THE COURTS.

The Right to Extend the Elevated Railroad Across the Battery.

LIABILITY FOR BONDS PLEDGED AS SECURITY.

A New Indictment Against Charles A. Lawrence.

NOVEL TERMINATION TO A SLANDER SUIT.

An argument of considerable length was heard yesterday before Chief Justice Monell, of the Superior Court, on the motion to continue the injunction against the new elevated railroad at the suit of Jeremiah V. Spader. The company, as will be remembered, were temporarily restrained by Judge Speir from erecting their road across the Battery opposite plaintiff's premises, No. 7 Bridge street. Mr. Spader, who claims title through a conveyance by the city to Edmund Smith dated June 19, 1815, guaranteeing that neither the Battery nor Bowling Green should ever be appropriated for private use. The whole question is as to the construction of this covenant deed. Messrs. John E. Parsons and Wheeler H. Peckham appeared on behalf of Mr. Spader, and ex-Judge Emott and Edward C. Delevan represented the railroad company.

Mr. Parsons, who opened the argument, after reciting the covenants in the deed stated that the defendants assert that they succeeded to the rights of the old West Side and Yonkers Railroad, which had its charter in 1857. He then went on to say that the proposed road was traced out over that part of the Battery originally lying between high and low water mark, which, prior to March 16, 1790, composed what was known as Fort George, the title of which the Corporation held for erecting thereon defences and public buildings, and by their title they are prohibited from disposing of these lands for any other purpose whatsever. The plaintiff holds title from the Corporation, and has paid a higher price for it on account of the clause referred to. The building of that road would spoil the park and depreciate plaintiff's property. He further contended that the charter of the old West Side Railroad allowed the extension of the line to the foot of Greenwich street, and that they had no power to connect with South ferry. With regard to the license from the Park Commissioners Mr. Parsons argued that those officials had no authority to control the parks for other than park uses, save through the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. The authority of the Commissioners was, he insisted, limited, and they have no right to make any disposition of the parks by sale or anything short of sale. He urged, further, that the use of the Battery for the purpose of having a railroad run across it is a violation of the trust upon which the same was acquired by the city from the people of the State of New York under and by virtue of an act passed September 16, 1790, and of the covenants contained in the deed from the city to Edmund Smith of the premises of which he is now seized; that the building of this railroad would greatly depreciate the value of the plaintiff's property and will prevent a full and free use of the Battery as a private park.

Judge Emott, on behalf of the defendants, handed in a verified statement of the proceedings before the Park Commissioners, which resulted in the granting of the license, and copies of various opinions and statutes; also an affidavit of James A. Cowan, secretary of the company, proving title to all the privileges of the defunct West Side Company. He then entered upon a lengthy argument in reply to Mr. Parsons. The railroad company, he said, claimed the right to build the road across the edge of the Battery under a license or with remarkable authority granted in the name of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the city of New York, and executed by the Department of Public Parks, which department he claimed is vested with all the power and authority theretofore possessed, in relation to the Battery, by the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the city of New York, and any and all branches of the municipal government. The plaintiff asserts a right to complain of the exercise of this authority in this case and to stay its exercise, apparently on the grounds that the permission given by the city for this use of the Battery is a breach of a covenant in the deed by which the city conveyed to Smith, the plaintiff's predecessor, in June, 1815, and that it is a violation of a trust created by an act of the Legislature, passed in 1790, purporting to release to the city the rights of the State in certain premises described in the act. No possible right of the plaintiff to bring such an action can be imagined upon any other ground. He is a resident of Brooklyn. His property is used and occupied for storage purposes. Neither it nor any property near it is occupied for dwellings. The railroad does not propose to take nor to touch his property. It does not come within 308 feet of it. His property is situated on a cross street running perpendicularly to the Battery and to the railroad track. His property does not front on the railroad, so as even to be affected by its construction or use. Nor does it front on the Battery, so as to be affected by any use of that place or park. He must therefore show that he is entitled to the exercise of the equitable power of the court, and to an injunction against this deliberate act of the public authorities, either because it is a breach of a covenant with him, or because it is a breach of a trust of which he can complain. The action of the Department of Public Parks was most deliberate and well considered. Public discussion was invited and arguments made by the learned counsel who now asks for this injunction and others. Reports were made by a committee of the Park Commissioners and by the Lanoscape Architect. The opinion of the Corporation Counsel was taken, after he was informed of the views presented in opposition to the request of the company, and the grant was finally made in the form of a license, revokable at any time, with his advice and approval as to its form and contents. He insisted further that the license or authority given by the city to the defendant is therefore not an appropriation of the Battery to private use; that no action, even for damages, will lie for a breach of the covenant in the deed to Edmund Smith, and that as the Battery is applied to public uses, the precise nature or character of any such use is in the discretion of the city authorities. He claimed that in point of fact the title of the city to the portion of the present Battery over which the structure is to be built is not derived from the State under the act of 1790, but either from the British Crown under the Dongan and Montgomerie charters, or from the State under the act of 1821, considered in the Phenix case, or, as some of the judges held in that case, from the act of Congress of 1822 and the surrender and delivery under it; that the part of the present Battery in question was wholly below high water mark in 1790; that part of it was below low water mark and that it was not at that time part of the Battery, but was either part of the shore or wholly under water at all times. But, aside from this answer to this part of the suit, the titles of the defendants to all the franchises they are exercising everywhere is complete, without invoking any acts or parts of acts which can be faulted as unconstitutional; and as to this connection with the South ferry, their rights are wholly independent of the statutes referred to in this complaint. As to the claim that this injunction should be granted to the plaintiff, because the route pursued by the defendants varied from that indicated by the Rapid Transit Commissioners, he urged that it the people of the State of New York, and the Corporation of the city of New York make no complaint of this variation it does not concern the plaintiff; that there is no variation; that the route laid down by the Commissioners is along the edge of the Battery; that the present structure is built from five to twenty, thirty, and in one place 100 feet from the mathematical line, which is the outer limit of the Battery; that it is placed where the Park Commissioners and their architect believe it was best for it to go; that it is where it will be less of an obstruction and a blemish than if it skirted the Battery along the sidewalk; that the courts will not, at the complaint of a mere outsider, go into a question of discretion like this, or reduce the "edge of the Battery" to a mathematical line, and that, independent of all this, the defendants have good right and title to the use of this territory, from the consent and license of the city, without resorting to the powers or acts of the Rapid Transit Commissioners. Following the close of the argument Judge Monell took the papers.

PLEDGED BONDS.

On the failure of Henry Clews & Co. in this city and Clews, Habicht & Co., of London, Henry Hennequin & Co., of France, had $29,000 of Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw Railroad bonds deposited as security with the New York house on account of a running credit for $6,000 with the London house. These bonds had been in the meantime pledged by Clews & Co. to Butterfield & Co. for loans amounting to about $700,000, and being unable to secure them again they were obliged to give Hennequin & Co. twenty-nine first mortgage bonds of the Burlington, Cedar Rapids and Minnesota Railroad in lieu of the unreturned pledged bonds mentioned above. Hennequin & Co. sued Clews & Co. and the Butterfields to recover the original bonds, claiming that they took the latter as security for the return of their own bonds. Judge Sedgwick, before whom the case was tried in the Superior Court, says that the only question to be decided was whether the Butterfields accepted the pledge in good faith or were aware that Clews & Co. were not the owners. He decides that they were taken in good faith in the usual course of business, and therefore dismisses the complaint as against the Butterfields.

THE LAWRENCE CASE.

The case of Charles A. Lawrence, which has been in the United States Court for a long time, will come up again next Monday for trial, on a new indictment prepared by District Attorney Bliss. At the last term of the Circuit Court Lawrence, through his counsel, Mr. Tracy, refused to plead, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, and Judge Benedict, therefore, ordered a plea of not guilty to be entered for him. His counsel held that he should have been tried for only one offence, the one under which he was extradited, and pleaded this in abatement, but the plea was overruled by Judge Benedict. The new indictment is substantially the same as the previous one, and contains a large number of counts. It is a serious question if the trial will ever begin or ever terminate. It has been several times asserted that Lawrence was prepared to make a confession which would implicate a number of officials, and District Attorney Bliss as often stated that the government would not receive the confession but would try the case. Lawrence himself a few evenings since stated to a visitor in Ludlow Street Jail that his case would never be tried, and his manner during the conversation was exceedingly confident. Legally speaking, the refusal of Lawrence's counsel to plead will not retard the trial, should both sides be ready to go on. It is said that Mr. Sidney Webster will be retained in the case as special counsel for the government.

VIRTUE VINDICATED.

Mary Biogiatti, a fair daughter of sunny Italy, and but eighteen years of age, learning that she had been slandered in respect to her virtue by one of her countrymen, named John Dalbert, sought, through her guardian, such reparation as the courts could give her. With this view suit was brought in the Marine Court to recover damages against the slanderer, which came to a conclusion yesterday, before Judge McAdam. Numerous witnesses were examined on both sides, and the Judge, holding the words spoken by the defendant to have been slanderous and untrue, gave a verdict for $100 in favor of the plaintiff. After the rendering of the verdict another scene ensued which was not set down in the bills. It appears that when the slanders against Miss Biogiatti were uttered she was receiving attentions with a view to marriage from one of her young countrymen, named Peter Bujletti; but when he heard the slanders he refused to marry her until they should be disproved. When, therefore, the result of the trial was announced, the friends of the young lady and her admirers got around them, and, after considerable animated conversation, induced the young people to get married there and then, and thus give the lady's virtue a double and emphatic vindication. Mr. J. Stewart Ross, who appeared as counsel in the slander case for the plaintiff, announced to Judge McAdam as the result of the consultation of the principals and their friends that they wished to be joined in matrimony. In response, Judge McAdam called attention to the fact that there was a clergyman present of the same church as the parties and suggested that he might more properly perform the ceremony. To this the parties rejoined through an interpreter that it was the custom in Italy to have a civil marriage and afterward they could have the ceremony performed in the church; the civil marriage they wished to have performed then. Judge McAdam complied with their wishes.

COST OF CITY AWNINGS.

In December, 1872, the Supervisors allowed a bill of Mark Lanigan for awnings for the courts and court offices at $10,[illegible]35. In May, 1874, a receiver of the plaintiff in supplementary proceedings obtained a peremptory mandamus to the County Auditor to audit and allow the bill, and the Auditor certified the bill to the Comptroller as allowed by him at $6,124, which amount the Comptroller paid, and suit was brought for the balance. The Court directed a verdict for plaintiff, but afterward ordered a new trial, and the plaintiff appealed to the General Term of the Court of Common Pleas. In giving the opinion of the Court yesterday Judge Van Brunt said the only function of the Auditor was to see that the voucher was a county charge, and he was bound to allow it at the amount for which it was audited by the Supervisors; that the examination of the claim by the Auditor is a condition precedent to compelling the Comptroller to pay; that no such fact had been established; that no return having been made to the mandamus there is no final judgment, and on such return being made plaintiff might object that such an audit was not a return to the mandamus, and that the order below therefore must be affirmed, with costs.

EFFECTS OF A SECOND MARRIAGE.

Samuel L. Young, in an outburst of parental affection, conveyed all his real estate to his daughters, and on the same day the latter executed to him a life lease on the property. Mr. Young was then a widower and his daughters grown up and married. Subsequently on taking to himself a second wife he repented of his liberality and brought suit to have the conveyance set aside. On behalf of the daughters a motion was made for the appointment of a receiver of the property in question on the ground that Mr. Young was collecting the rents but leaving the taxes and assessments unpaid. It is averred that the second Mrs. Young prevented the papers being served on Mr. Young, and so another motion was made for a substituted service, which was granted by Judge Curtis, of the Superior Court. A motion was then made to set aside this order, which motion, together with the one for the appointment of a receiver, was heard before Judge Speir, of the same Court. Judge Speir gave his decision yesterday refusing to vacate the order of Judge Curtis and granting the motion for a receiver.

SUMMARY OF LAW CASES.

Before the Supreme Court, General Term, yesterday was argued the case on appeal of Anna Wagenan against George Kemp, impleaded with the city. The circumstances of the case have already been published. The plaintiff was injured through a bridge constructed over an excavation in front of Kemp's premises. The Court took the papers.

In addition to the suit pending against Charles A. Lawrence in the United States Court there has been one commenced in the Superior Court, to recover on a judgment for $327 27, found against him in 1859. The defence is that he is exempted from payment through having gone into bankruptcy.

Judge Speir, of the Superior Court, yesterday dissolved the injunction he issued against Sidney Dillon and Jay Gould at the suit of Rufus Hatch, and dismissed the entire proceedings, both on account of fatal defects in papers and on the merits. The suit was to remove Dillon and Gould from directorship of the Pacific Mail Company and prevent them from settling certain suits. Messrs. Dillon and Gould were represented by the attorney of the company, H. S. Bennett, and Mr. Hatch by Messrs. Sewell and Pierce.

Ex-Sheriff Brennan's suit against the city to recover some $53,000 fees, alleged to be due him from the city, was continued yesterday before Judge Van Hoesen in the Court of Common Pleas. There was a lengthy argument on a motion made by Mr. Strahan, plaintiff's counsel, for an immediate direction to the jury to find for his client on the ground that the audit of the Board of Supervisors approving the bill was conclusive and final and could not be reviewed except on certiorari. Mr. Carter replied, claiming that the bill was fraudulent. Decision was reserved.

John Loehr, a match manufacturer, of No. 427 West Fifty-fourth street, was arrested yesterday upon an indictment charging him with presenting a fraudulent claim to the Revenue Department. The allegation is that subsequent to the destruction of his premises by fire some time ago he made a false statement of the number of revenue stamps in his possession that were destroyed, and for which he demanded recompense. The accused gave bail in the sum of $5,000 to appear for trial.

DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT—SPECIAL TERM.

By Judge Larremore.

Grissler et al. vs. Browning et al.—Demurrer overruled, with leave to answer on payment of costs.

Delafield vs. Smith et al.—Findings settled.

SUPERIOR COURT—SPECIAL TERM.

By Judge Speir.

Carter et al. vs. Youngs, &c.—Defendant's motion to vacate order of Judge Curtis denied and the plaintiffs' motion for the appointment of a receiver granted. Memorandum.

Hatch vs. Gould et al.—The order granting an injunction herein must be vacated and injunction dissolved on the merits. Order settled on notice the 15th inst., at eleven A. M.

Hale vs. The Omaha National Bank.—Order on remittitur.

By Judge Sedgwick.

Hennequin et al. vs. Clews et al.—Plaintiffs' complaint dismissed as against defendants Butterfield & Co. Memorandum.

Pursell vs. The Mayor &c.—Findings settled and filed.

Greer vs. Tillinghast.—Plaintiff's complaint dismissed with costs of motion and that defendant have judgment accordingly.

Wood vs. Dexter.—Writ of inquiry ordered.

Poillon vs. Lawrence, et al.—Motion denied.

COMMON PLEAS—SPECIAL TERM.

The Ferroplastic Manufacturing Company vs. Beckelhaupt.—Motion denied. See memorandum.

Hubert Clark vs. Charlotte Clark.—Referee's report confirmed.

Louisa Kueny vs. Ernest Kueny.—The proof of the service of the summons does not conform with the rule.

MARINE COURT—CHAMBERS.

By Judge McAdam.

Freeman vs. Carlton.—Defendant discharged from imprisonment.

Watrous vs. Parry.—Defendant ordered to file papers.

De Moor vs. Hamburger.—Complaint dismissed.

Cammon vs. Almy.—Proceedings dismissed.

Douglass vs. Brown.—Third party ordered to pay $150.

Zemlicka vs. Jackson.—An order may be entered substituting William F. Howe as attorney for plaintiff in place of Samuel Hirsch, deceased.

Leddy vs. O'Reilly.—Sheriff ordered to give up property.

Wright vs. Campbell.—Amendment allowed.

Sadlier vs. Schlamoritz; Hoyt vs. Fowler; Hobart vs. Banks; Whitney vs. Cassidy; Ahrens vs. Conner; Mattlage vs. Kreiling.—Motions granted.

Place vs. Rau.—Motion for judgment denied, without costs.

Markgraf vs. Kreidenweig.—Final order made.

By Chief Justice Shea.

Leeds vs. Molleson.—The motion on minutes of trial for a new trial is denied. The sale was not one by sample; the bulk of the goods purchased were present at the time of the transaction, and capable of being examined by the purchaser. The words spoken by the agent were not intended as a warranty, nor can an express warranty be inferred in law as their effect. In the absence of fraud, which is not imputed in this case, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to this class of transactions. The judgment can be entered on the verdict, with five per cent allowance.

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS.

Before Recorder Hackett.

THE "ABDUCTION" OF HETTIE HALL.

Josephine Fisher and John Fisher, the latter's real name being Maurice Obermeyer, the proprietors of the disorderly house in Greene street from which the girl Hettie Hall said she was escaping when found running through Prince street dressed in fancy costume a few nights ago, were arraigned yesterday for trial. Two indictments were filed against the prisoners, one for keeping a disorderly house and one for abduction. They were tried and convicted of the first offence. With respect to the second indictment Assistant District Attorney Bell said he was not inclined to prosecute, and a nolle prosequi was therefore entered. The girl Hall testified to the character of the house. She admitted herself to be a prostitute of a very low grade, although but a child in years, and while on the stand her manner was that of one wholly depraved. His Honor sentenced each of the prisoners to pay a fine of $250 and to undergo twelve months' imprisonment in the Penitentiary.

A BAD "PILL."

James McCormick, alias "Pill," a baker, of No. 43 Laight street, pleaded guilty to burglary in the third degree, and was sent to the Penitentiary for two years. On April 2 he broke into the apartments of Zachariah Westfield, No. 8 Gansevoort street, but did not contrive to steal anything.

STOLE TOOLS.

John Levy, of No. 523 East Twenty-ninth street, and Edward Wilson, of No. 218 East Twenty-eighth street, who stole a lot of carpenter tools from John Brady, of No. 223 West Twenty-ninth street, pleaded guilty, and were sent to the Penitentiary for six months each.

POLICE COURT NOTES.

At the Tombs Police Court yesterday, before Justice Murray, Thomas Holmes, of No. 182½ Cherry street, was held to answer in $3,000 bail on complaint of Henry Doyle, of No. 64 James street, who charged that while standing in front of his residence on Thursday afternoon the accused snatched from his vest pocket a watch valued at $15.

Charles and Madeline Gerlish were yesterday committed for trial at the Tombs Police Court on a charge of keeping a disorderly house in Hester street.

Daniel Mangan, of No. 64 Montgomery street, asked John McCarthy, of No. 305 East Forty-sixth street, who pretended to have influence at Police Headquarters, to help him to get on the police. McCarthy told him that $100 was all the influence he needed, which, he said, should be given to Commissioner Erhardt. Mangan procured the money and paid it to a man whom McCarthy told him was Mr. Erhardt, at the St. Nicholas Hotel. Not receiving his appointment, Mangan obtained a personal interview with the Commissioner. The result was the arrest of McCarthy. He was brought up at the Fifty-seventh Street Police Court yesterday and remanded to enable the police to discover McCarthy accomplices, the latter refusing to tell who they were.

David Flaherty, of No. 161 East Thirty-second street, was accused of striking his mother, who is seventy years of age and palsied, with his clinched fist and knocking her down. The son was held for trial.

David Bird, of No. 36 Skillman street, Brooklyn, was arraigned on a charge of stealing a horse worth $150 from Henry Krone, of No. 175 Montgomery street, same city. He was held for trial.

Roundsman Magan, of the Eighteenth precinct, brought into the Fifty-seventh Street Court two Italian flower girls whose only offence was selling flowers to people attending the fair in the Academy of Music and being out at a late hour. The officer exhibited a letter from the Society for the Protection of Children asking for the arrest of some of the flower girls and saying that the society would help to have them sent to prison. The Court decided to send the children to the Catholic Protectory. The father of the girls was in court and said he was unable, because of an affection of the lungs, to do any work, and his only dependence for the necessaries of life was on his children. He appealed to the Court to discharge them this time and he would never send them out again at night. The request was not granted.

THE MARINE COURT CLERK.

NEW YORK, May 12, 1876.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD:—

Your issue of the 2d inst. does me injustice. It intimates (if, indeed, it does not directly charge) that I was in Albany, without the knowledge of the judges of the Marine Court, lobbying through the Legislature a bill giving me more power than "the whole bench of judges," and that all this was, fortunately, disclosed in time by one of the judges, who, suspecting me, took a trip to Albany and made the discovery. This statement was so untrue and so injurious to my character that I would have contradicted it at the time, but that I was assured by more than one of the judges that they not only did not believe I had betrayed their interests, but that they would promptly take occasion to vindicate me. It is now the 12th of May—eleven days since my removal—yet this promised vindication has not yet made its appearance, so I am obliged to speak for myself. The public is interested in other questions connected with my removal than those embraced in the article I refer to, so you will pardon me if I am somewhat general in my statement. For many years past the Marine Court was looked upon as a sort of legitimate treasury to pay the bills of the latest political organization in control of the city, and its Clerk's office as a hospital for ward politicians who had suffered in the service. The anti-Tammany organization, of which I am a secretary, looked for a reformation in this respect under me, and in one particular I flatter myself I have carried out its hopes, for the City Chamberlain's office will show that my predecessors in office, ever since the court was established, paid to the city in any one year, on fees received by them, not more than an average of $175 per month, while my average for the four months I was in office was over $1,200 per month. So much for the treasury. As to the hospital, it was beyond my reach to reform it, for, strange as it may seem, although the law held me responsible for the acts of my subordinates, it gave me no power over their employment or dismissal, a state of affairs which does not exist in any other court of record in this city. On several occasions I found that this worked disadvantageously, both for the good of the public service and the welfare of the city treasury, but satisfied myself by calling the attention of the judges to the fact, who assured me that these things would be remedied by and by. Near the end of the Legislature there were several bills under consideration affecting the Marine Court. One proposed to give to me, as Clerk, the power to remove and appoint my subordinates, the same as the assistant clerks are removed and appointed in other courts of record, and the other reduced the salaries of the judges from $10,000 to $7,000 per annum. I knew nothing of either until I read of them in the newspapers, and to this day never had their introducers or anybody in their interest approach me as to what I would do in case the Clerk's bill should become a law. The judges were opposed to both bills; and at the urgent request of two of their number, and with the knowledge of certainty three I went to Albany, as their agent, to say for them that they were opposed to the bills becoming a law, and to keep them informed as to the progress of the measures. All this I did faithfully and honestly; and it was at my request that one of the judges came to Albany, as I can prove by letters and telegrams sent and received, copies of which I have in my possession and which may be seen by any person questioning my statement. When I was removed the judges volunteered a statement of their confidence in my faithfulness and of my capability as a clerk, going even further in their praises than I care to mention here, and gave me distinctly to understand that a threat having been made against their court by a State Senator should they attempt to interfere with the reforms proposed in his bill, this was the only way left to them to vindicate their dignity and independence. Of course, if dignity and independence can be so easily given to the Marine Court, it is hardly proper that I should object to a "consummation so devoutly to be wished," even though I suffer a temporary inconvenience thereby. But I cannot wait longer for that promised vindication and hence this letter to the public. Very respectfully yours,

JOHN D. COUGHLIN.

NOT THE MAN.

NEW YORK, May 12, 1876.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD:—

In the report of a "Struggle with a Lunatic" in yesterday's HERALD the supposed madman's name is given as George Clark and his residence Astoria, L. I. As this is calculated to injure me if not contradicted, I beg you to publish my statement to the effect that I am the only George Clark at present residing in Astoria; that I am not considered a lunatic; that I have never attempted suicide, have not been on a Hoboken ferryboat for years, have never been arrested in my life, and, in short, that I am not the person mentioned in the above. GEORGE CLARK.

[The person who attempted suicide in Hoboken gave his name as George Clark, residence Astoria.—ED. HERALD.]

TRIAL OF CAPTAIN LOWERY.

Captain Lowery, of the Sixth precinct, was placed on trial yesterday before Commissioners Smith, Wheeler and Nichols, on a charge of neglect of duty in failing to prevent the sale of liquor in the Atlantic Garden on Sunday, the 7th inst. Counsellor William F. Howe appeared for the defence, and proved by the blotter of the station house that the Captain had sent two men to the place on the day in question, dressed in citizens' clothes, with instructions to arrest if liquor was sold. For the prosecution the inspector of the First district testified that he personally witnessed the selling of beer in the garden on the Sunday mentioned. Counsellor Howe then endeavored to show that the beer sold was "Pilsner," and was not embraced in the category of intoxicating drinks.

The case was referred to the full Board.

AN EDITOR ROBBED.

Yesterday morning a woman obtained admittance to the residence of Charles A. Dana, No. 76 West Eleventh street, and while the servant went up stairs stole a silver water pitcher worth $50 that was in the hall.

MOULTON-BEECHER.

Argument by Opposing Counsel at General Term Yesterday.

THE DIVERSE POINTS PRESENTED.

Long Statements in Reference to the Demurrer.

POUGHKEEPSIE, N. Y., May 12, 1876.

The case of Francis D. Moulton, appellant, against Henry Ward Beecher, respondent, was argued at the General Term this morning. Roger A. Pryor appeared for Mr. Moulton and Thomas S. Shearman for Mr. Beecher. It was an appeal from Judge Dyckman's decision sustaining a demurrer in the famous suit for malicious prosecution against Mr. Beecher. Each counsel occupied three-quarters of an hour, and the Court House was crowded, many clergymen of this city being present. During his argument Mr. Pryor alluded in a pathetic manner to Mr. Moulton's position, asserting that he is nearly ruined financially, having been compelled to part with his property to defray the expenses of this serious trouble. Mr. Shearman's argument was confined closely to his points.

The Court took the papers and reserved its decision.

THE CASE FOR THE APPELLANT.

On behalf of the appellant counsel submitted the following as his statement of the case:—

Appeal from judgment entered on order sustaining demurrer to complaint.

Action for abuse of legal process, to plaintiff's damage. The specific points presented for review, are:—

First—Whether an order of nolle prosequi granted by the Court on motion of the District Attorney, and entered of record, be not such an end of the prosecution as will support the action; and

Second—Whether, on the special and peculiar facts of the case, the action may not be maintained, without a technical termination of the prosecution.

The following were the points submitted:—

First—If a criminal prosecution be capable of termination by a nolle prosequi, the complaint is sufficient; for it alleges the prosecution was wholly ended and determined. The reference to the nolle prosequi only indicates the manner of the termination, but does not qualify the fact of the termination.

a—The gist of the action for malicious prosecution is the want of probable cause (Johnstone vs. Sutton, 1 T. R., 544), and the averment that the previous action is determined does not touch the merits, but is a mere "technical prerequisite."

b—Originally, upon a false analogy to the writ of conspiracy, a technical acquittal was indispensable to the support of this action. (Holt, J., in Goddard vs. Smith, 6 Mod., 262; 2 Selwyn's N. P., 1,062.) Now, however, it is not essential that the prosecution so terminate as to discharge the offence and oppose a bar to a fresh proceeding. An end of the particular prosecution suffices.

c—Here the particular prosecution is determined. In a civil action a nolle prosequi "is an acknowledgment or agreement by the plaintiff entered on record, that he will no further prosecute his suit."

d—A nolle prosequi is such an end of the prosecution, as will sustain this action. Entry of a nolle prosequi being an end of the prosecution, the defendant's discharge follows as a legal consequence. If the *nolle* be not an end of the prosecution, then an allegation of defendant's discharge would be nugatory.

Second—On the special and peculiar facts of the case the action will lie though the prosecution be not at an end.

a—Hitherto the argument has assumed that, until determined, a legal proceeding cannot be made a ground of action. But the rule is not inflexible, and, being a mere "technical prerequisite" (supra, point I), like formal notice or demand in certain other actions, the condition is waived when inconsistent with the claims of substantial justice.

b—The complaint, of which all the allegations are admitted by the demurrer, exhibits a case of unique atrocity and oppression. From all other instances of malicious prosecution reported in the books this is discriminated by the circumstance that it was nolle prossed at the special request of the defendant and against the protest of the plaintiff. It is admitted that if the prosecution were at an end plaintiff would have redress for the outrage of which he is the victim; but defendant himself is allowed to perpetuate the prosecution and so to escape retribution.

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT.

Mr. Shearman, on behalf of counsel for the respondent, submitted an argument on their motion to have the dicision of the lower court confirmed. He stated that this is an action for malicious prosecution, the complaint in which sets forth that the defendant instituted a prosecution against the plaintiff for libel, upon which he caused the plaintiff to be indicted and arrested, but that afterward the District Attorney, by leave of the Court entered a nolle prosequi, and that in this manner the prosecution against the plaintiff was terminated in his favor. To this complaint the defendant demurred, on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained by Mr. Justice Dyckman, at Special Term, and judgment entered thereon, from which the plaintiff appeals.

The following are the points submitted by counsel in their argument:—

First—It has been settled by innumerable adjudications, only a few of which it can be necessary to cite, that an action for malicious prosecution cannot be sustained unless the original prosecution was finally determined in favor of the plaintiff before the commencement of the action.

Second—The complaint must show how the original prosecution terminated, and it must state that fact in such a manner as to raise some presumption that the action was without foundation. This can only be done by alleging an acquittal or something which is in law equivalent thereto. This rule is laid down, either literally or in substance, in many cases.

Third—Any statements in the complaint asserting in general language that the original prosecution was ended or determined are always construed in the light of the mode of termination set forth in the complaint. If the facts given as a description of the mode of termination are not sufficient to show a termination in fact, the courts disregard the other general language as mere conclusions of law, and on demurrer the complaint will be held insufficient, while, upon the trial, the evidence will be confined to a determination in the manner specifically alleged.

Fourth—A nolle prosequi, entered before the trial of an indictment, is not a final determination of the prosecution. It is no determination of anything. It is a mere declaration of the prosecuting officer that he does not intend to proceed, which declaration he can revoke; and after its revocation the Court has power to try the accused under the same indictment.

Fifth—Accordingly it has long been settled by the decisions of courts of the highest authority that an action for malicious prosecution cannot be sustained where the original prosecution was not terminated in any other manner than by the entry of a nolle prosequi.

Sixth—The cases holding that a nolle prosequi is not a sufficient basis for an action for malicious prosecution are strongly supported by other cases, distinctly holding that a mere abandonment of a prosecution is not sufficient cause, since, as we have shown, a nolle prosequi in criminal cases is nothing more than a formal declaration by the Attorney General or District Attorney that he does not choose to continue the prosecution.

Seventh—The doctrine for which we contend is inferentially supported by a large class of cases in which the courts have been required to consider whether the action could be maintained without the verdict of a petit jury. Some of these cases are cited by the plaintiff, but they can only be made to appear as authorities in his favor by partial quotations, not taking into account the facts of each case. We shall endeavor to state them here with sufficient fulness, and it will be seen that they afford no countenance to this suit.

Eighth—The averment in the complaint that the nolle prosequi was entered at the request of the defendant, and in opposition to the will of the plaintiff, is entirely immaterial, and cannot affect the question now before the Court.

Ninth—The provisions of the New York Revised Statutes (2 R. S., 728, sec. 54), giving to district attorneys power to enter a nol. pros. with the consent of the Court, does not in the least affect the question here to be considered, nor change the effect of a nol. pros. when entered. The Court has nothing to do with a nol. pros. except to grant a mere permission to the district attorney to enter it if he sees fit to do so. The nol. pros., when entered, is a mere act of the district attorney, and in no sense an adjudication or order of the Court, which has no power to compel him to enter it against his will.

Tenth—Should the Court consider the question as one entirely new, and without being governed by previous decisions of the courts, the same conclusion must be reached, if any regard is to be had to the general principles which have governed the administration of justice in other matters by the tribunals of English and American law. Actions for malicious prosecution are looked upon with disfavor (per Holt, C. J., Savile vs. Roberts, Carthew, 416; Pantoune vs. Marshall, Say., 162), for, as Lord Camden said, "Courts will be cautious how they discourage men from suing" (Joslyn vs. Wilcock, 2 Wilson, 202), an expression which was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. (Cardival vs. Smith, 109 Mass., 158.) Upon this principle the courts extend protection to suitors in private actions against unnecessary harassment by actions for malicious prosecution or false imprisonment, and there is much stronger reason for doing so where prosecutions are dropped for the public benefit and in the name and under the control of the State.

Eleventh—Even if the doctrine of the cases cited on the part of the plaintiff from Indiana courts should be accepted as law, yet the plaintiff has not brought himself within the range of those decisions, because there a judgment discharging the plaintiff from the indictment was specially pleaded, and here there is no such allegation.

Twelfth—The demurrer is well taken, and the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.

With each of these points counsel also cited a great number of legal decisions and rulings, which, they claimed, supported their view of the case.

THE BROOKLYN BRIDGE.

A STARTLING EXHIBIT—WILL NEW YORK COMMERCE BE CRIPPLED BY ITS COMPLETION?

The question of the completion of the Brooklyn Bridge is agitating the dock men, shipowners, shipbuilders and warehousemen from Corlear's Hook to Grand street as no question has moved them for fifty years. So a HERALD reporter was informed yesterday, and he immediately assured himself of the fact by personal interviews with a number of the most prominent property owners, shipwrights and others on South, Water and Front streets. Captain Briggs, President of the New York Floating Dry Dock Company, whose office is No. 254 South street, said:—"I speak in no narrow sense when I tell you if the wires are ever stretched across that bridge it will virtually close the East River to all large vessels. I have been a shipmaster for forty years, and I know the navigation of the locality thoroughly. The distance between the roadway of the bridge and the river now is admitted to be only 135 feet, and I can procure you a list of a number of vessels that have to pass under it whose masts range from 140 to 205 feet. Nor is this such a slight thing as some of the newspapers have chosen to consider it, the lowering of topgallant masts of vessels. Consider, in case of hard winter weather, when the rigging is frozen and ropes can be snapped almost by the touch of a man's hand, the cost and labor of such work. There are no men, perhaps, more public spirited or more in favor of public improvements and the conveniences of rapid transit between the cities than those whose interests lie on and are adjacent to the water fronting street. Mr. A. B. Miller, Thomas Freebo n, M. S. Driggs, George W. Roosevelt and scores of others equally well known will bear testimony to the desire that the bridge should be built, but very properly insist that it should be high enough to permit vessels to pass without lowering their topmasts, which in some instances would involve an expense of several hundred dollars, to say nothing of the delay which would ensue.

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specifically states that the construction of the bridge should 'not obstruct, impair or modify navigation, and I predict if it is completed on the present plan it will reduce the valuation of water front property over forty per cent."

Mr. G. W. Roosevelt said:—"I am a sparmaker and shipwright, and have an interest in about forty vessels; a good many have masts from 150 to 190 feet in height, but, beyond my own interests, I believe there are hundreds of ships that will not enter the port if this Brooklyn bridge obstruction is completed. Here is a list of a few vessels the masts of which are from 150 to 205 feet in height:—

HEIGHT OF SPARS FROM KELSON TO TRUCK.

Ships.	*Ft.*	*In.*	*Ships.*	*Ft.*	*In.*
Alexander Marshall	156	9	James Foster, Jr..	159	9
Great Western.....	162	3	Guy Mannering.....	173	11
Young America.....	205	0	Harvest Queen.....	167	8
Black Hawk.....	172	0	Neptune.....	164	9
C. H. Marshall.....	154	3	Ocean Monarch.....	179	0
Three Brothers.....	203	0	Thornton.....	166	10
Invincible.....	190	4	Universe.....	158	6
Australia.....	[illegible]	0	Vanguard.....	161	10
John Bright.....	180	0	Isaac Webb.....	165	8
Cultivator.....	176	8	Manhattan.....	165	8
Baltic.....	174	6			
Steamships.	*Ft.*	*In.*	*Steamship.*	*Ft.*	*In.*
China.....	144	0	Granada.....	140	0
Great Republic.....	141	0	Acapulco.....	140	0
America.....	141	0	City of Peking.....	204	0
Japan.....	143	0	City of Tokio.....	204	0
Colon.....	140	0			
Schooners.	*Ft.*	*In.*	*Schooners.*	*Ft.*	*In.*
Alcott.....	136	0	Dauntless.....	141	6
Mohawk.....	146	3	Robert Dilon.....	165	0
Wm. Mason.....	133	6			

Mr. Roosevelt added that the committee who recently appeared before the Aldermanic Committee on Roads, Tunnels and Bridges represented the leading shipping and warehousing firms on the water front, and if they could get no relief from the Board of Aldermen they certainly would go to the courts and ask for an injunction against the perpetual damage to their property. "I make about the following calculation," said Mr. Roosevelt, "as to the height of the masts on large ships:—Lower or mainmast, 90 feet; topmast, say 55 feet; topgallant mast, royal pole, &c., say 70 feet—making 215 feet; from which deduct 18 feet; taking off the doublings you have still a height of 197 feet. Now, we have from Corlear's Hook to Grand street about one mile of dock property, and one of the finest shelters in the port for vessels; the water is deep and clear, and in winter some vessels seek this anchorage simply for the shelter, and I venture to predict after the bridge is completed—if it ever is—that all this shipping will be driven to New Jersey, Staten Island and other places."

Mr. James M. Thompson, a harbor master, stated that the deepest and best water of the city was east of the bridge, and that many of the vessels of the heaviest tonnage found wharfage there. Unless the bridge was built of the proper height the warehouses above it could only be used as tenements.

It will thus be seen that the great stone piers may not serve the uses contemplated for them without