

only due—to the prompt and firm enforcement of the United States of its traditional policy. During the past forty years the revolutions on the isthmus have succeeded one another with monotonous regularity on the isthmus, and again and again United States sailors and marines have been landed as they were landed in this instance to protect the transit. One of these revolutions resulted in three years of warfare; and the aggregate of bloodshed and misery caused by them has been incalculable. The fact that in this last revolution not a life was lost, save that of the man killed by the shells of the Colombian gunboat, and no property destroyed, was due to the action which I have described. We, in effect, protected the isthmus in the interest of its inhabitants and of our own national needs, and for the good of the entire civilized world. Failure to act as the administration acted would have meant great waste of property; all of which was avoided by the firmness and prudence with which Commander Hubbard carried out his orders and prevented either party from attacking the other. Our action was for the peace both of Colombia and of Panama. It is earnestly to be hoped that there will be no unwise conduct on our part which may encourage Colombia to embark on a war which will not result in her regaining control of the isthmus, but which may cause much bloodshed and suffering.

Injurious Insinuations Repelled.
I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which have been made of our policy. The insinuations of the revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as destitute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for my referring to them is the fear lest unthinking persons might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self-respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one connected with this government has taken part in preparing, inciting or encouraging the late revolution on the isthmus of Panama, and that, save from the reports of our military and naval officers, given above, we are not connected with this government had any previous knowledge of the revolution except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary intelligence. I read the newspapers and kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs.

By the unanimous action of its people, without the firing of a shot—with a unanimity hardly before recorded in any similar case—the people of Panama declared themselves an independent republic. Their recognition by this government was based upon a state of facts in no way dependent for its justification upon our action in ordinary cases. I have not denied, nor do I wish to deny, either the validity or the propriety of the general rule that a new state should not be recognized as independent until it has shown its ability to maintain its independence. This rule is derived from the principle of nonintervention, and as a corollary of that principle has generally been observed by the United States. But, like the principle from which it is deduced, the rule is subject to exceptions; and there are, in my opinion, clear and imperative reasons why a deviation from it was justified and even required in the present instance. These reasons embrace, first, our treaty rights; second, our national interests and safety; and, third, the interests of collective civilization.

Not Bound to Bolster Bogota Government.
I have already adverted to the treaty of 1846, by the thirty-fifth article of which the United States secured the right to a free and open transit across the Isthmus of Panama, and to that end agreed to guarantee to New Granada her rights of sovereignty and territorial integrity over that territory. This article is sometimes discussed as if the latter guarantee constituted its sole object and bound the United States to protect the sovereignty of New Granada against domestic revolution. Nothing, however, could be more erroneous than this supposition. That our wise and patriotic ancestors should have entered into a treaty with New Granada solely or even primarily for the purpose of enabling that remnant of the original republic of Colombia, then resolved into the states of New Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador, to continue from Bogota to rule over the Isthmus of Panama, is a conception that would seem incredible, even if the contrary did not clearly appear. It is true that since the treaty was made the United States has again and again been obliged forcibly to intervene in the preservation of order and the maintenance of an open transit, and that this intervention has usually operated to the advantage of the titular government of Colombia. But it is equally true that the United States in intervening, with or without Colombia's consent, for the protection of the transit, has disclaimed any duty to defend the Colombian government against domestic insurrection or against the erection of an independent government on the Isthmus of Panama. The attacks against which the United States engaged in protecting New Granada's sovereignty were those of foreign powers; but this engagement was only a means to the accomplishment of a far more important end. The great design of the article was to assure the dedication of the isthmus to the purposes of free and unobstructed interoceanic transit, the consummation of which would be found in an interoceanic canal. To the accomplishment of this object the government of the United States had for years directed its diplomacy. It occupied a place in the instructions to our delegates to the Panama congress during the administration of John Quincy Adams. It formed the subject of a resolution of the senate in 1822, and of the house of representatives in 1829. In 1846 its importance had become still more apparent by reason of the Mexican war. The treaty of 1846 did not in terms bind New Granada to grant reasonable concessions for the construction of means of interoceanic communication. It was only because it was not imagined that such concessions would ever be withheld. As it was expressly agreed that the United States, in consideration of its onerous guarantee of New Granadan sovereignty, should possess the right to grant reasonable transit on any modes of communication that might be constructed, the obvious intent of the treaty rendered it unnecessary, if not superfluous, in terms to stipulate that such modes of communication should not be denied.

Reasons for Recognition of Panama.
Long before the conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty the course of events had shown that a canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans must be built by the United States or not at all. Experience had demonstrated that private enterprise was utterly inadequate for the purpose, and a fixed policy, declared by the United States on many memorable occasions, and supported by the practically unanimous voice of American opinion, had rendered it morally impossible that the work should be undertaken by European powers, either singly or in combination. Under the universally recognized conditions on which the legislation of the congress was based, the negotiations with Colombia were begun and concluded. Nevertheless, when the well-considered agreement was rejected by Colombia and the revolution on the isthmus ensued, one of Colombia's first acts was to invoke the intervention of the United States; nor does her conviction appear to have been confined to this government alone. By a telegram from Mr. Beaupre, our minister at Bogota, of the 7th of November last, we were informed that General Reyes would soon leave Panama, invested with full powers; that he had telegraphed the president of Mexico to ask the government of the United States and all countries represented at the Pan-American conference, "to aid Colombia to preserve her integrity"; and that he had requested that the government of the United States should meanwhile "preserve the neutrality and transit of the isthmus" and should not recognize the new government. In another telegram from Mr. Beaupre, which was sent later in the day, this government was asked whether it would take action to maintain Colombian rights and sovereignty on the isthmus in accordance with article 35 [of] the treaty of 1846. In case the Colombian government should be unable to suppress the secession movement there. Here was a direct solicitation to the United States to intervene for the purpose of suppressing, contrary to the treaty of 1846, a government which has uniformly construed it as a new revolt against Colombia's authority brought about by her own refusal to permit the fulfillment of the great design for which that treaty was made. It was under these circumstances that the United States, instead of maintaining Colombian rights and sovereignty to make the engagements of the treaty a reality, recognized them as the proper custodians of the sovereignty of the isthmus.

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Vital Necessity of Canal.
This recognition was, in the second place, further justified by the highest considerations of our national interests and safety. In all the range of our international relations, I do not hesitate to affirm that there is nothing of greater or more pressing importance than the construction of an interoceanic canal. Long acknowledged to be essential to our commercial development, it has become, as the result of the recent extension of our territory to the Pacific, more than ever essential to our national self-defense. In transmitting to the senate the treaty of 1846, President Polk pointed out as the principal reason for its ratification that the passage of the isthmus, which it was designed to secure, would relieve us from a long and dangerous navigation of more than 9,000 miles around Cape Horn, and render our communication with our own possessions on the northwest

coast of America comparatively easy and speedy. The events of the past five years have given to this consideration an importance far greater than it possessed in 1846. In the light of our present situation, the establishment of easy and speedy communication by sea between the Atlantic and the Pacific presents itself not simply as something to be desired, but as an object to be positively and promptly attained. Reasons of convenience have been superseded by reasons of vital necessity, which do not admit of indefinite delays.

Why Colombia Temporarily.
To such delays the rejection by Colombia of the Hay-Herran treaty directly exposed us. As proof of this fact I need only refer to the program outlined in the report of the majority of the Panama canal committee, read in the Colombian senate on Oct. 14 last. In this report, which recommended that the discussion of a law to authorize the government to enter upon new negotiations should be indefinitely postponed, it proposed that the consideration of the subject should be deferred till Oct. 31, 1904, when the next Colombian congress should meet in ordinary session. By that time, as the report goes on to say, the extension of time granted to the New Panama Canal company by treaty in 1893 would have expired, and the new congress would be in a position to take up the question whether the company had not in spite of further extensions that had been granted by legislative acts, forfeited all its property and rights. "When that time arrives," the report significantly declares, "the people, without any impediment, will be able to contract and will be in more clear, more definite, and more advantageous possession, both legally and morally, of the canal." The naked meaning of this report is that Colombia proposed to wait until, by the enforcement of a forfeiture repugnant to the ideas of every civilized nation, the property and rights of the New Panama Canal company could be confiscated.

Colombia's Game of Grab.
Such is the scheme to which it was proposed that the United States should be invited to become a party. The construction of the canal was to be relegated to the indefinite future, while Colombia was, by reason of her own delay, to be placed in the "more advantageous" position of claiming not merely the compensation to be paid by the United States for the privilege of completing the canal, but also the forty millions authorized by the act of 1902 to be paid for the property of the New Panama Canal company. That the attempt to carry out this scheme would have brought Colombia into conflict with the gov-

ernment of France cannot be doubted; nor could the United States have counted upon immunity from the consequences of the attempt, even apart from the indefinite delays to which the construction of the canal was to be subjected. On the first appearance of danger to Colombia, this government would have been summoned to interpose, in order to give effect to the guarantees of the treaty of 1846; and all this in support of a plan which, while characterized in its first stage by the wanton disregard of our own highest interests, was fitly to end in further injury to the citizens of a friendly nation, whose enormous losses in their generous efforts to pierce the isthmus have become a matter of history.

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Our Mandate from Civilization.
In the third place, I confidently maintain that the recognition of the republic of Panama was an act justified by the interests of collective civilization. If ever a government could be said to have received a mandate from civilization to effect an object, the accomplishment of which was demanded in the interest of mankind, the United States holds that position with regard to the interoceanic canal. Since our purpose to build the canal was definitely announced, there have come from all quarters assurances of approval and encouragement, in which even Colombia herself at one time participated, and to general assurances were added specific acts and declarations. In order that no obstacle might stand in our way, Great Britain renounced important rights under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and agreed to its abrogation; receiving in return nothing but our honorable pledge to build the canal and protect it as an open highway. It was in fulfillment of this pledge, and of the proposed actment by the congress of the United States of legislation to give it immediate effect, that the Pan-American conference, at the City of Mexico, on Jan. 22, 1902, adopted the following resolution:

"The republic assembled at the international conference in Mexico applaud the purpose of the United States government to construct an interoceanic canal, and acknowledge that this work will not only be well for those who are pessimistic as to our active participation in recognizing the republic of Panama, while we lawfully protected the transit from invasion and disturbance, to recall what has been done in Cuba, where we intervened even by force on general grounds of national interest and duty. When we interfered it was freely prophesied that the intended republic of Cuba and administrator it for our own interests. The result has demonstrated in singularly conclusive fashion the falsity of these prophecies. Cuba is now an independent republic. We

governed it in its own interests for a few years, till it was able to stand alone, and then started it upon its career of self-government and independence, granting it all necessary aid."
A Lesson from Cuba.
We have received from Cuba a grant of two naval stations, so situated that they in no possible way menace the liberty of the island, and yet serve as important defenses for the Cuban people, as well as for our own people, against possible foreign attack. The people of Cuba have been immeasurably benefited by our interference in their behalf, and our own gain has been great. So will it be with Panama. The people of the isthmus, and as I firmly believe the adjoining parts of Central and South America, will be greatly benefited by the building of the canal and the guarantee of peace and order along its line, and hand in hand with the benefit to them will go the benefit to us and to mankind. By our prompt and decisive action, not only have our interests and those of the civilized world been conserved, but we have forestalled complications which were likely to be fruitful in loss to ourselves, and in bloodshed and suffering to the people of the isthmus. Instead of using our force, as we were invited by Colombia to do, for the twofold purpose of defeating our own rights and interests and the interests of the civilized world, we have forestalled the submission of the people of the isthmus to those whom they regarded as oppressors, we shall, as in duty bound, keep the transit open and prevent its invasion. Meanwhile, the only question now before us is that of the ratification of the treaty. For it is to be remembered that a failure to ratify the treaty will not undo what has been done, will not restore Panama to Colombia, and will not alter our obligation to keep the transit open across the isthmus, and to prevent any outside power from menacing this transit.



As to Treaty Obligations.
It seems to have been assumed in certain quarters that the proposition that the obligations of article 35 of the treaty of 1846 are to be considered as general, and following the sovereignty of the isthmus, so long as that sovereignty is not absorbed by the United States, rest upon some novel theory. No assumption could be more absurd. The question is by no means true that a state, in declaring its independence, rids itself of all the treaty obligations entered into by the former government. It is a mere coincidence that this question was once raised in a case involving the obligations of Colombia as an independent state under a treaty which Spain had made with the United

States many years before Spanish-American independence. In that case Mr. John Quincy Adams, secretary of state, in an instruction to Mr. Aiden, our minister to Colombia, of May 27, 1823, said:
"By a treaty between the United States and Spain concluded at a time when Colombia was a part of the Spanish dominions, the principle that free ships make free goods was expressly recognized and established. It is asserted that by her declaration of independence Colombia has been entirely released from all the obligations by which, as a part of the Spanish nation, she was bound to other nations. This principle is not tenable. To all the engagements of Spain with other nations, affecting their rights and interests, Colombia, so far as she was affected by them, remains bound in honor and in justice. The stipulation now referred to is of that character.
The principle thus asserted by Mr. Adams was afterwards sustained by an international commission in respect to the precise stipulations to which he referred; and a similar position was taken by the United States with regard to the binding obligation upon the independent state of Texas of commercial stipulations embodied in prior treaties between the United States and Mexico when Texas formed a part of the latter country. But in the present case it is unnecessary to go so far. Even if it be admitted that prior treaties of a political and commercial complexion generally do not bind a new state formed by separation, it is undeniable that stipulations having a local application to the territory embraced in the new state continue in force and are binding upon the new sovereign. Thus it is on all hands conceded that treaties relating to boundaries and to rights of navigation continue in force without regard to changes in government or sovereignty. This principle obviously applies to that part of the treaty of 1846 which relates to the isthmus of Panama."

Panama Republic Accomplished.
In conclusion let me repeat that the question actually before this government is not that of the recognition of Panama as an independent republic. That is already an accomplished fact. The question is whether or not we shall build an isthmian canal.
I transmit herewith copies of the latest notes from the minister of the Republic of Panama to this government, and of certain notes which have passed between the special envoy of the Republic of Colombia and this government.
—THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
White House, Jan. 4, 1904.


MINNEAPOLIS DRY GOODS CO.

SEMI-ANNUAL DISCOUNT SALE OF FURNITURE.



Right on the heels of the inventory comes a general mark-down on all Furniture. Our object is to make room—quickly and plenty of it—for the spring shipments which will soon be coming along. An immense distribution will be necessary this year. Every piece of Furniture in stock, without exception, will share in the sacrifice. The quality of the stock is known to everyone who has spent even five minutes on the fourth floor. Honest, well-made furniture from first to last now and always. What about the savings at this sale? 10 per cent is the smallest discount, and there are not many pieces that are reduced so little. 25 per cent is more common; so is 33 1/2 per cent. Many prices are cut squarely in two. Think of saving \$1 to \$5 on every \$10 you spend, with this whole great stock to select from, and with no sacrifice whatever of quality. Without going into descriptions, let us state a few of the facts in cold figures.

- Dining Tables that were \$20, now - \$15
- Dining Tables that were \$35, now - \$25
- Dining Tables that were \$45, now - \$35
- Dining Chairs that were \$6, now \$4.50
- Dining Chairs that were \$4, now - \$3
- Dining Chairs that were \$2.50, now - \$2
- Dining Chairs that were \$2, now \$1.50
- Buffets that were \$18, now - \$12
- Buffets that were \$28, now - \$20
- Sideboards that were \$40, now - \$25
- Sideboards that were \$28, now - \$20
- China Closets that were \$25, now \$15
- China Closets that were \$38, now \$30
- Gilt Sofas that were \$25, now \$12.50
- 3-piece Parlor Suits that were \$100, now \$50
- 3-piece Parlor Suits that were \$75, now \$40
- 3-piece Parlor Suits that were \$38, now \$20
- 3-piece Parlor Suits that were \$50, now \$25
- Roman Seats that were \$12, now - \$6
- Odd Chairs that were \$10, now - \$5
- Davenport that were \$140, at - \$75
- Davenport that were \$100, at - \$70
- Davenport that were \$30, at - \$24



This Sale Will Open Promptly at 8:30 Tuesday Morning

Lingerie, Linens, White Goods, Wash Goods and Cottons
These are the features of the general White Sale that will open Wednesday. Full announcement in papers of Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday morning.

Opening Sale of Embroideries, January 12th, a Week From Tuesday.

Fur Garments Reduced to Close

Cold weather hangs on like grim death, and winter is only begun. This is what you think of in buying furs. We, who have to sell them, look at the calendar, and see that our season will soon be on the wane. Forewarned is forearmed. We have resolved not to carry over any of this season's goods. Now is the time to strike hard. See a few of the reductions that go into effect Tuesday morning. Come to the second floor for them.

- Astrakhan Capes, 27 inches long, full sweep, were \$32.50, now \$25
- Astrakhan Jackets, made of full skins, were \$37.50, now \$32.50
- Astrakhan Jackets that were \$50, now \$40
- Astrakhan Jackets that were \$60, now \$47.50
- Electric Jackets, several lines worth up to \$30, all at \$20
- Electric Capes, with black marten collar and edge, were \$37.50, now \$30

Clean-up Sale of Lace Curtains.

The inventory is taken. It shows more Lace Curtains in stock than there ought to be. We cannot allow the surplus to remain. In the lots advertised at such low prices today are Scotch Nets, Cable Nets, Arabe and many novelties, besides many fine Brussels Curtains, shorn of profit and sold at cost.

- \$1.50 Curtains, pair 98c
- \$2.00 Curtains, pair \$1.19
- \$2.25 Curtains, pair \$1.48
- \$2.50 Curtains, pair \$1.98
- \$3.00 Curtains, pair \$2.25
- \$4.00 Curtains, pair \$2.98
- \$5.00 Curtains, pair \$3.98
- \$6.00 Curtains, pair \$4.98
- \$7.00 Curtains, pair \$5.20