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
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The Navy Quietly Makes History



REAR ADMIRAL GLEAVES (left)
AND FLAG LIEUTENANT LAWSON
IN NEW YORK HARBOR ON THE
ADMIRAL'S SPEEDY MOTOR LAUNCH.

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Why the U-Boat Hopes Have Vanished

By ALBERT WHITING FOX.
Approved by the Navy Department.

THE United States Navy is doing big things in a big way these days, living up to its best traditions. The men at the helm are steering a course of action which leads to victory, and the men in the service are giving a spirit and devotion to duty which will make glorious history.

The work that the navy is really doing, however, is not as well understood by the general public as it might be. The surging battle on the western front has so concentrated the attention of all that the role being played by the navy, even in these battles, is being overlooked. The necessary secrecy which shrouds naval matters at this time is an added reason why much of the navy's work cannot be properly appreciated. There are many things which could not be told about the navy at this time without affording valuable information to the enemy, but there are some facts which can be given, and these are perhaps sufficient to give a general idea of results accomplished. In warfare results alone count; speculation as to what may be or what might have been is footless. The navy's balance sheet must be judged as it stands, and the public can see for itself whether the goods have been delivered.

Has Twofold Task to Perform.

First of all, it is important to understand that the navy from the beginning of the war has had a twofold task to perform: vitally important major functions; and secondary functions, important of course, but relatively unimportant in comparison with the former.

The vital functions have been—and still are—the following:

Assisting in the aggressive campaign against the U-boats.

Protecting troop transports and ships carrying all necessary supplies—in other words, keeping the lanes of transatlantic travel open between Europe and America.

Being ever ready for battle with the German high seas fleet.



KING GEORGE RECEIVED BY REAR ADMIRAL RODMAN
ON THE FLAGSHIP OF THE AMERICAN BATTLESHIP SQUADRON
IN BRITISH WATERS

BRITISH OFFICIAL PHOTO.

The secondary functions:

Protecting our coast against annoying raids.

Assisting coastwise and other shipping to guard against attack by U-boats and assisting the flow of commerce generally, whether or not important war issues were involved.

It is easy to realize that the vital functions had precedence. Success of the German U-boat campaign in the war zone would have rendered useless all our efforts to train and transport troops and would have made it impossible to keep supplies flowing to Europe. The Germans counted on this campaign to nullify America's efforts, and thus to be the vital factor in the war.

Now it is very clear that these enemy hopes have gone glimmering. We know that the U-boat campaign is still an embarrassment, still a danger, but it is no longer a capital military factor. We are inclined to accept this highly important development thankfully, without inquiring how the result has been brought about.

But any officer of the Royal Navy or the French Navy or the American Navy knows the curbing of the U-boat campaign did not come about through mere chance or through lack of enemy efforts to make the submarine deadly and decisive. The U-boat is beaten, but beating it has taken the best cooperative efforts of the Powers associated against Germany. The American Navy was the force which tipped the scales against the U-boat, just as Amer-

Sweeping Up the Army's Path to France

ica's soldiers next year will tip the scales against the Prussian landgoing war machine.

The American Navy's accomplishment in helping to nullify the U-boat campaign is now apparent, and as matters stand now the plan which Secretary Daniels followed seems like the essence of simplicity and common sense. But it must be remembered that this plan had to be conceived long before any of the present results could appear. We are reaping now the benefits of a policy decided upon nearly a year and a half ago, and had that policy been different—as some at that time thought it should be—the whole course of the war and the

map of the world might by now have been radically changed.

When the United States became a belligerent, and even before it was known that any American troops were to go abroad, the navy had to decide upon its general course of action. There was throughout the country a general feeling that our armed forces should be primarily used to protect ourselves. Rumors were current that U-boats would strike at points on our coast; shipping was alarmed; our methods of guarding our long stretch of coast line were necessarily inadequate. By employing every ship in the navy and commandeering other available vessels we might have been able to insure a partial protection. Besides, our entrance to the war had been forced by Germany's insistence on attacking American vessels, and many believed that the navy's first move should be to safeguard these vessels. Of course the skipper of every American ship plying the Atlantic wanted protection.

Keystone of Naval Policy Sounded.

In view of all this, it took farsightedness and conviction to decide at once upon the sending of American destroyers—the most efficient craft to cope with U-boats—off to the war zone in European waters. The sending of the first six destroyers sounded the keynote of our naval policy. Armed naval guards for shipping, coast protection, &c.,