OCR Interpretation


The day book. [volume] (Chicago, Ill.) 1911-1917, July 28, 1916, LAST EDITION, Image 5

Image and text provided by University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library, Urbana, IL

Persistent link: https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045487/1916-07-28/ed-1/seq-5/

What is OCR?


Thumbnail for

BANQUO'S GHOST AT THE FEAST! THAT'S
WHAT DANBURY HATTERS' DECISION WILL
BE FOR HUGHES AMONG WORKERS!
BY BASIL M. MANLY
(This is the second in Manly's se
ries of articles, breaking the silence
I of Silent Hughes. In these articles
' Manly, by quoting verbatim from
speecnes ana supreme court deci
sions of Hughes, lays bare the actu
ating principles by which the mind
of Chas.' E. Hughes operates. Editor.)
Whenever labor reads the record
of Charles E. Hughes' decisions as
a supreme court judge, the thing it
wil remember first is that he con
curred in the decision of the court in
the famous Danbury Hatters' case.
The fact that the opinions which he
personally delivered upholding the
California eight-hour law for women,
the Illinois child labor law and the
federal hours of service act for rail
road employes were very liberal and
enlightened, are apt to be forgotten
by every labor man. Even the fact
that in the Coppage vs. Kansas case
he was party to a ringing dissenting
opinion upholding the right of a
state to legislate to prevent discrim
ination against union workmen, will
be more than outweighed by the
Danbury Hatters' decision.
To those not in actual touch with
the labor movement, this attitude
will be a surprise. It will doubtless
surprise Hughes.
To understand this situation it is
necessary to see what the Danbury
Hatters' decision means to labor.
The Danbury Hatters' decision had a
three-fold meaning to labor:
First, it definitely deprived labor of
the boycott, one of its most effective
weapons.
Second, it made each individual
union man definitely answerable un
der therSherman act for all the activ
ities of his organization.
Third, it showed labor ike a flash
of lightning the absolute unfairness
with which the law was enforced
against labor as compared with cap
ital. In addition, there was a strong
sentimental appeal in the fact that
in this case the law in its utmost se
verity was being enforced against a
band of old and infirm men, who had
grown gray while the 15-year-old
case was beiag prosecuted against
them.
The Standard Oil and American
Tobacco decisions, in which Hughes
also concurred, had been rendered
just long enough for their memory
still to be fresh, while at the same
time their grimly farcical effects in
increasing the value of the corpor
ate securities and their own strangle
hold on their respective industries
could be plainly seen. Labor remem
bered that the court in handing down
the Standard Oil and American To
bacco decisions had shown its com
plete familiarity with the criminal
careers of those corporations, had
roundly denounced their practices
and had dismissed them without any
punishment except a fake dissolu
tion. Labor remembered also that, as
shown by the congressional record,
the Sherman act was not intended to
apply to labor organizations.
The reason that Hughes' endorse
ment of labor's right to organize, as
expressed in the Coppage vs. Kansas
case, carries little weight with the
workers is very simple.
"Of what right," they say, "is an
abstract right to organize and to be
protected from being discharged for
being a member of a trade union,
when the employer can fire you for
any other reason under the sun on a
moment's notice, and when, by the
very court that pretends to give us
(he right to organize, every weapon
gtfj2va- -.- aa- -- L.-jutMmmtmi

xml | txt