OCR Interpretation


The day book. (Chicago, Ill.) 1911-1917, December 18, 1913, Image 14

Image and text provided by University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library, Urbana, IL

Persistent link: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045487/1913-12-18/ed-1/seq-14/

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The "deterioration" is greater dur
ing the first few months of a cam
paign than later, for the men grow
"seasoned" and the percentage of
loss grows less. But allowing for the
minimum of 50 jier cent decrease due
to "deterioration"-we will have left
at the end of the "first period" of the
campaign about 250,000 men out of
our original army of 500,000.
Volunteers Must Be Used.
And where is this army of 500,000
men to come from? They must be
volunteers. The war department has
only about 25,000 men available for
active service. A few thousand more
could be brought in from scattered
points, but the bulk would have to
come from the volunteers. It is im
possible to estimate the cost on the
great body of people that this would
entail, through absence of wage
earners, return of those who will be
come" invalids and thereby lose their
earning power, deaths, disappear
ances and partial disability. Part of
the cost can be estimated in dollars.
The greater part that part which re
sults in after years cannot even be
estimated. It would far exceed the
millions the expenditure of which can
be seen as necessary at the begin
ning. The strength of the militia is
about 100,000. Even allowing for re
cruiting the full strength of the
militia there would be an immense
gap to fill with volunteers who are
not even partially trained soldiers.
Twenty per cent of the volunteers will
be stricken from the rolls after the
iirst month by one cause or another.
The downfall of Huerta will not
settle the problem of "to intervene or
not to intervene." Many advocates
of non-tintervention go on the theory
that the end of the Huerta dictator
ship means the end of the difficulty.
This Is not the case. i
The fall of Huerta will, for a time, I
clarity the atmosphere, but the !
United States soon will be confronted
by the same difficulty, unless some
unusually capable man arises in Mex- j
ico and begins a new regime. This
man is not yet in sight. He may be
one of the rebel leaders now in the
field, but this cannot be determined
until he has been tried out in a wider
field. Indications are that, with the
fall of Huerta, Mexico will continue to
be the prey of adventurous generals
and unscrupulous politicians.
Therefore, the problem of inter
vention is not one of the moment,
hinging upon the acts of Huerta, but
one that will have to be settled, one
way or the other, for a" long time to
come.
It remains to be seen whether, un
der conditions admittedly as serious
as these, Intervention would be justifiable.
(Tomorrow Editor Canfield will
tell you how the Mexicans "Would
treat an intervening army and what
the sequential "occupation" of our
sister republic would mean.)
o o
wm
H. V. Anaj., ,,iexican rebels' rep
resentative in Arizona, who is alleged
u'.iave -..igcI across tho border
an reroplane to .Carranza's consti
tutional army,.
,s

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