

The Anti-Slavery Bugle.

SALEM, OHIO, MARCH 31, 1855.

LETTER FROM JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS.

JERFESSON, March 20, 1855.

Mr. Robinson—

In the Bugle of Saturday last you say he (Mr. Giddings) repudiated the "higher law" and put the pro-slavery portions of the Constitution in its place. Will you be more specific and say when and where and in what language, I repudiated the "higher law"? Or put portions of the pro-slavery Constitution in its place? You say, "Mr. Giddings is careful again to disclaim all purpose to prevent this pirate traffic in Christian men and women, provided these christianized chattels are taken to market by land and not by sea."

Commerce in the language of the Constitution can only be carried on in property, which is held by all advocates of freedom to be distinct and entirely separate from persons. The Constitution nowhere admits that it is possible for man to be made property. Mr. Madison said in the convention "It would be wrong to admit in the Constitution that man can be held as property." The States may in their individual capacity declare men, or angels, or Deity to be property. For I understand man to be constituted of mind, intellect, spirit, soul and the body is the mere tenement, the residence in which the man dwells for a time only. Now to speak of a commerce in spirits whether mortals or angels would be to me just as absurd as it would be to speak of a commerce in that Deity in whose likeness man was created. You appear to think the Constitution has authorized a Commerce, to be carried on in slaves, by land where you say, "If these slave mongers drive their manacled Chaffs with all their accustomed brutality over land from Norfolk to Savannah or Charleston it is the prosecution of a Constitutional Commerce with which Mr. Giddings will not meddle."

You may as well say that I would not meddle with the trade in Circassian slaves, carried on with Turkey. Congress has the same power to prohibit Circassian girls from travelling or being taken to Constantinople, as it has to prohibit slaves being taken from Norfolk to Charleston. Or you may as well say that I would not meddle with the sale and purchase of men and women by New Zealanders, for their "peculiar institution," as to say I would not meddle with this traffic. You could only have understood me as speaking on the subject of Legislation and not as expressing my own moral feelings when I uttered the words quoted. My moral sentiments were expressed when I said "the pirate who hangs at the yard arm on the coast of Africa is less guilty than the man who deals in slaves in this city." You could not have supposed me to believe that the crime of dealing in slaves was either enhanced or diminished by being committed on land. You must therefore of necessity suppose me to hold that Congress had not the Constitutional authority to prohibit the transit of slaves from one State to another. I have now reached a point on which I have long felt that you and other Editors have done injustice to members of Congress. I do not impute to you or others intentional injustice. While speaking or acting on the subject of legislation we speak and act under the limits, and restrictions of the Constitution. Were we to attempt legislation beyond its boundaries such legislation would not only be void but would render Congress contemptible. No one, for instance pretends that Congress possesses the power to abolish Slavery in Cuba. Yet you and other Editors assail us for admitting that we have no power over Slavery in the States, or over the internal slave trade between the States. Neither you nor any other man will attempt to point out any more authority in the Constitution for Congress to legislate for the abolition of Slavery in the States or the internal slave trade between them. Yet while you and I think all intelligent men admit that Congress has no such power, I have long seen myself and others assailed for admitting this obvious truth, and saying that we do not intend to usurp power, even to abolish Slavery, where we have not constitutional authority to do so, and while we thus express our views of the constitutional limitations of power, we are held up to the public as expressing our "moral feelings," that we are willing Slavery shall exist in the States. I repeat, you may as well charge me with willingness that the New Zealanders shall kill and eat each other because I do not urge congressional legislation to prohibit Cannibalism in those islands, as to charge me with willingness to meddle with the slave dealer who drives his galle of Christian humanity from Richmond to Charleston. When you represent me as saying that "we will restore the fugitive law of '93, you do not fairly represent what I said. Indeed I did not use the language imputed to me. I was speaking not my own opinions nor my own views. I was uttering the present popular sentiment of the north, when I said "the further extent to which we will go will be to restore the law of '93." Every reader who will glance at the remarks as reported will see that I regarded the law of 1793, as perfectly useless, obsolete and void. The fact that I said to southern men, "if you can catch your slaves when they get into our northern States do it," I spoke the language of challenge, of defiance. To me it appears impossible that any other construction could rationally be placed upon my language yet speaking of me you say, "he consented to lay aside his manhood, his moral principles, his self respect, to say, "if you can catch your slaves when they get into our northern States do it."

I would not be sensitive over criticism, but I appeal to your readers whether in the remarks I made I justly incurred the imputations of having in any degree laid aside my "manhood" or my "self respect" or my "moral principles."

Again when I told the fugitive to defend himself for the purpose of inspiring him with manly dignity; and added "were I in your place I would defend my liberty while I could wield a weapon," all will see that I did it to impress him still farther with the importance of defending his own manhood. For the same purpose I told him "I cannot defend you," for I could not go with nor could I attend him on his journey. In doing this did I lay aside my own manhood. I did not say what I would do if present when a slave catcher shall arrest a man, would you say whether I would

defend him or not, that would depend entirely on circumstances. If I believed my defence would prove effective I might exert it. But sir before I go further let me ask you, have you done even this? Have you ever placed the deadly weapon in the hands of the flying bondman? Have you endeavored to nerve him up to the defence of his own humanity? Have you ever told him you would defend your own liberty while you could wield a weapon? Please give categorical answers to these questions. You indeed misrepresent facts. You say, "the helpless man invoked my aid," (evidently meaning my assistance in defending him.) Not so, I stated that he came to consult me as a lawyer, he sought my advice not my defence of him. I gave him what he sought. He armed himself he protected his liberty, he maintained his manhood. His object was effected, and so was mine, no law, no constitution was violated, no right was trampled upon. The man is now enjoying his freedom while you assail me for putting him in the way to effect his own emancipation, because it was not done in your way. And permit me to say, that in my opinion if you and all the friends of humanity would arm the fugitives, encourage them to defend themselves as they have the most obvious right to do under the "higher law," under the Constitution and under the law of '93. I think few, very few would be carried back to bondage.

You say "and these he informs his hearers, are the opinions of the Anti-Slavery party." You have no right to thus misrepresent me. I did not speak of, or for the Anti-Slavery party. I stated at the outset, that I would speak "the Northern sentiment prevailing in the free States no far as I understood it." Having quoted Mr. Gerry, who declared in convention that slavery was a state institution, that while the federal government had no jurisdiction over it, we should be careful to lend it no sanction," I added "the freedom of the free States is not to be sacrificed to the doctrine," I did not speak of the Anti-Slavery party, and I continued to speak of the "people of the free States and not of the Anti-Slavery party. In saying "our people," I include the great mass of our northern population; and when in the course of my remarks, I used the pronoun, "we," I referred, to the people, the whole people of the northern States, as I did at the commencement, and the instance I gave of my own personal advice to the slave was given merely as an illustration of the popular feeling.

Now, sir I may be in error, my views of the Constitution may be wrong, all I can say is, that my opinions have been formed after long investigation and much thought, and whether right or wrong, they are the convictions of my heart. If you or any other person dissents from them, I have no right to assail you for it, I respect you as honest men, and will courteously interchange sentiments with you. If you possess higher, more enlightened views than I do, go forward, wield them for humanity, make war on oppression in precisely the mode which your own judgement dictates. Strike for liberty, wage unceasing battle against Slavery. While you are denouncing the common enemy I will discharge the small arms at my command into the thickest ranks. I will so far as I can disable him; but rest assured my dear sir, that I will not turn aside to commence a fire upon you; nor will I attempt in the heat of battle to dictate to you the manner in which you shall carry on this warfare. I have neither time nor disposition to enter into contest with any friend of freedom, I prefer to exert what power I possess against the enemies of liberty. I may not be able to think your thoughts to speak your words or to do your work. God has intended you to perform that duty. Were I to lay aside my own judgement in order to carry out your views my identity would cease. I should become a collateral appendage to yourself. I should no longer be a man.

Very respectfully,
J. R. GIDDINGS.

REPLY TO MR. GIDDINGS.

DEAR SIR: With you, I acknowledge the importance of the most vigorous and unceasing warfare against the enemies of Freedom. With you, I disclaim any attempts at dictating to my fellow soldiers the manner in which the warfare shall be waged—and with you, too, I should deplore the loss of any man's individuality, as with it I am sure he would lose his efficiency and usefulness. In addition to our warfare upon the enemies of freedom, I recognize it as the right and duty of every abolitionist, fraternally and faithfully to mark and criticize the position of every fellow soldier, especially those of commanding position and influence. The necessity for this originates in the fact that slavery, with which we contend, is the veritable "sociability of unrighteousness." That it has deceived the very elect friends of Freedom, inducing them often to build up the course they have honestly and earnestly labored to destroy. An additional cause for this watchful criticism is the fact, that slavery comes with its especially adapted temptations, to every man in every position. In such case, a brother occupying another position, may sooner or more clearly see the danger, and give timely warning, and thus may we all be of real service to each other, and to our common cause.

In the discharge of this duty, I wrote the article to which your strictures refer—not with any purpose of misrepresenting your words or positions, or of assailing you for aiding in the emancipation of a slave, or of any other like noble work. And I now request the readers of the Bugle to correct, in the light of your own statements, any error into which I have fallen. I thought, that among the many excellent things you said, in your answers to Mr. Letcher's interrogatories, you also assumed positions which you had previously occupied, calculated to thwart your own and others' efforts in behalf of freedom. Hence the remarks you criticize. I think so still. While I answer your questions, and comply with your requests, I must therefore maintain my position.

You ask for "categorical answers" to the following questions. I will oblige you by giving them, though I do not see their relevancy to the questions at issue between us.

Speaking of a slave in danger of arrest, you say, "I cannot say what I would do." "If I believed my defence would prove effective, I might exert it." Then you ask:

"Have you done even this?"

A. If you mean to ask if under the circumstances I "might" defend the fugitive, I answer, I would do it, without restraint from the Constitution, or the penalty of the law of '93.

Q. "Have you ever placed the deadly weapon in the hands of the flying bondman?"

A. Never. Never was I for a moment the owner of a deadly weapon, either dirk-knife, sword, gun, or revolver.

Q. "Have you endeavored to nerve him up to the defense of his own humanity?"

A. Yes; many a time and often, and shall do so again.

Q. "Have you ever told him you would defend your own liberty while you could wield a weapon?"

A. Can't answer positively, either in the affirmative or negative, as I cannot now recall all my conversations with fugitives. I think it very likely I never did, as it never occurred to me as important in such connection, till your question suggested it. I will, however, give it the consideration it merits, when I next have opportunity to converse with a fugitive.

I stated that you repudiated the higher law, and put pro-slavery portions of the Constitution in its place. You ask, "when?" "where?" and "in what language?"—"Will you be more specific?"

I will; though I thought I was sufficiently so before. It is not my wont to make as grave a charge, without what I think good authority.

The higher law, which you are charged with setting aside—what is it? In regard to the fugitive slave, it is this:

"Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee: he shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best."

Such is the law of Moses—such the higher law—the law of God.

The pro-slavery article of the Constitution which is at war with, and which you, sir, substitute for this higher law, says of escaping servants:

"They shall not be discharged from service or labor, but shall be delivered up."

Certainly these two laws are conflicting, and the latter is in such language that it might seem intended to repeal the former. As I understand your language on various occasions, you propose that, in some form, the people shall discharge this constitutional obligation. Hence the charge. I will be specific, and give what is reported to be your own language.

In your answer to Mr. Letcher, you say:

"We will live up to all our constitutional obligations."

On the 4th of July, in the city of Providence, R. I., you said:

"Let no man say that we intend to violate the Constitution in any particular."

That these declarations are to be specifically applied to the fugitive clause, is manifest from what follows in the same speech. You say:

"In my view of this matter, I agree with Henry Clay." He said, the Federal Government gave to Congress no power but that of direct taxation, and the return of runaway slaves. "Aside from this," said he, "it has no power over the institution of slavery." To-day, my friends, I repeat that doctrine.

Again, in the same speech:

"Let me be understood. Whenever we have legislated on this subject, [slavery] we have violated the Constitution. I mean with no exceptions, save the return of fugitive slaves."

Again, at the same time and place:

"Now, my friends, the reform we propose is, to restore the Constitution to its pristine purity, to repeal the present fugitive slave law, and reinstate the law of 1793, which leaves the master the liberty to come and catch his slave, if he can get him."

On other occasions, also, you say you have proposed to reinstate the fugitive law of 1793. Whether that law is in harmony with the higher law, our readers can judge for themselves, after reading it. I copy it below in a note. Let them, if they please, take your own synopsis of the provisions of that law—your anti-slavery interpretation of it—and still I am sustained in the charge I have made.

In a letter over your own signature, published in the Bugle of Sept. 9, 1854, speaking of the fugitive law of '93, you say:

"It prohibited the people of the free States from secreting the slave. 2d. From defending the slave. 3d. From rescuing the slave from his master. And you should have added, left the whole territory of the free States open as a hunting-ground for his pursuer. The higher law says the fugitive shall dwell with you. You, sir, say, let the hunter come and get him, if he can. Let him take him if he can, while we Northern people will regard our constitutional obligations, refusing to secrete him from the hunter—to defend him from his more than murderous assault—or to rescue him when once in the clutches of the villain. Yes, and will impose a fine upon all men or women whose divine impulses of humanity compel them thus to aid the oppressed and hunted against the oppressor."

Again, on the same 4th of July, you make Judge M'Lean's language your own, and say:

"In the emphatic language of Judge M'Lean, of the Supreme Court, 'No man has a right to interfere between a slave and his master; neither to secrete a slave from his master, nor defend a slave from his master, nor to rescue a slave from the possession of his master.' And there our duty ends, and the duties of the Federal Government end there also."

And I should suppose that the slave master had reasonable cause to be satisfied that it should end there. The master's absolute right is conceded—"no man has a right to interfere between the slave and his master." What could the slaveholder ask more?

In the next sentence of this speech, as reported, you proceed to say:

"The whole object of the clause in respect to fugitives is, to prevent Northern men from acting

"Sec. 3. And be it also enacted, That when a person shall be held in any of the United States, or in either of the territories on the northwest or south of the river Ohio, under the laws thereof, shall escape into any other of the said States or territory, the person to whom such service or labor may be due, his agent or attorney is hereby empowered to seize or arrest such fugitive from labor, and to take him or her before any judge of the Circuit or District Courts of the United States, residing or being within the state, or before any magistrate of a county, city or town corporate, wherein such seizure or arrest shall be made, and upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate, either by oral testimony or affidavit taken before, and certified by, a magistrate of any such state or territory, that the person so seized or arrested, doth, under the laws of the state or territory from which he or she fled, owe service or labor to the person claiming him or her, and it shall be the duty of such judge or magistrate to give a certificate thereof to such claimant, his agent or attorney; which shall be sufficient warrant for removing the said fugitive from labor, to the state or territory from which he or she fled."

Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder such claimant, his agent or attorney, in so doing, or arrest or detain from their duty, or shall rescue such fugitive from such claimant, his agent or attorney, when so arrested pursuant to the authority herein given or declared; or shall harbor or conceal such person after notice that he or she was a fugitive from labor as aforesaid, shall, for either of the said offences, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars. Which penalty may be recovered by and for the benefit of such claimant, by action of debt in any court proper to try the same; saying, moreover, to the person claiming such labor or service, his right of action for or on account of the said injuries, or either of them.

Approved February 12, 1793.

In favor of the slave, and to leave a man the same right to chase a slave into your territory as he has to chase his horse."

The historic fact is, my dear sir, that the master had claimed and exercised just that right; and if I do not misunderstand your Providence speech, you propose he shall still exercise that right, "if he can." The Virginia may pursue his stray man, the Pennsylvania may his stray horse. The latter may coolly catch and bridle his animal—the former may catch and manacle his slave. Horse and man have a right to escape or resist if they can, but no one has a right to secrete or defend either the quadruped or the human chattel. The result would be, that if the slave were seized in an anti-slavery neighborhood, he would receive sympathy and aid despite the Constitution, and make good his escape. If in a pro-slavery community, the master would most likely succeed, and bear back his victim to chains.

Thus, my dear sir, have I endeavored to be specific, according to your request, in regard to time, place, and language. I regret to say that, in my opinion, your language justifies the charge. I am aware that you have repeatedly affirmed the supremacy of the higher law—that you have denounced slaveholding and slave-catching, and slave holders and slave-catchers, with burning indignation. I am aware that you have done these very things in documents from which I have quoted these pro-slavery declarations. I am aware that you have done it there clearly, strongly and unmistakably. But these pro-slavery declarations are also clear, strong and unmistakable. And the burden of the entire article you criticize, was the exposure of this very inconsistency. An inconsistency, as I think, most both desired. Against this charge of inconsistency you make no defence; nor am I able to see that such a defence is possible for one whose moral feelings are anti-slavery, and who yields allegiance to a Constitution acknowledgedly pro-slavery. I grant you have done the best you could, and all you could, under the circumstances; but that does not destroy the influence of your fatal concessions to slavery.

In reference to my remark that you decline interference with the inter-State slave trade, you say, "This remark implies that Congress has power to prevent persons from going by land from Virginia to South Carolina."

No. It implies that, very consistently with your other positions against the slave trade, you consent to be a party to a Constitution which permits this traffic, and recognizes these traffickers in human souls and sinews—these more than pirates, according to your "moral feelings," as co-equal participants in your National Government,—and as a necessary condition of this co-operation, governmental silence and non-interference is pledged and enforced. This inter-State traffic is at least so far constitutional, that it is tolerated without rebuke by the Constitution,—and those who practice it are admitted to the highest posts of honor and profit in the nation, instead of swinging at the yard-arm as pirates, as you say they deserve to do.

I wish it distinctly understood, that my objection to the position which you and others occupy is, that you have formed a union with slave traders, and that, by the terms of that union, you are compelled to say, as you said to Mr. Letcher, "So far as the transportation of slaves from one State to another, internally, is concerned, I have nothing to do." You purchase union with pirates by thus publicly pledging yourself to have nothing to do with their piracy.

You think I may as well find fault with you for non-interference with the trade in Circassian girls, or the traffic by New Zealanders, in their peculiar institution.

Not so. Whenever you, my dear sir, for the sake of political union with Turkish slave merchants and New Zealand cannibals, shall voluntarily take a solemn oath which binds you not to interfere with their piracy and murder, and when you shall welcome those Turkish pirates and New Zealand murderers, as your co-equal legislators, in the union thus formed—then will the cases be parallel. Till then your illustration fails of any force.

Certainly I did not suppose that the crime of dealing in slaves was enhanced by being committed on land, but I thought you grossly inconsistent in hanging one trader at the yard-arm, and welcoming another as an honorable member of Government. I thought, and still think, that gross wrong was done to your "moral sentiments," when you consented to hold them thus in subjection in your legislative capacity.

I am obliged to you, my dear sir, for specifically stating the subject of your grievance against myself and other editors. Certainly, for one, I have never intentionally done you injustice, though it may be that I have not at all times seemed to recognize, with sufficient distinctness, the distinction between you, as a legislator under the National Constitution, and your "moral feelings" as a man. Perhaps the preceding remarks may help you to perceive the true ground of our objection to your course. I do indeed recognize a heaven-wide difference between the "moral feelings" of every true and good man, and our "constitutional obligations" to the fugitive slave. And, as I have already said, my main charge is, that you hold those "moral feelings" in subjection, that you may discharge your legislative duties under the Constitution. In so far as this is true, you do give sanction to slavery—to its existence in the States—to the inter-State slave trade—and to the rendition of fugitive slaves—and in so far as you do this, you are unfaithful to liberty, and responsible for the continuance of those wrongs. Can the slave accept your plea of justification,—that you have no constitutional power—when by your oath of office you have voluntarily limited your power? You have laid down your power to secrete the slave, and then, when pressed by his pursuer on ground you have relinquished for the chase, you tell him you cannot secrete him—you will coolly tie your hands with the Constitution and the law of '93, and then complain that the endangered or seized victim, I can neither defend nor rescue you. I ask again, Can the slave receive such a plea? and do we, with whom you feel aggrieved, do either you or him injustice by refusing to admit it?

You say that my representation that you are willing to restore the law of '93 is erroneous. Certainly I understood your late remarks in Congress as expressing such a willingness. And so, I think, did your slaveholding auditors on that occasion. Perhaps I may be excused for so understanding the language then used, since at Providence you are reported to have said:

"The reform we propose is, to restore the Constitution to its pristine purity, to repeal the present fugitive slave law, and reinstate the law of 1793."

As a further apology for the representation of which you complain as not being fairly made, I present the following from your letter to Isaac Pierce, already referred to:

"Again, I have ever contended that there is no obligation resting on Congress to enact any law whatever on the subject, and that it was wrong to do so

Then, in Congress and out of it, I have contended for the total repeal of the fugitive slave law, and of all laws of Congress which support slavery. This has been for fifteen years the distinct avowal of my views, as I supposed them understood by all who read my speeches; and to reach that position, I have, on some occasions, proposed, as the first step, to discard the compromise of 1850 by a total repeal of the fugitive slave law, and, if necessary to attain that at this time, I would reinstate the act of 1793, as a temporary compromise, until public opinion should come up to the main point of a total separation of our Federal Government from all support of slavery."

You say you were not uttering your own views on the floor of Congress, but the popular sentiment of the North. I am glad to hear it, sir, for it indicates progress since last August—when you were willing to "reinstate" this "useless, inoperative, and void" law. May the whole Northern people speedily advance far beyond your present position, and resolve to tolerate no law which shall at all circumscribe their freest action in behalf of the bound or escaping slave.

You say you spoke in the language of "challenge of defiance," when you said to Southerners, "If you can catch your slaves, when they get into our Northern States, do it."

I admit your right to challenge the slaveholder to so unequal a contest with yourself, if so you choose to do. But I deny your right, under the fearful disadvantages, to make it for the escaped slave. With the Constitution and the law of '93 against him—with the popular sentiment, which you think approves that law, against him, after binding yourself and every man and woman in the nation to abstain from secreting, from aiding, and from rescuing him,—then to tell the slaveholder "if he can take him, to do it," seems to me a very questionable species of bravado. Under these very circumstances, slaveholders have come into our States and taken their victims back, and so would they do again; and it seems to me your position is one not free from responsibility for the melancholy event.

With regard to the case of the fugitive slave, I do not see that your explanation at all helps the matter. You informed him, "I cannot defend you." He came to you, as a lawyer, for advice. You gave it to him. What was that advice? Why, that "he should defend his own manhood while he could wield a weapon." As an anti-slavery lawyer, that was the only advice you could give him. That advice, given as a lawyer, was a confession on your part that he was an outlaw,—that your Constitution wickedly made him such,—that his only hope was in cunning and brute force,—and, from your closing remarks, one not acquainted with other declarations of yours, would infer that you deemed this nearly sufficient for such a case; for you tell us that if the friends of liberty would give similar advice, and arm the slaves, "few, very few, would be taken back to bondage."

Sir, I claim constitutional and legal protection for the fugitive. Not such as the law of '93 affords him, but such as shall enable him to cast aside his bowie-knife and revolver,—such as shall preclude the necessity of the murderous advice you gave the man, and permit him, in accordance with the higher law, to sit down among us "where it liketh him best,"—to sit quietly "under his own vine and fig-tree, with none to molest or make him afraid." I do not think that your "moral feelings" respond with cordial approval to this claim. But the unfortunate distinction which you have set up between yourself, the moral man, the friend of justice and liberty, and yourself, the legislator, sworn to discharge your constitutional obligations, has led you and others into a maze of inconsistency and contradiction, and holds you in a position sadly antagonistic to freedom.

You say I assail you for putting him, (the man) in the way to effect his own emancipation. Not so. I did not complain of you that you advised the man to defend himself. But I assailed your position of allegiance to a constitution and obedience to a law, which gave no protection to the slave and disarmed you for his defence. Submission to such a constitution I must contend is neither self-respectful nor manly. And when you shall stand in the presence of a human brother claimed as a slave, who shall need your aid, as you say this did not, the better impulses of your nature will impress you with the truth now unwelcome uttered.

You say "if you and all the friends of humanity would arm the fugitives and encourage them to defend themselves, I think few, very few would be carried back to bondage."

Permit me to reply to this, by saying that I think that if you and all the friends of freedom would unite to repudiate the law of '93 as well as that of 1850. If you would repudiate a pro-slavery constitution, if you would dissolve that Union which requires the rendition of the fugitive, and enforce silence and non-interference with the inter-State slave trade and with slavery itself with all its comprehensive enormities in the States, and then unite to establish a union for liberty, and adopt a Constitution which should protect the rights of all, without throwing the responsibility upon individuals, and making their liberty to depend upon their successful use of bowie-knives and revolvers,—then none would be carried back to bondage, and our soil would be everywhere unpolled by the tread of the ruffian man-hunter, and unstained by the blood of his victim.

ANTI-SLAVERY SALE IN BOSTON.—The managers of the Boston Anti-Slavery Bazaar, have since the close of their successful annual sale, received large collections of choice and elegant articles from Great Britain. These articles were delayed in consequence of the withdrawal of several of the Cunard steamships by the Government. These receipts were so valuable and attractive that the managers held another sale on the 14, 15 and 16, of the present month. The receipts of this sale amounted to \$614.57. A result highly satisfactory to those engaged in the enterprise.

JUDGE LORING.—The Massachusetts Legislature still keep this slave catching functionary in suspense regarding his fate. The majority of the committee which has his case under consideration, close their long report on the subject as follows:

"Allowing the trial to be held and conducted with soldiers, so as to outrage the sense of the people." After stating the fact, the committee ask, "Shall the poor trembling suppliant of the God-given boon of freedom plead on the soil of Massachusetts under the terror of dirks and pistols?" What though the judge who permits this be a United States commissioner.—Is it that he also should be a Massachusetts Judge of Probate?"

The report closes with this sentence:

"After having given this case of Judge E. G. Loring a long, faithful and impartial examination, your committee, in view of the facts and considerations set forth in his report, recommend that the accompanying address be sent to the Governor, requesting him, by and with the advice and consent of the Council, to remove Edward Greeley Loring from the office of Judge of Probate for the county of Suffolk."

WANTING IN PLUCK.

It seems that the Superior Court of Cincinnati, dodged the real question at issue, in the case of the colored man brought before them last week on a writ of Habeas Corpus. The law and the facts were all clear, and yet the Judges preferred to throw the responsibility upon the men themselves, and send them into slavery upon their declarations, made while under the restraint of the law and the terror of their Rev. master. The following from the Cincinnati Gazette, puts the matter in its true light:

THE RECENT HABEAS CORPUS CASE.

Editors.—Many thinking men here believe that two grave wrongs were done in the procedure and termination of this case.

The question was fairly put by our citizens to our judiciary, "whether a man held as a slave under the law of another State, but brought upon Ohio soil with the consent of the claimant, becomes by that act, free?"

A decision of this point, under the Constitution and laws of Ohio, was sought in one of their own courts, by citizens of Ohio. Several of our ablest jurists, unbiassed and for the simple love of freedom, elaborately argued the point. Very many men of Ohio earnestly awaited a decision. That decision has been withheld.

Again. With what propriety can a Judge, previous to decision rendered, put the question to an alleged slave, "are you willing to return with your claimant?"

If the man be free, why put the question? He is free to go or to stay, as he will. If he be a slave, the question is idle, and the reply valueless.—Whether he be free or not, to put the question previous to the declaration of his freedom, to a man in duress, subject to every influence of suggestion and of threat, which the pecuniary interest of the claimant may have led him to exert upon the prisoner, makes the reply necessarily a reply under duress.

What kind of a god is this idol slavery, that we should erect to it northern altars, and immolate thereon manliness and justice? Ours.

ROSETTA AGAIN ARRESTED.

In the Cincinnati Times of the 24th we find the following, from which we learn that the Rev. Henry M. Dennison is determined if possible to again enslave the emancipated girl Rosetta. We fear he may succeed as he has now a U. S. Commissioner to decide upon his claim. He ought to be arrested and punished as a kidnapper.

Close upon the heels of the late half dozen of "slave cases" has come another, which bids fair to create an excitement unequalled by any of its predecessors. The last case is one in which a girl sixteen years old named "Rosetta," has been arrested as a fugitive slave. Her claimant is the Rev. Henry M. Dennison, of Cincinnati, who was the Tyler. The most singular feature of the affair is, that the girl has once been declared free by an Ohio Court—she being no other than the one recently emancipated by Judge Jamison, of Columbus.

The decision was rendered about two weeks since, and until yesterday "Rosetta" resided with her guardian. Happening to call into the house of a neighbor, Dr. Coulter, on some errand, she was arrested while there by Deputy Marshal Bennett, assisted by ex-officio Cuthbert, of this city, who obtained entrance by pretending to wish to see the Doctor professionally. It seems that the Rev. Master, not content with the decision of the Probate Court, came before the United States Commissioner Penderly, and swore out a warrant for the arrest of the girl as a fugitive. The warrant was placed in the hands of the United States Marshal, and served as above. Rosetta was taken on board the train for this city, whence she arrived last evening. She was lodged in jail for safe keeping—word being given that the case would come up before Mr. Penderly this morning.

Happening in at the designated hour (ten o'clock,) we found that the examination had been postponed until Monday morning at 10 A. M., at which hour it will positively commence. The Commissioner's Court being superior to the Probate, it is not likely that the decision of Judge Jamison will influence Mr. Penderly in the least. As the case involves nearly the same point that the late labour corps did, no little interest and importance is attached to the result. Mr. Van Slyke asserts that "Rosetta" has no inclination to return to slavery, but prefers to live and die in a free State. In this respect at least the case stands different from that recently before the Superior Court.

ROSETTA'S CASE.—The latest account we have of this case in Cincinnati, is that the girl had a hearing before Judge Parker of that city on Tuesday, on a second writ of Habeas Corpus. Mr. Chase appeared in her behalf and made an able vindication of her right to freedom. Mr. Wolf of Louisville, the Rev. Kidnapper's lawyer refused to plead before the judge. He would be heard by the U. S. Commissioner. Judge Parker was to give his decision on Thursday. Here is a set and determined effort to trample under foot the laws of Ohio and substitute those of Kentucky and slaveholding.

JUDGE SWAN—AN EXPLANATION.

The last Columbus gives a satisfactory explanation, of Judge Swan's declining to issue a writ of habeas corpus, in favor of the girl recently released from slavery in that city. We copy its statement of the facts:

The Judges of the Supreme Court are authorized, with all other Judges, to let to bail all persons imprisoned in the county jail. They, however, do not deem it their duty, (at least Judge Swan does not,) to do so, in the case of the judges of the county in which they happen to reside, unless the local Judges are absent, or there is some other reason for their not acting. The facts in regard to the application to Judge S., in the case of the girl Rosetta, Amistad, were, as we are informed, these: The colored man called on Judge S., and stated to him that there was a slave in the city with her master, and that they desired to have proper steps taken to obtain her liberation. The Judge, without making any inquiry as to the facts told them that it would be necessary to employ a lawyer to draw up the proper papers to obtain a habeas corpus. They then inquired whether they should make the application to him (the Judge) for the writ. He, without examining to them the relation of the local judges to the local business, told them that Judge Jamison, and not himself, was the proper person to grant the writ and hear the cause, and as Judge Jamison was in the city, they ought to make the application to him. They accordingly obtained the writ from Judge Jamison.

If Judge S. had stated his ground of objection to acting in the case, it would have saved all misapprehensions as to his conduct.

FEMALE INDUSTRIAL BAZAAR.—We learn from the Philadelphia Woman's Advocate, that some of the friends of a more equitable remuneration for female labor have procured in that city spacious and pleasant rooms, for the sale of the products of female industry. The rooms are made attractive not merely by the goods exposed for sale but also by numerous pictures and other works of art with which they are adorned. The rooms are furnished with tables which are occupied by any females of good character who wish them, for the sale of their manufactures of whatever sort, useful or ornamental. A capital arrangement, as it seems to us.

MAINE.—Mr. Garrison has been on a lecturing tour into Maine. The last Liberator says, Maine, which has been so long backward in the cause of the slave, is evidently pressing forward to achieve the great work of emancipation.