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Daily Appeal.

UNION OR DISUNION.

AN ADDRESS TO THE DEMOCRACY OF VIRGINIA

From the Petersburg (Va.) Index, July 4

The undersigned, a committee appointed at a Democratic meeting recently held in the city of Petersburg, to ratify the nominees of the late national Democratic convention at Baltimore deeply impressed with the paramount necessity that Virginia should now, as in all times past, give the weight of her numerical strength and the greater weight of her moral influence, to the nominees of the national Democracy, beg leave to present to our fellow-citizens of the State some of the reasons which constrain us to adhere to our ancient party organization and support its unanimously accredited candidates.

Conceiving that our object can best be attained by a candid examination of the arguments presented by those who have attempted to adopt a different course, we shall follow, in the main, the address recently published by the seceding Virginia delegates, in vindication of their action—and examine whether the assertions of fact therein will bear the test of scrutiny; and whether, even if true, they will furnish the slightest excuse for their unprecedented action, and the attempted disruption of the national Democracy of the Union. We invoke from our fellow Democrats an unbiased consideration of the question, knowing that they have the independence to form the distinct judgment, and the resolution of their judgment to any issue. The first allegation of the address refers to the condition of things at the opening of the Charleston convention, and is worded in these terms:

"When the convention first assembled at Charleston, about one third of its members were the avowed and eager partisans of a northern candidate who remains the conspicuous champion of a political dogma, which has been condemned as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. As now urged, it has degenerated into a mere anti-slavery principle, trading to civilize parties by a geographical line. It is less candid, but not less sectional, than the leading text of the Republican party. In order to sustain that candidate, the leaders of his party in the convention were obliged to organize his partisans upon an unconstitutional principle and a sectional sentiment adverse to the South."

Now, whatever may have been the case elsewhere, it is a fact capable of authentication by a member of each one of the delegates sent from the Petersburg district to Charleston, in terms and in person, pledged themselves to give to the claims of this "conspicuous champion of a dogma condemned as unconstitutional" by the Supreme Court," a consideration equal to that which they would accord to any other Democrat, North or South, after their respective favorites. As Mr. Breckinridge was not the favorite of either, it follows they were pledged to the Democracy of the district to give Douglas as fair a chance for the nomination as Breckinridge.

Again, it is a fact capable of equally conclusive authentication, that both of these gentlemen, the one in person and the other by the mouth of a friend, declared all desire to the effect any al eration in the Cincinnati platform, and by obvious inference avowed their willingness to support this champion of an unconstitutional dogma, without any repudiation of that dogma.

And lastly, the imputation that we, and that "large body of sound Democrats who support Judge Douglas, the Johnsons, Soulés, Russ, Forsythe, Millson—are advancing "a mere anti-slavery principle, less candid but not less sectional than the leading tenet of the Republican party," is a slander that self-respect demands us to repel at once and in unmistakable terms: the people of Virginia will not tolerate it.

The authors of the address proceeded to make their first specific charge of unfairness, and we quote their language:

"The new rule to which we allude was, that in any State which has not provided as directed by its State convention how its vote is to be given, the convention will recognize the right of each delegate to cast his individual vote." The artifice concealed in this rule will be presently explained. The rule was first submitted to a committee of the convention and rejected when the committee was full. Afterward, in the absence of the delegates from Virginia and other members, a portion of the committee resolved to report it. Being unexpectedly sprung upon the convention, it was hurried through without opportunity for discussion. None but those who had studied some specific facts, not then generally known, could have foreseen its unfair effects and disastrous consequences. We opposed it as erroneous in principle and contrary to all former usage. Its special friends was afterward discovered."

The assertions of this paragraph are substantially, first, that the "rule" is unfair; secondly, that it was hurried through without opportunity for discussion.

As to the second charge, it not only is inconsistent with the admission of the authors of the address, that they opposed the rule, but it is flatly contradicted by the published report of the proceedings at Charleston. We quote from the semi-weekly Richmond Enquirer, of April 28:

"The report of the committee on organization presented an additional rule providing that in every State which has not provided as directed by the State convention how its vote may be cast, the convention will recognize the right of each delegate to cast his individual vote.

"A warm debate arose on the rule, in which Mr. Bradson, Mr. McCook, Mr. Cessna, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Barry, of Mississippi, Jacob Randall, and others took part, several southern members earnestly opposing it." The charge of want of discussion is triumphantly refuted, and the charge of undue haste is still further rebutted by the fact that the rule was not voted on at its first discussion, but lay over until the next session.

Nor is the essential justice of the rule less defensible than the mode of its adoption. Several States regularly instructed their delegates to vote as a unit, and when this was true, the convention assumed no right to alter the arrangement. But, where the rule was prescribed, it appears obviously fair to the delegates, fairest to the constituencies, and best calculated to elicit the honest preferences of the people by permit each delegate to cast his vote for himself.

For these reasons it cannot be a matter of surprise that the motion to lay this rule on the table was lost by a vote of two to one, and the rule "adopted by acclamation."

The case of Pennsylvania, chosen by the authors of the address to show the unfairness of the rule, is particularly unfortunate, as the friends of the contestants were in accordance with the uniform practice in Pennsylvania, whose delegate have never, in any instance, cast a united vote, save when they were instructed to unanimous. There was, in short, no violation of principle in the rule, and it is as fair to assume that those who opposed it were actuated by the hope of some undue advantage which its rejection would secure to them, as to charge the adoption of it with a similar motive. The address proceeds:

"It was by force of the contrivance we have explained that a minority rejected the platform supported by the majority. Its rejection caused several southern States to withdraw from the convention at Charleston. Our conduct in that crisis has already been vindicated before you, and has received your approval."

What was their conduct? "Vindicated and approved by the people of Virginia? It was this: *the undaunted and deliberate resolve of the Virginia delegation not to secede*, and the resolve equally deliberate, as we shall show, directly, to accept the minority platform so called—with what propriety may be seen from the fact that its first resolution passed the convention by a vote of 237½ ayes to 65 noes, and the remaining resolutions "by acclamation."

To have seceded at Charleston, in view of the fact that their constituencies had clothed them with no discretion to that effect, would have been a monstrous assumption of authority. How much more inexcusable was their secession at Baltimore after they had gathered the sentiment of their constituencies approving their refusal to secede at Charleston!

The address here concludes its account of the Charleston convention, and if any evidence in addition to the facts just detailed were wanting to establish the fact that up to this time there was no plausible excuse for secession, it is furnished in the act of the Virginia delegates, who not only declined to secede, but took the full share in this acts of the convention *the three days subsequent to the adoption of the new obnoxious platform, endeavoring for fifty-seven ballots to put their favorite on that platform as a candidate for the Presidency!* The conclusion is irresistible either that they and Mr. Hunter adopted the platform, or that they were engaged in the attempt to launch the national Democracy into a campaign "with a platform looking one way and a candidate the other."

The address now proceeds to give an account of the adjourned convention at Baltimore, and keeping in mind the fact that the Virginia delegates by the most solemn, unanimous and unequivocal acts, declared that up to this period there was no just cause for secession, let us examine their statements of fact as to the Baltimore meeting:

The first charge made by the address against the Baltimore convention, is the attempt to exclude the delegates from Mississippi, Texas and Georgia, upon which the address enlarges. These charges certainly do not seem to have invested the convention showed any disposition to exclude the delegates from Mississippi and Texas. No charge could be more prostitutes. The committee reported in favor of their admission, and the convention confirmed the report—in each case admitting the delegates from those States by a vote of 250 to 24. Five hundred delegates voted aye, "and only five nay." And in the case of Georgia, the convention, as the address admits, also decided the question in accordance with justice and with the wishes of the South, admitting the seceders and excluding their contestants by a vote of 145 to 104.

Indeed, the address itself having devoted more space to the cases of Mississippi, Texas and Georgia, than it bestows upon the entire proceedings at Charleston, obviously with the attempt to create the impression that the convention was bent upon injustice, conclusive by affirming that the convention "waived all the objections which were suggested, and properly rebuked the inquiry as to such cases by the simple question, who are the regular representatives of the Democracy of the South?"

There remained the cases of Alabama and Louisiana, in which there were full sets of delegates competing—Arkansas, where there was a partial competition, and in the cases of Missouri and Massachusetts, one contested seat in each of the delegations.

The address does not pretend to enter into any argument to show that the convention made an erroneous decision as to those cases, but contents itself with a more sweeping affirmance of that charge. We shall therefore dismiss it with a few reflections which must suggest themselves to any fair-minded man.

1. No principle can be clearer than the right of representative assemblies to judge of the qualification of their members. Dictates of obvious propriety and necessity commend the general adoption of this rule in all deliberative bodies. The Constitution of the Union and the organic law of every State in the Confederacy, contain provisions similar to that in our own Constitution. (Art. IV, section 6: Each House shall judge of the election, qualification and return of its members.)

To recognize the right and object to its exercise, except in accordance with our wishes and interests, is a position too puerile to merit discussion, and hence we find the most unwarrantable acts borne under its operation. It was under the force of this identical rule that Frank Blair, a Black-Republican, was a few weeks since admitted to a seat in Congress from St. Louis, over a Democratic competitor who had beaten him 4000 votes. The clear outrage, though perpetrated by a strict party vote, was not thought by the Virginia delegation in Congress a just ground for a secession.

2. In the case of Massachusetts and Missouri, the convention decided that when a delegate fails, from any cause, to accept his trust, and his alternate takes his place, the latter is forthwith seated with full powers as a delegate.

Any other course would, it appears to us, lead to perpetual conflict, to confusion and uncertainty as to the limits of the power of the alternates, and to the waste of the time of the convention in petty personal squabbles, as it would be competent for a principal to appear at any moment and oust a substitute, who might have been so connected with the action of the body, as a committee man, author of resolutions, or otherwise, that the substitution of a new man would seriously retard the business of the body. By no fair construction can the refusal of the principal to attend the convention be regarded otherwise than as a surrender of his office, and as the alternate is no less the choice of the people than the principal, it is obvious that no justice can be done to the constituencies except by the appointing power, the people themselves

3. In the case of Arkansas all the contestants were admitted and authorized to cast in conjunction the vote of the State—a decision for which abundant precedent may be found in the past history of Democratic conventions, as, for example, in the case of Georgia in the Baltimore convention of 1852.

4. There remain only the cases of Alabama and Louisiana, in each of which were two sets of delegates—the seceders, and delegates appointed subsequent to the secession by State conventions representing the anti-seceders. The convention was called on to choose between them; there was no room for compromise, for the parties refused compromise. On the one side was a party prepared to abide the decision of the convention, on the other a party instructed to withdraw if they did not obtain their desires; a party which had demonstrated its purpose of secession by a previous consummation of that act. Both claimed to represent the people, and it cannot be thought a matter of wonder that the convention in each case admitted that delegation which came prepared to act in good faith for the common interest of all.

But admitting, for the sake of argument, that the decision was erroneous, is it not the extreme of absurdity to pretend that such an election furnished the pretext of a reason for the rupture of the Democratic party? Imagine the storm of indignant mocks, with which a State Democratic convention in Virginia would have received a resolution instructing the Virginia delegates to withdraw from a national convention unless their wishes in the matter of delegates contested seats were complied with. This was not the confidency provided for even in the Alabama resolutions. Such an act of folly would have been as promptly spurned by the Union Democrats, on the adoption of the majority report, the representation of several Southern States, abandoned their seats, and twenty-five Virginia delegates who could not be driven out at Charleston on a question of fundamental principle, seceded at Baltimore on a question of organization—an act, we venture to affirm, unprecedented in the annals of deliberative assemblies, justified by no consideration of principle or true policy, condemned in advance by the indorsement by their constituents of the Virginia course, as they themselves admit, and unauthorized by any precedent in the history of Virginia Democracy.

The platform says, "Not an insuperable objection, for it must not be forgotten that they tried at Charleston for three days to get Mr. Hunter upon it as the national Democratic candidate for the Presidency." Hon. Henry Bell, by Virginia law, with all his unconstitutional heresies, the address in terms denies and disclaims as a reason for their act. The failing to nominate Hunter could not have been the reason, however, it was made the occasion, for the cause is absurdly inadequate to the effect. What was the fact? Could Virginia, can she have the face, or nobody? A desire to gratify the friends of Judge Douglas? A resolve to curle or sulk? A base subservience to the traitorous spirit of disunion? We think it was none of these. What then? The address is fatally silent. But it proceeds.

"Those who remained in the northern section of the convention made nominations of candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President. The former is reported to have received only 151 votes—less than two-thirds of all concerned."

This is an error of facts: Judge Douglas received the unanimous vote of the convention, (which "is reported" to have contained over 300 votes) and the delegates from several States were represented in that body than in the Seceders' convention, we are at a loss to see the propriety of the term "national" as applied thereto. If the number of States or the number of delegates determine the question of nationality, no one can be at a loss to decide to which the title belongs.

The secession having been effected, the national convention proceed to nominate their candidate, which being a complished, the following resolution was adopted as a part of the platform:

"*Resolved*, That it is in accordance with the true interpretation of the Cincinnati platform, and we hereby declare it to be our opinion, that, whenever by the decision of a competent tribunal, the measure of restriction, whatever it may be imposed by the Federal Constitution on the powers of a Territorial legislature over the subject of domestic relations, as the same has been, or shall hereafter be, finally determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, it will be the recognised duty of all good Democrats and enforced with unhesitating fidelity by every branch of the Federal Government."

A resolution which removed the last shadow of excuse for southern opposition to the platform.

Hitherto we have confined ourselves to considerations growing out of the facts of the late convention, abstain from any reference to the characters or purposes of the authors of the secession, and we make bold to claim that there is not the semblance of a reasonable pretext in those acts, for the disruption of that historic party which for so many years has controlled the acts, shaped the fortune and worked out the destiny of this great Republic.

The address which we have briefly reviewed studiously avoids all discussion, or, indeed, affirmance of the principle which it is elsewhere avowed constitutes this issue. The silence is ominous. If the authors of the address imagine that the reflecting, patriotic people of Virginia can be wheeled at will by any man or body of men, they have, we apprehend, greatly underrated the intelligence of the people. Before they will abandon the party ties and disrupt that political organization which they have proudly claimed to be the only conservative national party, they must be convinced that the maintenance of constitutional liberty and State rights, they will demand some higher motive than the mere will of any body of men, however respectable for their talents, or influence, or numbers. The attempt of "leaders" to sever the Democratic masses of Virginia from their political faith has been often tried, with a uniform result, the political destruction of the evil counselors.

What then is the issue of principle upon which the secessionists divide the Democratic party?

They contend that it is the duty of Congress to provide for the protection of slave property in the Territories by special legislation, if the territorial legislature fail to make such provision.

The objections to this doctrine are numerous, and it appears to us unanswerable. And firstly, we contend that the power and duty claimed for Congress are anomalous.

It is not pretended that it is the duty of Congress to intervene for the protection of any other description of property. A billiard table, for example, is as obviously a subject of property as a slave; yet the beneficial use of a billiard table may be prevented in a Territory, as in a State, by a tax so high as to amount to a prohibition; yet it is not pretended that it is the right or duty of Congress to interpose for the protection of this property. The same is true of spirituous liquors, and is generally true of all property, the use of or traffic in which involves considerations of sentiment or morality, however adjudged. In accordance with this view the Democratic party and the South have hitherto denied the jurisdiction of Congress on the subject, claiming that it was left by the Union up to a footing of precise equality with all other property. The assertion of the South has been in entire accordance with the deliberately expressed opinion of General Lane, the secession candidate for the Vice-Presidency, who in a speech delivered in the Senate on the 19th of December, 1859, three years after the Dred Scott decision, and said: "Congress has NO POWER over the question of slavery; they cannot, under the Constitution, establish it in a Territory, or exclude it from it."

Secondly, we contend that the exercise of such power, if it were lawful, would be physically impracticable.

No observation is more common or more true than this: That no law can be executed which is not upheld by local public sentiment. A duellist cannot be convicted of murder in Virginia; a Charleston jury will not proclaim the slave trade piracy; a Mobile jury refuses to condemn filibustering; American juries will not punish the murderer of a seducer—and the list might be greatly extended. For analogous reasons it is absurd to hope for the enforcement of a slave code in a free-soil Territory, more especially when we remember that the law sought to be enforced is the distasteful mandate of a foreign legislature.

Thirdly, though the power claimed were regular and practicable, its exercise in contravention of the popular will would be a fatal snare to the South.

It being generally conceded that it is the duty of Congress to admit a State with or without slavery, as the people may determine, the intervention of Congress would have no other effect than to induce slaveholders to take their property into a Territory where, at a period not remote or remote, it would be destroyed with a certainty and rapidity commensurate to the opposition of the people to the intervention of Congress. And moreover, if intervention is to last no longer than during the Territorial condition, the property of the slaveholder will become valueless precisely at the instant that it rises into political influence as an element of representation in Congress. So that, both in a political and pecuniary sense, we hold "intervention" a snare to the South.

Fourthly, The establishment of this doctrine would inevitably perpetuate the slavery agitation in Congress.

To avert this fatal and constant agitation has long been the aspiration of every patriot's heart. Conservative parties have in turns proclaimed it a paramount consideration of policy, and conservative men have often shaped their political relations with exclusive reference to this object. But the doctrine of intervention opens the door to infinite controversy. Not only will the framing of each new territorial bill be the signal for renewing the battle, but Congress will be constantly assailed with petitions on the one hand affirming the protection to be inadequate, and on the other unnecessarily great. One party will continually demand more protection; the other continually ask more restriction. Which party will be most likely to obtain a favorable hearing in an abolition Congress, it is not difficult to surmise; for Congress being sovereign and independent within its sphere, no earthly power can force it to pass a few obnoxious to the will of the majority.

Fifthly, Though the principle were normal, and practicable, and advantageous to us, and fraught with no danger to the public peace, it is a question which, in our judgment, Congress has no power, and must be settled by the judiciary, to whose decision all Democrats, and none more willingly than Judge Douglas, will cheerfully bow.

We are aware that it is claimed by some that the Supreme Court has decided the question, but actually Judge Douglas may be permitted to doubt this, and when such a constitutional lawyer as Hon. Reverdy Johnson denies it, and such a political model as the candidate of the seceders for Vice-President, as we have above seen, denies all authority of Congress in terms no less unequivocal. When the Supreme Court has decided it, or if that tribunal has already decided it, or if that tribunal has already decided it, Judge Douglas openly and on all suitable occasions avows his resolve to acquiesce at once.

Sixthly, We contend that the principle severs away the last bulwark of southern safety on the slavery question. If the jurisdiction of Congress be once admitted on this subject, the gate is at once opened for the entrance of Congress. It is idle to hope that the action of Congress will be limited to favorable legislation; idle, in fact, to hope that a Congress notoriously Black-Republican will ever legislate for the benefit of slavery, and none feel the truth of this more clearly than the leaders of the seceders. They know that a Black-Republican Congress will not pass laws protecting slavery, and their insisting on making this dogma a party test can only be explained on the supposition that the disruption of the Union is their paramount object. In this opinion, they have organized their party on a demand which they know cannot be complied with, that they may be able to delay or doubt in precipitating the issue of revolution.

No, if Congress undertakes to legislate on this subject, history is not without instructive warning as to the probable character of such legislation. The Spaniards at Cuba once claimed the same right to legislate on slavery in Cuba, and the annals of the island inform us that one of the protective laws permitted any negro who was dissatisfied with his master to go before a notary, who should assess his value, which price the master was bound to accept from any person whom the slave chose to as a purchaser, or else to emancipate the negro at a discount of 25 per cent. Our own Congress has in four memorable instances assumed jurisdiction as to the question of slavery. In the first case it swept slavery from the Northwest Territory; in the second it made the slave trade piracy; in the third it established the Missouri compromise line; in the fourth it abolished the slave trade in the District of Columbia. And this is the banquet to which the secessionists invite the South.

Lastly, if the principle were right, and expedient, and practicable and useful in its nature, it is at this period unnecessary.

On this subject we shall content ourselves with quoting the language of a noble advocate of "intervention," an ultra southern man, and one of the clearest minds in the South, Judge Reagan, of Texas. In a speech delivered in Congress, a few weeks before the meeting of the Charleston convention, he made the following language:—[*Daily Globe, March 1, 1860.*

"As I have said—of the powers of Congress over Territories I do not doubt. I must say a word more, to avoid being misunderstood. I have said Congress has the power, and that circumstance may render the exercise of that power necessary. But I am not discussing that question now, and do not wish to be understood as saying there is any necessity for its existence at this time. Slavery is not expected to go into Utah, Nebraska, or Kansas Territories; and hence no laws are necessary for its protection there. It now exists to a limited extent in New Mexico and Utah. In New Mexico, the territorial legislature has passed the necessary laws for its protection; and in Utah there is no complaint of a want of sufficient protection. I am not over Territories, and shows that no legislation is now necessary on the subject.

Fellow Democrats of Virginia, can such a barren abstraction as the principle the adoption of your party, much less the overthrow of your country. To this latter consummation we entirely believe the secession movement inevitably tends. Many of the engineers of secession would shrink with horror from this catastrophe, but that such is the object of its leaders, their character and antecedents conclusively establish. We do these leaders the justice to suppose that they are in earnest, that they have resolved to secure this assumed right, and they cannot be suspected of the child's play of quietly acquiescing in defeat, when the principle involved is of such transcendent consequence. Every one concedes that they will be defeated before the people, and what then? Will that sagacious party submit for four more years to this lawless oppression, with no certainty of deliverance even then? The idea is preposterous; resistance will sever go back until. If any considerable portion of the people support them, the bulletin of their defeat will be the signal of revolt. The cotton States, to use the language of the head of their living resolution was adopted as a part of the platform:

"*Resolved*, That it is in accordance with the true interpretation of the Cincinnati platform, and we hereby declare it to be our opinion, that, whenever by the decision of a competent tribunal, the measure of restriction, whatever it may be imposed by the Federal Constitution on the powers of a Territorial legislature over the subject of domestic relations, as the same has been, or shall hereafter be, finally determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, it will be the recognised duty of all good Democrats and enforced with unhesitating fidelity by every branch of the Federal Government."

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Thirdly, though the power claimed were regular and practicable, its exercise in contravention of the popular will would be a fatal snare to the South.

It being generally conceded that it is the duty of Congress to admit a State with or without slavery, as the people may determine, the intervention of Congress would have no other effect than to induce slaveholders to take their property into a Territory where, at a period not remote or remote, it would be destroyed with a certainty and rapidity commensurate to the opposition of the people to the intervention of Congress. And moreover, if intervention is to last no longer than during the Territorial condition, the property of the slaveholder will become valueless precisely at the instant that it rises into political influence as an element of representation in Congress. So that, both in a political and pecuniary sense,

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3	6.00	8.00	10.00	12.00	16.00	20.00	24.00	30.00	36.00	40.00	50.00	60.00	80.00	100.00
4	7.50	10.00	12.50	15.00	20.00	25.00	30.00	37.50	45.00	50.00	62.50	75.00	100.00	125.00
5	9.00	12.00	15.00	18.00	24.00	30.00	36.00	45.00	54.00	60.00	75.00	90.00	120.00	150.00
6	10.00	14.00	17.50	20.00	28.00	35.00	40.00	50.00	60.00	70.00	87.50	100.00	140.00	175.00
7	12.00	16.00	20.00	24.00	32.00	40.00	48.00	60.00	72.00	80.00	100.00	120.00	160.00	200.00
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☞ Yearly advertisers will be charged extra for a Change of more than one square, and business LARGE TYPE is required to be used, or the advertisement kept on inside of paper.

☞ Yearly advertisers will be charged extra at regular rates for Wants, Rents, Removals, Co-Partnerships, Sales, Lost and Found.

☞ *Transient Advertisements must be paid for in advance.*

☞ No advertisement will appear in the Weekly paper unless by special contract.

☞ Advertisements to be inserted in the Weekly paper should be handed in by Monday noon.

☞ Announcing Candidates for State, County and Municipal offices, $5 each, to be paid in advance in every instance.

☞ All advertisements for charitable institutions, fire companies, ward, town and other public meetings, to be charged half price.

☞ Marriages and Deaths are published as news; but Obituaries, Tributes of Respect and Funeral Invitations are all other advertisements.

☞ All legal and transient advertisements will be charged by the inserting.

☞ Editorial notices in local column will be charged double rates.

☞ No deviation or variation will be made from the foregoing rates.

M'CLANAHAN, TROUSDALE & DILL.

J. B. MILLER.....GEO. DASHIELL.
JOHN B. TAYLOR.....W. F. TAYLOR.

W. B. MILLER & CO.,
197
MAIN STREET,
CLAY BUILDING,



RECEIVE ALMOST DAILY SUPPLIES OF SEASONABLE GOODS, AND Offer at Prices to Suit all Buyers. jy4-3m

NO CLASPS  NO CLASPS

DR. Wm. W. MORGAN,

SURGEON DENTIST,

OF PHILADELPHIA,

HAS permanently located in MEMPHIS. In presenting his card to the public, he feels confident in the satisfactory manner. His PRICES are as LOW as the LOWEST, for the same styles, execution and material. Some eight years ago, Dr. M. abandoned the use of CLASPS altogether, in consequence of their destructive tendency upon the natural teeth (in our opinion of the dentist, the greatest evil of the day) and total loss to the wearer of all such work; and adopted the most improved method of ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE, by which means he is enabled to insert from a SINGLE TOOTH to an entire set with the utmost satisfaction. Being a Regular Graduate, Patronize, Chloralite, Porcelain, improved Chloroform, Aluminum, Platinum, Silver and Gold, Dr. M. can put up a new and beautiful style of CONTINUOUS GUM TEETH. Tooth powder, and other preparations of his own manufacture. Dr. M. is the celebrated PEARL FILLING, so favorably noticed by the public journals in 1858. In offering it remarks natural beauty, it is the CHEAPEST FILLING for CLEFT PALATE inserted. All

Warranted for a short time and cheap, and superbly finished in every point.

Malpractitioners of the natural Teeth referred.

Teeth extracted without pain, by the application of Chloroform. Ether, etc., if desired. ☞ Persons at a distance can be cured of toothache by the application of a remedy known at the profession, can be sent at his office. ☞

REFERENCE.—Hon. J. S. Black, Attorney-General of the United States; Dr. Wm. S. White, Dr. S. Starkey, Dr. C. C. Neil, Philadelphia, Pa.; A. J. Walker, Esq., J. S. Smith, S. Wilson & Son, Chandler & Co., Memphis, Tenn.; Dr. G. B. Fenkenbush, Hon. J. R. Ellis, M. C., Nashville, Tenn.; Capt. G. Bowers, Delta-mouth, New Orleans, La.

OFFICE AND LABORATORY OPPOSITE ODD FELLOWS' HALL, NO. 197 MAIN STREET, MEMPHIS, TENN. apr28-ly6m

HERRING'S
Champion Safes.

(Fitted with Hall's celebrated burglary and powder proof locks.)

MORE TRIALS—HEAR WHAT THEY SAY!

BANKING HOUSE OF BOURSE, BLAIR & CO.

GENEVEO, ILL., September 19th, 1859.

MR. FRANK W. ROBERTS, manufacturer of Herring's Safes, St. Louis, Mo.—Dear Sir: This notifies the, on the 6th day of February, 1858, our banking office was burnt, and our safe, which was Herring's patent, was exposed to the fire, and remained in the ruins together with the burning timbers, where it remained from Saturday evening until Monday morning. On being opened the contents were found to be uninjured, and we now have the same safe in use. We recommend the Herring's Patent Champion to the public.

NOURSE, BLAIR & CO.

HERRING'S SAFES EVER VICTORIOUS!

PALATKA, FLA., March 18, 1859.

MESSRS. Farrell, Herring & Co., 629 Chestnut street, Philadelphia: In justice to the many fire tests of Herring's Patent Fire-proof Safes, we would inform you that on the 31st of January last, our warehouse where our store was entered destroyed by fire. Fortunately we had our principal books, papers, and a large amount of silver safely stored in one of your safes, which, although it was exposed to the most intense heat for upwards of an hour, we extracted by the aid of some unscrewing dies, and putting your safe to the most severe test, as to its fire-proof qualities, we are happy to say it proved itself fully up to your recommendation. Our books, papers, etc., which it contained, were preserved unblemished. We cheerfully and gratefully tender our testimonial to the many already published toward giving the Herring Safe the credit and confidence it justly merits. Very respectfully,

TEASDALE & REID.

For sale at the Manufacturer's Agency, Second street, near Adams st., Memphis. EDWARD H. HALL, Agent.

N. B. Burglar proof, bank vaults and locks of the most approved patents and make on hand and made to order. jy22-daily6m

Notice.

I WILL keep constantly on hand a full supply of fresh Family Groceries of all kinds. Call and see. Corner of Union and St. Martin streets.

JAMES H. NIEL.

Notice.

THE BARBER SHOP of the undersigned on the corner of Union and Front streets, formerly occupied by Parker, Elder & Davis, is for rent. Apply to

A. PARKER & SON, or
ELDER & PARKER.

LaGrange Female College.

THE fall session of this institution will open on the 1st Monday in August, (Wednesday, 1st day,) next. LaGrange Female College is located in the healthy and beautiful town of LaGrange, Tennessee, forty-nine miles east of Memphis, on the M. & C. railroad, and three miles west of Grand Junction, and is accessible by railroad from all the surrounding States.

TERMS PER SESSION OF FIVE MONTHS.

Academic department	$18.00
Collegiate department	20.00
Latin and Greek	30.00
French, Italian, each	10.00
Use of instrument	10.00
Use of instrument	5.00
Contingent expenses	75.00
Painting in water or oil colors	$10 to 20.00
Instrument tuning	2.00
Stationery	7.00
Board on the institution (cooking and little extra)	12.00

One half of the board and tuition payable in advance. No deduction made except in cases of protracted sickness. For catalogues apply to A. D. Turner, secretary of the board, LaGrange, Tenn.

jy19-m6m J. P. HARA, President.

Professional Cards.

CHARLES H. STROTHER
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW and Collector of Claims, Memphis, Tenn. Office on Sixth street, between Main and Monroe streets.

E. S. HAMMOND,
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, Memphis, Tenn. Office No. 5 Odd Fellows' Building, Main and Monroe streets. Will attend to business entrusted to him in West Tennessee and North Mississippi.

Refer to Messrs. Allen, Orgill & Co., Memphis, Tenn.; Morris, Bledsoe & Marshall, Memphis, Tenn.; R. Dyer Pegram, Esq., Dr. Bowling Barksdale, Memphis, Tenn., Attorneys, Hickey, Mon., Hemes, Fowlkes & Stokes, Murfreesboro, Tenn. jy17-1y

W. D. BEARD,
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, Memphis, Tenn. Office No. 5, Jackson's Block, Main street.

Refer to J. H. Trezevant, Esq., George Dixon, President McNairy & Co. and Falls & Cook, Memphis; Jno. J. W. Pitt, Hon. Wm. T. Wood, L. Lewering, Sheriff, Memphis. jy10-1y

S. W. HOLLAND, M. D.,
PHYSICIAN, SURGEON and ACCOUCHEUR, most respectfully tenders his professional services to the citizens of Memphis, and may be found at the Drug Store of Mathis Chandler & Co., on Main street, adjoining Gilliland's Hotel, in the day time, and at his residence, Jackson, and at night at the residence of F. G. Holland, on Market street, below Third.

J. P. CARUTHERS.—E. W. VENGER.—MOSES WHITE.
Caruthers, Verger & White,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, Memphis, Tennessee.—Office in Sy Club's Building. jy10-1y

DR. G. W. ACREE,
DENTIST,
Court Street, opposite A. T. Wells & Bro.

ALL operations performed with the most possible pain, and in the most skillful manner. Diseases of the gums and teeth successfully treated. Artificial teeth inserted upon the most approved plan, with gums, and no blistering, either old or new, is used, so let no fear the public with