THE MEMPHIS DAILY APPEAL.

BY M'CLANAHAN & DILL. MEMPHIS, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1860. VOLUME XI.—NUMBER 228.

Daily Appeal.

GOVERNOR WINSTON IN JACKSON COUNTY.

From the Huntsville (Ala.) Advocate.]

Last week Gov. J. A. Winston addressed large audiences on three separate days in Jackson county. We were present at Larkinsville on Thursday. Gov. W. allowed time to Edwin Wallace, Esq., who represented the seceders although he had never been invited to speak with a single Breckinridge speaker. We will do Mr. Wallace the justice to say he made a fair and able speech—the fairest one on his side we have heard in this canvass.

Gov. Winston said he came as an old Democrat to vindicate that old party, the national Democratic, always mighty to save in the past, because national and united. He was no hogue, no new-comer into its ranks, no mischief-maker, no disorganizer. Such had crept into the party to its injury, and for selfish, disorganizing purposes. When the old party was united the country was safe—broken up now by agitators the country was on the verge of ruin. He came to talk to the old and true Democracy to whom he was so much indebted, to urge them to rally to the standard and save the party and the country.

He was a free-soiler in 1850, and opposed the compromise measures. He was for fighting then; the admission of California on purely equatic principles—he was for protection then. The people of this State and the South voted him down—they accepted the measures as a settlement; they were put in the party platforms; their principles were carried out in the Kansas act; non-interference was the settled policy, the slavery agitation to cease, "hands off" by Congress, and the question to be left to the people directly interested. He was ever a Democrat, and believed in the sovereignty of the people, in their right to rule, and he submitted to their decision in good faith. There was peace in his country and harmony in the party until agitators, mischief-makers, designing men, for bad and selfish purposes, threw this apple of discord into the Democratic camp at Charleston. He was for abiding by the settled doctrine of the party, non-interference, against agitation, for hands off by Congress, for keeping faith, etc., and so wrote, in 1859, to Mr. Figures, from the Virginia Springs. It was now not a practical question; it had ceased to be so; it was as dead as the United States Bank; no good could result from agitating it. Add so, recently, had said Buchanan and Breckinridge.

With these known opinions, to his surprise, he was appointed a delegate to Charleston. His hands were tied by instructions to which he was opposed. He determined to carry them out to the letter. In the Alabama delegation he treated the seceding leaders. They, however, did not want to establish principles, but merely to kill off men. He instituted a searching analysis into the Alabama platform, and the "when, as, and where" clause, which the seceders—the former requiring "unqualified protection" to slavery in the Territories and in the withorness—such entry into them with our slaves with lawful protection, etc.—the latter only for protection to our property "when necessary" in the opinion of an abolition Congress, who deny that slaves are property! And southern Senators (from Alabama, too), voting that protection is not now necessary even when territorial laws have prohibited slavery! The Alabama delegates refused to stand up to their own platform. So did the seceders' convention—their high professions subsided into "when necessary" in the opinion of abolitionists. When he saw such hypocrisy and insincerity he could have nothing more to do with them. Alabama was great on resolutions—making a fighting line and retreating from it, and this was another striking instance.

The senatorial dictators made the "when necessary" platform to kill off Douglas. They tried to dictate to the people as they had to the convention. Many of them, with the member of the President, were at the convention. But the people are the rulers, the masters, and not the servants of the Senators, Congressmen, or the President. Mr. F. S. Lyon last admitted that the Cincinnati platform was good enough for any man except Douglas. No one at Charleston could find fault with it, but the object was not to harmonize the party, but to divide and distract it for dissolution purposes.

The Governor said he did not believe much in platforms now; he wanted a good man, a sound, bold man. Douglas was such a man. He was the choice of the South in 1856, of the free-soilers too. Breckinridge was, too, for him up to 1854, and so was Wise, even on the Lecompton issue. Douglas came nearer to Andrew Jackson than any public man left to us. And Gov. Winston paid a noble tribute to his services in the cause of the South and the country. Did not exactly agree with him on the territorial question, yet it was not now a practical one—it was dead. There was nothing compared to holding on to the party and preserving the institutions of the country, now in peril, from the course of the seceders. Let the past be—the present is the time for action. No use now to talk about protection in the Territories; it has been given up, and greater interests are at stake. Congress had always legislated against slavery, and always would do so. Popular sovereignty had carried slavery into Texas over Mexican law against it, and into New Mexico. The people would regulate it; it could not be forced in the other against their will; climate, soil, etc. would settle it.

As to the Freeport speech of Douglas, so much abused, the governor, in his most emphatic manner, said, I indorse it; I made the same point in 1850, that municipal regulations, local laws, etc., are necessary to slavery—if this is treason, make the most of it. I own negroes, as many as the most of men, and am ready to fight for the oldest or youngest one I have got, and this Freeport speech of Douglas' is true and correct. He then read the noted part of it, and in telling comments contrasted it with Jeff. Davis' Portland speech, and Orr's speech in Congress, both going further than Douglas on this point. Orr was the Democratic speaker two years ago.

In allusion to Douglas' course on the Lecompton Constitution, Gov. W. said that Yancey had admitted that four-fifths of the people of Kansas were opposed to it. In that case, said Gov. W., I am opposed to it, as being any constitution upon the people against their wishes. Alabama had resolved to fight if Kansas was not admitted under this Constitution; yet "not one member from Alabama dare refused to call the convention, as directed by law, on her rejection!"

The governor's dissection of Breckinridge was capital and amusing. He was not the seat of kin of the old fire eaters, and his services were imaginary. In the hard struggles of the party he was missing, or had gone a hunting. He wanted to see Breckinridge's speeches in defense of slavery—his battles against the abolitionists! It was easy to be a Democrat or a Southern man in Jackson—Douglas was a Democrat when battles were fought, and a defender of slavery and the South among the abolitionists, where courage was needed.

He took up Yancey's record, as the leader of the seceders in this move to break up the Democratic party and we have not heard a more masterly or scathing exposure of the Slaughter letter and the Charleston action. These documents contain the programme of what occurred in Montgomery, Charleston, Baltimore and Richmond. No general in the art of battle was ever more accurate in his commands, or had them more faithfully carried into execution. The army law of Alabama and the State connection to go out of the Union on Lincoln's election, are the offspring of this programme. The election of Lincoln presents the issue Yancey laid down in his Columbia speech, and the Alabama legislature obeyed his commands. The army bill is an arm the State to go out of the Union on that event, and the legislature passed it. Had I been governor, said Winston, I would have *tested the army law!* He ridiculed it numerically, as totally inadequate to put the State into fighting trim. If I was for fighting, as these men say they are, I would have voted for millions, and built an arsenal, too, and located it, not down here, but among you all, and not have bought a lot of bad Yankee muskets.

A State convention, said Gov. Winston, in all probability, will be held in the next four months. A fire-eater in the peal, with the Democratic party united, the South, and the national men of the country united, I should have been for resistance on Lincoln's election. But I am for waiting, not *creating* that result. I am for uniting the Democratic party to defeat him—and breaking it up to elect Lincoln. We are *stopped* from resisting his election, if we produce that result by our divisions. It is *our* (or as he is the seceder's) act, by dividing the national Democratic party, which, union on the old platform and principles, could have easily defeated Lincoln. In that dire event, said the Governor, speaking for himself, I will be "silent speaker," and let Yancey, Walker & Co. fight it out the best way they can—and see how they'll dissolve the Union!

The Sedge story will be re-enacted on the Tennessee State line in the days of nullification a militia officer in South Carolina had his troops drilled to whip old Jackson. His three commands were to sedge (hide), to unsedge, to hide it from view. The day the seceders came in, repeating that Jackson was on the road with his troops, "Sedge," shouted the officer, and they hid, peeping out. Another order came pouring in, shouting that Jackson was only a mile off with his dragoons! "Rush it!" yelled the officer to his troop, and away they scampered like geese. So it would be with the seceders in resisting Lincoln's election, after having elected him by breaking up the Democratic party on what is of no real practical value at this time, and not possible of attainment. The seceders have produced the present state of things, and are responsible for the consequences.

Gov. Winston said these same men who have dropped the Democratic party on their "when necessary" platform—Yancey, Walker & Co.—wanted to reopen the African slave trade, or rather repeal the laws against it, which was the same thing; but the force of public opinion had forced them to keep quiet on the subject now. The laws repealed, they would have flooded the country with cannibals, savages, heathens, wild Africans brought over by the captivity of northern ship-owners, until in twenty years your slaves would be worthless, our people be forced to go armed for protection, our wives and children in constant danger from the ferocious bands, and at last we would be driven to kill them in self-defense. Their policy was ruinous to the South and the safety of her people. They were casuists and dangerous leaders.

I am satisfied with the Government and the Union as it is now; I am not for breaking it up now. It protects all the great interests of the country, the rights and liberties of the people. We should labor to preserve, to save, to uphold, to defend the Government and the institutions of the country. If the South, on Lincoln's election, should resolve to go out of the Union because of it, he would be willing—he would go with the South—yet a majority of the people of no one State would agree to do so. This he was sure would be the case.

He thanked the assembled Democrats to adhere to, sustain any had been led off, to return to the old party, its time-honored flag and principles, and support its true nominees—Douglas and Johnson. Douglas was a true, a noble, a great, an Andrew Jackson sort of a man. Did any man believe that if Douglas had been the nominee in 1856, and we had now President, that there would be any strife in the country or any fear of the future? Douglas was the only man upon whom the country could rally with any hope of beating Lincoln. With the Bell party he had no present quarrel. They differed on questions of policy, but on the great issue of saving the country from disorganization, strife and bloodshed, they were agreed. He asked them to vote for Douglas, the strongest man. To Democrats he had a right to plead in behalf of the old and glorious party now rent in twain by new recruits, mischief-makers, disorganizers, etc.

He called upon the honest yeomanry to rally to the old standard and support the regular and only nominees of the party, Douglas and Johnson. We might be in a minority now, but before the close of 1861 the party would recover itself, and the course of the seceders be condemned. He always did his duty and let consequences take care of themselves. The people were honest and patriotic, and would do right. They might be deceived by demagogues for a time, but would retrace their steps and punish their betrayers. He knew the Democracy and had no fears. With the Democracy and had no fears. With the Democratic party would right itself by next year, and recover its ascendancy and again rule the country.

Gov. Winston spoke for three and a half hours to a most attentive audience. It was an able effort—it was a frank, bold, true man speaking honestly, candidly, and practically to the people. He did not deceive, mystify, or lead astray—but to instruct, advise, and persuade. It was a speech of marked power, strength of argument, and fullness of information. And it was effective in a high degree, eloquent in its truthfulness and its earnestness. In ridicule, sarcasm, and invective upon the leaders in this secession from the Democratic party, it was very severe and caustic. We wish every Democrat and conservative voter in the State could hear Gov. Winston in this canvass. He guarded their interests with fidelity while governor, and is now laboring to save the State and country from Black-Republican rule and the horrors of civil strife.

LETTER FROM HON. W. S. INGE.

Hon. W. S. Inge, formerly of Alabama, but now of California, has written the following able letter in favor of Douglas and Johnson, the regular Democratic nominees. Col. Inge, several years since, represented a portion of Alabama in the House of Representatives:

SAN FRANCISCO, August 16, 1860.

GENTLEMEN: I have received your note asking an expression of my views in relation to the nomination of Douglas and Johnson, to the Democratic party of the Union.

There can be no doubt about the regularity of those nominations, when treated by even the severest rules applicable to such proceedings. Both were nominated at the head of their respective bodies, and were unanimously preferred to the fundamental principles which parties are organized to carry into effect. If Douglas and Breckinridge represented the same political principles, then it would be necessary to determine the question of regularity. But the division of the party occurred in references to the platform, before the nominations were made, and is essentially one of substance and not of form. The only legitimate object of party organization is to sustain principles in which we believe, and as the rival candidates nominated at Baltimore represent different and antagonistic principles, we have to be governed in our election by the principles they represent, and not by the forms that were observed in their nomination.

This difference in principle is radical, clear and well defined. Douglas maintains the time-honored Democratic doctrine of non-interference by Congress with slavery in the Territories; Breckinridge, the anti-Democratic heresy that it is the duty and intention of the protection of slavery in the Territories. One is Democratic, the other anti-Democratic; one is national, the other sectional. Douglas is faithfully sustained by a majority of the principle of polic established in the Democratic creed in 1848, which has never since been questioned or disturbed until the present day, and the practical effect of which has been demonstrated by experience. Breckinridge represents a mischievous sectional principle, solemnly abandoned by the South in 1850, and repudiated by the Democratic party ever since, as fatal evils to the harmony and perpetuity of the Union. From 1820 to 1850, the practice of Congress was to intervene on this subject. First the action of compromise and mutual intervention, as in the case of the Louisiana Territory in 1820; afterwards, as the anti-Democratic party arose into a great political power in the free States, the sectional spirit of compromise was suffocated, and that of rapacious sectional monopoly animated the sectional party in the North, as in the case of the Wilmot proviso in 1846.

It then became apparent that the future action of Congress would be a struggle between force organized in the halls of Congress, and never ending, except in the overthrow of the Republic. The only hope of peace to the country and stability to the Union was in the principle of non-intervention by Congress with the whole power of Congress over it, to the people of the Territories. They can determine it without difficulty, except in cases where foreign interference, of which all the treaties across to Texas. They ought to determine it, because it is peculiarly a question of local concern; and, more than all, they will determine it in a manner because they have over it a practical power which will mockingly defy the theoretical sovereignty of Congress. I hold this doctrine of non-intervention to be essential to a political necessity, without which neither national parties nor the Union can long exist. How illustrative of this is the present condition of the country! Lincoln is for congressional intervention to exclude, and Breckinridge to protect slavery in all the Territories of the Union, without reference to soil, climate, or the will of the people interested.

One is at the head of a northern sectional, the other a southern sectional party; and it is claimed by friends that they will be sustained by majorities in their respective sections. My hope and confidence is that the patriotic masses of both sections are yet loyal to the Union, and will sustain Douglas and the national Union party, against the sectional disunion intervention of Lincoln and Breckinridge. Upon the Douglas platform the Democracy of the South have always prospered in Presidents, and have never suffered defeat. I am not unmindful of the defeat of Cass, in 1848, but that contest turned upon a comparatively unimportant issue. Cass himself was forgotten in oft-rehearsed battle fields, and it is not surprising that the hero of Hull's surrender paled his inefficient fires before the conqueror of Buena Vista.

The present Chief Magistrate undoubtedly owes his position to this doctrine, and, it may be added, the execration of the American people, to its bear abandonment. In 1856, the Republicans stood squarely upon the doctrine of congressional intervention, and were beaten by the patriotic sentiment of the Union. Standing upon the same ground now, they will be beaten again in the free States, unless conservative and national feeling are extinct. It is not the doctrine of Lincoln's intervention of Lincoln has a practical object, inside the Union, and attainable by the forms of legislation. It elected his party, before the end of his administration, will have the power, and will exercise it, to abolish or exclude slavery everywhere within the jurisdiction of the confederacy outside of the States. But the intervention of Breckinridge, for protection, means nothing inside the Union. Congress will never again legislate for slavery in any form, and with a full knowledge of that fact, the supporters of Breckinridge desire to drag it back into the halls of Congress. They demand a change of venue from the impartial tribunal of public opinion to a packed jury, who have already prejudged the issue against them.

They insist Congress should exercise the power to protect slavery in the Territories, when Mr. Breckinridge himself says "the right involves the correlative right to prohibit, and denying the latter, I would vote for neither."

Gentlemen, no man living believes that Congress will again legislate to establish or protect (synonymous terms) slavery in any Territory of this Union, and we must therefore look beyond to avowed objects of the Breckinridge party for their real designs. What is the alternative when what they call a constitutional right is denied? When they demand of Congress what they know it will not do, what is the meaning of that demand? It is painfully apparent that the Breckinridge programme means disunion, and if the people of the South support him, which, may God forbid! they also mean disunion, and there is no human power that can arrest the downfall of the Confederation.

Viewing the subject as a Californian, it astonishes me that an attempt even should be made to organize a Breckinridge party in this State. In our fundamental law we have abolished slavery, and the public sentiment of the State is as fixed on the subject as that of any State in the Union. Congress will never, if ever,