THE MEMPHIS DAILY APPEAL.

BY M'CLANAHAN, TROUSDALE & DILL. MEMPHIS, THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 1860. VOLUME XI.—NUMBER 81.

Daily Appeal.

THE ITALIAN QUESTION.

Count Cavour's Reply to the French Government.

The following note from Count Cavour, addressed to M de Kigra, at Paris, dated 20th February, has been published in reply to the message of Mons. Thouvenel to Baron Talleyrand:

MONS. LE CHEVALIER: Baron Talleyrand came yesterday to read me a despatch which his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Emperor of the French has transmitted to him, with the copy of an official paper which he has addressed to Count Persicny, relating to the course which he judges necessary to issue from a situation all the more dangerous the more confused it becomes.

In the despatch which Baron Talleyrand has just read to me, M. de Thouvenel justly thinks that the moment has arrived for every one to explain himself with the Italian Court, plain without reserve the thought of the French government, in order that the Cabinet of Turin may judge for itself of the measures by which it would be most suitable to regulate its own conduct.

Not to endanger the results of the war, and to act that they should be recognized by Europe, by placing them under the sanction of international law—such is the double object which M. de Thouvenel assigns to the policy of France in Italy. He engages the Turin Cabinet to associate itself to the measures by which he proposes to attain this double end, at the same time leaving us free to follow, without the co-operation of France, a different line of conduct.

Regarding the present situation as the turning point of a historical period without analogous terms previously marked for its duration, M. De Thouvenel believes that, above all, it is necessary to eliminate the elements of perturbation which, at home as well as abroad, might impede the regular and pacific development of the order of things prevailing in Italy. A too great extension of the territory of Sardinia, which would impose on her the task of a too laborious assimilation, appears to M. de Thouvenel the most dangerous of these elements of perturbation. According to Mons. Thouvenel, Sardinia, if excessively aggrandized, would be led away by the unreflecting ardor of its new peoples, to adopt a line of direct her policy, and her centre of action would be displaced. M. de Thouvenel thinks that it is hatred to Austria which has brought towards Sardinia the population of Central Italy, and he consequently believes that the annexation of all these provinces would place the King's government in the necessity of choosing between war and revolution.

Influenced by these considerations the French Government proposes:

1. To recognize immediately the annexation of the Duchies of Parma and Modena.

2. To give to Sardinia the temporal administration of the Romagna, under the form of a Vicariat, which, according to M. de Thouvenel, would give satisfaction to the catholic and municipal feeling of the population, at the same time respecting the high suzerainty of the holy See.

3. To re-establish the autonomy of Tuscany, the population (even at least, in the opinion of M. de Thouvenel) by no means shares the desire of absorbing in a more extended kingdom its noble and glorious traditional individuality.

After having explained the combination, M de Thouvenel adds, that France would engage to support it in a congress or in a conference, that she would even, if circumstances should rise of a nature to place obstacles to the execution of this plan, in order that Sardinia, on after her to these proposals, should have France behind her and with her.

In the contrary hypothesis, the French government would take its own interests as the only guide as regards its conduct, and thinks it would reassume the independence of its policy in order to disengage its responsibility, and place itself out of the reach of all complication.

Reserving myself to treat in another dispatch the arguments which have reference to Central Italy, I hasten at this time to make you acquainted, M le Chevalier, with the answer which his Majesty's government deems it its duty to return to these propositions, which have made the subject of serious examination and conscientious discussion. Emanation from a Government which has so many claims on the gratitude of Sardinia, and the benevolent attitude of which for the condition of Italy cannot be called in question, the King's Government naturally disposed to receive these observations in the most favorable manner.

In spite of that disposition, the Cabinet (whose President Thouvenel has spoken to) has come to the conviction that their realization would encounter serious difficulties, which it is beyond the power of the King's Government to overcome; and this is in consequence of the following considerations, the force of which, I hope, M. de Thouvenel will appreciate:

I do not mean to go deeply into the discussion of the propositions which have been communicated to me. Whatever objections they may present, and some of which I shall point out hereafter, it is certain that they contain a solution much more advantageous for Italy than that which we were permitted to hope for the day after the peace of Villafranca.

The complete destruction of Austrian influence on the right bank of the Po, the exclusion of every thought of restoration, and, finally, a lay and liberal government secured to the Romagnas, are immense benefits, the importance of which we cannot refuse to admit. It is, therefore, possible that if this solution had been proposed in the month of August it would have been accepted, if not with enthusiasm, at least without repugnance by Central Italy.

That, however, cannot be the case at present. Sardinia may still, out of deference towards France, accept it; it is a fact in herself to concerned, in order to put an end to a precarious state of things, replete with danger and opposed to her interests; but it is not doubted that these propositions would meet in Tuscany, as in the Romagna, the most serious difficulties which the King's Government cannot hope to overcome.

The populations of these countries have been administered for more than eight months by a national Government, which has known how to conciliate the most ardent patriotism with a remarkable spirit of moderation and prudence. That conduct, to which M. de Thouvenel is pleased to render justice in his dispatch to the Marquis de Pepoli, has won for the populations of Central Italy the praise of the whole of Europe. The result is, that the feelings as to the rights of disposing of their own condition is strongly developed among them. It is strengthened by the assurance formally repeated by the Government of the Emperor, that it should never be permitted that any particular form of Government should be imposed upon them by force; it has acquired an irresistible right since the preference given to the four English propositions, the first two of which were accepted by France without reserve, and establish in a peremptory manner the principle of non-intervention.

With such a state of things before us, Sardinia must find herself in transmitting to the Governments of Central Italy the propositions of France, without letting them remain in ignorance of any of the motives which have led the Government of the Emperor, after mature reflection, to consider them as the solution most proper to secure the maintenance of peace by reconciling the interests of Italy with the exigencies of Europe. It is hardly probable that the Governments, the issue of popular suffrage, should take on then the responsibility of a resolution so grave, and which pronounces on the destiny of these populations.

They insist, naturally, as they have hitherto argued to do by the fourth English proposition, to consulting the nation, so as to obtain a manifestation of its wishes as complete and as unmistakable as possible. For that purpose they will, perhaps, adopt the means of universal and direct suffrage, as the one of which the result may be least contested.

The communication of which I have just spoken will be made this very day, either to M. Farini or Baron Ricasoli. If the French Government deems it necessary to advance any arguments or considerations which are especially applicable to Tuscany or to the Romagna, I shall lose no time in transmitting them to you, in order that, putting himself in a position to give the arguments such a force of publicity as M. de Thouvenel may deem fitting.

Yet I think it right to observe that if the proposition relative to the Romagna be presented in the form it assumes in the dispatch of M. de Thouvenel, we cannot ourselves take on ourselves to support it, or even to recommend it to the Romagnols. On his part, the holy father would probably give it a still less favorable reception than if the absolute separation of these provinces were in question.

The idea of a vicariat, implying that of a direct interference of the court of Rome in temporal administration, would encounter among the populations of those countries absolute resistance. It would be impossible to make them accept it otherwise than by force. Submitted to the test of popular suffrage, the proposition would hardly meet with any favor; and on this point there can be no sort of doubt. It is, moreover, evident that the holy father would not accept this combination, however inspired it might be by the desire of saving his rights, and of not lowering the high position which he occupies in Italy. What has, in point of fact, hitherto prevented his holiness from consenting, I do not say to measures calculated to limit his sovereign authority, but even to reforms which were suggested to him by all Europe, is the fear of incurring the responsibility of acts which, though in conformity with the principles in vigor in the greater part of civilized countries, might lead to certain results contrary to the precepts of religious morality, of which the sovereign Pontiff justly considers himself the supreme guardian. A very recent fact corroborates this assertion. When France put an end to the occupation of Rome she requested the holy see to form a national army like the other European powers. The Roman government replied that the holy father could not admit of recruiting, because it was very great to his conscience to subject a great number of his subjects to a military oath contrary. The institution of the Vicariat would not prevent over these scruples. The holy father, remaining the sole, the directly responsible for the acts of his Vicar, would certainly not allow the liberty of action necessary to permit the proposed plan to have any useful result.

I am of opinion that France proposing to herself to secure to the holy father certain advantages, and to preserve his high political sovereignty, the object would be attained without difficulty if the annexation were accomplished with the express reserve on the part of the King of Sardinia to negotiate with the Holy See, and to obtain its assent to the new state of things by means of certain obligations his Majesty would contract with it; these obligations to consist of the acknowledgment of the entire sovereignty of the Pope, and in an engagement to co-operate, even by force of arms, in the maintenance of his independence, and to contribute to a certain extent, toward the expenses of the court of Rome. According to these considerations, which cannot escape M. Farini, it is possible that, in order to obtain a more sincere manifestation of the wishes of the population, the Government of the Romagna will make no express mention of the vicariat in the proposition to be submitted to universal suffrage. If, however, M. Thouvenel is of a contrary opinion, I think that M. Farini would make no difficulty in proposing the form to which the court of Rome would give its conformity with the dispatch M. Thouvenel communicated to me. The proposition relative to Tuscany not giving rise to any misunderstanding, I have no more to make any observation on the form in which it is to be presented to the popular vote. Whatever may be the reply returned by the Sates of Central Italy, this King's Government at once declares that it will accept it unconditionally. If Tuscany declares for the preservation of her autonomy it appears to me, that we cannot any longer oppose it. Indeed, did we wish to do so, we could not. In the present state of public opinion, a ministry who would refuse a so-called demand for annexation, sanctioned by a second popular vote on the part of Tuscany, not only would no longer find support in Parliament, but would, perhaps, be overthrown by a unanimous vote of censure. In accepting beforehand the contingency of annexation, the king's government takes upon itself an immense responsibility. The formal declarations contained in the dispatch of M Thouvenel to Baron de Talleyrand, render, it is aware, the dangers much more serious which it may produce. If I do not recede before them, it is because it is convinced that by rejecting the cession of Tuscany, not only the cause, but King Victor Emanuel himself, would lose all influence and all moral authority in Italy, and would probably be reduced to the alternative of yielding by force. Rather than hazard in such a manner the great work of regeneration for which France has made so many generous sacrifices, the honest, and even the interest, well understood, of our country, urge the King and his Government to expose themselves to the most perilous chances. I venture to flatter myself that M. de Thouvenel will appreciate the motives which engage us to follow the line of conduct I have traced out, and, which would be contrary to behave that we are taking a wrong course, that he will kindly do justice to the sentiments which prevent us from conforming entirely to the counsels which come from a government for which we are accustomed to see such sympathy as deference.

After having explained with entire frankness the intention of the King's Government, I think it my duty, before I conclude this despatch, to add some reflections on the proposal to restore to Tuscany her autonomy, in which the minister of foreign affairs of the Emperor appears to attach a great importance. M. de Thouvenel fears that a too great extension of Sardinia would render the task of the King's Government more difficult, and expose it to be led away by the extreme parties who would be able to find in it a sufficient counterpoise in monarchial traditions and in the conservative instincts of the of Provinces of Piedmont. I confess that I cannot participate in these fears. If the annexation of Central Italy takes place, Tuscany, very probably, will form the province which will strengthen the conservative party in the Subalpine kingdom. The constitution of property, the morals of the inhabitants, and their disciplined traditions, concur to giving that country a marked superiority to the national element which the moderate party. The events of 1848, and still more those which have occurred within the last year, prove that the population of Central Italy, and be consequently believes that the annexation of all these provinces would place the King's government in the necessity of choosing between war and revolution.

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THE HERO OF THE FIGHT IN THE GULF.—The Philadelphia *Press* noticing the news from the Gulf says:

Capt. Thomas Turner, of the United States sloop of war Saratoga, a citizen of Pennsylvania, (his family now residing in Philadelphia,) led in the attack on the corsairs. He is one of the last men to act without orders, or without full reflection and ample provocation. He is, although attached to a warlike branch of the public service, in every sense of the word a Christian gentleman, an active and conscientious member of the Episcopal church, and a servant of the strictest moral department. No officer in the navy is more thoroughly versed in maritime law, or more familiar with current events.

TOO MONEY TO BE GRATEFUL.—The Liverpool *Mercury* says a young lady, the eldest daughter of a well known politician, of honor, was so deep a sleeper that it was always difficult to wake her; and to the year 1858 a fire broke out in the family mansion, when a male domestic burst into her room, and snatching her as she lay in bed, conveyed her to a place of safety. Strange to say, the lady's high sense of modesty caused her preserver to be discharged from her father's service. The lady is still unmarried, but the man who risked his life to save that of his mistress, has been rewarded by a legacy of £500, bequeathed him by his late master.

The Memphis Appeal.

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SPACE	1 DAY	2 DAYS	3 DAYS	4 DAYS	5 DAYS	1 WEEK	2 WEEKS	3 WEEKS	4 WEEKS	1 MONTH	2 MONTHS	3 MONTHS	6 MONTHS	1 YEAR
1	3 00	4 00	5 00	6 00	8 00	10 00	12 00	15 00	18 00	20 00	30 00	40 00	50 00	75 00
2	4 00	6 00	7 50	9 00	12 00	15 00	18 00	20 00	25 00	30 00	40 00	50 00	75 00	100 00
3	6 00	8 00	10 00	12 00	15 00	18 00	20 00	25 00	30 00	35 00	50 00	60 00	90 00	125 00
4	7 50	10 00	12 50	15 00	18 00	20 00	25 00	30 00	35 00	40 00	60 00	75 00	100 00	150 00
5	9 00	12 00	15 00	18 00	20 00	25 00	30 00	35 00	40 00	50 00	75 00	90 00	125 00	175 00
6	10 00	14 00	17 50	20 00	25 00	30 00	35 00	40 00	50 00	60 00	80 00	100 00	150 00	200 00
7	12 00	16 00	20 00	24 00	30 00	35 00	40 00	50 00	60 00	70 00	100 00	125 00	175 00	250 00
8	13 50	18 00	22 50	27 00	30 00	40 00	45 00	50 00	65 00	80 00	110 00	135 00	200 00	300 00
9	15 00	20 00	25 00	30 00	35 00	40 00	50 00	60 00	75 00	90 00	125 00	150 00	225 00	350 00

☞ One square, renewable weekly, per annum $40.00
☞ Two squares, renewable weekly, per annum 60.00
☞ Three squares, renewable weekly, per annum 80.00

☞ All advertisements for the Special column to be handed in at the Clerk's desk.

☞ All transient advertisements must be marked for a specified time. When not thus marked, they will be charged until ordered out and discontinued at the end of that time.

☞ All advertisements required to be kept on second page, CHARGED AS NEW EACH DAY, and to be inserted in large type, charged at DOUBLE RATES.

☞ Fancy advertisements will be charged extra for display space over ordinary, and when TABLE TYPE is used, or to be used, or the advertisement occupies a portion of a page.

☞ Twenty advertisements will be charged extra at regular rates for Wedding Cards, Resolutions, Co-Partnership Notices, To Consumptives, etc.

☞ *Transient Advertisements must be paid for in advance.*

☞ Every member of the House knows, from the political life of Mr. Buchanan, in which he had filled, in the course of a long series of years, every position in the Government, from a judge to the highest, with honor and credit, honor to himself and to the advantage and credit of his Government, that he was the last man in Congress to attempt to approach, and approach another corruptly, and, consequently, they repelled these charges with the indignation and contempt which they properly merited.

Finding themselves in this unpleasant position, and aware that they were looked upon by the whole country as base and unprincipled calumniators, it became necessary for them men to put on a bold front, and to present to the country a seeming belief in their wild and groundless. For this purpose, after the organization of the House, Mr. John Covode, who was one of the leading authors of the charges, moved for an investigating committee, which, was carried, and the Black-Republican Speaker, Mr. Pennington, appointing a committee to sit, placed Mr. Covode, its author, as the chairman, to preside upon the truth or falsehood of his own charges.

This committee, with all the zeal and with all the determination to sustain, in some possible way, at least, the charges which the charges made, which would reflect credit upon a "holy inquisition" of last age, have been for some time "in the full tide of successful experiment."

The President, not in behalf of himself, (for he courts investigation in the fullest and most manly manner, and, in fact, he joins with the view of arresting at once this highly outrageous insult upon the Chief Magistracy, and preventing the contrary action from becoming a precedent by which future Presidents may be annoyed, insulted, slandered, and degraded, twisted the eyes of the citizens of these United States and of the world, has sent this message to the House.

The defense of the rights and dignity of the office of the Chief Magistrate was eminently proper at this time, and will meet with, though not the full evil system of legislative slander, which gives consequence to rogue and unenlightened charges by appointing committees of investigation.

The document itself, like everything that emanates from the pen of that distinguished man, is marked with unexpanded ability.

It has become almost one of the "institutions" of this country, to abuse, slander, and, if possible, bring to disrepute the Chief Magistrate.

Every President, since the days of Washington, has been villified and attacked, and, as he is expected, the very best men have been those who were most abused. Jefferson, Jackson, and now Buchanan, have each in turn been the subjects of the most unreasonable; but, in the last instance, as in all the others, "the darts of malice will fall harmless at his feet."

A REMARKABLE WOMAN.—The Marietta, Ohio, papers give an account of a very remarkable woman who is now living in that city. Although now in rather reduced circumstances, she claims to be a lineal descendant of the "lords of England," and asserts that her mother's uncle was "King of England." Her life has been an exceedingly active one. She has been married four times, her third husband with whom she lived three years, had three other living wives, which she says is the most sorrowful features of her life. She has had twenty-nine children, of whom twelve were triplets. She has been twice entranced, one of which lasted two and the other three days, both times when she returned to consciousness she found herself emboldened for the grave. She is now about sixty years of age, and says in her youth she was remarkably active, and her present "good condition" warrants the assertion. One of her daughters, upon being interrogated as to the number of brothers and sisters she had, answered, "I cannot tell."

DEATH OF ONE OF LAFITTE'S MEN.—The Florida (Pensacola) Tribune of a recent date, contains an obituary of "Don Juan Riera," a native of Port Mahon in the Island of Minorca, who died at the residence of Reuben D. Ivy, Esq., in Baldwin county, on the 20th ult., aged more than eighty years. The writer states that in coming to America, he was captured by Lafitte and compelled to serve under him for some time. One day, however, while at Barataria bay, he obtained permission to go to New Orleans, under a plea of illness, and never went back. When in good health, he was never known to be idle an hour in the day; and he would work as any field laborer, when more than eighty years old, yet he never made more than a living. He had been a resident of Pensacola or its vicinity for more than thirty years.

MEN'S EYES WILL WANDER.—Show but a strip of white stocking above your boot, or a bit of an embroidered shirt, or a Balc oral, says Fanny Fern, and you will feel a New Yorker by the nose all over Manhattan, though all Wallstreet stand waiting for him. I have positively seen gentlemen standing at the ferry gates when their arms were half broken with bundles, eagerly bobbing their heads this way and that to catch a sight of the entire boots as they hitched into the various omnibuses. And not all young men either, but gray-headed old codgers, who had grandpa written all over them. Why should a woman care about it, if her ankles be pretty? "Care?" It may be just possible that if an exhibition is force-ordained and inevitable, she may prefer to choose her audience.

THE PRETTY DAUGHTER.—A good looking citizen of Kentucky, who, for several years, has taken some pride in cultivating a full crop of hair on his face, was called away from home on business some time since. While absent an inexperienced barber spoiled his whiskers in trimming them, which so chagrined him that he directed the barber to make a clean job of it by shaving whiskers and moustache both off. The barber obeyed, and our friend's face was as smooth and delicate as when he was in his teens. He returned home in the night. Next morning his little girl did not recognize him on waking up. Looking over her mother and seeing, as she supposed, a stranger in bed, she remarked in her childish simplicity: "Mister, get out of here; I'll tell pa on you when he comes home."

☞ Fanny Fern takes a sharp stick to male writers of "books of advice to women." She says "it is as if some storekeeper should cut out and make a quantity of ready dresses with hooks and eyes already to snap round customers. One won't meet at the bell; another is short in the skirt; another drags on the ground; another compresses the chest to suffocation; illusory man of speculation finally makes up his mind that it would have been best to let every woman take her own measure, instead of stifling through life in habits of his choosing, without regard to the way the Almighty put her together."

OIL MANUFACTORY IN ARKANSAS.—The Union Coal company, located at Camden, is said to be rapidly pressing with their works, and will in a short time be extracting oil from the lignite, of which large deposits exist in that neighborhood.

Professional Cards.

J. P. CANTRELL.....E. M. YERGER.....MOSES WHITE.
Caruthers, Yerger & White,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, Memphis, Tennessee.—Office in Hyde's Building.

H. R. FOLK,
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, Memphis, Tennessee. Gives prompt attention to collecting all claims placed in his hands, and remits daily. Office north side in Court Square.
Refers to Hon. J. P. Caruthers.

E. S. HAMMOND,
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, Memphis, Tenn. Office No. 5 M. Calhoun Block, corner Court and Main streets. Will attend to business entrusted to him in West Tennessee and North Mississippi.
Refers to Messrs. Bridges & Orgill, Memphis, Tenn.; Mess. Bridges & Marshall, Memphis, Tenn.; Mr. Thos. Barr, Memphis, Tenn.; Gen. Green B. Raum, Chicago, Attorney, Ripley, Miss.; Messrs. Jordan & Hillsman, Murfreesboro, Tenn.

S. W. HOLLAND, M. D.,
DENTIST, SURGEON AND ACCOUCHEUR, offers his professional services to the citizens of Memphis and vicinity. Office on Second street, between Madison and Monroe streets, adjoining Polk's Hotel. Hours from 8 to 12 A. M., and from 2 to 5 P. M. Can be found at his office when not professionally absent.

A. P. MERRIWEATHER,