

URGES BETTER WAR METHODS FOR AMERICA

Raymond B. Price Says Lack of Organization Must Be Remedied.

Raymond B. Price, in a pamphlet, "Washington, Nine Months at War," published by the Patriotic Education Society, of Washington, renders a real service in that he furnishes information to make the people think. Tribute is paid to the "moral purposes and standards behind our Executive's acts," and he adds that "failures in a great part are due to poor organization."

Mr. Price canvasses the war situation as it has existed since the beginning. He cites the experience of Britain and France: the problem of shipping and how it has been met, or, rather, not met; the question of labor, which he maintains is still unsolved; and he adds "no greater single problem lies before Congress, our administrators, or the country at the present time."

Mr. Price urges the importance of prompt action and quotes Sir William A. Holman, of New South Wales, as stating that fifty per cent of Australia's troubles have been settled without strikes and their "Arbitration Courts had proved of great educational value."

As a solution of the labor problem, the suggestion is made that the government with its war powers "could make the teaching of English compulsory." The writer also sees weakness in the intelligence service, and quotes Editor Rathorn, of the Providence Journal, as saying that it is "ridiculously undermined and ridiculously underpaid." The fact that in munitions plants alone there have been 49 explosions and 17 fires in which 147 have been killed and 142 injured, with a loss of \$35,000,000, is quoted to show the inadequacy of our protection against disasters at home. In addition, there have been ship fires causing a loss of millions, trains wrecked, canal plots, houses bombed, and the pamphlet urges Congressional investigation. It points out that this country has to meet "the deceptive, lying, misrepresenting of Germany, which knows no moral limits," and adds that this can only be met by counter-propaganda.

Chapters on transportation, the effects of congestion; on fuel and its world-wide sources of supply and distribution; on imperfect democracy versus perfected autocracy; on the duty the government owes business in war; the Council of National Defense; on Congress; personnel; are combined with the need of the next six months.

A very interesting chapter is that under the head "The General Staff," by William Hard, as is another "Retagging the Allies." Unlike many pamphlets in which the author offers no constructive criticism, Mr. Price presents in concluding chapters a plea to do away with half-way measures. He tells us what we know—that the public is disgruntled that the President is without necessary information, and he adds "the executives have labored with equivalent difficulties."

To strengthen the system. Reorganize, therefore, the elimination of government debating society committees, by hindrance and compromise, by chance and request, by installing, by censorship, by delay and hesitation, and says "We must strengthen the two weakest spots of the national executive system."

Between the President and the complex group of executives and administrators dependent upon his decisions and policies. Between the leading executives and their right-hand men dependent upon their chief's decisions and plans. By having each executive free from detail. Giving each executive condensed, sifted vital information; Organizing each executive for and with instant daily decisions; Providing each executive with careful plans, studied policies, organized suggestions; Supporting each executive with constructive vision, operating efficiency; Demanding of each executive adequate checks and safeguards against failure, oversight, misunderstanding, scandal, secrecy and delay; Requiring each executive to know what is most urgent each day—and months ahead; Furnishing each executive with the right man for the right place—systematically; And providing more concentrated activity."

Attack in West by Germans Bluff to Frighten Allies

Regardless of Losses, Enemy Plans to Take Ground, Prisoners and Guns in Offensive.

By JOHN L. BALDERSTON. (Copyright, 1918, by the McClure Newspaper Syndicate.)

London, Jan. 6.—Expert opinion here, after months of disagreement, is now unanimous that a great German offensive against the allies on the Western front is to be expected within a period that can now be measured in weeks. In this story I am able to explain, on the highest authority, why this Teutonic attack must fail to achieve the results that Germany desires to make the allied people think will be secured.

Germany is trying in advance to make the world believe that she can obtain a decision and win the war by knocking out the French and British armies, or one of them, before the American divisions are ready to take an important part in the fighting. This is pure bluff. An analysis of the situation in the West, obtained from one of the most eminent military experts in Europe and given below, makes clear the impossibility of an enemy victory of this character.

Blow Against Morale. What Germany is really planning by the new offensive is a blow primarily against the morale of the allies. She expects to capture some ground and perhaps force a few divisions away, inflicting at the same time heavy casualties, and capturing thousands of prisoners and many guns. In other words Hindenburg, finding that because of the Russian collapse and the Italian disaster the initiative has passed from Haig and Petain to himself, proposes to win if he can a partial success like those of the allies on the Aisne and the Somme, at Arras and in Flanders.

The enemy believes that the result of an initial advance in the coming great offensive will greatly discourage the allied peoples, make them fear the total collapse of the allied armies, or at least convince them that with the Germans able to launch such heavy blows in the fourth year of the war it is useless to hope for decisive allied victories in the field that will smash up the Teuton armies. Von Kuhlmann and his military associates hope then to conclude a German peace with a weary and disappointed enemy.

So it is that soldiers look upon the coming attack. They have not the slightest fear but that they deal with it and smash it up. More than that, they sincerely welcome it. There would be grave disappointment in the high command of England and France if at the last moment the Germans called the show off. But the soldiers, knowing that the Germans know the impossibility of a military decision resulting from the coming operations, and knowing also that the Germans are not fools, realize the primarily political character of the German aims in the next campaign.

Task of the Allies. It is not the business of the allied generals to do propaganda work. Their task is to meet and defeat the German attack. But before the attack begins, military opinion is anxious that civilians in all the allied countries, and especially in America, should understand the position. The success of the German campaign depends upon ignorance of the civilian public about military affairs.

"What we have done, the Germans can do," said Gen. Maurice director of military operations of the imperial general staff, in discussing the prospects with a group of American correspondents.

What that remark means is this. The enemy will concentrate guns and men in a certain sector. By the same methods that the British and French used on the Somme, the Aisne and the Scarpe, he will break through our defenses, if he pays a high enough price, in battering in certain defensive systems and capturing a number of prisoners and guns that loom large to the enemy in all probability, if he reads of attacks and captures by the allies on the Western front.

Whether the attack succeeds or fails depends upon the losses the enemy suffers, proportionate to the casualties he inflicts on us and the ground he gains. In the existing conditions on the West front, as is authoritatively explained below, the Germans cannot hope to succeed, as success is measured by military formula.

To Claim Victory. But as soon as the attack is launched and certain initial results follow, the Germans will trumpet a great victory all over the world. Pessimists, croakers and ignorant critics in the allied countries will lift up their voices according to their whim in time of trouble. That is what Von Kuhlmann wants. That is when German diplomacy will suavely step in with its offer of accommodating terms in the hope that people will believe they can never beat them, and we had better agree and make peace while there is yet time to save our armies and prevent a debacle.

It is to be remembered that the German general staff might launch scores of divisions into a great attack, suffer an enormous defeat after the inevitable initial advantages, and yet win the war through the political effects obtained by it. In the very moment perhaps when the exhausted German armies were ready to crack up. Happenings in Russia and Italy have convinced soldiers of what politicians and newspaper can know at the beginning of the war that public opinion, for good and evil, is as powerful as cannon.

If, then, it were dignified for the high command to address a message to the American people, this message would be something like this: "Pay no attention to German claims when the attack begins, but wait patiently and with confidence, and you will not wait in vain. If we lose prisoners and guns, remember how many prisoners and guns we took from the Germans in the great offensives of the past, and remember that these did not win the war. Our task now is to hold out, inflicting the maximum losses possible on the Germans, until your divisions of young men come in to finish off an exhausted enemy. We can do this with ease, if the people at home don't let us down."

Germany Not Superior. Few details of a technical character can be given in advance of a great action. It may be said that the Germans are not as yet superior, either in men, guns or air work, to the allies in the West. The transfer of troops from the East front continues, whether or not the enemy in this way manages temporarily to obtain a superiority, it is absolutely certain that he can obtain nothing like the same superiority that the French and British enjoyed in the West in 1914 and early last year. That is one of the dominating facts about the war at present, because even with this superiority the allies were not able to inflict decisive defeats upon the Germans. And with a vastly greater superiority than the

SEMI-FORMAL FROCK FOR RESTAURANT



With large and formal social gatherings out of fashion, the semi-formal gown which is suited for both afternoon and evening wear, for restaurant dinners, or for the afternoon bridge or tea, is a wardrobe necessity. Skill and thought are demanded in the selection and construction of this double-duty dress, and the frock pictured here is an example of a real success in a gown of this sort. The foundation is of amethyst panne velvet, the cuffs and high, shaped girdle are of turquoise blue satin intricately braided in navy blue silk soutache. The oversleeve and sleeves are of crepe in the amethyst shade, revealing a lovely bit of blue and silver metallic lace, filling the front of the corsage. The crepe sleeve is notably large and loose and a good effect is obtained by setting a braided band of the velvet broken with the crepe just above the braided satin cuff which finishes the sleeve.

A clever bit of designing in braid and velvet links the pale satin gridle to the crepe and velvet underbosom.

divisions? Such an estimate verges on absurdity. It would verge on absurdity if a German division meant on the average now what it meant a year ago. But notoriously the term now means less. And, owing to the change referred to, the rate of wastage that has to be faced is higher.

Must Meet Wastage. The second effect is yet more important than the first. It is that before the military breakdown of Russia these battles on the West had all the while been discounting such relief as the enemy might obtain by a Russian breakdown. He had to meet troops on the East front, and by absorbing in anticipation annual classes of young recruits. Since, however, the number of his divisions broken in the Western battles was large, transfers from Russia were the mainstay.

"The effect of Russia's participation in the war remains, and it has been a costly effect for the enemy's forces and his staying power have alike been hugely reduced in consequence. It was that effect, already chiefly brought about by the end of 1917, which rendered the division of forces between the two fronts increasingly burdensome. Every draft on the East front made during 1917 to supply the wastage on the West decreased the number of troops that could be made in the West by Russia ceasing to be a belligerent. That fact in the present situation is one of great weight. It by no means follows that because Germany and Austria were outmatched so long as Russia remained in the war, they not only cease to be outmatched, but become superior. The benefits arising from a cessation of hostilities in Russia has been a costly effect for the enemy's advance in the battles in the West.

"The third effect of last year's Western battles illustrates the second. Ever since the end of 1917, if not earlier, it became the enemy's hope on the West to separate the allied armies by forcing a retirement of the French line between Noyon and the Meuse. This was one cause of defensive. Both in Cambrai and in the Verdun there have been efforts at patching up, and in view of probable developments the proceedings are, from the German point of view, common sense.

"Look back over the battles of 1917 on the West. There was the battle of the Ancre, followed by the abandonment of the German defenses before the French attack upon the Aisne ridge and the Champagne ridge; there were the operations round Verdun, which threw the enemy back to the Meuse; and in March 1918, there was the taking of the Meuse ridge, followed by the capture of the German defenses east of Ypres; lastly, there was the breaching of the Siegfried line southwest of Cambrai.

Effect of Success. What do these successes amount to? As it stood in the beginning of 1917, and notwithstanding the initial breach made in the German front on the Somme, the German fortified front on the West constituted a system of defense the like of which has never been known in war. The labor of millions of men, and millions of tons of material, had been expended upon it during the greater part of two years. In spite of the German counter-offensive to recover the Aisne ridge—an effort which continued for five months, and is comparable only to the assault upon Verdun—that system of defenses is today a thing of the past. And just as this system was itself unprecedented, so its destruction by the allied forces has been a feat of arms wholly without parallel in war. It is now to be said that all this was for naught, for the enemy has had, so far from being in any sense of the word futile, these allied operations, marked by tactical skill of the highest order, have had three most momentous effects.

The first effect is the forced change in the enemy's tactics. At the beginning of the year he relied mainly upon his defenses. At the present time he has to rely mainly upon counter-attack. He cannot depend upon his defenses, he has had, so far as he is able, to man his Western front more heavily. At the beginning of 1917 he had on the West 110 divisions plus his fortified bulwarks. He has now apparently 122 divisions minus the bulwarks. Is he therefore stronger for the change? It is an open question. Was this vast system of defenses, as a matter of economizing forces, worth only 22

tons of frogs. From Meigs, Minn., John and Milton Jackson, brothers, have shipped five tons of frogs to eastern markets. To get the five tons suitable for market it was necessary to handle nearly 30 tons of frogs.

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HOROSCOPE.

Sunday, February 3, 1918. The Sun is in benefic aspect in the morning, Uranus and Saturn are in evil place.

Saturn again menaces mines and mining, making for many troubles that persons in power will be compelled to meet.

Astrologers see in the place of Uranus prognostication of accidents and even treachery in connection with mines. Labor troubles are again indicated.

Uranus continues to warn those who read the stars that more will be disasters to the United States from internal sources. Under the malefic rule of this planet secret machinations are supposed to be encouraged. The direction is especially helpful to spies.

This is a fairly lucky day for association with superiors, but it is not a favorable government under which to woo, marry or meet new friends.

Increase of religious interest and zeal, so long foretold by the seers, will be strongly apparent in many centers of population, especially in Washington, Boston and Chicago. Theaters and educational institutions come under adverse influences this month.