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Daily Appeal.

[FROM THE ARMY EDITION.]

CONGRESS.

The next session of the Confederate Congress will meet in Richmond on the 7th prox. Already, says the Richmond *Whig*, the members are beginning to arrive to secure lodgings for the winter. Several of them have rented furnished dwellings, and will bring their families and servants with them. Others will doubtless rent apartments wherever they may obtain them, and get their meals at some restaurants, except when they are invited out to dinner or tea.

The approaching session of Congress will, it is hoped, afford an early view of the turn in that long lane of financial embarrassment through which the people of the Confederate States have been passing for several weary months. If the members will act promptly and wisely, and not open their legislative mouths as frequently as they did at the last session, some measure of relief may be adopted in time to arrest the rapid depreciation of our currency, and enable the people with small incomes to subsist during the winter. Every body is glad that the session will soon commence.

Good News from the West.

A gentleman direct from the far Southwest, has kindly furnished us with a copy of the *Press* extra, published at Paris, Texas. It contains the following, which is important, if true:

GLORIOUS NEWS—GENERAL BLUNT AND HIS STAFF KILLED AND CAPTURED.

We give the following letter in full, which was received this morning, direct from the writer. Owing to our long acquaintance with Col. Simon Folsom we have every reason to believe that the contents of the letter are true. [Ed. Press.]

HEADQUARTERS 2D CHOCTAW REGIMENT, Camp near Doaksville, Oct. 11, 1863.

To Captain Campbell Leslie and other Members of the General Council:

GENTLEMEN: News has just been received here officially, and which is perfectly reliable, that General Blunt has been killed by General Quantrell, in command of the Missouri forces. General Blunt and most of his staff were killed while escorting from Fort Smith in the direction of Kansas. All of his staff was captured by Quantrell. "The Federals have evacuated North Fork. * * * Blunt's brigade is cut to pieces. Things are now assuming a much brighter aspect in this department.

Tell our friends the news.

Yours truly, S. N. FOLSOM, Colonel Commanding 2d Choctaw Regiment.

Capture of Guerrillas.

Capt. W. S. Latham, of the 5th battalion of Ohio volunteer cavalry, captured the following prisoners in this State, and took them to Cincinnati, where they were confined in McLean barracks. The following is a list of their names, former residence, military connection and date of capture:

Mathew Wilson, Bath county, Hemphrey Marshall's army guard, captured in Bath county, October 20.

Hollins Moore, Bath county, private of 24 Kentucky battalion mounted riflemen, captured in Bath county, October 21.

John R. Bonney, Fleming county, private 24 Kentucky mounted riflemen, captured in Fleming county, October 21.

E. J. Hamilton, Nicholas county, 24 Kentucky mounted riflemen, captured in Nicholas county, October 21.

P. S. Robertson, Montgomery county, 1st Kentucky mounted riflemen, captured in Montgomery November 10.

Benjamin Simmons, Fleming county, 24 Kentucky mounted riflemen, captured October 21.

Bruce Offley, Rowan county, 24 Kentucky mounted riflemen, captured in Rowan county, October 23.

Of the following all belong to the same band (there is no doubt), from their close proximity to each other. One of them, known as Holly Moore, recently shot three men of the 5th Ohio volunteer cavalry, whom he had captured and had disarmed as prisoners. Capt. Latham has held the people of that portion of Kentucky under great obnoxious to aire for visiting them of such inhuman outrages.—*Louisville Democrat.*

West Tennessee—Senator Shaynes.

The people of Knoxville for ten days past, have been suffering all the horrors of famine. The Federal forces have pillaged every house and every town in central East Tennessee.

The losses sustained by the Hon. Langdon C. Haynes are not greater than those visited upon all loyal Tennessees. His residence in Knoxville is the headquarters of Gen. Sam. D. Carter, an old school-mate of the present senator. His summer home in Jonesboro has been converted into a hospital. The Yankees have not left him an ear of corn nor a grain of wheat. His horses and stables emptied and burned, his household furniture destroyed, his bed-clothing taken away, and there is nothing left to mark the scene of social pleasures for which the country home of the Tennessee senator was distinguished, save the bare walls of a beautiful residence converted into a filthy hospital. His neighbors all shared his fate. He lives now at Wytheville, Va.—*Knoxville Register.*

Whisky in the Yankee Army.

"Dorn Browne," the army correspondent of the Springfield *Republican*, thus discourses of the use of whisky in the Yankee army:

An army is a big thing, and it takes a great many articles and not a few drinkables to carry it along. Have you any idea how many barrels of "commissary" (that's a gentle euphemism for whisky) it takes per week to run the machine? I don't know exactly, but I do know that it would be better to Uncle Sam than 100,000 volunteers to his army, if he would shut off entirely and absolutely the supply of intoxicating liquors from officers and men, from sutlers, hospitals, and everything and everybody connected with the army. On what ground is the present vast supply of whisky furnished? Is it that an occasional relaxation may be issued to the soldiers who returning from picket, or after an exhausting march? Why, there hasn't been a whisky ration issued to a single regiment, to my knowledge, for many a month, and I am certainly within the truth when I say that not ten a year are issued to the troops on an average.

It is no good as a total abstinence society to be a private in the army. Come why? The use of liquor has so increased among the officers that none is now left over to be issued to the men! Three gallons a week are about the general usual allowance of a brigadier-general, and officers allowed in proportion. A major-general, who is himself and reasonably hospitable, is expected to spend at least his pay in various liquor. Every time a general or staff officer calls on a comrade, the bottle is expected to be produced. Every time an officer is promoted, he is expected to "wet his commission." Every occasion of a sword or horse presentation is improved for a big drunk all around. It is not considered yet quite reputable for an officer to be habitually or even drunk when actually engaged on some special duty, such as an officer of the picket or judge advocate of a court-martial, but at other times it is nothing against him, and even if caught in such a case it is rather his misfortune than his fault, poor fellow.

THE YANKEE CHARACTER.—A pamphlet was published in London in 1862, entitled "A Trip to New England—with a sketch of the country and people." Some of the descriptions are truly graphic and show that the Yankee of 1863 is a legitimate descendant of the Yankee of 1862. Speaking of Boston, he says: "Every stranger is mercifully forced to take this notice, that in Boston there is more religious zealots than beneficent men, more parents than churches, and more exercise than principle. For the town, unlike the people, is subject to no division. The temperance cause may be religious, showing many converts and visible signs of inward and spiritual grace. But though they weep in their lacon the movements of doves, you will find them in their dealings as subtle as serpents. Interest is their idol—money their God, and large possessions the only Heaven they covet."

The Grand Duchess Olga, of Russia, has left already, and the Princess Amelia has safely quitted her bulletin. The royal females of Europe are industrious.

GREAT GENERALS.

ATLANTA, November 20, 1863.

EDITORS APPEAL: The remarks in your editorial columns, this evening, on "Great Generals," are so appropriate and interesting that I am encouraged (with exceeding diffidence, however,) to pursue the subject with a few comments of my own.

Livy and Plutarch, and several others of the old writers, relate a conversation which Scipio is said to have had with Hannibal, in Asia, after their wars had been ended.

"Whom (says Scipio) do you judge the greatest commander?

Hannibal answered "Alexander."

"And whom the second?

"Pyrrhus."

"And whom the third?

"Myself, no doubt," replies Hannibal.

"What, then, (says Africanus, smiling,) would you have said, had you conquered me?"

"Then, indeed, (answers Hannibal) I would have set myself before Alexander and Pyrrhus, and all the commanders that ever lived."

The Carthaginian's meaning was, that Alexander's foes were inferior in skill and courage to his Macedonians the Romans, in numbers, if not in warlike qualities, to the troops of the King of Epirus; and his own Punic, Celtic and Iberian troops powerless, even though directed by his consummate generalship, to withstand the veteran legions of Scipio. And therefore that he was the greatest, although fortune had declared against him more by on account of the inadequacy of his means.

Macaulay describes William III of England as the greatest general of a warlike age, though William won few victories, if, indeed, he won a single one.

With braver troops than the Yankees have, though with vastly inferior numbers and means, Gen. Lee has checked and routed the repeated advances of the enemy in Virginia.

If his army is in good condition now, it is because he has furnished it with arms, munitions and all other appliances of war, taken from the enemy. Did Napoleon Bonaparte, greater than any of the leaders of antiquity, do more?

Our beloved chieftain has so ably carried out the plans of his Government that it is not for human presumption to judge to what success he might have attained if left to the untrammeled exercise of his own genius.

He has not achieved a victory to deceive and overwhelming as Austerlitz, because he has been withheld, by a wise and cautious policy, from venturing all upon the hazard of a die; nor has he reaped the fruits of a hard-won field, like Waterloo, because he had not the means of transportation and pursuit.

His campaign in Maryland and Pennsylvania, his temerity in attempt the Yankee capital, and his harassing and shattering of the enemy's countless hosts, smack wonderfully of the wars of the great Frederick against the combinations of continental Europe.

General Lee reminds me much of Saturius, who, exiled by cliques from Rome, maintained himself for many years in the mountains of Spain, with twenty thousand of his veterans, against the whole power of the republic—beloved by the natives for his wise and conciliatory administration, idolized by his soldiers, kind and just, and forseeing in all the actions of his life.

The skill, the science, the indomitable energy, the vigilance, the buoyancy under disaster, and a score of other great military essentials, combined with the filial devotion of his men, mark him as one

"in whom
The ancient Roman honor more appears
Than any that draw breath in Italy."

General Bragg is, undoubtedly, a very able, brave and meritorious officer. But he is unfavoring, it strikes me, to introduce the harsh discipline of European regular armies (Prussian and Austrian) into his own. It seems but right that a commanding general, clothed with arbitrary power over his officers and men, and further, held responsible for their management and conduct, should exercise that power, and punish the subordinate who neglect or transcend his orders.

But in this land of "liberty, equality and fraternity," not only the private soldiers, but the generals of high rank are restive and even rebellious, under Bragg's sternness and severity: the feeling is natural, one of education, and hard to overcome.

It was very well for Imperial Bonaparte to say to one of his marshals, "It will take you till such an hour to reach the enemy's rear by making a detour of so many miles! At that hour I shall attack in front."

The Imperial will was mere potent with Ney, or Lannes, or Murat, than any obstacles of nature or of man: with them hesitation or defeat was summary death or degradation—against him there was no possibility of such a charge as rashness or insanity.

With no the sergeant and corporal discuss the policy of an order with their captain, he with his colonel, and so *ad infinitum*. Each one reminisces complacently over the probable result of a court-martial, convened at his instance, upon his superior officer.

The gallant Bragg might accomplish greater things, and accomplish them more smoothly and pleasantly, if he relaxed a little of the severity of his rule, and noted "something to the spirit of liberty" and to human nature.

Of Stonewall Jackson, *Vir magnæ bellæ, nullis pietate secundus*, words of mine are inadequate to speak.

With the exception of that "heaven born general," as the London *Times* terms him, pardon me if my humble conclusion is that Gustave T. Beauregard is the military genius, who soars above all others on this continent.

Without alluding to the bombardment of Fort Sumter, let us make a very imperfect enumeration of his achievements:

In February, 1861, when all was despondency and gloom in the Southwest, when even the great abilities of Albert Sidney Johnston were thought inadequate, Beauregard was sent thither to confer with the illustrious and lamented hero.

One eagle glance of the swarthy Louisianian took in the whole situation—its extreme peril, and the chances of escape. He explained himself with the frankness and energy of a soldier, and his magnanimous compeer, acknowledging the correctness of his views, forthwith acted upon them—barely saving his army by a masterly retreat, and forming that junction with Bragg which enabled them, combined, to fight and win at Shiloh.

I have heard, though of course I cannot say how truly, that Beauregard originated and planned the late campaign in Kentucky; but, alas, his genius was not there to carry it out successfully. His retreat from Corinth is unsurpassed among the achievements of the war—increasing every now and then to bay that braggadocio, Pope.

He was the first to adopt iron as a protection for forts and war vessels; and where are Palladas and Saragossa; Tortleben and Sebastopol, when mentioned with Beauregard and Charleston!

I fear I am trespassing too far upon your readers' patience and your space. I shall close, before having said half I had intended to say, with the assurance, which I give as an eye-witness, that Magrader and Taylor, now operating in an almost inaccessible portion of our country, and from whom we get but rarely the boldest items, will, when their campaigns are known to us, have proved themselves worthy of association with the oldest and most chivalrous of our commanders on this side the Mississippi.

W.

Omens.

From the Richmond Enquirer.]

Many symptoms prove that the Yankee nation has given up all hope of subjugating the Confederacy. While some seizure owls, here in Richmond, are pretending to despond and despair of the fortunes of the country—in order that they may depreciate Confederate money, and so amass so much of it, and as little for it, as possible—we find that our enemies put a higher value upon it than we do; and they would put on it a still higher value but for our own persistent efforts to discredit it. They must fallow, in a measure, our own estimate of our own affairs. Yet, within their lines—at Winchester, for example, or anywhere north of the Rappahannock—a Confederate dollar will buy about five times as much as it will buy in Richmond. Sutlers of the Yankee army, in some cases, receive Confederate bills at half the value of greenbacks; here it is one-seventh or eighth of the value.

Another symptom. Evidently the Yankees have no confidence in their permanent occupation of those regions of the Confederacy which they have overrun; because they will buy no land there, at any price; they will not invest a dollar in their "conquests," and in those counties of Virginia which are now in rebellion against the State Government, and pretend to form a new State, no man either sells or buys an acre of land. The reason is, that they foresee the day when these counties will be reunited with the State, and when Yankee purchases would be annulled.

"Is the Union worth an eight years' war?" is the anxious inquiry of the New York *World*; which replies in its own question, that before the South can be subdued, the North will be bankrupt; that they may have the eight years' war and the bankruptcy, and no reunion after all; and that then they will have "thrown the helve after the hatchet." Everything tends to show that thoughtful Yankees know and feel that they have lost the cause; and the prudent ones, premonitory of storm, make hay while the sun shines. Listen to the New York *Tribune* of a few days ago:

"The truth is, we are in the midst of the mad intoxication induced by an excess of irredeemable paper money. Everything will go on swimmingly until pay day comes, and then—heaven help us all! In the meantime, it would be well for every one to make hay while the sun shines.

* * * * * * *

"While we are chewing of the insane root, however, our cities will swarm with well-dressed people—stocks will go up—real estate advances—the theaters and operas crowded, and, to all appearances, we will be prosperous beyond all precedent."

There is no insane root at all; they are not mad; but "knew" perfectly well what they are about. They make hay while the sun shines—that is, make cash out of the fluctuating gains out of the fattening concern, and invest them in some safe, extraneous manner; and, in the meantime, keep the war going, on the same principle that a firm which knows itself insolvent keeps its doors open, and even affects to be doing a rushing trade. The door once shut, and all is over—not a rat must run from the failing house, and sleep from under.

We have been pondering that strange phenomenon of the diamonds. Consider it a little. In the second year of the war the Yankee nation imported four times the quantity of diamonds and uncut gems that had been brought in the year before the war. The third year promises, say New York papers, to double upon that. This third year precious stones are imported to an amount eight times as great as in any of the prosperous years before the war.

A portion of this increase might possibly be accounted for by the rise of sudden fortunes in war contracts, as Mrs. McDowdy, after her husband has earned a few barrels of greenbacks, runs of course have her brown-stone house and her diamonds; but the importation is so enormous that this will not explain the whole. Besides, there are some facts which give significance to this species of apparent extravagance; for example, a steady and orderly business man, who has not been habitually too liberal in the matter of jewelry, suddenly, and without solicitation, presents to his wife (with expressions of unwonted affection) a box of diamonds—uncut diamonds, sometimes even spent—such as the bewildered woman cannot exhibit at a Russian ball.

She is pleased, of course; a woman never refuses diamonds from her lawful husband; but she wonders what it means. Little she thinks that her anxious spouse, with a gloomy prevision of the coming financial ruin of all the land and a fearful looking for of bankruptcy—seeing the business of the country sliding with a pace ever accelerating toward the brink of the gulf where all property and value, stocks, deals, shares, business profits, landed property and all, will tumble into wild wreck together; and, being resolved to secure at least something of his hard earnings, has bethought him to take a purse of his "greenbacks," while it is yet time, and, the things are still going, and buy with them that which combines the greatest value in the most portable bulk, and which always commands its full price in every country, namely: diamonds. These prudent and avaricious gentlemen are the rats preparing to flee; they will go to Europe with their fortunes in a little square box. Once, again, are buying stocks in European funds; and though they know that the purchase of exchange for that purpose will still further empty the country of the gold, and make the crash more tremendous when it comes; yet they hope to be gone in time, besides cash does not know what the others are doing; and hopes that his own small operation will not much affect the fortunes of the country. For his own part, he is done with the glorious Union; he is weaned from the "old flag"; he lays up his treasure in Europe, where neither Chase nor Lincoln doth corrupt, and where war contractors cannot break through and steal.

The splendid crops of this season in Europe, cutting off the hope of remitting in breadstuffs, and calling for payment in gold for the immense importations, must be stimulating this prudent movement. It is in vain that Mr. Chase keeps down the value of gold by his own periodical operations in that article—in vain that he suppresses all State banks, and merges them in a grand Federal bank, based not on capital, but on the indebtedness of the Government. These manœuvers may cheat the general public, and blind for a little the simple Confederates; but they do not deceive the men who buy sweet diamonds. As for Chase himself, and Lincoln, and Seward, and the rest of the gang, it would be interesting to know how they are providing for their future fortunes in the peaceful decline of life. In what jewel casket, in what French rentes and English consols are they investing their pickings and their stealings?

After all, some of these rogues may be caught by the reins before the moment they calculate on; they may try to make the firm go longer than the laws of nature admit; for the Yankee soul is greedy, greedy; and besides, a certain sort of madness comes upon men in such a whirl—as in the rapids above a cataract men lose their presence of mind. We cannot but diagnose this fatal symptom in the late wild speech of Seward. It shows a passionate and feminine rigor at the thought of any others than the present incumbents coming in and making something out of the disgraceful estate before the concern fails; a fierce resolution to keep the management of the affair, and pass it to the ultimatest extremity before they run from the ruin. Abraham Lincoln, according to Seward, cannot be displaced in 1864 by any election; can never be displaced until he has become President of the whole Confederacy, for his entire term of four years. Those years in which he was kept out of his property by violence and *tort* do not count. The time of the "rebellion" is not to come into the calendar, is to disappear from "the number of the months." The term stopped at secession—it is to begin running again when Lincoln is President or all *under his original election*, and not till then. The earth is to be rolled back in her orbit, all those years that she took the liberty of revolving while Lincoln was kept out of his own. As the sun stopped over the valley of Ajalon, so the world shall stand still until the Republicans at Washington have reduced the last possible silver into diamonds and consols. Then let the solar system go about. Is not this stark madness?

And there are abject creatures in Richmond—everywhere in the Confederacy, but especially in Richmond—who affect to tremble lest our cause should sink and go down before that rascally rout of Yankee swindlers! Believe them not, reader. They are not troubling, unless it be with eagerness to grasp and gather the largest amount possible of that very currency which they affect to depreciate; and they affect to depreciate it purposely, that people may be willing to give them sheaves and bushels of it for little or nothing. These are the people who have depressed our good currency below the Yankees' worthless paper, they are—and this is the worst we can say of them—as careless of armor or country as the Abolitionists at Washington.

General Bragg and his Generals.

Having copied from the Richmond *Enquirer* the article to which the following is in reply, we deem it but just to all the parties involved that this rejoinder should also have a place in our columns:

To the Editors of the Enquirer:

GENTLEMEN: In an editorial in a late number of your paper, headed "A noble sentiment from Gen. Braxton Bragg," you made some comments, founded on information furnished you, which it course. These comments do injustice to Gen. Bragg. The article is marked with so much candor and dignity, and with none of the venom which usually characterizes the criticisms on this officer, that I know it will afford you pleasure to correct an expression that works injustice. You say, in the editorial referred to, "that Gen. Bragg no longer enjoys the confidence of the army cannot be disguised, whether it is asserted, upon evidence that we cannot question, that every major general of the army except Breckinridge and Lieut. Gen. Longstreet (restrained by considerations of personal delicacy), united in memorializing the President for a change of commanders." The evidence can be questioned. The assertion is not true, as made to you. There were two Generals commanding divisions at the battle of Chickamauga. Two of them did request a change of commanders, two were silent, and six earnestly urged the President to make no change. The statement is the fact. It is evidence which the President possesses, and which is well known to nearly every officer in this army.

In that editorial you further say that the "division commanders spoke not only their own sentiments, but represented the army; and with such feelings between the army and its commander, it is impossible that success can attend that army." Your comment would be just were it true that all the division commanders were favorable to a change; but as such is not the fact, I am satisfied that you are mistaken in your comment, and equally satisfied that Gen. Bragg enjoys the confidence of his troops as fully as any general in the service. It was said before he went into Kentucky that his troops had no confidence in him, and would not fight under him. With less than 15,000 of these troops he met the enemy at Perryville, and defeated over 22,000 of their number. After his retreat from Kentucky it was again urged that Gen. Bragg had forfeited the confidence of his soldiers. At Murfreesboro the same troops, under his lead, by their daring heroism, defeated double their number, and wrote one of the fairest pages in their country's history. After his army had been depleted to swell our ranks in Mississippi, and he was compelled to leave Middle Tennessee, the cry of want of confidence was again raised, and demands for his removal came from every quarter. The answer to these was given on the banks of the "river of death," where 40,000 of these troops stormed the strong intrenched camps of the enemy, and routed 70,000 of the foe. Surely then Bragg must be a most remarkable commander if his own force troops who hate him to win such victories.

In view of these facts may we not well doubt the assertion (of those who say that he does not enjoy the confidence of his officers and men?

You further say, in the same editorial: "But is there no sacrifice that Gen. Bragg should make? He knows the state of feeling between himself and his subordinate officers. Will he not, forgetting his own personal wishes demand a removal, or at least that another general be appointed to command?"

Without, then, alluding, after the battle of Chickamauga to neutrality, the opinion of all his commanders—when he found that a small number of them were dissatisfied—Gen. Bragg did ask, nay, begged the President to relieve him from the command. He did do same thing after the retreat from Kentucky. In victory or retreat, (defeated he has never been,) he has yielded to the clamor of a part of the press, so far as to ask to be relieved from a position which entails from them censure, and causes only, let his enemies be that which believe a victory or weeks a loss. He cannot expect, he cannot hope for the approval of all; but with a pure patriotism, he is willing to sacrifice himself where duty calls, whether the position be that of the commander of an army or a private in the ranks. I feel satisfied that you will take pleasure in correcting an error predicated upon assertions untrue in point of fact, but I cannot expect others who have copied your article, but who are not governed by your sense of justice, will be so ready to right a wrong. H.

Napoleon's Position towards Russia, Austria and England, on the Polish Question.

The *Memorials Diplomatique*, of October 24, publishes the following analysis of the dispatch sent by M. Drouyn de l'Huys to the ambassadors of France in London and Vienna, upon the 30th of June last, and of the dispatch forwarded upon the following day to the Duc de Grammont:

In the first dispatch the cabinet considers the preliminary agreement of the three courts as a gauge of moderation and strength, because, although it imposes upon them the necessity of proceeding by way of compromise, it adds to the authority of their language; it shows them united in the pursuit of the same end.

It is as useful as necessary to maintain this solidarity which, in addition, presents a guarantee of security for Austria, most exposed by her geographical position.

The dignity of the three Powers which signed the notes of April 10, and the gravity of the interests which they defend, render it a duty to foresee the eventuality of non-success, which might either occur from a direct refusal upon the part of Russia, or a negative result of the conference of the Powers which signed the final act of 1815, then aggregated to be held at Brussels.

For this purpose it would be requisite to agree upon the wording of a diplomatic act either in the form of a convention or a protocol. By means of this document the three courts would solemnly renew their engagement to place Poland in the conditions of a solid and durable peace, and to reunite their efforts to attain the common end in case of refusal of persuasion being exhausted without result.

In the dispatch dated June 21, which the Duc de Grammont read two days afterward to Count Rechberg, the French cabinet declared that it fully understood the circumspection which prudence rendered necessary for the court of Vienna in the Polish question. France was far from attributing to Austria any idea of timidity, which was so unmited to so great a Power as it was incompatible with the lofty character of its Emperor.

Calling the attention to the theater of war, Austria, more than any other Power, was forced to take counsel with herself, and weigh her resolution before acting. The dignity of the three courts demanded from substantiance of their proposals.

France was, above all, guided by the desire of securing to Austria all the assistance upon which it would be useful for her to be able to reckon in every eventuality.

The arrest behind of causing the balance to incline in favor of an amicable and peaceful solution was to throw into the negotiations the weight of the common will. This agreement was and would remain a guarantee of peace.

France was ready to assume every obligation of furnishing to Austria the guarantee and assistance which she would have a right to require in case of her geographical position exposing her to disastrous results. In proposing to link mutual interests firmly together, the Government of the Emperor wished to offer her every security which her interests could desire.

"These two French dispatches," concludes the *Memorial Diplomatique*, "in spite of the remoteness of their date of more than four months back, still preserve great actual interest. They not only give the key of the real state of the Polish question, but they still constitute the most striking justification of the policy followed by the Cabinet of Tuileries in the anterior negotiations."

Perusal of these two diplomatic papers establishes with the utmost possible clearness that even when the three courts which signed the notes of April 10th presented the programme of the six points for the acceptance of Russia, the Government of the Emperor was not under any illusion as to the veritable disposition of the court of St. Petersburg.

All Well.

From the Richmond Enquirer.]

Yes, all goes well; the ultimate independence and triumph of the Confederacy are sure. There is more fighting to do, indeed, more sacrifices to make, more privations to bear. More men must be put in the field, and those who have hired substitutes, and have enjoyed exemption for years, must now acknowledge the duty of fighting in their own persons. All exempts must turn out; the clergy themselves must march with their flocks, as the Swiss priests used to do against Austria. Disasters and defeats, too, may have to be sustained; famine and pestilence themselves, until consummate of long warfare, may make havoc in our homes; yet, through all, through privation and sacrifice, battle and defeat, and pestilence and famine, the end is sure. Because the mass of our people, and the army, which is the pick and choice of our people, are resolute never again to be united with the Yankee nation.

We do not speak in encouraging the persons called "croakers" if they by their croaking can depry the currency of the country, so that they can amass guilty and filthy fortunes in it, that is all the encouragement they want. Neither is it worth while to argue with those poor creatures who sighs for "peace on some terms." peace on any terms. With them we reason not; but take a certain vindictive pleasure in assuring them that they can have peace on no terms whatever. The thing is out of the question for a good while to come. Peace cannot come save by utter defeat and prostration of the Yankee military power; and that is not accomplished yet—though by help of bankruptcy and social anarchy of the North, it is in a fair way. No, there can be no peace till then. The army will never allow it; and the army is the only part of the population of this country whose opinion is both sound and potential. It is in vain for those who call themselves "peace men" to express themselves quite ready to go under the yoke and to fasten it on the necks of their children; they can by no means be allowed to have peace, whether on honorable terms or on dishonorable; they will not get leave to debase themselves; they will be coerced to stand erect, and to refrain from grovelling, by a force called the mere war. It is no longer a free country; men are not permitted here to eat dirt, though they may have an appetite for it; nor to become the serfs and vassals they feel themselves fitted to become. They must be free Confederate citizens, and beget free Confederate citizens, whether they will or not, under this grinding tyranny which crushes their right of private judgment.

We do not argue with these croakers, we learn, are deeply disconsolate about the fortunes of our Confederacy; but it is not encouragement they need—it is flogging, and the death of a dog.

In saying, then, that all goes well, we address ourselves only to these good and faithful Confederates, mostly in the army, who are in no hurry for peace; who want no peace save on the basis of absolute independence; who are in disaster no reason to despond, but only to work and fight; who are not giving up stocks of Confederate money, which they first decry and undervalue for that purpose. Thank God! our people, with an unanimity quite sufficient for all practical purposes, are thoroughly resolute to stand the wear and tear and fall of shot and cinders, and a place of skulls, rather than accept reunion upon any terms whatever with the base nation which has the impudent pretension to subdue us. It is to encourage and inspire these worthy Confederates we point out the bright signs ahead. This third winter of the struggle is almost upon us; and there are symptoms that the Yankee Government is in even a more urgent hurry than ever to get the "rebellion" crushed within certain weeks, or the great level up of their own system will be upon them at home; and then, adieu to the Union and the big wheat! They drive Meade forward; they goad him, and taunt him; they pour out, to swell his force and leave him no excuse, most of their Washington garrison; and the grand army is still beyond the Rappahannock, almost where it was three years ago. "On to Richmond" is still the cry, and on "to Richmond" Meade dare not come.

Then, with the immense resources in naval armament and gunnery, brought to bear upon our seaboard, our enemies have not yet taken one of our important seaboard cities between Norfolk and New Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, Wilmington, have not even been attacked, while Charleston, on which great fleets and armies have poured a "fire of hell" for one hundred and thirty days, wears them out and wonder them as they impotently hurled from her forts; and their eyes are still scorched with the fiery glare of many Confederate banner floating over old Sumter, terrible in ruin. On the southern corner of Tennessee, indeed, there is a mighty struggle impending; but there, also, the best chances are ours. The chasm of victory—or at least of progress—which so long attended the Northwestern troops, was broken when, on the bank of Chickamauga, they met our Georgians and Tennessees, Alabamians and Mississippians, exasperated by their recollection of wasted homes and ravaged fields, and insulted families. Movements now in progress in East Tennessee promise to wrest that fine country from Burnside and his Abolitionists; and, once rescued, it will never fall again into their unnatural grasp. Whatever may be the varying fortunes of armies in the field, the Yankees are sufficiently aiding us and preparing our ultimate triumph, by the manner in which they deal with regions which have fallen for a time under their military rule. We know how the actual presence and dominion of that fiend rose have operated in our Valley of Virginia. In Winchester and its neighborhood there are fewer "Union men," there is a more intense desire and resolve to be rid of the Yankees for ever, than there was when Virginia seceded. So it will be in East Tennessee. The mere ignorant inhabitants of that region had been deceived by the idea that they were to be special pets and favored subjects of Lincoln and Seward. Now that they have had a taste of Yankee occupation they will be better Confederates for the future.

☞ The New York *Times*, in an article on New York city politics, thus graphically describes a majority of the population of New York:

"Its position has made it the recipient of the very dregs of European emigration—the best portion of it goes westward—and the enormous expansion of our trade and industry, has drawn hither from all parts of the Union, the shiftless, the broken down, the characterless, and the needy of all classes, in the hope of finding some means of bettering their condition. Consequently the texture of society in New York is no longer American, but European. We have on the one side a proletariat as ignorant and unassuming as that either of Paris or London, owning nothing, disliking the tedium of honest industry, with a strong taste for plunder in some shape or other, indifferent to public opinion, unshamed by the pulpit or by the press, and having more or less of that sense of wrong, and that grudge against those who are better off than themselves, which have been for six thousand years a characteristic of the ingorant and vicious."

The *Times* shows a sad picture of the corrupt expenditures and heavy taxation, which promises to result in "municipal repudiation, or else a burden of taxes which will amount to wholesale confiscation, and render all real property inside the city limits worthless. When this prospect stares people in the face, we shall look for a movement toward a radical change in the structure of the Government, but not sooner. Our consolation is, that it cannot be very long till this period arrives."

The war between capital and labor has commenced. The workingmen are marshalling their forces—"strikes" are taking place on every side, and without capital summits to the demands of labor, a collision cannot be avoided. Lincoln's regulars may protect capital for a little while but anarchy will reign at last. The press and the pulpit, by their teachings, have raised a storm they cannot allay; the Constitution has been destroyed, and the North has but the choice of the evils—anarchy or despotism.—*Richmond Sentinel.*

The Confederate Victory in Virginia.

From the London Times, October 26.]

The sudden retreat of the army of the Potomac northward was forced on Gen. Meade by the superior tactics of the Confederates. * *

The retreat of the Federals was so hurried that they had to make the sacrifices of a beaten army, even without a battle. They could not carry away their heavier stores and supplies, but at Culpeper "burned everything that could not be readily moved." This implies much more than it expresses, when it has to be done by an invading army, retreating on the line by which it had advanced. It proves that the army is enthusiastic and virtually defeated without fighting. Heavy reinforcements have now been ordered to the support of Gen. Meade, but winter-story are very near at hand time will hardly be allowed for them to arrive before the inevitable engagement. The city of Washington may send some troops in self-defense, but whether any large portion of the garrison of Baltimore could be spared is doubtful. The "loyalty" of Maryland requires a strong Federal force to sustain it. What troops there may be even in New York are almost too distant for the present emergency, so suddenly has the blow fallen.

In these last operations in Tennessee and Virginia the Confederate commanders have displayed a degree of military skill and a power of combining their forces that the Federals have never been able to attain. The armies of Gen. Lee and Gen. Bragg, in Georgia and Northern Virginia, were more than four hundred miles apart in a straight line. Yet they co-operated with and supported each other with as much celerity as if they were engaged in one operation. A whole corps has been taken from one and added to the other with facility as great as if the main bodies had only been separated by the distance of a day's march. The immense advantage of railroads for the purposes of war has never yet been so signally proved as by the transfer of Longstreet's corps from Virginia to Tennessee, to aid in the defeat of Rosecrans, and back again to enable Lee to make the advance so confidently. The troops thus twice moved from point to point must have traversed more than a thousand miles of road, some of the railway lines they took being circuitous.

The possession of these lines has been an immense advantage to the Southerners, but it requires great strategical ability to turn even advantages to account. Lee and Longstreet could not refer to any operations of ancient war for precedents. To weaken one army in the face of the enemy of equal force, to strengthen another five hundred miles distant, was hardly within the resources of all military science. It has not only been done, but repeated, and both movements have been successful. It is a remarkable achievement, and its importance is singularly illustrated by a complete contrast with it. Burnside was dispatched to reinforce Rosecrans as soon as Longstreet's movement was ascertained. But the Federal general had no railway lines to move by. He struggled on through a country either roadless or ill-provided with the means of communication. He could not arrive in time to prevent the disaster of Chickamauga, was intercepted in the attempt, and his whole force tells for little in the present state of the war in Tennessee.

The engagement he is stated to have fought near Strasburg, has only resulted in a heavy loss, to be added to that of the battle of Chickamauga, without visibly improving the position of Rosecrans, who is almost besieged among the mountains. He has a powerful army in his front, which can harass him by its artillery and yet avoid a battle, while strong bodies of cavalry are in his rear cutting off his communications and intercepting his supplies. It is a speculation whether he will "have to capitulate or retreat. The former appears to be the more probable alternative. The Confederates have been able, it is said, to destroy the railways and cut the telegraph lines at several points between Chattanooga and Nashville, and they have taken a valuable train of three hundred wagons, containing ammunition and supplies for the Federals, a heavy loss to an army beset in front and rear.

Exchange of Prisoners.

About three hundred and fifty sick and wounded Yankee prisoners were sent to City Point in lighters, towed by the steamer Schuylkill, on Tuesday, to be exchanged for returned sick and wounded Confederates, brought to City Point on the flag of truce boat. A committee from the Citizens' ambulance corps went down on the Schuylkill to aid in effecting the transfer. During the trip they ministered to the wants of the Yankees as far as the means at their command would allow. Rations were given to the prisoners similar to those allotted to the guard.

On the arrival of the Schuylkill at City Point, the Yankee were put aboard the flag of truce steamer, and the Confederates transferred to the lighters, the committee assisting in lifting those of either side who were unable to walk. When this disagreeable and irksome task (to the committee a self assumed "labor of love") was completed, the Schuylkill was headed for Richmond with the lighters in tow. The released Confederates, two hundred and seventy in number, made the welkin ring with their cheers as they receded from the boat in which they had experienced their last hours of captivity, and in passing Fort Drewry they again gave vent to their feelings in hearty hurrahs.

They were, indeed, jubilant at their return to Dixie, and the kind treatment of the committee and the surgeons in attendance, increased the exuberance of their joy. The poor fellows were mostly minus a leg or arm each, and some were