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Trouble and Summary Law in Texas.

From the Texas *Republican*, of the first inst., we extract the following:

A week or two ago we gave a brief account of the troubles in Cook county, growing out of the discovery of a treasonable plot to surrender that portion of the State to Federal authority. Cook county is a border county, contiguous to the Indian territory, and is thinly inhabited, a great portion of the settlers being originally from Ohio and Indiana. It seems there was a secret organization formed, having signs, grips and passwords. The members were sworn to secrecy, and those found worthy were entrusted with three degrees. The first degree bound the member to secrecy and to avenge a brother member's blood. The second degree was confined to robbing, jayhawking, etc. The third degree contemplated the reestablishment of the old Union. By some means the whole plot was discovered, and created intense excitement. About seventy men were arrested, the most of them, as we understand, low characters, with liars and there a man of limited influence. About twenty-four of these were tried and executed, when the community was highly excited by the intelligence that the son of the hotel keeper at Gainesville, (whose name we do not recollect,) had been waylaid and assassinated several miles from town.

Col. Wm. C. Young and several others went out to get the body, but had not reached the spot when some one in ambush shot Young through the heart, killing him instantly. So was the exasperation caused by these assassinations that the community hung several others. The number executed in Cook county, at last accounts, reached forty-two, and two others were shot in attempting to make their escape. The extent of the plot was not known, but was not supposed to be very extensive. How could it be, when there are probably not a thousand Union men (if so many) in the State? It was traced, however, to Grayson county; some few arrests had been made at Sherman, and one man was condemned to be hung. Here, it was expected, would be summarily dealt with.

Since writing the foregoing it is rumored that several persons have been hung in Grayson county, and among them a Dr. Lively.

From the Houston *News* the following part of a letter is extracted:

SHERMAN, October 8, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER: " " " You know that I was in New Orleans when that city was captured, but there is no comparison as regards the excitement there and that here at this time. We have more excitement in one minute than we have in our whole day. I suppose you have heard something about the cause of it. The first we heard was that the d—l had broke loose in Gainsville. They hung so far up to this time hung six men in that place, and have about seventy five more in custody, who, if found guilty, will share the same fate. They are charged with being Abolitionists in disguise, stirring up insurrection. Others say their object is plunder and thieving on a large scale. Cook county has all the appearance of a military camp. Gainsville is literally an encampment. There are no less than five hundred men guarding town every second night. Every man under arrest is tried separately, and when convicted by twelve men is hung. They are hanging them all the time. The captain of the gang was hung day before yesterday. His name was J. Lock. There are hundreds of them which the scouts are constantly bringing in. The entire Cross Timbers is now evacuated, as the Abolitionists living there have runaway for safety. This state of things has cast a deep gloom over the whole country.

The Gainesville troubles have now reached us. Our town don't look like itself. It is crowded with men under arms. Here they have only taken up fifteen since yesterday; but the trouble has only just commenced. Among those taken up are Dr. Harris, from Walesburg, Dr. Williams, of this place, and Taylor Windham, who will be hung without a doubt. Nothing can save him. He has been enrolling officer for the Federal army, at this place. Sumner, the lawyer, was president of the association. He has made his escape, but they will run him up and river if they catch him. Whittaker, the editor of the *Journal*, has made his escape to Missouri. Dr. Lively has also escaped, but was men stopped after then a few moments ago. He was seen in the country this morning. He was also one of the head leaders. If they get him, he is gone sure. They have, also, a young man named John Bostwick, son of the county clerk; also, Colip and his son John, and a brother of his, are implicated; also, Barney Harris, of Whitesboro'. They commence trying them this evening. This moment while I am writing, they have brought in the son of Steadham.

SAM. HISLBRUNER.

Cavalry Expedition to the Peninsula.

RICHMOND, November 3.—A body of cavalry five hundred strong, under command of Colonel Ball, started from camp on Sunday, the 26th of October, and proceeded down the Peninsula to the point where it was supposed the settlement of runaway negroes, who murdered Messrs Graves and Shriver, was located. It was ascertained, however, that the Yankees about Williamsburg had received information of the coming of the expedition, and had removed the negroes to a point below Fort Magruder. Learning that the enemy at Williamsburg had been reinforced by two or three regiments, it was not deemed advisable to make any attack upon the place, and our troops returned on Wednesday. On their way back they captured about one hundred and fifty negroes, several disloyal citizens, and a number of horses.

From the Army of the Potomac.

The news from the army of the Potomac indicates important movements near at hand, and we think many days will not elapse before a battle takes place in the valley. As a strategic movement, the line of our operations has been extended considerably, but our original battlines on the valley and on the south side of the Blue Ridge have not been materially changed.

There is a rumor that General Jackson has had an engagement with General Burnside, in which the latter suffered a defeat, but we can gather nothing of a reliable character concerning the reported battle.—*Lynchburg Republican, 4th.*

To the Editor of the Knoxville Register:

I find in your issue of this morning an extract of a letter, alleged to have been addressed by me to the Hon. Garrett Davis, of the United States Congress, on the subject of the difficulties between the North and the South, and read before a convention in Brooklyn, New York, as genuine.

I had heard that such a letter was in existence and in circulation for several months past. I desire to say it is a forgery throughout. I have never addressed a letter to Mr. Davis on that or any other subject.

Very respectfully, your ob't servant,

L. POLK.

KNOXVILLE, Tennessee, October 30, 1862.

☞ For selling liquor contrary to martial law in Petersburg, a man named Wm. Harrold was sentenced to have one-half his head shaved, to wear a barrel shirt, and stand with it on several hours a day for three days, in front of the house where he sold the liquor, and to work for six months on the public fortifications with a ball and chain attached to his leg.

☞ A gang of twenty-eight field negroes were sold in Charleston, November 33, for $16,000, being an average of $600 apiece.

LETTER FROM EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.

WASHINGTON, November 1.—The *Intelligencer* of to-day contains the following letter from ex-President Buchanan, in relation to his conduct during the last months of his official term:

To the Editors of the National Intelligencer:

On Wednesday last I received the *National Intelligencer*, containing General Scott's address to the public. This is throughout an undisguised censure of my conduct during the last months of the administration, in regard to the seven cotton States now in rebellion. From our past relations, I was greatly surprised at the appearance of such a paper. In one aspect, however, it was highly gratifying. It has justified me, may, it has rendered it absolutely necessary that I should no longer remain silent in respect to charges which have been long vaguely circulating, but are now indorsed by the responsible name of General Scott.

I, "The first and most prominent among these charges, is my refusal immediately to garrison nine enumerated fortifications, scattered over six of the Southern States, according to the recommendation of Gen. Scott, in his "views" addressed to the War Department on the 29th and 30th of October, 1860. And it has even been alleged that if this had been done it might have prevented the civil war.

The refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to the influence of Governor Floyd. All my Cabinet must bear me witness that I was, this President myself, responsible for all the acts of the administration; and certain it is that, during the last six months previous to the 29th, of December, 1860 (the day on which he resigned his office after my request,) he exercised less influence on the administration than any other member of the Cabinet. Mr. Holt was immediately thereafter transferred from the Pacific Department to that of War; so that from this time until the 6th of March, 1861, which was by far the most important period of the administration, he performed the duties of Secretary of War to my entire satisfaction.

But why did I not immediately garrison these nine fortifications, in such a manner, to use the language of General Scott, "as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or *coup de-main* ridiculous?" There is one answer, both easy and conclusive, even if other valid reasons did not exist. There were no available troops within reach which could be sent to these fortifications. To have attempted a military operation on a scale so extensive, by such means within the President's power, would have been simply absurd. Of this General Scott himself seems to have been convinced, for on the day after the date of his first "views," he addressed on 30th October, supplemental views to the War Department, in which he states: "There is one (regular) company in Boston, one here (at the Narrows,) one at Pittsburg, one at Augusta (Georgia,) one at Baton Rouge"—in all, five companies only within reach, to garrison or reinforce the forts mentioned in the "views."

Five companies—four hundred men—to occupy and reinforce nine fortifications in six highly excited Southern States! The force "within reach" was so entirely inadequate, that nothing more need be said on the subject. To have attempted such a military operation with so feeble a force, and the Presidential election impending, would have been an invitation to collision and secession. Indeed, if the whole American army, consisting then of only sixteen thousand men, had been "within reach," they would have been scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Such was our want of troops that, although General Scott, believing, in opposition to the opinion of the committee raised in the House of Representatives, that the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln might be interrupted by military force, was enabled to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th of March, six hundred and forty-three men, rank and file of the army. And, to make up this army, even the sappers and miners were brought from West Point.

But why was there no greater force within reach? This question could be better answered by General Scott himself than any other person. Our small regular army, with the exception of a few hundred men, were out of reach, on our remote frontiers, where it had been continuously stationed for years, to protect the inhabitants of the Southern States on their way thither against the attacks of hostile Indians. All were insufficient, and both General Scott and myself had endeavored in vain to prevail upon Congress to raise several additional regiments for this purpose. In recommending this augmentation of the army, the general states in his report to the War Department of November, 1857, that "it would not more than furnish the reinforcements now greatly needed in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington Territory, Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving a company for Utah." And again, in his report of November 1858, he says:

"This want of troops to give reasonable security to our citizens in distant settlements, including emigrants on the plains, can scarcely be too strongly stated; but I will only add that, as often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from the frontier, in order to reinforce another, the weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion."

These "views" of General Scott exhibit the crude notions then prevailing even among intelligent and patriotic men on this subject of secession. In the first sentence the general, while stating that, "to save time the right of secession may be conceded," yet immediately says: "This is by no means balanced by the correlative right on the part of the Federal government against an interior State or States to re-establish, by force, if necessary, its former continuity of territory." (For this he cites "Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy," last chapter. It may be there, but I have been unable to find it.) While it is difficult to ascertain his precise meaning in this passage, he renders what he did not mean quite clear in his supplementary "views." In these he says: "It will be seen that the 'views' only apply to a case of secession that makes a *gap* in the present Union."

The falling off, say of Texas, or of all the Atlantic States, from the Potomac south, (the very case which has occurred), was not within the scope of General Scott's "provisional remedies;" that is to say, to establish by force, if necessary, the continuity of our territory. In his "views" he also states as follows: "But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of recruiting the fragments, except by the laceration and despotism of the sword. To effect such result, the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play." In the general's opinion, "a smaller evil (than these intestine wars) would be to allow the fragments of the great republic to form themselves into new confederacies, probably four."

He then points out what ought to be the boundaries between the new Unions; and at the end of each, goes so far as even to indicate the cities which ought to be the capitals of the three first on this side of the Rocky Mountains, to-wit: "Columbia, South Carolina," "Alton, or Quincy, Illinois," and "Albany, New York," excluding Washington City altogether. This indication of capitals, contained in the original now in my possession, is seriously omitted in the version published in the *National Intelligencer*. He designates no capital for the fourth Union on the Pacific. The reader will judge what encouragement these views, proceeding from so distinguished a source must have afforded to the secessionists of the cotton States.

I trust I have said enough, and more than enough, to convince every mind why I did not, with a force of five companies, attempt to reinforce Forts Jackson and St. Phillip on the Mississippi; Fort Morgan, below Mobile; Forts Pickens and McRea, in Pensacola harbor; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston harbor, and Fortress Monroe, Virginia.

These "views," both original and supplementary, were published by General Scott in the *National Intelligencer* of January 18, 1861, at the most important and critical period of the administration. Their publication, at that time, could do no possible good, and might do much harm. To have published them without the President's knowledge and consent, was as much a violation of the sacred confidence which ought to prevail between the commanding general and the commander-in-chief, as it would have been for the Secretary of War to publish the same documents without his authority. What is of more importance, their publication was calculated inductively to affect the compromise measures then pending before Congress and the country, and to encourage the secessionists in their mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union into fragments. From the great respect which I then entertained for the general, I passed it over in silence.

It is worthy of remark that soon after the Presidential election representations of what these "views" contained, of more or less correctness, were unfortunately circulated, especially throughout the South. The editors of the *National Intelligencer*, in assigning a reason for their publication, state that both in public prints and in public speeches, allusions had been made to them, and some misapprehensions of their character had got abroad.

II and III. Gen. Scott states that he arrived in Washington on the 12th, and accompanied by the Secretary of War, held a conversation with the President on the 15th of December. Whilst I have no recollection whatever of this conversation, he doubtless states correctly that I did refuse to send three hundred men to reinforce Maj. Anderson at Fort Moultrie, who had not then removed to Fort Sumter. The reason for this refusal is manifest to all who recollect the history of the time. But twelve days before, in the annual message of the 3d of December, I had urged upon Congress the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of the same character with those subsequently proposed by Mr. Crittenden, called the "Crittenden Compromise." At that time high hopes were entertained throughout the country, that these would be adopted. Besides, I believed, and this correctly, as the event proved, that Maj. Anderson was then in no danger of attack. Indeed, he and his command were then treated with marked kindness by the authorities and people of Charleston. Under these circumstances, to have sent such a force there would have been only to impair the hope of compromise, to provoke collision, and disappoint the country.

There are some details of this conversation in regard to which the general's memory must be defective. At present I shall specify only one. I could not have stated that on a future contingent occasion I would telegraph "Major Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack;" because, with prudent caution, this had already been done several days before, through a special messenger sent to Major Anderson for this very purpose. I refer to Major Buell, of the army.

The general's supplementary notes of the same date, in speaking to me of General Jackson's conduct in 1833 during the period of nullification, as an example, requires no special notice. Even if the cases were not entirely different, I had previously determined upon a policy of my own, as will appear from my annual message. This war, at every hazard, to collect the customs at Charleston, and outside of the port, if need be, in a vessel of war. Mr. Coleock, the existing collector, as I had anticipated, resigned his office about the end of December, and immediately thereafter I nominated to the Senate, as his successor, a suitable person, prepared, at any personal risk, to do his duty. That body, however, throughout its entire session, declined to act on this nomination. Thus, without a collector, it was rendered impossible to collect the revenue.

IV. Gen. Scott's statement alleges that "the Brooklyn, with Capt. Vogdes' company alone, left the Chesapeake for Pickens about January 22d, and on the 29th President Buchanan, having entered into a quasi armistice with certain leading seceders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and Toucey to instruct, in a joint note, the commander of the war vessels off Pensacola, and Lieut. Slemmer, commander of Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Capt. Vogdes' company unless the Fort should be attacked." He afterwards states, within brackets, "That joint note I never saw, but suppose the armistice was consequent upon the meeting of the peace convention at Washington and was universal to terminate with it."

These statements betray a singular want of memory on the part of Gen. Scott. It is scarcely credible that this very joint note, presented in such odious colors, was submitted to General Scott on the day it was prepared, (29th January,) and met his entire approbation. I would not venture to make this assertion if I did not possess conclusive evidence to prove it. On that day Secretary Holt addressed me a note, from which the following is an extract: "I have the satisfaction of saying that on submitting the paper to Gen. Scott he expressed himself satisfied with it, saying that there could be no objection to the arrangement in a military point of view or otherwise." This requires no comment. That the general had every reason to be satisfied with the arrangement will appear from the following statement:

A revolutionary outbreak had occurred in Florida; the troops of the United States had been expelled from Pensacola and the adjacent navy-yard; and Lieutenant Slemmer, of the artillery, with his brave little command, had been forced to take refuge in Fort Pickens, where he was in imminent danger every moment of being captured by a vastly superior force. Owing to the interruption of regular communications, Secretary Holt did not receive information of these events until several days after their occurrence, and then through a letter addressed to a third person. He instantly informed the President of the fact, and reinforcements, provisions and stores were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pickens without a moment's unnecessary delay. She left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of January.

Well-founded apprehensions were, however, entertained at the time of her departure that the reinforcements, with the vessels of war at no great distance from Fort Pickens, could not arrive in time to defend it against the impending attack. In this state of suspense, and while Lieutenant Slemmer was in extreme peril, Senators Slidell, Hunter and Bigler, received a telegraphic dispatch from Senator Mallory, of Florida, dated at Pensacola, on the 28th January, with the urgent request that they should lay it before the President. This dispatch expressed an earnest desire to maintain the peace, as well as the most positive assurance that no attack would be made on Fort Pickens if the present *status* should be preserved.

This proposal was carefully considered, both with a view to the safety of the fort and to the unhappy effect which an actual collision, either at that or any other point, might produce on the Peace Convention, then about to assemble at Washington. The result was that a joint dispatch was carefully prepared by the Secretaries of War and Navy accepting the proposal, with important modifications, which was transmitted by telegraph on the 29th January to Lieutenant Slemmer, and to the naval commanders near the station. It is too long for transcription; suffice it to say it was carefully guarded at every point for the security of the fort and its free communication with Washington.

The result was highly fortunate. The Brooklyn had a long passage. Although she left Fortress Monroe on the 24th January, she did not arrive at Pensacola until the 6th of February. In the mean time Fort Pickens, with Lieutenant Slemmer (whose conduct deserves high commendation) and his brave little band, were placed, by virtue of this arrangement, in perfect security until an adequate force had arrived to defend it against any attack. The fort is still in our possession. Well might General Scott have expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement. The General was correct in the supposition that this arrangement was to expire on the termination of the Peace Convention.

V. But we now come to an important period, when dates will be essentially necessary to disentangle the statement of General Scott. The South Carolina commissioners were appointed on the 22d December, and arrived in Washington on the 27th December. The day after the arrival it was announced that Major Anderson had removed from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. This rendered them furious. On the same day they addressed an angry letter to the President demanding the surrender of Fort Sumter. The President answered this letter, on the 30th December, by a peremptory refusal. This brought forth a reply from the commissioners on the 2d January, 1861, of such an insulting character that the President instantly returned it to them with the following indorsement: "This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it." From that time forward all friendly, political, and personal intercourse finally ceased between the revolutionary Senators and the President and he was severely attacked by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr. Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had previously been of the coldest character ever since the President's anti-secession message at the commencement of the session of Congress.

Under these changed circumstances, General Scott, by note on Sunday, the 30th December, addressed the following inquiry to the President:

"Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York harbor to reinforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition and subsistence? It is hoped that a sloop-of-war and cutter may be ordered for the same purpose to-morrow."

The general seems not to have then known that Mr. Floyd was out of office.

Never did a request meet a more prompt compliance. It was received on Sunday evening, December 30th. On Monday morning I gave instructions to the War and Navy Departments, and, on Monday evening, General Scott came to congratulate me that the Secretaries had issued the necessary orders to the army and navy officers, and that they were in his possession. The Brooklyn, with troops, military stores and provisions, was to sail forthwith from Fortress Monroe to Fort Sumter. I am, therefore, utterly at a loss to imagine why the general, in his statement, should have asserted that "the South Carolina commissioners had already been many days in Washington, and no movement of defense (on the part of the United States) was permitted." These commissioners arrived in Washington on the 27th of December; General Scott's request was made to the President on the 30th. It was complied with on the 31st, and a single day is all that represents the "many days" of the general.

Again, Gen. Scott asserts, in the face of these facts, that the President refused to allow any attempt to be made—to reinforce Fort Sumpter—because he was holding negotiations with South Carolina commissioners. And still again that "afterward Secretary Holt and myself endeavored, in vain, to obtain a ship of war for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer Star of the West." Will it be believed that the substitution of the Star of the West for the powerful war-steamer Brooklyn, of which he now complains, was by the advice of Gen. Scott himself? I have never heard this doubted until I read the statement.

At the interview already referred to between the general and myself, on the evening of the 31st of December, I suggested to him that, although I had not received the South Carolina commissioners in their official capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, yet it might be considered an improper act to send the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumpter until I had received an answer from them to my letter of the preceding day that I had could not continue more than forty-eight hours. He promptly concurred in this suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and the orders were not transmitted to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning of the 2d of January I received their insolent note, and sent it back to them.

In the meantime, however, the general became convinced, by the representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and the Navy informed me, to secure secrecy and success, and reach the fort, would be to send a fast side-wheel mercantile steamer from New York with the reinforcements. Accordingly the Star of the West was selected for this duty. The substitution of this merchant steamer for the Brooklyn, which would have been able to defend herself in case of attack, was reluctantly yielded to by me to the high military judgment of General Scott.

The change of programme required a brief space of time; but the Star of the West left New York for Charleston on the evening of the 5th of January. On the very day, however, when this ill-fated steamer left New York, a telegram was dispatched by General Scott to Col. Scott to countermand her departure; but it did not reach its destination until after she had gone to sea. The reason for this countermand shall be stated in the language of Secretary Holt. to be found in a letter addressed by him to Mr. Thompson, the late Secretary of the Interior, on the 5th of March, 1861, and published in the *National Intelligencer*. Mr. Holt says:

"The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thompson) was not responsibly sanctioned by the President than it was by myself or Secretary Toucey, not because of any dissent from the order on the part of the President, but because of a letter received that day from Major Anderson, stating, in effect, that he regarded himself secure in his position; and yet more from intelligence which late on Saturday evening (5th January, 1861) reached the Department, that a heavy battery had been erected among the sand hills, at the entrance to Charleston Harbor, which would probably destroy any unarmed vessel (and such was the Star of the West) by which might attempt to make its way to Fort Sumter. This important information satisfied the government that there was no present necessity for sending reinforcements, and that when sent they should go, not in a vessel of commerce, but of war. Hence the countermand was dispatched by telegraph to New York; but the vessel had sailed a short time before it reached the officer (Colonel Scott) to whom it was addressed."

A statement of these facts, established by dates, proves conclusively that the President was not only willing, but anxious, in the briefest period to reinforce Fort Sumter.

On the 4th of January, the day before the departure of the Star of the West from New York, as Gen. Scott in his statement admits, succor was sent to Fort Taylor, Key West, and to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their safety. It is needless speculate on the consequences which might have followed had the reinforcements not reached their destination in due time; and even expresses the extraordinary opinion that, with the possession of these forts, "the rebels might have purchased an early recognition."

I shall next advert to the statement that the expedition under Capt. Ward, "of three or four small steamers belonging to the coast service," was kept back by something like a truce or armistice [made here], embracing Charleston and Pensacola harbors, agreed upon between the late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, etc. And this truce lasted to the end of the administration. Things altogether distinct in their nature are often so blended in this statement that it is difficult to separate them. Such is eminently the case in connecting the facts relative to Charleston with Pensacola.

Having already treated of the charge of having kept back reinforcements from Pensacola, I shall now say something of the charge of having also kept them back from Charleston. Neither a truce, nor *quasi* truce, nor any thing like it, was ever concluded between the President and any human authority concerning Charleston. On the contrary, the South Carolina commissioners, first and last, and all the time, were informed that the President could never surrender Fort Sumter, nor deprive himself of the most entire liberty to send reinforcements to it whenever it was believed to be in danger, or requested by Major Anderson. It is strange that General Scott was not apprised of the well-known fact. It was then, with some astonishment, that I learned from the statement of the general that he had, on the 12th of March, 1861, advised that Major Anderson should be instructed to evacuate the fort as soon as suitable transportation could be procured to carry himself and his command to New York. A military necessity for a capitulation may have existed in case there should be an attack upon the fort, or a demand for its surrender, but surely none such could have existed for its voluntary surrender and abandonment.

Probably that to which the general means to refer was not the *quasi*, but the actual, truce of arms concluded at Charleston, on the 11th of January, 1861, between Governor Pickens and Major Anderson, without the knowledge of the President. It was on the 9th of January that the Star of the West, under the American flag, was fired upon in the harbor of Charleston, by order of Governor Pickens. Immediately after this outrage, Major Anderson sent a flag to the governor, stating that he presumed the act had been unauthorized, and for that reason he had not opened fire from Fort Sumter on the adjacent batteries; but demanded its disavowal, and if this were not done in a reasonable time, he would consider it war, and fire on any vessel that attempted to leave the harbor.

Two days after this occurrence, on the 11th January, Governor Pickens had the audacity to demand of Major Anderson the surrender of the fort. In his answer of the same date, the major made the following proposition: "Should your excellency deem it, previous to a resort to arms, to refer this matter to Washington, it would afford me the sincerest pleasure to depute one of my officers to accompany any messenger you may deem proper to be the bearer of your demand."

This proposition was promptly accepted by the governor, and, in pursuance thereof, sent, on his part, Hon. J. W. Hayne, the attorney general of South Carolina, to Washington, while Major Anderson deputed Lieutenant Hall, of the United States army, to accompany him. These gentlemen arrived together in Washington on the evening of the 13th of January, when the President obtained the first knowledge of the transaction. But it will be recollected that no time intervened between the return of the Star of the West to New York, and the arrival of the messenger, bearing a copy of the truce, at Washington, within which it would have been possible to send reinforcements to Fort Sumter. Both events occurred ab uno die, same time.

This a truce, or suspension of arms, was concluded between the parties, to continue until the question of the surrender of the fort should be decided by the President. Until this decision, Major Anderson had placed it out of his own power to ask for reinforcements, and equally out of the power of the government to send them, without a violation of public faith. This is what writers on public law denominate "a partial truce, under which hostilities are suspended only in certain places, as between a town and the army besieging it."

It is possible that the President, under the laws of war, might have annulled this truce upon due notice to the opposite party; but neither General Scott nor any other person supported this expedient. This would have cast a reflection on Major Anderson, who, beyond question, acted from the highest and purest motives. Did General Scott ever propose to violate this truce during its existence? If he did, I am not now, and never was, aware of the fact. Indeed, I think he would have been one of the last men in the world to propose such a measure.

Colonel Hayne did not deliver the letter which he bore from Governor Pickens, demanding the surrender of the fort, to the President until the 31st of January. The documents containing the reasons for this worrying delay, were communicated to Congress in a special message on the 9th of February, to which I refer the reader. On the 5th of February, the Secretary of War, under the instructions of the President, gave a peremptory refusal to this demand in an able and comprehensive letter reviewing the whole subject, explaining and justifying the conduct of the President throughout. Its concluding sentence is both eloquent and emphatic.

"If (says Mr. Holt,) with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault Fort Sumpter and imperil the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our country into the horrors of civil war, upon them, and those they represent must rest the responsibility."

The truce was then ended, and General Scott is correct in stating "that it lasted to the end of that administration."

An expedition was quietly fitted out at New York, under the supervision of General Scott, to be ready for any contingency. He among the details with regard to the reinforcements thus provided for as sufficient. This was ready to sail for Fort Sumpter on five hours' notice. It is of this expedition that General Scott thus speaks:

"At that time, when the truce was passing away, Secretaries Holt and Toucey, Captain Ward of the Navy, and myself, with the knowledge of the President, settled upon the employment, under the captain, of three or four steamers belonging to the coast survey, but he was kept back by the truce."

A strange inconsistency. The truce had expired with Mr. Holt's letter to Colonel Hayne on the 5th of February, and General Scott in his statement says "I would have been easy to reinforce this fort down to about the 15th of February." Why then did not the reinforcements proceed? This was simply because of communications from Maj. Anderson. It was ascertained that they did not proceed; because the three or four small steamers which was to bear them would never have reached the fort, and in the attempt must have been captured or destroyed. The vast inefficiency of the force provided to accomplish the object, was demonstrated by information received from Major Anderson at the War Department on the last day of the administration.

I purposely forbear to present any more on this subject, lest I might, however unintentionally, do injustice to one or more of the parties concerned, in consequence of the brevity required by the nature of the communication. The facts relating to it, with the appropriate accompaniments, have been fully presented in a bi-torial review, prepared a year ago, which will ere long be published. This review contains a sketch of the last four months of my administration. It is impartial; at least such is my honest conviction. That it has not been published has arisen solely from an apprehension no longer entertained, that something beneficial might be thereby perverted into an interference with the government in a vigorous prosecution of the war for the maintenance of the Constitution and the restoration of the Union, which was far, very far, from my business.

After a certain retrospect, I can solemnly declare before God and my country, that I cannot reproach myself with any act of omission or commission since the disunion trouble commenced. I have never doubted that my countrymen would yet do me justice. In my special message of the 9th of January, 1861, I presented a full and fair exposition of the alarming condition of the country, and urged Congress either to adopt measures of compromise, or, failing in this, to prepare for the last alternative. In both aspects my recommendation was disregarded. I shall close this document with a quotation of the last sentences of the message, as follows:

"In conclusion, it may be permitted me to remark that I have often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now surround us. This may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officially. I feel that my duty has been faithfully, though it may be imperfectly, performed; and whatever the result may be, I can look to my grave the consciousness that I at least meant well for my country."

Your obedient servant,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

Wheatland, near Lancaster, October 29, 1862.

A Yankee Abroad Giving the Effect of the Proclamation.

The New York *World* says the following is an extract from a letter written by an American gentleman of the highest character and position, now resident in Europe, always unwavering in his devotion to the government, and holding a faithful supporter of the administration:

I have just read Lincoln's proclamation, and I am hopeless. The whole nature of the war I consider changed, and the idea of a restoration of the Union under the Constitution rendered impossibility. The President, under the Constitution, would have an equal right to issue a proclamation declaring that in Connecticut the law of descent of property should be no longer as it is, but in some manner more agreeable to the powers that be. Will the conservative part of the North not raise *en masse* against this subversion of that charter of its liberties and only bone of its existence as a government, though proclaimed under the delusive idea of sustaining it?

The effect on the South can only be to make them more and more desperate in their resistance, and to embitter their hatred to us. "Now you see we were in the right as to the intention of the Lincoln government when we induced you to begin this war."

Brig.-General Preston Smith's Brigade.

The statement that Brigadier-General Preston Smith's brigade was not in the fight at Perryville is incorrect. It moved from Harrodsburg the night before the battle of Perryville, as the advance of Donelson's (known as Cheatham's) division. When it had marched five miles it was ordered to file off the road, let other troops of the division pass it, and return to Harrodsburg, where it performed important picket duty on that night. At sunrise on the day of the battle it was ordered to march to the scene of conflict, and arrived there before the infantry engagement began. General Bragg there assigned it to his especial command, and moved it as in his judgment suited the exigencies of the occasion. It was placed on the extreme left, to hold two roads, important approaches to Perryville, at all hazards. It was then moved to reinforce the center, under a terrible cannonading of the enemy, which killed one and wounded another of General Smith's body guard. The brigade was then ordered back and picketed for the night, our extreme front on the left of our lines. It was the only infantry force under the fire of the enemy's cannon on the next morning, and was assigned the important duty of bringing up the rear, pressed, as it was supposed, by a strong force of the enemy.—*Chattanooga Rebel.*

THE CONDITION OF GEN. MCCLELLAN'S ARMY.—A gentleman who visited Gen. McClellan's camp recently, writes to the Philadelphia *Ledger*:

The officers who accompanied us pointed out a number of the men who had *neither shoes, stockings, drawers, shirts, overcoats, blankets or tent.* A pair of torn pantaloons, not sufficient to hide their nakedness, and a portion of what was once blue army blouse, constituted, with a cap, the entire clothing of these poor fellows. A large pile of ashes in the midst of the camp was pointed out to us as the place where a number of these poor soldiers had slept the night previous. These ashes were yet warm from the fire of the preceding day, and the almost naked soldiers sought them as a resting place and protection from the frosty night air. Quite a number had their feet wrapped up in rags, their shoes having either been lost on their thirty-two days march or worn out.

As he passed I could but wonder how many times he had prayed on Saturday night before commencing his hellish Sabbath work. His old servant says that "when massa prays four times in de night, he knows de devil 'll be to pay de next day." And I am very sure that there were a large number of devils at work above Harper's Ferry on Sunday, September 14, 1862. M. C. A.

A correspondent of the New York *Tribune* says:

GENERALS WITH AN IDEA.

BOSTON, October 14.—A friend of mine who was graduated under Stonewall Jackson, when he was a professor at Lexington, Virginia, has given me an account of him which possibly little comports with the impression which his dashing raids and movements have made upon the popular mind. The man who makes nearly his forty miles a day, who crossed the Potomac and swept Middleton Valley of cattle, without taking with him a single tent, except one to cover certain charts and papers in case of rain (for such a candid rebel prisoner in Washington declares to be truth,) who has, even when meeting with superior numbers, met with nothing which can be called a defeat—stands more chance, certainly, of writing his name high upon the lists of those to whom the world has accorded the praise of military greatness than any man who has appeared on the arena of this war.

This man, my friend informed me, was remarkable at the college wherein he was a professor for his austere and secluded life, his reserved manners, and his quiet and gentle ways. He was beloved by the students above other professors, for his kindness and humanity. He was considered the most devout religionist, almost to the extent of quietism; and was also full of the mild enthusiasm of an unworldly abstractionist. He was just such a man as Napoleon would have snubbed as an "ideologist." Such is the man who, under the touch of an emergency, looms up before the world as a man full of strength and inspiration. He is this day overshadowing many a man who, in times past, has regarded him as a very unimportant visionary. No doubt his vision is a delusion, his inspiration fanaticism; but in their strength he outstrips the wondering "practical" men around him.

PRACTICAL HINTS FOR HARD TIMES.

From the Savannah Republican.

LIGHTS.

Our fathers used little artificial light. They preferred the cheap light of day. For this reason they went early to bed, and were all the more healthy and more wealthy for their practice. The chief light of their houses, like that of the houses of nobility of England, a few centuries back, was a ruddy glare from the hearthstone.

1. *Primitive Lights.*—The earliest artificial illuminators of which we have any record, were lamps. These, at first, consisted of nothing more than a cup of oil or grease, with a wick lying against its side. Its shape was soon improved in convenience and elegance.

2. *A Heathy Extemporized Light.*—The writer was one of a family party who were belated in the mountains of Georgia, and compelled to seek shelter with a family who owned neither lamp nor candle. Our ingenious hostess, however, devised a light for the table. It was by means of a slice of fat bacon, (do not laugh, reader, I tell the simple truth.) This slice was spread in the bottom of a saucer, and on this was laid some candle wick, the burning end of which was kept elevated by being passed through a tailor's thimble.

3. *Rush Lights.*—Among the poor of Europe a very cheap and easily made light is constructed of the ordinary bulrush stripped of its skin except enough to hold the internal path together, and then saturated with suet or wax.

4. *Confederate Candle.*—This rivals the rush light in simplicity, and far exceeds it in serviceableness. To make it, melt together a pound of beeswax and a quarter of a pound of rosin, or of turpentine fresh from the tree. Prepare a wick thirty or forty yards long, made up of three threads of loosely spun cotton. Saturate this well with the melted compound, and draw it through your fingers to press it closely together, and to keep the size even. Repeat the process until the candle attains the size of a straw or quill; then wrap around a bottle, or into a ball with a flat bottom. Six inches of this candle elevated above the rest will burn for fifteen or twenty minutes, and give a very pretty light, and forty yards have sufficed a small family a summer for all the usual purposes of the bedchamber.

5. *Lard Taper.*—Equal to our mountain friend's bacon light in cheapness, and yet more pleasantly available for the necessities of the sick room, is a light made up of a tanner half full of lard and a little wisp of spongy paper. The paper, twisted so as to form a short pointed wick with a broad base—say two-thirds of an inch high, an inch broad—is set in the midst of the lard, and by the heat it generates, sided by the shelving sides of the saucer, keeps itself supplied with fuel until the lard is all consumed. The paper can be shaped on the point of one's finger, and the burning end twisted quite small. It should rest on the bottom, and the vessel should be shallow—a saucer, not a cup.

6. *Lard Lamps.*—At the present prices of illuminating material, the result accomplished by far for those who live in the interior and far from gas, is lard. This requires a lamp whose wick tubes are of thick metal, for the purpose of conveying the heat of the flame into the midst of the lard, and keeping it melted around the wick. The lard must be melted when the lamp is lighted, or it will not burn well. The wick should be of several thicknesses of spongy cloth.

7. LARD OIL—When combined with one-fifth part spirits of turpentine, will burn in an ordinary lamp and afford a beautiful light. To obtain the oil, enclose the lard in a strong, close canvass bag, and subject to gradually increased pressure. The indurated mass left in the bag is not injured for culinary purposes.

8. CANDLES OF TALLOW AND PRICKLY PEAR.—Whoever can command tallow for candles, will greatly improve them in firmness and in illuminating power, by combining with it a