Daily Appeal.

On Hearing Mrs. ——— say She never had a Friend.

BY MRS. S. A. MOTTE OF CHARLESTON, S. C.

There was a sadness in the words—
No restless murmuring—
Yet still the sigh seem to sway the chords
Upon my own heart strings—
As though the resolution brought
Some late dream of my own—
(From out the hidden cell of thought)
I dreamed but long since flown.

But late—say, oh! can it be
That she so blessed as thou
Had (true to own that word) for thee
One gift in wanting now?
Health, Beauty, Love—all these are mine,
Wealth, too, that worldliness prizes;
Oh! that still each another sighs—
Would that fear were to the skies!

Then art believed—oh! can there be
On earth self-sacrificing of thine?
Do not a second's mystery
That eight out equal life.

The garden, lady—that forget
My words of folly (pain)
I would not be a moment let
Regrets on thee to rain.
I wish to share thy blissful smile,
And thought thee like the rest,
Wouldst need some one to share the while,
With life weal and best.

Its light within thy sparkling eyes,
Has gone upon thy cheek,
Which speaks aloud a varied prize,
Of deep emotions—pleasure.
Are there no deeper sympathies
Now stirring at thy heart?
I know a depth of feeling thine
Unnerved, save in part.

Though many cares of happiness
Upon thy path lie wait;
Though flowers of hope and loveliness
Are springing in thy trodden—
With all the joy—thought not known
Pure friendship's holy power,
With soothing word, and gentle tone,
To cheer the adverse hour.

Sweet lady! there are not thy share—
The lone world's lone heaved
Thy heart would sing for much, I fear,
In this intense neither bound.
Believe, then, God has wisely given
Such blessings to thee here,
That looking one, there'll turn to Heaven,
And find it dwelling there.

The Purchase of Cuba.

The following is a full synopsis of the reports which accompany the bills introduced in the House and in the Senate from their Committees on Foreign Relations, making an appropriation of thirty million dollars to facilitate the acquisition of the island of Cuba by negotiation:

Mr. Slidell, of Louisiana, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill to king appropriations to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba by negotiation, reported that it is not consid red necessary by the Committee in so urge upon the vast importance of the acquisition of Cuba. Its ultimate acquisition may be considered a fixed purpose of the United States—a purpose resulting from political and geographical necessities which have been recognized by all parties and administrations, and to regard to which the popular mind has been expressed unanimously. The purchase and annexation of Louisiana led, as a necessary corollary, to Florida, and both point with unerring certainty to Cuba. What the possession of the mouth of the Mississippi was to the West, Cuba would become to the nation. Of a healthy and vigorous offspring, endowed with a sedimen and perseverance to hasten the consummation. [Here are quoted the opinions of Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Clay, Van Buren, and Mr. Buchanan his ispatch to Mr. Sanders, of Mr. Ewerett in his letter to Count Sartiges, and of Mr. Molony in his dispatch to Mr. Soulé.] From these authorities it seems that not but the ultimate acquisition of Cuba has long been regarded as not only desirable, but inevitable. The only difference is the time mode and conditions of obtaining it.

The sw of our national existence is a growth we cannot stay, sober. While we should not indulge slepless, we should be careful not to impose upon ourselves a regimen so strict as to prevent its healthful development. England, France and Russia are all expanding by the same law of progression; but their growth is the absorption of weaker powers, while ours is the result of geographical position, higher civilization, and greater aptitude for government. We have neither the right nor the disposition to interfere with them. Let England pursue her annexation in India; France in Africa, or on the Rhine; let Russia subdue barb tous Asia, and we shall look on their progress, if not with favor, at least with indifference. We claim on this hemisphere the same privilege. We repeat that it is but a question of time. The fruit that was not ripe in John Quincy Adam's day, is now mature, and the question is, shall it be plucked by a friendly hand, prepared to compensate its proprietors with a princely guerdon, or shall it fall to the ground? As Spain cannot long maintain her grasp upon it, there are but three alter n ives.

First—The possession of Cuba by one of the great Eu ropean Powers, which is incompatible with our own safety, and must consequently be resisted.

Second—The independence of the island, which would result in a protectorate more or less direct and. If under ours, annexation would follow; if under European, civil and servile wars would ensue.

The third is an exa ion.

And the question is, how is this to be done? The answer is, by conquest or negotiation. Congress even without the bottle in effrance of other powers than Spain, would be expensive, as well as semi-interference would involve the other nations concerned in war. Fortunate, in the only practicable course; but that cannot be attempted with success unless the President be vested with the powers to negotiate and pay, as he has suggested in his message. Much has been said of the danger of confiding such powers to the Executive; but we have three examples in Louisiana, Florida and Mexico.

Much has also been said of the indelicacy of the offer—of it would wound the Spanish pride, and be rejected with contempt. For many years has our desire to make the purchase been known to the world. We simply say to Spain, Sell. You have an island you hold by a precarious tenure, which is almost in ly unable to cafor the protection of our commerce, and which may, from its peculiar geographical position, claim a population and mod—to which it is governed, lead at any time to a rupture, which both nations would deprecate. The possession yields you a net revenue annually, on an average series of years, to one-h tified h part of the price we offer you for it. True, you have refused to sell hitherto; but circumstances are changing daily, and our offer may now be more acceptable then in 1848.*

Should war break out in Europe, Spain can scarcely hope to escape being involved in it, and the Cubans may seize the opportunity to proclaim their independence. Further, our Minister will not broach the subject of purchase till he has reason to believe it will be favorably entertained. Spain is a country of cosmopolitan and prospective—the children of to-day may be a fugitive to-morrow. With the forms of a responsible government, Spain is a despotism sustained by the bayonet. Her financial condition is one of extreme embarrassment, and a crisis may arise when the dynasty may be overth own unless a large sum of money can be raised forthwith. The President says we must not, if we could, seize Cuba first act by bona ide negotiation, and he will to expar from such a course under circumstances, we do not, he does not, anticipate, render the d par ure justifiable under the supervision and over-ruling law of self-preservation. He tells us I may be necessary to renew negotiations and make in advance without waiting the ratification by the Senate. This, in point of fact, is no appeal to Congress for an expression of its opinion on the propriety of entering the negotiation. Should we fail to give him be ause he will consider it as intimation that we do not desire the acquisition of the island.

The report then goes on to say that if, as has been said, the Cubans do not desire a transfer, it would be a true service to them to do the measure; but he Cubans would be less than men if they were contented with their lot, and the moment they have the sufficient authority for asserting that nearly the entire population of Cuba desire an annexation. The report then proceeds at considerable length to discuss the bearing of annexation on the slave trade, stating that "that illegal traffic is now confined to Cuba and Porto Rico, and that Spain could have long suppressed it as completely as Brazil has done, but has not done so. Therefore, those who desire to extirpate the slave trade, may find, in their scoups by fe the African, an ally in the cause of humanity."

Then, arising round, the report proceeds to refer the mind of Sir Henry Bulwer, the approved friend of Spain, and a peri ds their institution from the different channels which Cuba may be embarrassed with a coolness and perseverance to hasten the consummation. [Here are quoted the opinions of Bulwer, Calhoun, Clay, Van Buren, and Mr. Buchanan his ispatch to Mr. Sanders, of Mr. Everett in his letter to Count Sartiges, and of Mr. Molony in his dispatch to Mr. Soulé.] From these authorities it seems that not but the ultimate acquisition of Cuba has long been regarded as not only desirable, but inevitable. The only difference is the time mode and conditions of obtaining it.

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