

Change in British Policy Toward America Seems Certain

By FRANK H. SIMONDS.

Too little noted even in Washington, where foreign affairs command more attention than elsewhere in the United States, yet unmistakable in all foreign newspapers and comment, is the recent appeal of Lord Derby to his fellow countrymen for an out and out alliance with France. The appeal was made at the moment when Derby ended his two years and more of service as British Ambassador at the French capital, and it came at a moment when British public opinion was unmistakably occupied with the question of the future relations of the empire to the world and to the European nations.

It is possible to exaggerate the immediate importance of the Derby incident, but it is nevertheless necessary to mark at the beginning of a new year the growing tendency at least in certain quarters of the British Isles to demand an abandonment of the policy which has dominated British actions for nearly a quarter of a century, that is ever since the Spanish-American War, and found its climax at the Paris Conference. This policy, moreover, amounts to the earnest and persistent effort to create between the two Anglo-American nations an association, an alliance, in reality a partnership in all world affairs.

Few Aware of Big Effort

To reach community of policy Americans, who are proverbially blind to events beyond their boundaries and particularly in Europe, have been little conscious of the steady, systematic and sustained British campaign to arrive, not alone at the elimination of all causes for friction and for mutual misunderstanding, but also at a community of action and of policy all over the world. Only those who were in London during the recent war, and more exactly during the period following our entrance into the struggle, and those others who were in Paris, during the whole of the peace conference, can fully appreciate the intensity of this British effort.

Looking back over a quarter of a century it becomes clear now that far more promptly and infinitely more exactly than Americans, British public men appreciated the significance of the Spanish-American war and of the Roosevelt administrations which followed closely upon that brief struggle. They saw that in reality the United States had at last arrived at the stature of a world power and that the responsibilities we had undertaken in the Near East, together with the development of our interests in all other parts of the world, ineluctably drew us into the vortex of world affairs.

Perceiving this situation, British policy recognized that the arrival of a new world power was bound ultimately to disturb the equilibrium of existing conditions and that the United States within a few years was certain to rank, not merely as a great power but, all things considered, as the greatest power, with the possible exception of Russia, whose internal development was still in a backward condition.

Moreover, the British saw with equal clarity that were it conceivable that between the British Empire and the newly arrived America there should develop rivalry, bad feeling, jealousy of the sort that not infrequently leads to war, the outcome of the

Renewal of Old Alliance With France, Dropped When Paris Conference Drew Support of Wilson Ideas, Forecast by Derby's Sensational Plea--Many Economic Reasons Why Albion Needs Support in Continental Europe and Can Ignore the United States

struggle, whatever the decision reached on the battlefield, would be the ruin of one or both countries.

Now, there was in addition to policy not a little genuine friendliness; not a few Englishmen not only recognized the logic of the situation but were as much influenced in advocating Anglo-American association by real affection and admiration for the United States. Both forces worked, both influences combined to seek the same end. It and friendship began, but the fact stands forth that for twenty-five years those who were most powerful in the politics and those who were the most conspicuous in the public life of Britain labored to bring about an Anglo-American partnership, which, however disguised by less definite terms, amounted in British minds to a full partnership.

This was the situation which existed when Great Britain became unpleasantly conscious of the rise of the German menace. Even in the face of all the troubled years which separate Tangier from Sarajevo and the first Moroccan crisis from the assassination of the Archduke and the consequent world war, British effort was continued.

When the world war came it would not be an exaggeration to say that many Englishmen and women were surprised and bitterly disappointed that there was no immediate American response to the German challenge. It is, I think, quite fair to say that under similar circumstances British participation on America's side would have been swift and sure. But in the United States there was a prompt assertion of neutrality. Moreover, for upward of three years that neutrality stood under extreme provocation.

In fact, not only was the United States officially neutral in all the first years of the war, but there was an explosion of anti-English emotion, coming to be sure almost exclusively from German and Irish quarters, which not merely grieved but angered Englishmen. To have been in London in 1916, after Mr. Wilson had said "too proud to fight," or in 1917, after he had advocated "peace without victory," was to have felt a very active resentment, concealed in many quarters, but by no means in all, under the outward mask of courtesy.

Obliterated by Our Entrance,

With Whole Souls, Into War

The entrance of the United States into the war in April, 1917, changed everything. The performance of our army, our navy, and beyond all else the magnitude and the loyalty of our services, instantly and completely obliterated the momentary resentments of the recent past. British policy and British public opinion reverted promptly to the old pathway: "The idea of an Anglo-American partnership was revived in a far more vigorous form, and any American who chanced to be in London immediately following the armistice and in advance of the Paris Conference would have been almost overwhelmed by the universality of expression of an idea which had not found the smallest lodgment in the minds of the

of \$31,364. The salvage was a little over \$1,000. In fact, according to Col. Robert N. Harper, chairman of the inaugural committee, it cost more to tear the structure down than was realized from the lumber.

Then there is the great stand in front of the Capitol Building, which is built by the Federal Government. Four years ago, according to Superintendent Elliot Woods, this stand alone cost \$25,000. There was an additional appropriation of \$25,000 by the United States Government for the maintenance of public order, first aid stations and information booths.

The latter appropriation was made payable in equal amounts out of the revenues of the District of Columbia and the Federal Government, under the half-and-half system then prevailing, which has since been changed on general appropriations for the District to a sixty-fifty basis. Seats in this stand are not sold, but distributed among the members of Congress and Government officials.

This Year an Appropriation Exceeding \$50,000 Will Be Sought

An appropriation of \$40,000 was sought from the Federal Government four years ago, but \$25,000 was all that was granted. It is probable that from \$50,000 to \$75,000 will be asked for the coming inauguration and it is certain that there must be a much greater appropriation for the building of the Capitol stand.

The two items of lumber and labor, while constituting the chief expenditures, are not the only things upon which money is spent for the inauguration and which will require greatly increased outlay this year. The sum of \$6,205 was used for illumination, of which \$5,000 went for current and materials. This did not include the expenditures for this purpose on the Government buildings themselves, which would be hard to estimate.

The great array of flags and bunting, generally whipped to pieces in the wind and rain that more often than not accompanies inaugural week, constitute an item of considerable expense. The flags and flagholders of the last inauguration cost very close to \$1,000.

Publicity work came to the neat sum of \$1,059 in 1916 and there was a printing bill of \$3,353. Badges for the committee members and gold medals struck for the President, Vice-President and chairman of the inaugural committee figured up to \$869.40. Fireworks cost \$4,190.

These and many other items of expense bring the bill of direct cost to a surprising total, notwithstanding the fact that the utmost care is used in supervising expenditures, and that services rendered are for the most part donated, as well as some material.

Republicans, in view of the overwhelming victory of their candidate and their gratification of taking over the reins of power after eight years in the opposition, have been planning on a tremendous demonstration at the inauguration, believing that in spite of the troubled financial condition of the country and increased railroad fares, a record breaking crowd will attend.

Americans with whom he had talked a few days before, as he was leaving home.

Speaking from personal experience I remember nothing in my life at once more arresting and more astonishing than this sentiment, which I found everywhere in London in January, 1919. It was easy to be stamped by it, and it was hard to utter anywhere any such warning as was appropriate in the circumstances, for it was manifest at once to all Americans, save the few whose long residence in England had blinded them to American facts, that there was nothing in the least corresponding to this sentiment in the United States.

This British feeling dictated British policy at the Paris Conference. On two subjects, and only two, were the British condemned by their own national interests to oppose the United States, if President Wilson insisted upon pressing them--namely, the "freedom of the seas" and the question of the German colonies. At the risk of American friendship British statesmen felt condemned to stand fast on these points. But when President Wilson tacitly dropped the first and accepted the mandate compromise with respect of the second, British support for the President was assured unconditionally for all else in his programme.

Threw Over Other Allies

To Back President Wilson

The result was this: In effect Lloyd George turned his back upon his Continental allies. France, Italy and the smaller States, whose aspirations found themselves in conflict with President Wilson's ideals, were suddenly faced with the fact that so far from having British support they had to reckon with open or only slightly concealed British championship of the American thesis and the American President. Lest it be thought that as an American I speak unfairly on this matter I quote the words of L.J. Maxse, editor of *The National Review* in the December number of that well known British magazine:

(At Paris.) "We threw over M. Clemenceau to ingratiate ourselves with President Wilson."

So much for the recent and the more remote past. All through the Paris Conference British delegates supported President Wilson, and there was an open revolt on the part of Italy and some other Continental nations against the so-called Anglo-Saxon domination. A general revolt was only checked by the bestowal upon France of the Anglo-American guarantee of French frontiers against a new German attack. And even here, British assurances were made contingent upon American ratification of this three-sided agreement.

Since the United States Senate has failed to ratify this agreement and will in all human probability continue to refuse ratification, it will be seen that the abandonment of France is complete.

As a consequence of the British course at Paris, British prestige in Europe was unmistakably shaken. France felt herself abandoned and said so. *Perfidie Albion* became again a familiar phrase in France. Nor was Italy less bitter, since she had received from Britain a guarantee for her claims in the Treaty of London in 1915, whereas, after entering the war on this assurance and suffering unexpected trials, she found British sympathy aligned with Wilson and not with Orlando over the Fiume dispute. Quite inaccurately this British course was laid to British shipping plans in the Adriatic and the resulting bitterness may be easily calculated.

Might Have Ignored All Else

Had League Idea Prevailed

All of the Continental resentment against British policy at Paris might have been disregarded with equanimity in London but for a single fact, the cause of this resentment, the adherence of British policy to American purposes was predicated upon the assumption that in supporting Wilson, Great Britain actually supported the United States, and that out of this intimate association at Paris and through the League of Nations, which was the product and the exclusive product of Anglo-Saxon brains and experience, there was going to develop an Anglo-American partnership, to attain which Britain had sacrificed her Continental associations.

When, however, it became tardily clear to the British that in reality the magnifying of President Wilson at Paris had resulted not in increasing but actually in weakening Anglo-American associations, when it became plain in London that from one end of the United States to the other there was a rising tide of revolt against the League of Nations and against President Wilson personally, a revolt which found expression at the November election but was long visible on the surface of the political waters, something approaching consternation resulted in London.

In point of fact it was not until the vote in the recent election was actually known that the mass of the British public at last awakened to the realization of the fact that President Wilson had lost the United States, and, since, through Paris incidents, Anglo-American partnership and President Wilson's League of Nations proposals had become inextricably intermingled, as a consequence the thing the British most desired was suffering by this association with the President's own personal policy.

To-day, with the election returns no longer doubtful, there is no mistaking the movement of a new thought in British circles, or, to put the thing more exactly, that minority of which Mr. Maxse, whom I just quoted, was a conspicuous member, which always suspected the American venture and consistently urged that Britain remain loyal to her European alliance rather than discard it for the American illusion, has begun to demand that there should be a brusque return to the old Anglo-French entente which had saved Europe and the world in 1914 and the succeeding years, before ever America came into the war.

Furthermore, it must frankly be recognized that a very large number of British subjects in Washington and in the United States generally have been impressed, and unfavorably impressed, by what they regard as the present anti-British sentiment in this country. Not a few have talked with me on the subject. They resent most deeply the evident suspicion which attaches to all British actions, official and unofficial. They resent the degree to which the United States shelters the leaders of and sympathizes with the Irish rebellion. To put the thing with

utmost directness, they are conscious of a general and nationwide sentiment of unfriendliness to their own country.

Nor can one fail to put down beside this the fact that there is going on in Great Britain a corresponding anti-American agitation, with Horatio Bottomley playing in England the odious role played by Hearst in the United States. If in the United States there is a feeling in certain quarters that Great Britain sought to entangle us in European affairs to her profit and our loss, there is in England a very keen resentment of the apparent course of the United States, not only in abandoning the British friend of Paris, but in giving aid and comfort to the Irish rebel.

In this situation what is British policy to be for the future? Is it to be a continuation of the old course, followed since the days of the Spanish-American war, the labor to create that Anglo-American partnership which seemed for a moment realized at Paris, only to crumble into dust almost before the ink was dry on the signatures of the Treaty of Versailles? Is it, by contrast, to be a swift or even a slow return to the old order of ideas, the preservation of the balance of power in Europe by the creation of a new system of alliances? And at the bottom of the system of alliances lies the question of France.

One must face the fact that there is a strong element in British public life and public opinion which clings to the idea of the Anglo-French alliance, there is an even stronger faction which is hostile to France and has consistently labored for the American arrangement and at the same time tirelessly endeavored to communicate to the United States its own hatred of France. Roughly speaking the lines divided between the Conservatives and the Liberals, with Labor standing solidly with the vanishing Liberals.

On the whole, the old Conservatives outnumber the old Liberals in the present Coalition Cabinet, but in the nation the prevailing sentiment is not friendly to France and the Cabinet has followed the line of least resistance.

British Alliance With Other Nations

Against France Is One of Possibilities

Still, it is apparent that if the sentiment in the United States remains netely hostile to any foreign partnership; if, as most Britons believe, the bitterness and suspicion of the present hour are permanent factors; if, as many Britons now believe, an intense period of commercial and perhaps naval rivalry between Britain and the United States is approaching, then persistence in the policy of pursuing American friendship and seeking American partnership can only lead to disappointment and may lead to worse.

On the other hand, the alternative is not attractive. There is a double alternative: To restore the Anglo-French association by creating a formal alliance between France, Britain and Italy, with Belgium, now joined to France by alliance, as an immediate partner and Poland as an eventual ally. Against this may be set the possibility of the erection of an anti-French combination, with Germany and Italy as immediate partners and Russia as an eventual participant. The former of the two associations would perpetuate the victory in the recent war, but the latter would fall in with British commercial and industrial necessities. Thus the French alliance is warmly championed by those who were conspicuous during the war and responsible in the main for the victory, while the latter is advocated by the men who opposed British entrance into the war on the French side and have resumed their hostility to France.

But the construction of a new alliance in Europe is not the simplest matter in the world because it carries with it the necessity to recognize not a few aspirations of Continental nations which are by no means consonant with British interests. French and British policies have steadily clashed over Germany and over Russia. British, French and Italian policies conflict in the Mediterranean, and particularly in the old Turkish Empire. Eager as are the French for the British alliance, they would not consent to pay for it by any modification of the Treaty of Versailles and they would be hardly less determined in the defence of their Russian policy. But this raises barriers to British economic rehabilitation, which seems to rest in some measure upon the reopening of Russian and German markets.

Present European Troubles Traced to Break Between France and England

As to an understanding with Germany, there are many obstacles in the way. The proposal would be desperately fought by all the elements who sustained the war most vigorously. It would bring Britain into immediate collision with France. I do not mean that that war would result--an Anglo-French war is as unthinkable as an Anglo-American armed conflict--but it would lead to vigorous French action in Germany, and it must never be forgotten that France now possesses the single efficient army in Europe and that this army stands on German soil. The result of such a British understanding as I have suggested would then by no means lead to the removal of obstacles to German economic rehabilitation, which is the end aimed at, but might lead to even greater paralysis in Germany.

However much one may canvass the situation, it seems to me to be clear that the only hope for successful British action in the direction of restoring economic health in Europe, a condition precedent to the reestablishment of British economic health at home, must lie in continued association with France. The chief trouble in Europe to-day grows out of the break between the two countries and the degree to which the conflicting views have led to mutual opposition to the efforts of each. While the United States was a party to the world settlement the British were able to enlist American support for most of their views, and France was forced to bow to the combination. But when the United States went home France resumed her freedom and Lloyd George's attempt to use Italy as a partner, replacing the United States, was mainly unsuccessful. Britain cannot return to her historic isolation because her own industrial prosperity is conditioned upon the restoration of economic life in the adjoining portions of the European Continent, which furnished her

with her great market. She is faced with a desperate problem of unemployment, which has already moved Lloyd George to talk of enforced emigration to the Empire. She cannot actually achieve any considerable results in reopening the European markets, and particularly those of Germany and Russia, as long as France stands in the way. And with the United States removed from the situation she possesses no means of coercing French policy. This is the present situation in a nutshell.

Since the main French objective at all times is security for the future, some measurable progress might be realized provided the British were prepared to concede a point in this direction and undertake by formal treaty to do what both Britain and the United States pledged themselves to do in Mr. Wilson's Treaty of Insurance. But an enormous fraction of British public opinion is hostile to such a commitment, a portion for traditional reasons, an even larger portion because of the existing resentment against France. But until French security is thus assured there is not the smallest possibility that British views as to the economic rehabilitation of Germany can find French acceptance.

The war has temporarily deprived Britain of precisely that weapon which gave her predominance in the past. Her own economic structure has been shaken by the conflict. It is the United States and not Britain which at the moment occupies the position which has been British for centuries. But the United States for a variety of reasons declines to make use of that power and even more emphatically refuses to use it in partnership with the British. And without our association Britain finds herself powerless to promote the economic rehabilitation of the Continent and suffers severely in her own industrial life. Moreover, much of the bitterness which results is directed against us for our seeming refusal to continue an association we entered upon at Paris with apparent enthusiasm.

Germany Taking Advantage of Anglo-American Lack of Confidence

So much for the existing situation. It is complicated by two circumstances which must have, at least passing mention. Germany, while as yet quite prepared to accept British direction as a condition precedent to her own economic rehabilitation, is tending to grasp at the signs of Anglo-American coldness, which all Germans emphasize and even exaggerate, as a promise that presently she can regain her old economic prosperity by American rather than British assistance, and therefore on far easier terms. For, while we shall have no political calculations in any policy toward Germany, such considerations cannot ever wholly disappear from British.

Second, there is a similar recognition in France of the present disturbance on the

surface of Anglo-American waters, and the French are just as eager as the Germans to find in American associations a possible counterpoise to British predominance for the future. Our official declaration in a letter to the Italian Ambassador at the crisis of the Polish situation was eagerly seized upon by the French as a weapon against British policy in dealing with the Bolsheviks, was used effectively and awakened violent protests in Great Britain. Thus the British are bound to be aware, unpleasantly aware, that the Continental nations are seeking to employ the United States in their own interests when these interests conflict with British and so far have not wholly failed.

A New Situation Is Developing Restoration of Anglo-French Alliance

When, however, one asks the blunt question, Will British policy change abruptly? It seems to me the answer must be negative. The obstacles in the way of a speedy restoration of the Anglo-French alliance, with Italy conjoined; the obstacles in the domestic life of Britain and the barriers resulting from conflicting economic interests are so enormous that such a change seems impossible, save after long delays.

But, by contrast, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that there will be a gradual cooling of enthusiasm on the part of many Englishmen for the pursuit of American friendship, as consequence of the disappointments and even rebuffs which have so far attended this policy. One must not blind one's eyes to the fact that whatever satisfactory explanations Americans can give themselves of the temporary coldness in Anglo-American relations, however clearly Americans perceive that no domestic agitation by any elements in our population of German and Irish origin can lead to any real quarrel between the two nations, to that supreme calamity which would be an Anglo-American conflict, however distinctly we perceive that these elements can exercise only a negative influence, an influence precluding partnership but incapable of provoking war, much that is axiomatic with us is hidden on the other side of the Atlantic. There, as here, too, negative influences are at work and are bound to continue.

In sum, we are, in my judgment, on the threshold of a new situation. Anglo-American relations are obviously bound to be more difficult for a period, at least, and during this period British policy will have to face with some degree of decision the outstanding fact that the Paris conception of an Anglo-American alliance, the cornerstone on which British statesmen built for the future, is not to be realized in any near future. As a consequence there is certain to be a growing demand in Britain for a restoration of the Anglo-French alliance. This demand is, in its turn, certain to promote at the least an increased cooperation between the two nations and perhaps the termination of the present unhappy deadlock. After all, the chief argument against the Anglo-French association has been that it would interfere with the Anglo-American. But as the prospect of the latter lessens, the argument must lose force.

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Men Who Run Congress and How They Do It

Continued from Preceding Page.

Kahn of California is the military expert, and Thomas S. Butler, a Pennsylvania Quaker, and Patrick H. Kelley of Michigan are the naval experts.

Nor is Uncle Joe Cannon left out in the cold. He has had too much experience in the varied activities of the House to be overlooked. He is content to let younger men do the hard work now, but when the problems become really knotty Uncle Joe is asked to help straighten them.

The Democrats in the House are a hopeless minority in the present Congress, the Republican majority being fifty-one, but they can still make a splash on important legislation, just to keep their record straight. In the next House they will be so few that it will be hard to find them at all. The Republican majority will be 168.

To-day Ex-Speaker Champ Clark of Missouri, now minority floor leader, and the former floor leader, Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, have most influence in shaping the minority policies. Mr. Clark was snowed under in the big storm of Republican ballots in the last election and will not be in the new Congress. Another very able and influential Democrat, Cordell Hull of Tennessee, goes out of the House on March 4. He is the man who had most to do with writing the income tax law, and there are few men in Congress who are better informed on tax questions.

Much Recent Criticism

And Its Causes Told

An accurate survey of conditions in the House would not be complete without the statement that there has been much talk of the "loose methods" of the House leaders within the last two years. In many instances there has apparently been an utter lack of team work. Important measures have been allowed to drift along and go through the lower body in half baked form, to be whipped into shape in the Senate. That is just about what is being done now in the framing of the so-called emergency tariff bill. The House has thrown every sort of thing into it, and expects the Senate either to kill it entirely or make it a sensible measure. The Senate in this instance intends to let it die a natural death, according to the present outlook.

The real work of the men who direct affairs in Congress is done in the committee of conference between the two houses. Every bill that is amended by either house after being received from the other usually winds up in conference, because it is seldom that these amendments are accepted offhand. Each house appoints conferees. They are usually very few in number, from three to five on a side--most frequently the smaller number.

The differences between the Senate and House on important measures are generally so wide that the conferees have before them virtually two separate bills. They have to fit them together if they can. Very often they cannot, and then they write an entirely new bill or a bill that is entirely new in most of its important features. These conferees are the ranking men on the committees which originally handled the bill. They are in con-

stant touch with the leaders on both sides. They meet in secret.

The results of these conferences must be accepted by the two houses or the bills die. They are most frequently accepted.

The total appropriation for Congress during the present fiscal year, which comes to an end on June 30, 1921, was \$8,186,296, of which \$2,359,991 was for the Senate and \$5,826,305 for the House. Before the year is out more money may be needed, and if it is will of course be forthcoming, for Congress holds the national purse strings.

Senators' salaries and their mileage allowances amount each year to \$771,000. The same item for House members and five Territorial delegates totals \$3,479,500. Each Senator and Representative has a secretary and each committee has a clerk. Many committees are constantly holding hearings and investigations, which require the services of highly paid experts from the outside, and the expenditures are increased by printing, travelling, stenographic reports and many odds and ends.

Many Employees On Roll

And Bills Run High

There is a large force of doorkeepers, messengers, Capitol police and numerous other employees. The clerk hire for individual members of the House amounts this year to \$1,408,000. This is entirely outside of the employees of the House itself. The stationary bill of the House is \$60,000.

These are a few examples of how expensive Congress is to the people. And yet it is a principle of the United States Government that sufficient salaries and expense money shall be given those who serve in its national Legislature to make it possible for the poorest man to accept such a place.

Senators and Representatives receive salaries of \$7,500 a year, with mileage and for their homes at the beginning and end of each session or recess. They are provided with office rooms, secretaries and stationery. After all, that is not very much in these days of the high cost of living. Many of them do not need it, but many of them need every penny of it, and more, too, because they have no other source of income to support large families in one of the most expensive cities in the world.

The present House is too unwieldy to function properly in the opinion of some observers and of some of its own members. Nevertheless the Republican majority in caucus only recently voted to increase the membership from 435 to 483. This was necessary in order that under the new apportionment, following the late census, no State would lose a seat which it now holds.

The Constitution requires that a census of the people be taken every ten years and that a basis of representation be fixed to determine how many Representatives each State shall have. If the basis of representation had been made high enough to leave the number of members the same as at present several States would have lost seats. The present basis is one member for every 211,000 of population. It has been decided to increase this figure to 218,979, which is just at the point to prevent any States losing, but it will give gains to twenty-one States, ranging from one to five, or a total increase in membership of forty-eight.