NAPOLEON'S HISTORY OF THE WAR

The Franco-Prussian Campaign of 1870 by Bonaparte.

HIS MAJESTY'S REVIEW OF EVENTS.

Causes of the French Reverses.

HOPES OF THE FINAL RESULT.

By the European mail at this port and from the office of the *French Figaro*, in London, we are enabled to print the whole of the Emperor Napoleon's history of the campaign, literally translated from proof sheets of the *brochure* about to appear in Brussels under the title of "Campagne de 1870: des Causes qui ont amené la Capitulation de Sedan. Par un Officer attaché à l'Etat Major Général." This statement has, we are informed, been dictated by the Emperor during his retirement at Wilhelmshöhe. It reads:—

When war was declared, and the Emperor assumed the command in chief of the French armies, he frequently gave expression to the thought, reflected in his initial proclamation, that the campaign about to open would be surrounded by the greatest difficulties. In the midst of the satisfaction occasioned by the enthusiasm which everywhere greeted his footsteps many observed the look of sadness with which he listened to shouts of "Onward to Berlin!" uttered by the excited multitude—as if the enterprise were destined to be merely a military promenade, and a march forward would suffice to vanquish the nation of Europe most thoroughly exercised in the profession of arms and best prepared for war. The Emperor knew that Prussia was ready to call out in a short time 900,000 men, and, with the aid of the Southern States of Germany, could count upon 1,100,000 soldiers. France was only able to muster 600,000; and, as the number of fighting men is never more than one-half the actual effective force, Germany was in a position to bring into the field 550,000 men, while we had only about 300,000 to confront the enemy. To compensate for this numerical inferiority it was necessary for us by a rapid movement to cross the Rhine, separate Southern Germany from the North German Confederation, and by the *éclat* of a first success secure the alliance of Austria and Italy. If we were able to prevent the armies of Southern Germany from forming their junction with those of the North the effective strength of the Prussians would be reduced 200,000 men, and the disproportion between the number of combatants thus much diminished. If Austria and Italy made common cause with France then the superiority of numbers would be in our favor.

The Emperor's plan of campaign—which he confided, at Paris, to Marshals MacMahon and Lebœuf alone—was to mass 150,000 men at Metz, 100,000 at Strasbourg and 50,000 at the Camp of Chalons.

The concentration of the first two armies, one on the Sarre and the other on the Rhine, did not reveal his projects; for the enemy was left in uncertainty as to whether the attack would be made against the Rhenish provinces or upon the duchy of Baden.

As soon as the troops should have been concentrated at the points indicated it was the Emperor's purpose to immediately unite the two armies of Metz and Strasbourg, and, at the head of 250,000 men, to cross the Rhine at Maxau, leaving at his right the fortress of Rastadt and at his left that of Germersheim. Reaching the other side of the Rhine he would have forced the States of the South to observe neutrality and would then have hurried on to encounter the Prussians. While this movement was in course of execution the 50,000 men at Chalons, under the command of Marshal Canrobert, were to proceed to Metz to protect the rear of the army and to guard the northeastern frontier. At the same time our fleet cruising in the Baltic would have held stationary, in the north of Prussia, a part of the enemy's forces, obliged to defend the coasts threatened with invasion.

The sole chance of this plan succeeding was to surpass the enemy in rapidity of movement. To accomplish this it was necessary to muster in a very few days, at the points decided upon, not only the number of men required, but also the essential accessories of the projected campaign, such as wagon equipages, artillery parks pontoon train, gunboats to cover the passage of the Rhine, and, finally, the commissariat necessary to supply a large army on the march.

The Emperor flattered himself with the hope of attaining these results, and in this he was deceived; as, in fact, everybody was led astray by the supposition that, by means of the railways, men could be concentrated and horses and *matériel* brought forward with the order and precision indispensable to success, where preparation had not been made long in advance by a vigilant administration.

The delays incurred arose, in a great measure, from the defects of our military organization, as it has existed for the last fifty years, and which revealed themselves from the very beginning.

Instead of having, as is the case with Prussia, army corps always in an organized state, recruited in the province itself, and possessing on the spot their *matériel* and complete accessories, in France the troops composing an army are dispersed over the whole country, while the *matériel* is stored in different cities, in crowded magazines. [Three years ago orders were given by the Emperor to ascertain the time necessary to set up the wagons dismounted at Vernon, when it was proved that this simple operation would require six months' labor. These wagons were thereupon divided between Paris, Chalons and Satory. The concentration still remained too great and has been fraught with deplorable consequences.]

In case it is decided to form an active division upon any given point of the frontier the artillery generally comes from some distant place and the train equipage and ambulances from Paris and Verdun. Nearly all the munitions and provisions are brought from the capital; as for the soldiers of the reserve, they rejoin their regiments from all parts of France. The consequence is that the railways are insufficient for the transportation of the men, horses and *matériel;* confusion takes place everywhere, and the railway stations are often encumbered with objects of which the nature and the destination are equally ignored.

In 1860 the Emperor had resolved that the recruits of the second portion of the annual contingent should be drilled in the depots of their respective provinces, thence to be drafted, in time of war, into the regiments destined for the campaign. This plan combined the advantages of the Prussian to those of the French system. The men belonging to the reserve being simply obliged to go from their place of residence to the principal town of the department, were there assembled, speedily equipped and divided among the different regiments. Still, although rapidly completed, the regiments were not, as in Prussia, made up from the population of an entire province.

Unfortunately, this plan was modified by the War Office in 1866, and each soldier, after being mustered into the service, was immediately assigned to a regiment. The result was that in 1870, when the reserve was called out, the men belonging to it, in order to rejoin their various regiments, were, in many instances, obliged to follow a long and complicated route. Thus, for example, the men who were at Strasbourg, and whose regiments were actually stationed in Alsace, instead of at once joining the ranks at Strasbourg, were sent to their respective regimental depots, which might be in the south of France, or even in Algiers, and were thence obliged to return again to Strasbourg for incorporation. It may be easily conceived what delays in the assembling of the troops were caused by such an organization as this.

The same fact existed with respect to the camping material, the ambulance wagons and the officers' transportation. Instead of being distributed among the depots in the centre of each department of the empire, they were all stored in a limited number of military warehouses, so that many troops belonging to the reserve were forced to join their corps only imperfectly equipped, destitute of haversacks, tentes-abri, pannikins, saucepans and camp kettles, all objects of first necessity.

To these defects must be added the limited power entrusted to the generals in command of the departments and to the military commissariat. The most trifling thing required a ministerial authorization. It was, for instance, impossible to distribute to officers or men the most indispensable adjuncts—even the necessary arms—without an express order from Paris.

This administrative routine deprived the generals of the activity and foresight which may sometimes remedy defective organization.

We hasten to add, however, that, to make up an army, less account must be taken of individual intelligence than of a substantial organization, moved by simple machinery, and capable of working regularly in time of war, because it has been habituated to working regularly in time of peace.

Yet, notwithstanding all the deceptions we encountered, justice must be rendered to the functionaries at the War Office, who, at a moment of profound tranquillity, were invested with the task of setting in motion the entire military power of France. Taking into consideration the defective French administration, it was, in reality, a *tour de force* to bring into line, in so brief a period, armies incompletely formed, no previous measure for the purpose having been carried into effect.

No doubt the objection will be made that some, at least, of the faults heretofore mentioned ought to have been remedied in advance. But the difficulty of conquering inveterate habits and prejudices must not be forgotten. The Chambers, too, persistently refused the aid necessary to accomplish the most important reforms. Who does not remember the objections and protestations to which the bill providing for a new military organization gave rise? The opposition adhered to their vain theory of levies *en masse*, and the bill was everywhere badly received. On the other hand, the Emperor, confident in the armies which had achieved such glorious successes in the Crimea and in Italy, was not indisposed to believe that their irresistible rush (*élan*) would compensate for many deficiencies and render victory assured. His illusions were not of long duration.

The Army of Metz, instead of 150,000 men only mustered 100,000; that of Strasbourg only 40,000, instead of 100,000, while the corps of Marshal Canrobert had still one division at Paris and another at Soissons. His artillery, as well as his cavalry was not ready. Further, no army corps was even yet completely furnished with the equipments necessary for taking the field.

The Emperor gave precise orders to the effect that the arrival of the missing regiments should be pushed on, but he was obeyed slowly, excuses being made that it was impossible to leave Algeria, Paris and Lyons without garrisons.

Nevertheless, the hope of carrying out the original plan of the campaign was not lost. It was thought that the enemy would not be ready before us. His movements were not known, nor in what quarter his forces were being massed; and it was with a view of determining these things that, on the 2d of August, tentative steps were taken at Saarbruck. But, on the 4th, the attack upon the Douay division at Weissembourg by imposing forces, and, two days later, the glorious and fatal battle of Freischweiler, caused all uncertainty to pass away.

On the same day, the 6th of August, the army corps of General Frossard had a hand to hand struggle with a large body of the enemy upon the heights of Spiekeren, and, although the result of this engagement may not have been favorable, it may be affirmed that if the two divisions which were in a position to support General Frossard had executed more promptly the orders which they had received from Marshal Bazaine we should upon that day have carried off the victory.

However this may be, our position was critical. By the bold initiative of the German troops, who poured in simultaneously by the Sarre and by the Rhine, we were caught in the very act of formation. The corps of General de Failly had not had time to reinforce that of Marshal MacMahon, and found itself cut off from the Army of Metz; the corps of General Douay, which was slowly mustering at Belfort, found itself far distant from the theatre of military operations; and the army of Marshal Canrobert was not yet completely formed at the camp of Chalons.

Under these circumstances, profoundly depressed at witnessing all his combinations destroyed, and driven in these few days to think no longer of any but a defensive position, the Emperor resolved immediately to lead back the army to the camp of Chalons, where it might have gathered together the debris of Marshal MacMahon's army, Failly's corps and that of Douay. This plan, when communicated to Paris, was at first approved by the Council of Ministers; but, two days afterwards, a letter from M. E. Ollivier informed the Emperor that, upon mature consideration, the Council had decided that it had been too hasty in approving the retreat of the army upon Chalons, since the abandonment of Lorraine could only produce a deplorable effect on the public mind; in consequence of this he advised the Emperor to renounce his project. For the moment, therefore, the Emperor yielded to this counsel.

The effective force of the Army of Metz was brought up to 140,000 by the arrival of Marshal Canrobert with two divisions and the reserve, and it received orders for its concentration around Metz, in the hope that it might be able to fall upon one of the Prussian armies before they had effected their junction. Unfortunately, as if in this campaign all the elements of success for us were to be wanting, not only was the concentration of the army retarded by the combat at Spiekeren and by the bad weather, but its action was paralyzed by the absolute ignorance in which we always remained concerning the position and the strength of the hostile armies. So well did the Prussians conceal their movements behind the formidable shelter of cavalry which they deployed before them in all directions that, notwithstanding the most persevering inquiries, it was never really known where the mass of their troops was, nor, in consequence, where our chief efforts should be directed. On the 14th of August, as also on the 16th, no one imagined that the whole Prussian army had to be dealt with; no one doubted at Gravelotte that Verdun could easily be reached on the morrow. At Paris they were no better informed than we.

These melancholy openings of the campaign must, naturally enough, have affected public opinion in a painful manner. The Emperor felt that he was held responsible for the wretched situation of the army, while that army was charging Marshal Lebœuf with the delays and with the insufficiency of the organization. He decided, therefore, to give the command to Marshal Bazaine, whose ability was recognized on all sides, and to suppress the functions of the post of Major General.

While these events were taking place several generals implored the Emperor to leave the army, pointing out that it might happen that communication with Paris would be cut off, and that then, locked up in Metz and separated from the rest of France, the head of the State would be incapacitated for conducting the affairs of the country or of giving them proper direction, and that revolutionary agitations might arise from this situation.

These considerations had an indisputable weight which did not escape the Emperor, who, however, did not wish to leave the army until it had recrossed the Moselle on to the left bank.

This movement, of which Marshal Bazaine fully appreciated the importance, the Emperor hurried on as much as possible; but the bad weather and the encumbrance of baggage delayed its prompt execution.

Arrived at Gravelotte the Emperor, not foreseeing a general battle, and only looking for partial engagements, which might retard the march of the army, decided to precede it to Chalons. He left on the morning of the 16th of August, and passed by Conflans and Etain without meeting a single enemy on his route.

But the uninterrupted succession of disasters had produced in Paris a strong impression, and the Ministers, uneasy at this state of affairs, had thought that up to a certain point they could free themselves from the constitutional authority belonging to the Emperor only, since he had simply given to the Empress regent restricted powers. They therefore convoked the Chambers, without even a reference to the Emperor; and from the time of their assembly it was, as it always is in public calamities, the opposition which saw its influence increase, which paralyzed the patriotism of the majority and the progress of the government.

From this period Ministers appeared afraid to pronounce the name of the Emperor; and he, who had quitted the army, and had only relinquished the command in order to resume the reins of government, soon discovered that it would be impossible for him to play out the part which belonged to him.

As soon as he reached the camp of Chalons the Emperor found there the Duke of Magenta and General Trochu; the latter had been nominated by the Minister of War commander of the troops at the camp. These two general officers were summoned by the Emperor to a council, at which there were present Prince Napoleon, General Schmitz, General Trochu's chief staff officer, and General Berthaut, the commander of the National Garde Mobile. It was decided that the Emperor should nominate General Trochu to the command of the army in Paris: that the troops collected at Chalons should be directed towards the capital under the orders of General MacMahon; that the National Garde Mobile should go to the camp of St. Maur, at Vincennes, and that the Emperor should go to Paris, where his duties called him.

When this decision was learned by the government it excited an animated opposition. Several objections were put forward. "Paris," it was said, "is in a perfect state of defence; its garrison is numerous. The army of Chalons ought to be employed in breaking the blockade of Metz; the National Garde Mobile would be a danger to the tranquillity of the capital; the character of General Trochu inspires no confidence; in fact, the return of the Emperor to Paris would be very ill-interpreted by public opinion."

Nevertheless, it was decided to carry out the orders of the Emperor, while the propriety of succoring Bazaine was still insisted upon. But the Duke of Magenta informed the Minister of War that the march towards Metz would be one of the greatest imprudence, and pointed out all the dangers of such an operation.

Practically, at this period, the Prussian armies occupied the two sides of a triangle, of which we had to traverse the third side. Prince Frederick Charles was blockading Metz with 210,000 men. The Crown Prince of Saxony, with 100,000 men, held the country between the Belgian frontier and Verdun, and joined on his right the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, who, at the head of 150,000 men, had established his headquarters at Bar-le-Duc.

The Marshal, therefore, declared that he was not willing to expose troops, still imperfectly organized, in making an extremely perilous flank march in the face of an enemy very superior in point of numbers; and he announced that he was going to make his way towards Rheims, from whence he could proceed either to Soissons or to Paris. "It is only," said he, "under the walls of the capital that my army, when rested and reconstituted, will be able to offer the enemy any serious resistance." In consequence of this, the army was led toward Rheims, on the 21st, and took up its position behind that city. But the language of reason was not understood in Paris; it was wished, at all hazards, to give public opinion the empty hope that Marshal Bazaine could still be succored, and the Duke of Magenta received from the Council of Ministers, to which had been joined the Privy Council and the Presidents of the two Chambers, a most pressing injunction to march towards Metz.

Marshal MacMahon, a man, above all things, of duty, obeyed, and resolved to run the chance which was placed before him. Anything which resembled a sacrifice for the public good recommended itself to his noble soul, and he was flattered by the idea that, by attracting towards himself all the forces of the enemy, he was for the moment delivering the capital and giving it time to finish its means of defence. As to the Emperor, he made no opposition. It could not enter into his views to oppose the advice of the government and of the Empress Regent, who had shown so much intelligence and energy in the midst of the greatest difficulties, although he perceived that his own influence was being completely nullified, since he was acting neither as head of the government nor as head of the army. He decided to follow in person the movements of the army, fully sensible, however, that if he met with success all the merit would in justice be ascribed to the Commander-in-Chief; and that, in case of a reverse, its responsibility would fall upon the head of the State. It will not be unprofitable here to consider of what elements the Army of Chalons was composed. The First corps, formed principally out of regiments from Africa, had given proofs at Freischweiler of a heroic bravery which only the crushing numerical superiority of the enemy had been able to conquer. Vividly impressed by the defeat and by the tremendous effects of the Prussian artillery, these troops came away from the field of battle with dissatisfied and mutinous feelings, which the retreat upon Chalons, long and incessant marches, and physical privations, had still further aggravated. Marshal MacMahon did not shut his eyes to this fact, and considered that, before leading them again under fire, it would have been wise to give them repose and time enough to strengthen themselves after their defeat. These were the oldest of our veterans. Covered with the renown which rightfully belongs to the soldiers of Africa, they had amply justified it. The spectacle of their discouragement, seen by the rest of the army, was, therefore, doubly to be feared.

The Fifth corps was already specially feeling its effect. Exhausted, like the other, by forced marches, which had taken it from Bitche across the Vosges, by Neufchateau and Haute Marne to the camp at Chalons, having lost without a fight a portion of its equipments and almost all its baggage, the Fifth corps had an appearance of indifference and disorganization of a nature to inspire the most lively anxiety.

The Seventh corps, whose tardy organization was scarcely finished, had certainly not encountered the same trials as the two foregoing ones; but, in consequence of the long march from the rear, which had brought it from Belfort, through Paris, to the camp of Chalons, it did not show such solidity as might have been desired.

As to the Twelfth corps, of very recent formation, it comprised elements of different degrees of value. The First division was composed of new regiments, upon which we had reason to depend; the Second, of four marching regiments, formed out of four battalions, with incomplete staff, and of soldiers who had never fired a gun; and, lastly, the Third division was composed out of four regiments of marines, who bore themselves bravely at Sedan, but who, little accustomed to long marches, dotted the roads with stragglers.

Such were the troops upon whom was to be imposed a most difficult and most dangerous campaign.

The army, therefore, retraced its steps and left Rheims on the 23d; but scarcely had it made a march towards establishing itself on the Suippe, at Bethniville, when commissariat difficulties obliged Marshal MacMahon to re-approach the line of the railway. He made a movement on his left and reached Rethel on the 24th, in order to obtain for his troops several days' subsistence. This distribution occupied the whole of the day of the 25th. From Rethel the headquarters were transported to Tourteron.

Since the commencement of the war the Prince Imperial, despite his youth, had always accompanied his father, and, amid all the incidents of the campaign, had shared its fatigues. But, in view of the exceptional dangers which threatened us, the Marshal insisted, with the Emperor, that the Prince Imperial should be removed from the theatre of war. He therefore set out, to his father's great regret, for Mézières, and thence entered Belgium, where he learned the news of the capitulation of Sedan.

On the 27th the army arrived at La Chêne-Populeux. At this place the army of the Prince of Saxony had effected its junction with that of the Prince Royal of Prussia, and their vanguards had already come to blows with the corps of Generals De Failly and Douay. The Marshal, observing that the enemy were gaining upon him, resolved, in order to save the sole army which France had at her disposition, to turn back in a westerly direction. He immediately gave orders to this effect; but during the night he received by telegraph formal injunctions to continue his march toward Metz; unquestionably, the Emperor could have countermanded this order, but he was resolved not to oppose the decision of the Regency, and had resigned himself to submit to the consequences of the fatality which attached itself to all the resolutions of the government. As for the Duke of Magenta, he again bowed to the decision made known from Paris, and once more turned toward Metz.

These orders and counter-orders occasioned delays in the movements. Headquarters reached Stenne on the 28th. Unfortunately, the different *corps d'armée*, separated from each other, were unable to group themselves around this position, and those of De Failly and Douay were attacked separately.

The intention of the Marshal was to reach Stenay, and from thence Montmédy. But the enemy was already in strength in the first of these two towns. The Prussian army had made forced marches, while we, encumbered with baggage, had occupied six days with fatigued troops in marching twenty-five leagues. We were therefore obliged to establish headquarters at Raucourt, in order to pass the Meuse at Mouzon.

While, on the morning of August 30, a portion of the army effected this movement, already executed on the previous evening by General Lebrun, the corps of De Failly and Douay, still on the left bank of the Meuse, became engaged near Beaumont with the vanguard of the main body of the Prussian army. De Failly's corps, sharply pushed by the attacking troops, fought well for several hours, but it was finally thrown back in disorder towards Mouzon. The brigade sent to support it was involved in the retreat. As for General Douay arriving at Remilly, he was obliged to cross the narrow passage of the Meuse, which offered the greatest difficulties. Confusion took place also among his troops. Finally, the corps of Ducrot reached Carignan after a long and painful march.

For the third time Marshal MacMahon was compelled to abandon the project of going to the succor of Marshal Bazaine; and during the night of the 30th, the events of the day having shown him the impossibility of reaching Montmedy, he gave the order to withdraw upon Sedan. This city, classed as a fortress, is commanded on all sides and incapable of resisting the power of new artillery. It was, moreover, imperfectly armed and badly provisioned, possessed no exterior works and offered no shelter to an army in retreat. In fact, it had no importance, except that it is joined to Mézières and Paris by the railway, which, passing by Hirson, was the means of reprovisioning the army.

The troops, weakened by continuous marches, affected by successive checks, fell back without much order towards Sedan, where they arrived, harassed and exhausted, on the night of the 30th and the morning of the 31st.

The Emperor, who, on the evening of the 30th was at Carignan, with the corps of General Ducrot, where headquarters was established, received the same evening the news of the movement of retreat, and the advice from Marshal MacMahon to take the railway to Sedan. Nothing could have been easier for the Emperor than to go on to Mezières, and thus secure his personal safety. The proposition to do so was made to him; but he rejected it, desirous not to separate from the army, and determined to share its fate, whatever it might be. On the morning of the 31st the following proclamation was issued to the troops:—

SOLDIERS!—The opening events of the war not having been fortunate, I determined to set aside all personal considerations and give the command of our armies to the marshals more particularly indicated by public opinion.

Up to the present time success has not crowned your efforts; nevertheless, I learn that the army of Marshal Bazaine has reformed under the walls of Metz, and that of Marshal MacMahon met yesterday only a slight reverse. There is, then, no reason to be discouraged. We have prevented the enemy from penetrating to the capital, and all France is rising to drive back her invaders. Under these serious circumstances—the Empress worthily representing me in Paris—I have preferred the *rôle* of soldier to that of sovereign. No effort shall be spared by me to save our country. It still contains, thank God! men of courage; and, if there are cowards, the military law and public contempt will mete out justice to them.

Soldiers, be worthy of your old reputation! God will not abandon our country if all do their duty.

Given at the Imperial headquarters, at Sedan, August 31, 1870. NAPOLEON.

This proclamation, which we had barely time to distribute, was the last appeal which the Emperor addressed to his soldiers.

While the French army took up its position around Sedan the Prussians, to the number of 230,000, continued their march upon our track, and arrived at nearly the same moment as ourselves in sight of the town. It was too late to avoid the battle which they offered, and which we were now obliged to accept, in the disadvantageous position where we had been driven.

Our four corps d'armée were massed, not far from the city, in the order assigned for the movement of retreat. The Seventh corps, which formed the rear guard on the march towards Metz, was now at the head, across the departmental road from Mézières to the west of Sedan, occupying the ground from Floing to Calvaire d'Illy. The First corps extended from the Petite Moncelle to Givonnes and D'Aigny. The Fifth corps was posted partially in the town, partially on the heights which command on the southeast the gully of Givonnes. The Twelfth corps occupied La Moncelle, La Petite Moncelle and La Platinerie, near Bazeilles.

The army was thus formed in a semicircle round the town, the two wings leaning on the Meuse. Never was an army placed in such an unfavorable situation. Generally, a well-defined plan of operation is followed, assuring a line of retreat, on which are the reserves, the ambulances, &c. Here, on the contrary, our troops risked being surrounded on all sides, without any line of retreat; and, if they had the misfortune to attempt to take refuge in the city, they could only precipitate themselves into an inextricable defile, through narrow gates and streets, encumbered with wagons and baggage.

Such was, nevertheless, the consequence of a plan of campaign imposed from Paris, and contrary to the most elementary principles of the art of war.

On the morning of the 31st the corps of General Lebrun had already been engaged, and had sustained the struggle with equal energy and courage. But the army of the enemy, relying upon the superiority of numbers, had divided its forces into two principal masses, which were to attack separately—the one by the right and the other by the left. His object was to turn the two wings of our army, and, by reuniting again upon the heights behind Sedan, to entirely surround it. A reserve corps, composed of infantry and a large body of cavalry, drawn up in the plain near Donchery, was so placed as to prevent any communication with Mezières, and the opposite batteries upon the left bank of the Meuse were bristling with a numerous artillery, which flanked the fire of the right bank.

Under these circumstances, it appeared to us that only one last resource remained by which the army could be saved, and that was to take up a line of retreat upon the neutral territory of Belgium. It was too late to attempt to break through, either on the east, towards Carignan, or to the west, towards Mézières, for in both directions the army would have found itself exposed to a cross fire, in the presence of superior forces.

But to escape from an investment, and to effect a safe retreat, it was necessary to occupy in force the heights of Illy and Givonne; to abandon the town of Sedan to its own resources; to face about, and to retire by the roads leading into Belgium.

By crowning with a numerous artillery the heights which have been mentioned, it was to be hoped that the enemy would have been held in check and the retreat efficaciously covered. Unfortunately, however, the two generals who succeeded MacMahon, after he was wounded, in the command of the army, each proposed a different plan, and, as a consequence, the plateau of Illy, which was the most important position, was but feebly occupied.

Before five o'clock on the morning of September 1 the attack commenced towards the east at Bazeilles, extending to Moncelle and Givonne, and to the west upon the heights of Floing.

At five o'clock Marshal MacMahon proceeded to the advanced posts near Bazeilles, and sent to inform the Emperor, who mounted his horse and hastened to the field of battle. On his way he met the Marshal, who was being carried back to Sedan, wounded by the splinter of a shell. This unfortunate event at the commencement of the action was an evil omen; the army had unbounded confidence in the bravery and skill of the Duke of Magenta. He had resigned his command to General Ducrot, who was fully informed of his plans. General Wimpffen, however, being the senior officer, and producing a letter of authorization from the Minister of War, demanded and obtained the supreme command. This substitution was productive of grievous consequences; for it is fraught with danger to change arrangements previously made while a battle is being fought.

For nearly two hours the troops maintained with vigor an unequal fight. But about this time the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, coming from the west, effected a junction upon the plateau of Illy with the Crown Prince of Saxony's men, who were marching from the east, and the French army found itself entirely encompassed. From that time the battle might be considered lost and our army prisoners; for, cut off from Mézières, whence it drew its supplies and ammunition, it could only retire behind the fortifications of Sedan, where it would become a central point exposed to the fire of 500 cannon placed round its circumference. Moreover, neither the efforts of the different commanders of corps d'armée and of the officers generally; neither the heroism of our artillery nor the brilliant charges of our cavalry—nothing, in fact, could arrest the retreat of our troops.

The Emperor was, from early morning, in front of the village of Balan, where, as has been said, the Twelfth corps, commanded by General Lebrun, was heavily engaged with the enemy, and well maintained its position; thence he ascended the slopes of Moncelle, crowned with batteries of artillery, from whence there was a comprehensive view of most of the battle field. He then rode along by the bottom of Givonne, meeting a great number of wounded, and among them the brave colonel of the Fifth line regiment stretched upon a litter. Seeing who was passing, he raised himself and cried repeatedly "Vive l'Empereur!"—a touching testimony of the attachment which the army bore for its sovereign. Reascending the heights, the Emperor was rejoined for a moment by General Wimpffen. At all these points the earth was ploughed up by a prodigious quantity of shells, falling from the right and left, and crossing in their fire.

After having remained exposed to this hail of projectiles for five hours the Emperor returned to Sedan, in order to consult, if possible, with MacMahon. He then intended to return to the field of battle, but this he was not permitted to do. The streets, the squares, the gates were blocked up with all the *impedimenta* that an army in precipitous retreat collects in its train—vehicles of every description, rubbish of all sorts heaped up pell-mell. On the heights at the gates of the town, however, the remainder of the army was still fighting; but the corps, not being able to unite, could offer no longer any combined defence.

About half-past three o'clock General Wimpffen sent an officer to propose to the Emperor that he should place himself in the middle of a column of men who would endeavor to cut their way through the enemy in the direction of Carignan. The Emperor, who had recognized the impossibility of leaving the place on horseback, replied that he could not rejoin the general—[one of the officers who came to offer to the Emperor to cut him a passage through the enemy was himself unable to rejoin General Wimpffen]—that, moreover, he could not consent to save himself by the sacrifice of a great number of his soldiers, and that he was determined to share the fate of his army. The proposition of General Wimpffen, as events proved, had not the slightest chance of success. He wished, nevertheless, to make this desperate attempt, but he could only assemble 2,000 men, and, after having advanced 300 paces, he himself recognized the futility of his effort and was forced to return into the town.

Then it was that the commanders of the *corps d'armée* came and announced to the Emperor that their troops, after having sustained for nearly twelve hours an unequal fight, weakened by fatigue and hunger, could no longer offer any serious resistance.

In fact, the soldiers, driven back against the walls and thrown into the ditches, were decimated by the enemy's artillery; and Sedan itself, choked with the *débris* of all the corps, was being bombarded on all sides.

The shells set the houses on fire and struck the wounded, who had been carried into them. The great barracks, converted into a hospital, upon the top of which floated the red cross flag, were not spared, and men and horses, huddled up in the courtyard, were continually hit. Many of the officers and men were killed in the streets swept by the enemy's fire; among them two generals.

The Emperor then endeavored to make known to General Wimpffen the advisability of asking for an armistice, since every moment of delay only increased the number of victims. Not receiving any tidings of the General, at the sight of so much uselessly shed blood, and in such a hopeless situation, the Emperor caused the white flag to be hoisted upon the citadel.

At the same time the King of Prussia sent an officer to Sedan to demand the surrender of the place. The Emperor, not being in command of the army, referred him to General Wimpffen. The latter, looking at the gravity of the situation, and not wishing to take upon himself the initiative of the capitulation, sent in his resignation, which was not accepted.

The Emperor, convinced, according to the assertions of the press, that the King had declared that he made war not against France, but against her sovereign, did not hesitate to constitute himself a prisoner, hoping that, the object of the war being attained by the sacrifice of his liberty, the conqueror would be less exacting towards France and the army. He addressed to the King, by one of his officers, the following letter:—

SIRE (my brother, Monsieur mon frere)—Not having been able to die in the midst of my troops, it only remains for me to place my sword in the hands of your Majesty. I am of your Majesty the good brother (bon frere). NAPOLEON.

The King replied as follows:—

SIRE (My brother, Monsieur mon frere)—Regretting the circumstances under which we meet, I accept the sword of your Majesty, and I pray you to name one of your officers provided with full powers to treat for the capitulation of the army, which has so bravely fought under your command. On my side, I have named General Moltke for this purpose. I am of your Majesty the good brother, WILLIAM.

BEFORE SEDAN, Sept. 1, 1870.

General Wimpffen betook himself to the Prussian headquarters, in order there to discuss the terms of surrender. During the interview the French General tried to obtain more favorable terms; but General Moltke replied:—"Your army does not number at this moment more than 80,000 men; we have 230,000, who completely surround you. Our artillery is everywhere in position, and can destroy the place in two hours. Your troops can only go out by the gates, and cannot possibly form before them. You have provisions for only one day, and scarcely any more ammunition. In such a situation the prolongation of your defence would be only a useless massacre, the responsibility of which must rest upon those who will not prevent it."

On his return to Sedan General Wimpffen assembled a council of war, composed of about thirty-two general officers, and with but two dissentient voices it was decided that any fresh struggle would but entail the useless loss of thousands of men; and the capitulation was signed.

The 2d of September was a day the evil-omened memories of which will never be effaced from our mind.

M. de Bismarck had sent word to the Emperor, the previous evening, that the King of Prussia offered him an interview on the morrow. Consequently the Emperor left Sedan on the morning of the 2d, and sent to inform Count Bismarck of his arrival, asking him where was the place fixed upon for the interview. He waited for the Chancellor of the North German Confederation in a small house upon the road to Doncherry. Bismarck did not long delay in meeting him. In the conversation that ensued the Emperor hastened to declare that, as he had given full powers to the Regency, with it alone could negotiations for peace be concluded; that he merely delivered his own person into the hands of the King, claiming nothing for himself, but appealing to his generosity for the army and for France. He added that, the war having been unfortunate, he would not altogether throw off the responsibility which lay upon him, but that, nevertheless, he was bound to state that he had only obeyed a violently excited national feeling. The papers have made a crime of these words of the Emperor. However, both in his proclamation to the army on the eve of his departure from Paris and in his answer to the President of the Corps Législatif, he had expressed the same thought when he said—"We have done all in our power to avoid war, and I can say that it is the entire nation which has, in its irresistible *élan*, prompted our resolution." This statement was indispensable, since every day the Emperor is still accused of having drawn the sword in a dynastic interest. The two sovereigns met in the Château of Belle Vue, in the outskirts of Sedan. At this conference the King showed the lofty feelings which animated him by exhibiting to the Emperor all the consideration which his misfortunes demanded, and the Emperor preserved an attitude of the utmost dignity. General Wimpffen, who had told the Emperor that the army counted upon his intervention with the King of Prussia for better conditions, was informed of the fruitlessness of his efforts.

Such is the recital of the military operations which terminated so unhappily in the surrender of the army at Sedan. So tremendous a disaster should not only wring from us our tears—it should also be pregnant with instruction and should furnish lessons never to be forgotten.

The successes of Prussia are due to the superiority of numbers, to the rigorous discipline of her army and to the empire, exercised throughout Germany by the principle of authority. May our unhappy fellow countrymen who are prisoners at least profit, during their sojourn in Prussia, by appreciating that which gives strength to a country—the powers that be respected, the law obeyed, the military and patriotic spirit dominating all interests and all opinions. Certainly the struggle was disproportionate, but it would have been longer sustained and less disastrous for our arms if military operations had not been unceasingly subordinate to political considerations. We should also have been better prepared if the Chambers had not incessantly been desirous of reducing the war budget, and had they not always opposed any measure to increase the national forces. Fifteen days before the declaration of war the Committee on the Budget in the Corps Législatif expressed an intention to suppress the Imperial Guard and to reduce the effective strength of the army.

To these principal causes of our reverses we must add the lamentable habits introduced into the army by the wars in Africa. Want of discipline, want of cohesion, absence of order, exaggeration of the weight carried by the soldier and of the quantity of baggage of the officers—these are the abuses which have been introduced into our armies. The French foot soldier, formerly noted for the rapidity of his march, is become heavier than the German infantryman. Carelessness of bearing affects military spirit; our officers and soldiers seem to be no longer proud to wear their uniforms and the medly of costumes painfully affects the eye. This abandon in deportment is reflected in everything else. One comes across no more of that regularity, that love of duty, that abnegation of self, which are the first qualities both of those who command and those who obey.

To sum up, the army always reflects the state of society in which it has been formed. So long as authority in France was strong and respected the constitution of the army presented a remarkable solidity, but when the excesses of the tribune and of the press were permitted to enfeeble authority, and to introduce everywhere a spirit of criticism and insubordination the army felt the effects of it.

God grant that the terrible drama which is now being enacted may serve as a lesson for the future, and that our country may rise again from the catastrophe which now overwhelms her.

RANDOM WEDLOCK.

A Queer Case in the Tombs—Jewish Bigamists—The Female Offender with an Experience of Four Husbands—A Hebrew Crowd.

Yesterday forenoon and afternoon the examination room of the Tombs Police Court was crowded with a number of Hebrews, whose curiosity was excited by a case of bigamy, in which two of their religious persuasion were the principals. As is usual on occasions when a Hebrew is in the hands of justice, the clattering of tongues and the whirling of chairs created considerable annoyance, while the air of the room was disagreeably redolent of cigar smoke. The cause of all this hubbub was that on the 30th of October last a shoemaker named Isaac Rosenthal, at present residing at 35 Marion street, but by birth a native of Russian Poland, took into his heart to espouse a fat Jewess named Philia Jacobs, in utter forgetfulness of the fact that about ten years ago he had gone through a similar ceremony at Gabama, Russian Poland. The lady in the latter case was the same who now preferred against him a charge of bigamy, and who only on Saturday last, having been sent by a Jewish society, arrived in this city from England, bringing with her her two children, who appeared yesterday in court. The testimony taken in the case included a witness who was present at the marriage in Gabama, and Isaac Solomons, who was present at the second marriage, which took place at 339 Pearl street.

The second wife's name is Philia Jacobs, and this woman it appears had been already thrice married and thrice divorced before she drew Rosenthal into the net of her charms. Rosenthal is about thirty years of age and of very Jewish cast of countenance, and his wife seems to be over forty—a fact which destroys much of the sensational nonsense published in the afternoon papers of yesterday in connection with this case. Mrs. Rosenthal was sent to the House of Detention, and Isaac was held in $2,000 bail to appear for trial.

THE ELEVATED RAILWAY.

"How the Old Thing Works"—The Boiler Found Liable to Burst.

The opening of the elevated railroad on the west side of the city was announced to take place yesterday morning. A HERALD reporter called at the starting point of the road, ready to risk life and limb in order to test its safety, but he found that "the old thing didn't work" and was prevented from carrying his hazardous enterprise into operation. He was, however, informed by one of the officials of the line that four round trips had been performed during the morning when the boiler of the engine was found to be in an unsatisfactory condition, and, to avoid any accidents, travel was stopped in order to make the necessary repairs. He also explained that there are many difficulties experienced in operating this new mode of transit, as it is the first of its kind, but no further interruptions are apprehended, and the line will run to-morrow morning. Four stations have been opened along the route, and the line has been subjected to a test of 80,794 pounds, which is considered a satisfactory proof of its safety. Cars will leave Dey street at seven A. M. to Twenty-ninth street, and run at hourly intervals from each end, the whole distance to be performed in twenty minutes, stopping at Franklin, Houston and Bethune streets. The following is the list of officers:—President, W. L. Wallace; Vice President, C. J. Harvey; Secretary and Treasurer, H. W. Taylor.

THE BRIDGE DISASTER IN MISSOURI.

A Span of the New Bridge at St. Charles Gives Way and Precipitates Sixteen Men Into the River Below—Five Lives Known to be Lost—Others Injured or Missing.

[From the St. Louis Republican, Nov. 12.]

An appalling accident occurred at St. Charles, Mo., yesterday afternoon, at the new bridge now in course of construction across the Missouri river. The piers of the bridge are built and the superstructure is being placed in position, and it was in connection with this work that the accident occurred. The first chord of the span springing from pier No. 1 is in course of erection, and presented a busy spectacle a moment before the accident occurred, surrounded by its network of scaffolding, among which a number of workmen were actively engaged. The accident, in addition to resulting in serious loss of life, occasioned much damage to the works. The part of the bridge where it occurred is between the first and second piers. There were on this portion sixteen men at the time. There were near the first pier, two or three hundred feet from the St. Charles bank of the river, an engine and steam derrick, being used to hoist the first chord of a span, an iron casting of five tons weight. This had been elevated to such a height that it was almost ready to be placed in the desired spot when the wire rope of the derrick sustaining it snapped with the great weight and the ponderous iron mass fell on the false work beneath, and about 100 feet of the structure gave way. In a moment the scene enacted was of an appalling character. Amid the shrieks of the unhappy victims the engine and fifteen men went down with the broken mass of the timbers, and lifeless and mangled bodies were soon floating in the river beneath. One man jumped from the engine on the pier when he saw what was going to happen, and in a few seconds found himself isolated, contemplating from his high and solitary position the shocking sight below. The drowned and killed were Captain Odell, Mr. Thompson, foreman, and James Fannin, of St. Louis; Daniel L. Carr, of Cleveland, Ohio, and two others. The rest are reported to have been saved. The distance from the top of the works to the water was about eighty or ninety feet. One of the men who was killed was got out alive but had a leg broken, and had received other injuries. He lived but a short time. Two men among the saved were rather badly injured. One of the others succeeded in pulling off his coat while in the water, and swam ashore, dragging another man out who was unable to swim. None of the bodies were brought to St. Louis. A person who was present at the time of the accident, and who arrived in the city last night, stated that twenty-five persons went down with the timbers, and that twenty persons were killed or are missing, fifteen bodies not having been recovered. The disaster caused much consternation and excitement at St. Charles, and a large crowd collected in the vicinity. In this city during the evening it was difficult to obtain precise information of the disaster. The officers of the North Missouri Railroad looked mysterious and "knew nothing about it," as is generally the case with such officials in reference to accidents.

MAYOR HALL AND THE LOTUS EATERS.

On Saturday evening last Mayor Hall inaugurated his presidency of this association by inviting his brother members to a *petit souper*, through the happy medium of Delmonico, at the club house, Irving place, and the result was a numerous attendance and a brilliant evening. Mr. Arthur Matthison, of the Fifth Avenue theatre, on behalf of the club, read a poetical address of welcome to Mayor Hall, one line of which neatly condenses the diverse elements of the Lotus—"We, a rare salad of the law, the mart, stage, brush, musician's literati."

Mr. Hall replied in an earnest and eloquent speech, predicting a great future for the club, and claiming for it a speedy equality with the famous Garrick Club, of London; and he conducted the business—that is, the pleasure of the evening—as only an experienced, ready, witty diner out could. Among the toasts were "The Stage," coupled with the name of Mr. Augustin Daly; "Music," Dr. Pech and Mr. S. B. Mills; "Art," Mr. Rosenberg; "Commerce," Mr. Miner; "Journalism," Mr. Roosevelt. Recitations and songs from Messrs. Walter Montgomery, Harkins, Matthison and Knox, &c., mingled pleasantly with the champagne *frappée*, and mirth and good fellowship ruled the feast.

MURDEROUS ASSAULT BY A NEGRO.

A colored man, who gave his name as Andrew Zeadon, was arraigned before Police Justice Baird, at Yonkers, Westchester county, yesterday morning, for having used a razor with almost fatal effect on another dark skinned individual named William Johnson. It appears that both parties had been employed at a hotel in the village named, and, after getting into bed on Sunday night, became involved in an animated discussion on the subject of prize fighting. The debate having waxed too warm for theoretical demonstration, both men jumped from their beds, when, instead of adhering practically to the line of argument, Zeadon plunged a razor into the neck of his antagonist, barely missing the jugular vein, and followed this up by inflicting severe gashes on the throat and face of Johnson. Having by a desperate effort secured the weapon, the latter, while covered with blood, staggered into the street, where his cries attracted the notice of officer King, who subsequently arrested the would-be murderer, on whose person another razor was afterwards found. The accused was committed without bail to await the action of the Grand Jury.

ANOTHER ABORTION CASE.

Elizabeth Wenderwal, of No. 11 Oliver street, yesterday appeared in the Tombs Police Court and complained that in July last, being then *enciente*, she availed herself of the services of a Mrs. Squatts, who lives at No. 100 Elizabeth street, for the purpose of having a premature delivery caused, and that Mrs. Squatts gave her a compound which almost emaciated her, and utterly destroyed her health. Justice Hogan committed the accused to answer.

THE BELT RAILROAD STRIKE.

The Cars Still Running, but Guarded by Police—The Strikers Firm and Indignant.

The strike on the part of the drivers on the eastern division of the Belt Railroad was maintained yesterday with great stubbornness, and with considerable inconvenience to the residents through whose districts their cars run. The origin of the strike, as reported in the HERALD of Saturday last, was the discharging of eight men on the 6th inst. who had been prominent leaders in the strike that occurred on this line seven weeks ago.

Immediately it was made known among those who remained in the service of the company that these men had been discharged, a great outcry was raised against Mr. Terry, Superintendent of the road, and a threat was conveyed to him to the effect that if he did not reinstate the eight men by the 12th of November the whole of the men in the employ of the company would strike. No notice was taken of this announcement by the president, and consequently on Sunday morning last forty-six of the drivers refused to resume their labors. A few, however, started as usual, but did not remain long at their posts, as the whole force of the Drivers' Association was brought to bear against them, and they were compelled to desist shortly after twelve o'clock.

Yesterday morning a number of new hands were employed and arrived at the depot in Thirty-sixth street at six o'clock to receive instructions, but had it not been for the presence of a large body of police at the place it would have been impossible to have started a single car. The old drivers having received an intimation of the arrangement, assembled in force, and loaded the new men with abuse and threatened to upset the cars and "go for them," but the active measures on the part of the police prevented a disturbance. Several cars were started amid the curses and shouts of the men who had "turned out," each driver being accompanied by two policemen, one on either side, and it was so managed that no person was allowed to ride outside on the cars, in order to prevent the men being tampered with. Despite these precautions one car was left by the driver standing on the track at Twenty-seventh street at eight o'clock, the reason given by the man being that he did not wish to fight against so many and that he did not consider it safe to be on the cars under the circumstances. It was afterwards ascertained that he had been prevailed upon by two of the men on strike to quit the car in the manner and at the place named. The office at the depot was besieged throughout yesterday by the old hands, some in a state of intoxication, threatening vengeance and destruction against the officers of the company, and stating that every one of the new men would be remembered by them as trying to defeat them and frustrate their designs. Nothing fur[illegible] in the way of demonstration occurred yesterday worthy of remark, but a number of the men stated that they would not consent to re[illegible] which the [illegible] the arbitrary conditions [illegible] company sought to impose; that the company had agreed to allow them the additional twenty-five cents on Sundays, but that after the first week following this arrangement they sought to withdraw the concession again and put them on duties involving eighteen hours a day. It was expected that new officers would be elected yesterday to manage the affairs of the line, but it was not known at the depot if this had been done. About twenty cars were running last evening at five o'clock, but it was necessary to guard each one against any attempt that might be made by the old drivers. It is expected that the strike will continue for some days yet.

THE ELECTION RIOT IN BATON ROUGE.

Attempted Seizure of the Ballot Boxes—The Military Called Out—Four Men Killed and Over Twenty Wounded—Prompt and Efficient Action of the Nineteenth Infantry.

[Baton Rouge correspondence (Nov. 8) New Orleans Republican.]

About nine o'clock on the evening of election day (Monday, November 7), one of the most cold-blooded and disgraceful outrages took place in Baton Rouge that have been recorded for a long time. On Sunday evening a band of democrats came into town and marched through the streets, shouting and hooting in a disorderly way. The activity of its members and the rumors spread about let every one know that there was a possibility of trouble during the election. Yesterday (Monday) was a very still day; in fact, too quiet not to excite notice. The merchants closed their shops, and all day the people of all parties voted in a quiet, unexampled manner. The plan agreed upon by the rioters was that, at a signal given by striking the fire bells a certain number of times, they should rush forth, armed, and attack the Court House, after the voting was over, destroy the ballot boxes and kill such republicans as might come in their way. Everything had been well arranged. The democrats stationed their men near the house of the United States Marshal, and pickets at different points, one near the barracks, to prevent intercourse with the United States forces, and, at the proper moment, the signal was given and the work of destruction commenced. A rush was made for the Court House just as the commissioners of election were about to open the ballot-boxes and count the votes, the polls having been closed some time. The windows and doors were thrust open, volleys of pistol shots were fired into the court rooms, the mob made a dash through the rooms, but, the gas being put out, they were obliged to strike a match before they could proceed. In the meantime J. S. Chapman, commissioner of elections, made his escape through a side window with one of the ballot boxes. W. H. Van Ornum, United States Commissioner, quickly concealed two ballot boxes under some old records and himself in a small closet, where he remained undiscovered, although his hiding place was several times approached. Two or three colored men hid themselves in the upper part of the building. Henry Williams and Charles Morse, both colored, were unable to escape, and both were shot—Williams through the head and killed, and Morse through the thigh. Foiled in not getting possession of the ballot boxes, they commenced smashing the furniture, tearing up papers, &c. They fortunately overturned an enormous table, which fell on the polling books, hiding them from view, and thus preventing their destruction. The gas fixtures were torn down, the records of the court and all the documents in the Clerk's room were scattered in every direction. Soon after the firing commenced in the streets a deputy United States marshal made his way to the barracks and called upon the commanding officer for assistance, stating that the Marshal's house was surrounded by armed men. Captain E. S. Meyer, commanding the post, quickly moved two companies of the Nineteenth infantry to the scene of action, where he was soon joined by United States Deputy Marshal Shorten, who had forced his way past his assailants through a shower of bullets. Near a the market house about thirty of the ringleaders, armed, were surprised and arrested. Many of the revolvers taken from the prisoners were already hot from having been fired. A line of rioters, armed with muskets and shot guns, formed across North Boulevard street, but they quickly fled at sight of the soldiers. Colored men were shot down in the street wherever found. The number of republicans, mostly colored, shot during the rioting was about twenty, besides four killed outright. Among the wounded were —— Schoonmaker, deputy United States marshal, and Joseph L'Officiel, the latter shot through the right lung and not expected to live. Only one democrat was injured.

Had not the military acted with great promptness every colored man in town would probably have been killed, and much property destroyed. As it was, the rioting for the time being was suppressed, but things still look threatening. Mayor Elam has, by his own desire, turned the city over to the military authorities, who will preserve the peace at all costs.

Not a single ballot box was lost or a seal broken, and the votes are being counted this morning.

Both the United States Commissioner and United States Marshal are busy this morning, and all the rioters arrested are to be brought to trial under the new law, approved by the President May 31, 1870.

REPORTER.

A despatch from the Deputy United States Marshal at Baton Rouge to United States Marshal Packard on Tuesday reads thus:—

Supervisor and counters of ballots attacked by an armed mob; ballots saved. Four dead and about twenty wounded; all republicans. Marshal Schoonmaker wounded; L'Officiel was killed. United States forces work well with me. More trouble anticipated. Arrested about thirty of the leaders.

The Marshal telegraphed yesterday to know if more troops were required to keep the peace or make arrests, to which the Deputy Marshal replied:—

Captain Meyer, commanding, states that he is able to preserve the peace and make all arrests, under any and all circumstances.

Marshal Packard has given instructions for the removal of the prisoners from Baton Rouge to a place of security.

Mr. L'Officiel, who died from wounds received at the hands of the rioters, was a member elect of the House of Representatives, and a republican.

FEAT ON THE TROTTING TURF.

Murphy drove Mr. Bonner's horse Joe Elliott a mile and repeat yesterday afternoon over Prospect Park. The wind was cold and brisk, and the track out of condition. Messrs. Isaac Harvey, Hiram Howe and John Drew officiated as judges, while several prominent turfmen were present. First mile—Quarter, 37¼ seconds; half-mile, 1:14; last half mile in the wonderful time of 1:08, making the mile in 2:22. Second mile—Quarter, 36 seconds; half mile, 1:12½; last half mile in 1:09; mile in 2:21½, and came home without a break in either mile. Dan Pfifer, who is an acknowledged judge of speed, pronounced it an unprecedented feat, when the lateness of the season was taken into consideration.

TRADE OF NEW ZEALAND.—The import trade of New Zealand for 1868 consisted of £313,890 in iron, hardware, cutlery, &c., £557,754 in drapery, £293,094 in raw and refined sugar, £214,793 in tea, £118,461 in brandy, £91,602 in tobacco, £87,257 in wine and other articles; the total value of which amounted to £4,985,748 sterling. The colony exported in the same year gold and gold dust to the value of £2,492,721 sterling; gum, valued at £72,493; potatoes, to the value of £1,257; timber of all kinds, to the value of £15,846, and 28,875,163 pounds of wool, valued at £1,516,548; the whole amounting to £4,429,198, as compared with £4,644,678 in the previous year.