

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1897.

GRANT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

Continuation of Prosperity Requires Thorough Currency Revision.

NO RECOGNITION FOR CUBA.

Spain's Adoption of a Humane Policy Makes Intervention by United States No Longer a Necessity.

Urgent Need of Currency Reform

Repeated Bond Issues a Serious Menace

Cuba's Endless Struggle for Independence

Greenbacks in Exchange for Gold Only

to be, with or without reason, the signal of danger or of security. This ought to be stopped. If we are to have an era of prosperity in the country, with sufficient receipts for the expenses of the government, we must feel no immediate embarrassment from our present currency but the danger still exists and will be ever present, menacing us as long as the existing system continues; and, besides, it is in times of adequate revenues and business tranquility that the government should prepare for the worst. We cannot avoid, without serious consequences, the wise consideration and prompt solution of this question. The secretary of the treasury has outlined a plan in great detail for the purpose of removing threatened recurrence of a depleted gold reserve and saving us from future embarrassment on that account. To this plan I give my careful consideration.

I concur with the secretary of the treasury in his recommendation that national bonds be allowed to issue notes in the face value of the bonds which they have deposited for circulation, and that the tax on circulating notes secured by the deposit of such bonds be reduced to one-half of 1 per cent. per annum.

I join with him in recommending that authority be given for the establishment of national bank with a minimum capital of \$25,000. This will enable the smaller villages and agricultural regions of the country to be supplied with currency to meet their demands.

I recommend that the issue of national bank notes be reduced to the denomination of \$10 and upwards.

If the suggestions I have herein made shall have the approval of congress, then I would recommend that national bonds be required to redeem their notes in gold.

The most important problem with which this government is now called upon to deal, that pertaining to its foreign relations, concerns its duty toward Spain, and the Cuban insurrection. Problems and conditions more or less in common with those now existing have confronted this government at various times in the past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one of unrest, growing discontent, and a persistent and increasing demand for independence.

The revolution which began in 1895 lasted for ten years, despite the strenuous efforts of the successive governments to suppress it. Then, as now, the government of the United States testified its grave concern and offered its aid to put an end to bloodshed in Cuba. The course made by Gen. Grant was refused and the war dragged on, entailing great loss of life and treasure, and increased injury to American interests, besides throwing enhanced burdens of neutrality upon this government. In 1895 peace was brought about by the truce of Zanjon, obtained by negotiations between the Spanish commander, Martini de Campos, and the insurgent leaders.

enormous forces massed against it by Spain. The revolt and the efforts to subdue it carried destruction to every quarter of the island, developing wide proportions and defying the efforts of Spain for its suppression. The civilized code of war has been disregarded, no less so by the Spaniards than by the Cubans.

The offer made by my predecessor in April, 1896, tendering the friendly offices of this government, failed, and mediation on that part was not accepted. In brief, the answer read: "There is no effective way to pacify Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the rebels to the mother country."

Against this abuse of the rights of war I have felt constrained on repeated occasions to enter the firm and earnest protest of this government. There was much of public condemnation of the treatment of American citizens by alleged illegal arrests and long imprisonments awaiting trial or pending protracted judicial proceedings. I felt it my first duty to make instant demand for the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest.

Before the change of the Spanish cabinet in October, twenty-two prisoners, citizens of the United States, had been given their freedom.

For the relief of our own citizens, suffering because of the conflict, the aid of congress was sought in a special message, and under the appropriation of April 4, 1897, effective aid has been given to American citizens in Cuba and many of them at their own request have returned to the United States.

The instructions given to our new minister to Spain before

Annexation of Hawaii a Logical Outcome of Present Conditions.

AID FOR NICARAGUA CANAL

International Arbitration Indorsed—New Laws for Alaska Territory Are Now Imperatively Required.

Grant's Refusal to Give Recognition

In the presence of these significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch, it behooves the executive to consider the conditions under which so important a measure must needs rest for justification.

It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection, as it now stands, possesses beyond dispute those attributes of statehood which can alone demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession, short of the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the insurgents, and the conduct of the war by them according to the recognized code of war, are no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of belligerency than are the independence and the struggle upon the internal policy of the recognizing state.

Of the recognizing state, the position of President Grant in his memorable message of December 19, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection, as it now stands, possesses beyond dispute those attributes of statehood which can alone demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor.

"It is possible that the acts of foreign powers, and the acts of Spain herself, of this very nature might be pointed to in defense of such a position. Applying to its past history, the United States should carefully avoid the false lights which might lead it into the masses of our people to believe that the United States has rigidly and sternly to the rule, which has been its guide, of doing only that which is right and honest and of good repute.

"Belligerency, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed bodies and their occasional conflicts do not constitute belligerency. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations of high prestige and power when free from sensitive or selfish and unworthy motives, I fall to find in the insurrection the existence of a more rebellious insurrection or civil contest as to require a definition of its relations to the parties thereto.

"Such recognition entails upon the country according to the rights which flow from it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the exercise of the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may be transported freely and without interruption in vessels of the United States, to detention and to possible seizure by the military forces of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of these sudden and difficult complications which war upon the part of the United States, and which would be a commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other powers, calls for the definition of their relations to the parties to the contest. It would be a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of belligerent rights still to be an unwise and premature, as I regard it to be, at present, indefensible as a matter of policy.

"Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and reviewing its inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent to the question. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency. Such recognition, without more, will not confer upon either party to a domestic conflict a status not theretofore actually possessed by either party. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites the de facto condition of belligerency as its motive; it announces a domestic law of neutrality in its declaring state; it assumes the international obligations of a neutral in the presence of a public state of war; it warns all citizens and others within the jurisdiction of the claimant that they violate those rigorous obligations at their own peril and cannot expect to be shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas, and seizure of vessels and cargoes as contraband of war under admiralty law, must conform to international law as a legitimate consequence of a proclamation of belligerency.

AID FOR NICARAGUA CANAL

International Arbitration Indorsed—New Laws for Alaska Territory Are Now Imperatively Required.

Grant's Refusal to Give Recognition

In the presence of these significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch, it behooves the executive to consider the conditions under which so important a measure must needs rest for justification.

It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection, as it now stands, possesses beyond dispute those attributes of statehood which can alone demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession, short of the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the insurgents, and the conduct of the war by them according to the recognized code of war, are no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of belligerency than are the independence and the struggle upon the internal policy of the recognizing state.


"It is possible that the acts of foreign powers, and the acts of Spain herself, of this very nature might be pointed to in defense of such a position. Applying to its past history, the United States should carefully avoid the false lights which might lead it into the masses of our people to believe that the United States has rigidly and sternly to the rule, which has been its guide, of doing only that which is right and honest and of good repute.

"Belligerency, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed bodies and their occasional conflicts do not constitute belligerency. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations of high prestige and power when free from sensitive or selfish and unworthy motives, I fall to find in the insurrection the existence of a more rebellious insurrection or civil contest as to require a definition of its relations to the parties thereto.

"Such recognition entails upon the country according to the rights which flow from it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the exercise of the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may be transported freely and without interruption in vessels of the United States, to detention and to possible seizure by the military forces of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of these sudden and difficult complications which war upon the part of the United States, and which would be a commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other powers, calls for the definition of their relations to the parties to the contest. It would be a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of belligerent rights still to be an unwise and premature, as I regard it to be, at present, indefensible as a matter of policy.

"Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and reviewing its inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent to the question. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency. Such recognition, without more, will not confer upon either party to a domestic conflict a status not theretofore actually possessed by either party. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites the de facto condition of belligerency as its motive; it announces a domestic law of neutrality in its declaring state; it assumes the international obligations of a neutral in the presence of a public state of war; it warns all citizens and others within the jurisdiction of the claimant that they violate those rigorous obligations at their own peril and cannot expect to be shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas, and seizure of vessels and cargoes as contraband of war under admiralty law, must conform to international law as a legitimate consequence of a proclamation of belligerency.

"While according equal belligerent rights defined by public law to each party in one ports, disfavours would be imposed to both of Spain herself. Possessing a navy and claiming the ports of Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted, not only for the military investment of the island, but up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of things would exist for which the Cubans could not hope to create a parallel, while its creation through sympathy from within our domain would be even more impossible than now, with the additional obligations of international neutrality we would perform assume.



PRESIDENT M'KINLEY.

Spain Ceases Butchery of the Helpless

Discussion of the question of international duties and responsibilities of the United States as Spain understands them, is presented, with an apparent disposition to charge us with failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in fact. It could not have been made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant efforts this government has made, at the cost of millions and by the employment of the administrative machinery at the national command, to perform its full duty according to the law of nations. That it has successfully prevented the departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. But on this aspect of the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm in the conviction of a wholly performed obligation, due response to this charge has been made in diplomatic issues. Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own press, this government has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of right and in consonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own people, should the prolongation of the strife so demand. Of the untold measures these remain only:

Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; Neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression. Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often been canvassed as a possible, if not inevitable step, both in regard to the previous ten years' struggle and during the present war. I am not unmindful that the two houses of congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed, requiring or justifying the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session the senate voted a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not brought to a vote in the house.

United States Has Done Its Full Duty

Discussion of the question of international duties and responsibilities of the United States as Spain understands them, is presented, with an apparent disposition to charge us with failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in fact. It could not have been made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant efforts this government has made, at the cost of millions and by the employment of the administrative machinery at the national command, to perform its full duty according to the law of nations. That it has successfully prevented the departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. But on this aspect of the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm in the conviction of a wholly performed obligation, due response to this charge has been made in diplomatic issues. Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own press, this government has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of right and in consonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own people, should the prolongation of the strife so demand. Of the untold measures these remain only:

Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; Neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression. Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often been canvassed as a possible, if not inevitable step, both in regard to the previous ten years' struggle and during the present war. I am not unmindful that the two houses of congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed, requiring or justifying the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session the senate voted a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not brought to a vote in the house.

Cubans Are Not Entitled to Belligerency

Discussion of the question of international duties and responsibilities of the United States as Spain understands them, is presented, with an apparent disposition to charge us with failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in fact. It could not have been made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant efforts this government has made, at the cost of millions and by the employment of the administrative machinery at the national command, to perform its full duty according to the law of nations. That it has successfully prevented the departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. But on this aspect of the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm in the conviction of a wholly performed obligation, due response to this charge has been made in diplomatic issues. Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own press, this government has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of right and in consonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own people, should the prolongation of the strife so demand. Of the untold measures these remain only:

Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; Neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression. Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often been canvassed as a possible, if not inevitable step, both in regard to the previous ten years' struggle and during the present war. I am not unmindful that the two houses of congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed, requiring or justifying the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session the senate voted a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not brought to a vote in the house.