to war with any great maritime State, we should inevitably have run the risk of adding to that war a dispute with the other maritime Powers, which would have led to another armed neutrality. There is a principle upon which, as it appears to me, this doctrine must stand. We have lately maintained, at the risk of war, that a merchant ship at sea is a part of our territory; that that territory cannot be violated with impunity; that, therefore, individuals cannot be taken out of a merchantman belonging to a neutral country. The same principle may be said to apply to goods as well as men, and if it be granted, as we do grant, that a belligerent has no right to take out of a neutral ship persons who are enemies, so it follows that the neutral must always be respected, and in the case even of enemy's property on board, ought not to be violated. But the ground upon which the government assented to that declaration was, as has been well stated by the honorable member for Birmingham, that in the altered state of things and in the present relative positions of the great maritime Powers of the world, they felt that persisting to maintain a doctrine which no other nation maintained, would incur the risk of involving this country in hostilities with more than one Power if we came in contact with any one Power. The right honorable gentleman who has just sat down said that if we are involved in a war with the United States the Declaration of Paris would place us in an embarrassing difficulty, because the United States did not happen to agree to them. One of the conditions of the Declaration of Paris was that they should apply only to the States which became parties to them, *and therefore, in so far as the United States were not parties to the Declaration of Paris, they would not apply to any parties who engaged in war with the United States.* But, with regard to the second article, which said that the flag should cover the goods, *that has always been the principle which the United States has maintained, and, therefore, no difficulty arises between England and the United States upon that article.* (Hear, hear.) It requires no additional declaration to bind them to an observance of that article, because that has always been their doctrine, and the fact that it was their doctrine led us to think that it was more prudent and wise to adopt, in common with other parties, the Declaration of Paris. Therefore I have no hesitation in saying that to go back to the parties who assembled at Paris and to ask them to rescind those resolutions, is a course which no gentleman can seriously think the government is likely to adopt, or that, if adopted, the government is likely to get the other parties to agree to it. Then we come to the other subject—namely, the proposition which is made by the honorable member for Liverpool, that we should agree that private property by sea shall be exempt from capture. It is said that it is a logical deduction from the Declaration of Paris. I deny that proposition. The Declaration of Paris related entirely to the relations between belligerents and neutrals. The proposition of the honorable member relates to the relations of belligerents to each other. It is a matter totally distinct, resting on totally different grounds, and I cannot see any logical connection between them. The honorable member for Birmingham has been kind enough to attach some value to opinions which I expressed some years ago at Liverpool. The attention which he has been pleased to pay, and the weight which he has been pleased to give, to my opinion, induces me to hope that he will with me alter the opinion which was then expressed. (Laughter.) The passage quoted as having been part of what I said at Liverpool related to two matters. First of all, to the exemption of private property at sea from capture; and, secondly, to the assimilation of the principles of war at sea to the practice of war on land. *I am perfectly ready to admit that I have entirely altered my opinion on the first point.* (Hear, hear.) Further reflection and deeper thinking has satisfied me that what at first sight is plausible, and I admit that it is plausible on the surface, is a most dangerous doctrine, and I hope that the honorable member will be kind enough to give weight to my thoughts and also come round to those second thoughts, which are proverbially the best. (Cheers and laughter.) With regard to the assimilation of war by sea to the practice of war by land, I think that, as far as it was in the power of the government by arrangement with other Powers, we have accomplished it. For what is the main difference between the practice of war by sea and by land? It is said that the practice of war by land is to respect private property. Every one who holds that doctrine must forget everything which has passed within his memory, and everything which he has read. It is well known that when armies are in an enemy's country they take everything which they want, and very often destroy what they do not want, for the purpose of destruction. Not only do they destroy what they do not want and take what they do want, but they go further and levy heavy contributions upon the places which they occupy. I will relate two instances at different periods of time, which shows the continuity of the practice. In 1807, when the French army besieged Dantsic, then a Prussian town, France being at war with Prussia, after a long siege Dantsic surrendered. The French destroyed in the first place all the suburbs. They took a great many things which they wanted for their own purposes, requisites of clothing, and so forth, and then they levied on the town a contribution of 30,000,000f. Was that respecting private property? Who were to pay those 30,000,000f., except the inhabitants, and how were they to pay it, except out of their private property? That is one example of many showing that it is not the practice in war by land to respect private property. Take another instance at a much more recent period—in the year 1850 or 1851. There was a contest then in the Electorate of Hesse Cassell between different German Powers. What was the state to which they reduced that unhappy country? I will, if the House permit me, read extracts from letters addressed to me at that time by a diplomatic officer, who went to look at the country at the period and after that contest—a contest which did not last long, and between German armies, not animated by hereditary animosity or difference of race, but acting simply in the ordinary operations of war upon the theatre of hostilities. This is what he stated on the 17th of November, 1850:—

> It is deplorable to consider the inevitable consequences of this immense concentration of foreign troops in Hesse, of which your lordship no doubt is already informed, but the sufferings of the poor inhabitants is likely to exceed anything which can be imagined. Their provisions for the winter already setting in, have been consumed by the troops quartered on them. Sickness and disease are beginning to appear, and I believe, although the report is endeavored to be put down, that the cholera has appeared in several places.

That was the condition in November. In the following March he says:—

> The country (that is Hesse) continues in a deplorable condition. There is no commerce of any kind, and consequently no money. I am assured that in that part of it occupied in the beginning of the winter by the Federal and Prussian troops, everything is destroyed, and that there are some thousands of persons in a complete state of destitution. Not only were their cattle and stores all consumed, but their horses even taken, so that the ground cannot be tilled, and in the interior of the houses and cottages the furniture of all sorts was used for firewood.

This account was given to me by a person who is well inclined towards the Elector and his Government, and who added that it would require at least ten years to restore that part of the electorate to its former condition. (Hear, hear.) That is just a single specimen of the result of war by land, and then gentlemen ran away with the notion that in war by land private property is respected. Why, it is perfectly well known that it is taken whenever it is wanted, that it is destroyed frequently out of wantonness, that it is always destroyed in the necessary operations of war, and that in those cases compensation is not given by those who destroy it. By sea it is said private property is taken, but it is taken in a different manner and with more order and regularity. Private property by sea is not made prize until it is adjudicated by a competent tribunal as a legal and proper capture. By land it is taken at the moment it is wanted, and as it may be wanted. I was about to say that we have assimilated, or endeavored at least to assimilate, the practice of war by sea to the practice of war by land. What was the main difference of the two? Not that private property was not taken by land as it was by sea, but that by sea it was taken by a different set of people from those who were authorized to take it by land. By land no individual was allowed to make war unless he belonged to a regularly organized army, and was in the service of a State. If people made war on their own account on land they were taken and shot as banditti. Nothing was more common in Spain than for the French to take the peasants and shoot them without the slightest hesitation if they were not embodied as military. It is a well known fact that to carry on war by land the people must be in the service of an established authority; not so by sea. Private war on the ocean was a permitted and acknowledged practice. We agreed at last to the proposal that privateering by sea should no longer be a legitimate mode of carrying on war, and that future wars should be carried on only by regularly organized forces, acting under the authority and command of a responsible government. That part of the arrangement has so far been carried out that privateering—as regards those parties who acceded to the declaration—has been, and will be, discontinued. But these declarations do not apply to the States which did not accede to them. The United States of America have not acceded to the abolition of privateering, and, undoubtedly, if we had the misfortune, as was not unlikely a short time ago, to be engaged in a war with the United States, we *should not be bound to abstain from privateering unless the United States should also enter into a similar and corresponding engagement.* (Hear, hear.) Much criticism has been passed upon a remark of my right honorable friend the Secretary for War, that war puts an end to treaties. Undoubtedly war does put an end to treaties, and even to declarations of this sort (hear, hear), and in the event of war you would have to rest upon the honor and good feeling of the parties who had agreed to them in time of peace. We have had a recent instance to show that that principle is admitted and acted upon, *and that such declarations are not always likely to be observed by governments;* because the President of the United States, maintaining, as he did, that the capture of those two gentlemen on board the Trent was at variance with the unvariable and acknowledged principles of the United States, and allowing that it was, therefore, his duty to give them up, yet declared that *if it had been for the interest of his country—departing from his own principles and from the admitted doctrine of the United States—he should have felt it his duty not to give them up.* (Laughter.) My right honorable friend is quite right in saying that you have not that security from belligerents that in time of war they will observe the conditions laid down in peace which you have from neutrals. When you make an engagement with a neutral, if it is not kept by him you have the resource of war, but when you are at war you have shot your bolt, and you can do nothing more. It must rest on the honor of the belligerent, and with his respect for public opinion, though you have always this remedy—that you may say you will not conclude a peace with him unless you have ample redress and restoration for the injury done in the war in contravention of the principles previously established. It is said that the principles laid down at Paris would be fatal to our commerce and to the shipping interests; but the very arguments used by honorable gentlemen will

take that view negative the first part of the assertion, because they say our commerce would go on without any interruption whatever, and all that would happen would be that the channel through which it flowed would be changed, and that commerce would be carried on through the neutrals with much greater safety than in our own ships. If that be so, so far as our commerce is concerned, there is no ground for complaint. (Hear, hear.) It must be admitted that that principle would increase the inconveniences which the shipowners would feel when war broke out. But, unfortunately, it is of the nature of war that it cannot be carried on without embarrassment, suffering and loss to all parties concerned. If you make war without any suffering and any loss to any party whatever, it would become mere child's play, and it might last forever without coming to any result. (Hear.) It is said that all our commerce would immediately be carried on by neutrals, but how is that made out? I presume it may be asserted that the commerce of the world is carried on by the ships of the world, and I believe our commercial ships form a large proportion of the ships which carry on that commerce. Suppose that our ships were thrown out of employment, where will you find ships to take their place? Ships are not things which can be created on a sudden; it takes time to create a mercantile marine. I forget how many millions of tons we have in our merchant shipping, but supposing the whole of them were all at once confined to our harbors, where will you find neutral ships to take their place and to carry on the commerce which they now carry on? We are, I hope, the most powerful naval State, and we have, *I hope, a fleet which, in the event of war, would be superior to any adversary with whom we might be engaged.* (Hear, hear.) The ships of that adversary would either in a short time be confined to their ports or they would come out and suffer defeat; and when we had established our maritime supremacy at sea, then the danger to our merchant service would in such proportion be diminished. This really is only another instance of an attempt to set up the assumed interest of one class of persons against the general interests of the country. We have had a great many examples of that in years past, and in all those cases the persons who objected to a particular arrangement on the ground that they imagined that it was injurious to their interests found afterwards in the end that they were mistaken, and they have actually shared in the general good which resulted from that arrangement. When free trade in corn was established, the agricultural interest contended that they would be ruined, and great efforts were made to prevent the adoption of that measure; but the agricultural interest has since found that it prospered with the prosperity which that change produced. Our manufacturing interests also contended that by admitting foreign manufactures our manufacturers would be ruined, but instead of that our manufactures have increased in the very proportion that we have admitted foreign manufactures. This very interest—the shipping interest—is also an instance. They contended most elaborately and eloquently that the change in the Navigation laws would be their ruin, but the contrary has been the fact, and our shipping has increased ever since by reason of that change. The shipping interest now ask for the establishment of the principle contained in the resolution of the honorable member for Liverpool, because they imagine that it would relieve them of the pressure of war; but in the same way it can be shown that the remedy which they seek will, in fact, be detrimental to the general interests of the country, and that they would share in the injury which the country would sustain if that were granted to them which a short sighted view of their own interests induces them to think of importance. An island like this, with an army which is not large enough to be sent to a distance across the sea for any great operations of war, must mainly rest for redress upon its naval power being exerted in destroying the commerce and commercial ships of its antagonists, and in taking their crews prisoners. Gentlemen have argued this question as if it were simply a matter of ships and goods; but they forget that when you take an enemy's merchant ship you take not only the vessel and cargo, but also the sailors on board (hear, hear), who, if they are allowed to return safely to their own ports, are an additional source of strength to your enemy. Suppose—what I hope may be far distant—that we were at war with France. That country sends annually some 15,000 or 20,000 sailors to the different fisheries as nurseries for her war navy. Suppose we were blockading Brest, Toulon, Cherbourg, or L'Orient, if the principle of the honorable member for Liverpool were adopted, we should have to allow the fleet of 20,000 sailors to pass with impunity through our blockading squadron to man the enemy's ships lying in the port before us. (Hear, hear.) Therefore it is not simply the injury done to the enemy by the capture of his property and vessels which you have to consider; it is the injury you can do him by thus crippling his war navy, and depriving him of a certain number of men who would otherwise man that navy, and enable it to come out and give you battle. (Hear, hear.) *My opinion, therefore, distinctly is, that if you give up that power which you possess, and which all maritime States possess and have exercised—of taking the ships, the property and the crews of the nation with whom you may happen to be at war—you would be crippling the right arm of our strength.* You would be inflicting a blow upon our naval power, and you would be guilty of an act of political suicide. (Hear, hear.) If you allow the cargo to go free, you must allow the men also to go free. Suppose you were at war with France, you could not stop a merchant ship and take the men out of her while you let the vessel and cargo go. You could not say, "We will respect the cargo and respect the vessel, but you have sailors, and as the mercantile marine is that which feeds the war navy, sailors are part of the enemy's power, and, therefore, gentlemen, we cannot let you go into port—we must take possession of you, and allow the ship and cargo to get home as they best can." (Laughter.) Therefore, according to the principle of the honorable gentleman, you would be compelled to let any number of sailors pass into a harbor, to man a fleet there, that might come out to encounter yours, and offer it battle. (Hear, hear.) With this principle you would really almost reduce war to an exchange of diplomatic notes. (Hear, hear.) If you admit the principle that private property must be respected at sea, you cannot maintain a blockade. You enforce a blockade by confiscating the ships that break it; how can you do that if you assert that private property at sea is to be respected? You may say that ships shall only be taken in case they break the blockade. But what is it? That is not a question so clear that an infinite number of questions may not arise upon it. It may be alleged that a ship has not broken the blockade; it may be a question how far she was from the port, and in what degree her approach to it proved an intention of breaking the blockade. Many points of this sort would arise, exceedingly difficult to establish; and you would get into insuperable difficulties if you went the length of saying that private property is to be respected at sea, and only to be taken in the case of breaking a blockade. I repeat, if you adopt the principle of the Hon. gentleman you will cripple the main arm of your strength for all purposes of war. (Hear, hear.) We are all agreed that war is a thing to be avoided. I hope that this country will never be engaged in any unjust war. But as long as human nature is human nature; as long as mankind are ambitious, tyrannical, and oppressive, especially if they believe they may be so with impunity or without suffering for it, so long will a nation like this, whose subjects are scattered over the face of the globe, living in and engaged in commerce with every community in the world, and relying on the faith of treaties with their Governments, so long will this country be liable to causes of just quarrel from time to time with foreign nations. And the more remote the nation the more likely it is such causes of quarrel will arise. In such cases the navy is the only arm by which you can extort redress. You cannot send out military expeditions to conquer the country that has done you wrong. You can only obtain redress by means of your navy. It may be said you may bombard a city or a town. But that is not a practice that any one can recommend you to adopt. That is worse than taking private property on the sea, for you destroy the property of people who have had nothing whatever to do with the cause of quarrel between the two countries. You have no resource in cases of this sort but the power of your navy. Then, what class of persons in this country have most interest in maintaining the power of obtaining redress for an injury? The shipping and commercial interests, who have the most numerous transactions with foreign countries, and who are more likely than any others to be the objects of injury and wrong; they are the classes for whom this country is most likely to be called on to demand and obtain redress. (Hear, hear.) Under these circumstances, I should hope the honorable gentleman will be satisfied with the debate that has arisen on his motion, and with the very conflicting and contradictory support it has received from the House. (Laughter.) I think the honorable gentleman himself must be at a loss to know what is the sense his resolution is understood to bear. (Laughter.) I should hope he will be content with the mysterious vagueness in which it has been enveloped and the doubtful result of the opinions elicited in the debate that has arisen on it. (Hear.) I hope he will be satisfied with the discussion; he has made a very sensible speech, barring some of its opinions and arguments—(laughter)—a speech to which I listened with very great pleasure. I hope the honorable gentleman will be content with the discussion he has raised on the question, and withdraw his resolution. (Cheers.)

Mr. DISRAELI said whatever variety of opinion exists with regard to the motion, there cannot be two opinions as to the importance of the subject. (Hear, hear.) In my mind it is the most important subject that can engage our attention. In importance I put it far beyond the question of Parliamentary Reform, even when that question was a reality. ("Hear, hear," and laughter.) That question referred to the disposition of political power in England; the present question affects our national power throughout Europe and the world. (Hear, hear.) Now, how has this question arisen? No doubt it is raised by the Declaration of Paris in 1856. The Solicitor General says that when an apprehension of war arose, he did not see that any fear was expressed by the merchants of this country of the consequences of the changes that have been made in our maritime law; that they were ready, with inherent and hereditary courage, to meet the emergency before them. I cannot agree with the honorable and learned gentleman, except in giving credit to the merchants and shipowners for their courage. I think it is in consequence of the apprehension of war with a powerful State, that it is in consequence of that panic, this discussion has arisen. By the Declaration of Paris we have given up the cardinal principle of our maritime power. (Hear, hear.) I do not think the noble lord has been successful in imputing to the shipowners that this is a discussion got up merely about their individual interests. I am sure that this is not the case. There is a general impression that the great change made in the maritime code may be, perhaps must be, the cause of serious results to the maritime power of this country. (Hear.) It is not at all a question of the shipping interest only; it concerns the whole maritime strength of this country, if it is true that we have acknowledged the principle that the flag of a neutral covers the cargo. This must divert the commerce of the country in time of war into neutral bottoms; and that I believe will have dealt a serious blow to our maritime strength. Our maritime strength will follow the carrying trade. If the carrying trade leaves the shores of this country, the maritime population will go with it; and if we have not a preponderance of the maritime population we cannot have the preponderance of naval power. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord says we have got the ships, and as ships are not built in a day how can any other nation obtain the carrying trade? But these ships, if not used by us, will not be locked up in docks and harbors. No doubt, where the profits are good and the risk nil, the ships will find new masters. I have not heard any argu-

ment in the debate that has [illegible] at this point of the case, though it is a most important consideration. Did you take any step, by the declaration [illegible] of Paris, relinquishing a cardinal principle and impairing our maritime strength? That is the real question. It is not [illegible] interests superior to that of the shipowners that we are now discussing this subject. The noble lord has treated this question in an extraordinary manner. He first gave certain abstract reasons in favor of the change. It is very surprising that so experienced a statesman, born and bred in the school of politics that attached so much importance to this point of our maritime code, the school of Liverpool and Canning, should [illegible] only find there are abstract arguments against its existence. I must do the noble lord the justice to say that he did not dwell much on that point. He admitted that the real causes of the change have been placed more clearly before the House by the honorable member for Birmingham. It was because, on the eve of a war with Russia, we feared the assertion of the principle that a neutral flag does not cover the cargo might involve us in embarrassments with the United States. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord recognized the accuracy of that description. If that be a sufficient reason for the course taken, see how it has operated with regard to the very Power for which the sacrifice was made. As the House has been reminded, we might be at war with the United States, and the United States might at the same time, by virtue of the new principle that the flag covers the cargo, carry on the whole of their trade in neutral vessels, while they poured forth thousands of privateers to prey upon our merchant shipping. (Hear, hear.) In giving up this cardinal point, therefore, for a, to certain degree, visionary apprehension, which could not be put to a practical test, we have, without having effected our object, placed ourselves absolutely at the mercy of the United States, if, which God forbid! a war should ever take place between the two countries. That being the position of affairs, we have now before us a motion which has been described as the natural consequence of our relinquishment of this cardinal principle of our maritime policy in the Declaration of Paris. The noble lord denies that it is a natural consequence; but he forgot that he was the first great authority to announce that it was so. (Hear, hear.) Why, when the Declaration of Paris was signed and peace proclaimed, the noble lord travelled two hundred miles to a considerable city, and was the first person who called the attention of the country to the inevitable connexion between this renunciation of our old principle of maritime policy, and the policy recommended by the honorable member for Liverpool. The noble lord now says, "I have changed my opinion. I cannot deny that when peace was proclaimed I went down to Liverpool to receive the congratulations of my friends and stimulate the spirit of my party, not by a hurried, but by a well considered and mature manifesto, and that I said that the principles which were adopted at the Paris Conference might perhaps be still further extended, and that in the course of time those principles of war which were applied to hostilities by land might be extended to hostilities by sea, so that private property might no longer be the object of aggression on either side." Now, I want to know what more the honorable member for Liverpool has said? (Cheers.) These opinions, indeed, exceed anything which the honorable gentleman has recommended. The honorable gentleman has not dared to put in a resolution that which the Prime Minister of England announced in a speech. "But," says the noble lord, "I have changed my opinion." Well, a man has a perfect right to change his opinion. We do not grudge the noble lord his change of opinion on these vital subjects, but then the noble lord's opinion upon any subject can hardly be such a leading authority as it was before. ("Hear," and laughter.) Here is the noble lord, twenty years Secretary at War, fifteen years Foreign Secretary, and at the time when he made this declaration Prime Minister. For forty years he must have been meditating and manipulating kindred subjects to this. (Hear, hear.) Whether the flag should cover the cargo, every question affecting privateering, every form which a diplomatic declaration can assume must have constantly occupied the mind and meditation of the noble lord. Yet, upon the most important of these subjects the noble lord, holding a most responsible situation and making a well considered speech, which, from the manner and the time of its delivery, was more important even than a debate in this House, because it was a declaration to a nation—the noble lord comes to the same conclusion as the honorable member, and yet tells us now that he has entirely changed his opinion. Yes, the noble lord may change his opinion; but let me tell him that when he rises again, and when questions of this high importance are brought under the consideration of the House of Commons, and he warns the House that they are asked to adopt "a suicidal policy," he will not exercise that influence upon public opinion which he possessed before the hasty expressions that he has now recalled. What? "A suicidal policy!" Is that the policy recommended by the honorable member for Liverpool? Why, it is the policy which the noble lord himself completely planned and partially perpetrated. (Cheers and laughter.) I deeply regret this, because I know that there have been and may again be occasions of national difficulty when the warning voice of an experienced statesman, of the talents, popularity and authority of the noble lord would sink deep into the public mind, and would exercise a great and salutary influence upon public opinion. But, alas! that is all over. (Cheers and laughter.) However ruinous the proposition, however revolutionary the schemes, however vast the danger that may assail the State, though the noble lord may be deeply impressed with all these perils, though he may feel deeply and think deeply, and though there may be no risk of his changing his opinions, the world will remember that he went down to Liverpool to recommend a "suicidal policy," and they will cry "Wolf, wolf, wolf!" when otherwise his words might have saved the Capitol. (Cheers and laughter.) Now, what are we to do in our present position? The noble lord says we have two alternatives. I will take first the proposal made by the honorable member which the noble lord at Liverpool advocated with so much eloquence. (Laughter.) That appears to me a visionary proposition. (Hear.) I cannot myself dissociate the interests of nations and of governments. It seems to me dangerous to do so. It may make rich societies, but will surely make weak States. (Hear, hear.) I cannot believe that armies and navies can flourish when they are no longer bound up with the interests and passions of the community. If a society founded on such principles were long persisted in I see the possibility of immense corruption, and I can hardly doubt that the end would be that in some part of the world some man of force—some conqueror, with some new system of tactics or new kind of artillery—would take advantage of such a flourishing but dead community, which would then vanish with a rapidity which it is difficult now to conceive, and give place to a society established on very different principles from those which have now the ascendancy in the excellent town of Liverpool. (Cheers and laughter.) But, viewing the matter in the most practical light, I cannot see how you can maintain your system of blockades if you concede the principle which the honorable member recommends, and which the noble lord a few years back so warmly supported. (Laughter.) *If you cannot maintain your system of blockade it seems inevitable that your naval power must cease to be an aggressive power, and must only exist for defensive objects.* (Hear.) Then, what is the position of a country like England in the event of a war with a great continental power possessing great armaments if her fleets can only act on the defensive? Why we should sink into utter insignificance. (Cheers.) We should have no power to assert our authority. (Hear.) Although we might be carrying on a thriving trade, we might all this time be working only for others; and while we were sacrificing everything to the accumulation of treasure we must ultimately be the victims of some strong Power influenced by different principles from those which governed our system. (Hear.) I cannot, therefore, support the views of the honorable member and those heretofore advocated by the noble lord. These views are, as I think, most dangerous. I do not want to see the community entirely severed in sentiment from those who govern it. Patriotism depends as much on mutual suffering as on success, and it is by that experience of all fortunes and all feelings that a great national character is created. (Hear, hear.) Although I am still willing to admit the inconveniencies, the difficulties and dangers that beset our position, especially from the unfortunate loss of the cardinal principle of our maritime code at Paris, yet I rest my confidence on the patriotism of my countrymen and the good fortune of a country that I believe to be destined to remain great. (Hear, hear.) Although, therefore, I do not attempt to obtain by the first alternative that relief from the difficulty which the treaty has entailed upon us, yet I cannot agree with the noble lord in treating with the derision he has done the suggestion that the treaty of Paris is one that is never to be changed. (Hear.) The observation of the Secretary of State for War as to the consequence of war upon the treaty appears to me to be perfectly just, although it has the recommendation of having been long accepted. No one doubts that war terminates a treaty between belligerents, although this is a treaty that contemplates the action of war between belligerents. But there is one point which the right honorable gentleman entirely omitted. It is true that war terminates a treaty between belligerents, but only belligerents. (Hear, hear.) If we went to war with Russia, both Powers being parties to the declaration, the treaty of Paris is not terminated, because there are other parties to this arrangement besides Russia and England. Therefore the war would not relieve us from the declaration of the treaty of Paris, because the rights of all the other signataries to the treaty would continue to exist. They may assert their claims on us, and make those claims the foundation of a declaration of war. (Hear, hear.) The right honorable gentleman was too quick in assuming that there was a chance of getting rid of this precious bargain. (A laugh.) He has no longer to supply the funds for a war, and we remember how he supplied us with funds during the Russian war. (A laugh.) Of course the government might, as part of the programme of the year, declare war, in order to relieve us from the treaty. But there are wiser and milder means by which the country may obtain relief and the shipowner redress from the mistakes and improvidence of the statesmen who have been intrusted with this affair. I know that the noble lord will treat any suggestion with derision that proceeds from these benches. But I have an authority which ought to weigh with him, and which he ought to follow, for no one was more impressed with the mischievous and improvident character—the alarming character, of the Declaration of Paris, especially the principle that the flag covers the cargo, than the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (Cheers.) The noble lord is a practical man, and when he gives an opinion he is generally prepared with a measure to carry it into effect. (A laugh.) This highly esteemed nobleman thus expressed himself in regard to the Declaration of Paris:—"I cannot but think," he said, "that in point of principle, the declarations of the treaty of Paris ought to be altered. (Cheers.) The whole matter is most unsatisfactory, and has a most grave bearing on our national supremacy." (Cheers.) If that were the opinion only of Lord Russell, who has so long served his sovereign, who has sat so many years in her councils, and has led this House with so much ability, it would be highly valuable and ought to influence an assembly like this. But the House will remember that the nobleman who expressed this opinion is a Minister of the Crown, and who as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be intrusted with the management of this business in any negotiations that might take place. (Cheers.) I do not know what the present occupations of the Cabinet may be, or whether they are so multifarious as those of the House of Commons; but if they are not more employed than we are—(a laugh)—I would suggest to her Majesty's Ministers for their next subject of meeting the consideration of the means, to use the language of the Secretary of State, how the declarations of the Treaty of Paris may be altered. (Cheers.)

Mr. HORSFALL made a few observations in reply, and