

# SILESIA SUPPLANTS BALKANS AS THE WORLD'S THORN

By FRANK H. SIMONDS.  
THE Upper Silesian question, which has set all Europe by the ears for the last few weeks, is interesting beyond all else because it is the first purely political dispute since the world war. That is to say, it is exactly like the kind of dispute which, growing out of Balkan issues, for example, steadily threatened the peace of the world up to that moment when the assassination of Sarajevo precipitated the supreme crisis.

Frank H. Simonds, whose articles on international politics in the magazine section of The New York Herald are attracting wide attention.



There is a Silesian question, a purely Polish-Germanic issue, just as there were endless Balkan disputes, disputes between Serbia and Turkey, Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria and Turkey and, at a later date, between Austria and Serbia. But the Silesian, like the Serbian, aspect is minor. What Americans have now to appreciate is the fact that we are done with an old war and an old dispute, but we are entering into a new period, a new rivalry, Europe, after the tremendous upheaval which brought the United States to the Continent and involved the whole world in the German war, is settling back into the old ruts which have shaped history for a thousand years.

We may dispute the Upper Silesian question, as such, for the moment and analyze the real issues involved in the crisis, which was marked by the sensational exchanges of public statements between Lloyd George and Briand, statements which were at points almost minatory and were rightly accepted the world over as indicating the weakening of the Anglo-French Entente, not because of German issues, not because of differences of opinion as to issues of the old war but because of a totally different conception as to national interests existing in London and Paris.

### British Policy a Repetition of Her Continental Attitude

To look at the British point of view first, it will be seen at once that Great Britain has resumed her traditional Continental policy. From time to time the threats of Spain, of France under Louis XIV. and again under Napoleon have brought England to the Continent. She came last when Germany undertook to play the Napoleonic role. But always, when the immediate menace is over, Britain begins to consider the next dance, the next partner and the new European situation.

Germany was a danger, a menace commercially, industrially, finally politically. William II. challenged Britain on the blue water. The result was that Britain in the decade which followed the Boer War steadily extended her understandings on the Continent with that group of nations which were necessarily hostile to Germany. British policy envisaged an association against Germany which would check and restrain the overleaping ambition of the new Germany.

In the end the British policy led straight to the world war, because Germany was bound not to be limited, to dominate, not to play the role of one of many great powers. But the war came, Germany was beaten, as Louis XIV. had been, as Napoleon had been. And with German defeat Germany ceased to be a menace for the British. The German war fleet was gone, the German commercial fleet was mainly in British hands. So were the German colonies. That country which had been a dangerous rival became, instantly, no more than a prospective customer.

More than this, the defeat of Germany had brought the ascendancy of France on the Continent. France became in British eyes the next possible rival. It was the business of British statesmen to restrain France, to preserve Germany as a counter balance, exactly as Britain had preserved France from partition, after Waterloo, insisting that the France of 1789 should be restored to the Bourbons on their return from exile. In taking this course Britain fought Prussia a century ago as she is now fighting France. One must not confuse apparent moderation, reasonableness, even generosity to Germany by the British with an evidence of a higher moral standard than exists among other European nations. No, the British moderation is policy long before it is moral principle. Britain sees France now, as she saw Germany before the war, as a possible rival. Could France add the coal of the Ruhr to the iron of Alsace-Lorraine and of French Lorraine, France would become the greatest iron, steel and coal nation in the world, and on such bases German expansion and powers built.

### Britain Restrained the French By Using America and Italy

At the Paris conference the main effort of British statesmanship was to restrain France, using both the United States and Italy as tools. Mr. Wilson's fourteen points were convenient bases for action in restraint of French ambition—once Mr. Wilson had accommodatedly dropped that article in his faith which affected British naval strength, namely, the freedom of the seas. Thus we found the British opposing French acquisition of the Sarre, of the left bank of the Rhine and in the same way undertaking to block French expansion in Syria. A Germany which had no terrors for Britain might easily become a useful counterweight to France. Hence the insistence by the British upon concession after concession to the Germans. Every French effort to advance into Germany to enforce the Treaty of Versailles has met with instant British opposition. Unfortunately for the English, the Treaty of Versailles established certain laws, certain rights for Germany. In the last analysis, when the Germans openly violated these rights, the British were compelled to support French purpose, but always with reluctance and after desperate resistance.

British policy believes that a strong Germany is essential to the balance of power in Europe. British support of Germany, as a consequence, is not humanitarian, it does not rest upon any higher conception of international policy, it is exactly the same principle which has dominated British policy toward the Continent ever since Britain began to have a Continental policy. Some of the most cynical and some of the most righteous actions in all British history have resulted from the application of this policy, but Americans should perceive it is policy not morals, and British defence of German integrity to-day is no more than the pursuit of British objectives as always.

### Why France Wants Germany Kept Weak and Divided

Now, if one turn to the French situation, exactly the same conditions persist. The whole history of modern France is dominated by the desire and the necessity of France to keep Germany divided, weak, broken into small states. The reason is that, whenever Germany has been in any

measure united and France weak, German or Austrian armies, counting Austria as the great German power she was before the Napoleonic era, have overflowed into France, as they did in 1870 and again in 1914.

The advance of France to the Rhine under Richelieu was no more than the instinctive desire of France to place between herself and her hereditary enemy the single barrier which, from the days of Rome onward had been a real obstacle to predatory German tribes. French history from the time of Henry IV. onward has been a desperate battle to hold the northern frontier and the eastern gateways into France. When France has been strong she has pushed beyond the frontiers and conquered. When she has been weak, she has recoiled and suffered devastating invasions.

France made an alliance with Russia in the closing years of the last century to protect herself, to obtain a measure of independence in Europe, which had been lacking since Germany conquered her and reduced her to the level of a second rate state. French safety rested henceforth upon the certainty that a fresh German attack—and many were threatened—would be accompanied by a Russian declaration of war, and when the war came, while German troops were victoriously pushing toward Paris, Russian invasion in East Prussia recalled the German corps with which the Marne might have been made a German victory.

Germany defeated, France had two political objectives. The first was to reestablish her northern and eastern frontiers. She sought to do this by military, if not political, occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland. In addition, she claimed the Sarre Basin, most of which had been French since 1814 and had come to France not as a result of conquest but by peaceful bargain with Austria, the ancient owner. Her second objective was an alliance with an eastern neighbor of Germany, which would insure a war on two fronts for Germany if she made a new attack upon France.

### French Interests Would Lift Poland to First Class Power

But since Russia had fallen into anarchy and worse, there was no present possibility of a restoration of the old Franco-Russian alliance. As a consequence France had to find a new ally and she tabled upon Poland, historically bound to France by many ties, and now as a result of her liberation to become a considerable state. All French policy in Poland is centered upon making Poland as powerful as possible. And fundamentally, it is well for Americans to perceive that here is no question of sympathy for Poland—although there is much in France, but merely of French interest.

But Poland was certain to become the battle ground of French and British policy, for the size and importance of Poland was sure to be a determining factor in French influence and power. To put the thing simply, Poland, could she have Danzig, the eastern marches which she has disputed with Lithuania and with Red Russia, would be a State of between 30,000,000 and 40,000,000, with an area greater than that of Britain or Italy, and almost equal to that of Germany as reduced by the Treaty of Versailles. If, in addition, Poland could obtain the coal fields of Upper Silesia she would be a great power on her own unification were completed.

And this new great power would, in the nature of things, be an ally and even a subordinate of France, bound to the Republic by every possible tie. Moreover, Polish armies officered and trained by French generals would in closest union with the French supply a military strength which would be the controlling factor on the Continent, leading Germany in restraint, dominating the Balkans, and, in the nature of things, bound to Rumania, another important element in the New Europe, by an inevitable alliance against the common Russian enemy.

Thus it has resulted that on every occasion when a Polish matter has been up before the Paris Conference of the Supreme Council British policy has been flatly anti-Polish. It was Lloyd George who prevented Polish ownership outright of Danzig and Upper Silesia, who reduced the Polish corridor. It was a British High Commissioner of Danzig who refused to let French munitions pass to the hard pressed Polish armies when the Bolsheviks approached Warsaw. It was Lloyd George himself who proposed, while the Reds were still advancing, that Poland agree to a treaty which would have cut in half the area of the new state.

By contrast it was Gen. Weyand and his French subordinates, reinforced by French munitions, and ably assisted on the civil side by Ambassador Jusserand, who rallied the Polish armies, delivered the counter stroke before Warsaw, which won back Poland her lost territory. The Treaty of Riga restored to Poland all the lands lost in the second partition, and at last gave her something which approximates a natural frontier toward Russia. To-day French sympathy is extended to Poland claiming Vilna, where her ethnic majority is overwhelming. It is British opposition which may defeat the Polish aspiration.

One has, then, a clear notion of the real as contrasted with the imaginary issue at stake in Upper Silesia. Poland actually car-

## Great Nations Handling Disturbing Question With Old Diplomacy, Great Britain and Italy Opposing France From Selfish Motives, Frank H. Simonds Says, While the Gallic Republic Seeks to Aggrandize Poland to Take Russia's Place as Its Chief Ally

ried in the plebscite the area which she claims and most of what Korfanty has occupied. There is not the smallest question of fact. No interpretation of the language of the treaty can be made to establish Polish claims. But the British and Italians for purposes British and Italian oppose, the French for similarly selfish interests support, the Polish claims and the Poles, despairing of justice, have taken the matter into their own hands. One word now as to the Italian attitude. Italy is opposing France for many reasons, the first of which is historic jealousy and rivalry. The French and Italians are Latins, as we and the British are Anglo-Saxons and the legend that "blood is thicker than water" is about as accurate in one case as in the other. Before the war Italy was an ally of Germany and Italian foreign policy was chiefly anti-French, largely because of French success in acquiring the territories in North Africa, notably Tunisia, toward which Italian aspirations were directed.

But in the conference of Paris Italy had real grievances against France. Clemenceau treated the Italians very shabbily, and French representatives, bowing to President Wilson, turned their back not alone upon Italian claims but upon Italian rights established by treaty. It was the prompt proclamation of Italian neutrality which had allowed France to use her Alpine corps on the German front and denude her Italian marches. Wisdom and self-interest both dictated that France should support Italy against Wilson, but France gave only perfunctory aid, and as a consequence Italy felt and feels that she was deserted at Paris and has come out of the war in which her armies made great sacrifices and suffered grave losses, a loser—the one loser among the Allies.

### Hostility Has for Its Object Restriction of France

The consequence has been the steady hostility of Italy to France. Now Italian hostility to Poland is like British, primarily the result of a purpose to restrict France. The Polish occupation of Upper Silesia is in principle exactly the same sort of venture as that of D'Annunzio at Fiume. As to the sacredness of the principle of self-determination, which the British and Italians allege the Poles have violated, what does that mean to Italy, who insisted upon annexing 300,000 German speaking Tyrolese in the valley of the Adige, where there was not even an Italian minority, merely to give Italy her natural frontier of the crests of the Alps? What does it mean to Italy, who has similarly annexed 400,000 Slovenes behind Trieste, simply to obtain a defensible frontier for the great Adriatic port?

Italy, like Britain, is interested in keeping France within limits. Her policy is tinged with hatred and resentment, based upon treatment which can hardly be justified. In the British case there is no resentment, no bitterness, nothing but cold policy, but the end is the same in both cases. The question of Upper Silesia finds both the British and the Italians united because it is fundamentally a French and not a Polish question. The policy of Britain in preserving Germany finds Italian support because Italy, like Britain, has no desire to see France dominate the Continent through her Polish and other alliances.

Poland, then, has something of the value Serbia had in the days of the Balkan wars. It was because Serbia was the ward of Russia primarily that Austria and Germany sought to destroy the small state and thus weaken Russian prestige and influence in the Balkans. And because of the system of alliances in Europe all the other great Powers were dragged in and the general war resulted. But, just as in 1914 Austrian hostility to Serbia had its main origin in Russian support of the Serbian state, so in 1921 Anglo-Italian hostility to Poland has its chief explanation in French association with Poland.

### England Sets Bound On a Possible Rival in France

British policy seeks to keep Germany measurably strong and united as a restraint upon France, historically the great British rival in the world and in British eyes not impossibly a future rival. Italy seeks the same objective for similar reasons, to which are added feelings of a personal character. France seeks to keep Germany weak, not so much through the desire to dominate the Continent as because Germany has been for a century at least a deadly menace to French existence. But to keep Germany strong it is necessary to limit Poland on all sides, not only to prevent her from annexing German territory but from expanding eastward into the regions which are historically Polish. This is the whole Upper Silesian dispute in a nutshell.

Simple as is the issue, however, it is not simple when it comes to the American public through the medium of foreign dispatches. We have learned to think of Garibaldi's great exploit, when he set out with his Thousand for Sicily and overthrew the Kingdom of Naples as a deed of daring patriotism. But there is small difference between the Garibaldi episode and that of Korfanty in Upper Silesia. Korfanty is made to appear as a criminal, the Poles as the disturbers of the peace of the world, just as Austrian newspapers unquestionably described Garibaldi in the last century, because most of our European news comes from London, and British policy is gravely weakened by the Korfanty exploit.

It was precisely such affairs that made us ridiculous at Paris and after Paris. We were constantly accepting the surface political indications as complete. We were never in the current of the real facts. To take an example, when I first went to Paris I discovered that the whole American press delegation was filled with reports of French chauvinism, French imperialism, etc. Surprised, I made some investigations and discovered that a bitter battle behind the scenes was being fought between the French and British Foreign offices over Syria. Since the French insisted upon their rights as established by the Sykes-Picot Treaty, the British were invoking the President's Fourteen Points and propagandizing on all sides against the French, using every opportunity to impress the Americans with French militarism and greed for territory.

What Britain wanted was an Arab kingdom occupying all of the Arabian territories of Turkey, and naturally under British protection and under the rule of an Arab prince,

who appeared in Paris under the tutelage of a brilliant young British officer to plead the cause of self-determination.

The British wanted self-determination in Syria, because they did not want the French there. They did not want it in India, in Ireland or in Egypt, because they were there. To-day they do not want self-determination in Upper Silesia, because it means an accession to French strength. But they have invoked and they will again invoke this principle, so dear to Mr. Lansing's heart, whenever it falls in with British policy. France did not support Italy in the D'Annunzio policy, because she was not sympathetic with the Italians in this instance and saw her advantage in following President Wilson. But she is sympathetic with the Korfanty exploit, because it contributes to serving a French purpose.

At Paris Mr. Wilson's principles, his Fourteen Points, served as an admirable basis for dragging him in one direction and then in another. Whenever any European Power wanted something or wanted to prevent some other Power from getting something appeal was made to some one of the Fourteen Points and American support was enlisted. We supported the Bulgarian claim to a "window on the Aegean" at the expense of Greek aspirations, and the Italians supported us against the French and British, who were playing the Greek game. But one day the Greeks offered the Italians a piece of territory in Anatolia, and Italian interest in Bulgarian access to the Aegean vanished into history.

And it is well for Americans to realize now that the Upper Silesian dispute is no more than the first evidence of a European return to old policies. The battle between old rivals and new is to be fought in the familiar way. Europe is striving toward a new balance of power. France, at the moment the dominant power on the Continent, is seeking by building up a series of alliances with Poland, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia

and Czecho-Slovakia, to consolidate her position and insure herself against any German recovery. But in this seeking security she unquestionably marches toward a position of military and political supremacy in Europe.

To prevent such French expansion of power, Britain and Italy are seeking daily and separately to restrict French influence, to protect Germany, diminish Poland, even to restore Russia as a counterbalance to Poland. You may as an American prefer that, French to the British game or the British to the French. It is not inconceivable that Americans may believe their own commercial interests are best served by a restored and fortified Germany. But what it is essential to perceive is that a game is being played that two groups of nations with equally selfish purposes, selfish as contrasted with idealistic, but perhaps more accurately nationalistic purposes, are seeking to have the best of the play, and in the operation are making the usual appeal to all sorts of appropriate and inappropriate moral principles.

### Not Really a Moral Issue. Each Power Having Motives

In reality the Upper Silesian question is hardly a moral issue at all. Great Britain would like to prevent the Poles from acquiring this region, exactly as she turned back parts of European Turkey to the Ottoman butchers in the Beaconsfield era, because she desired to keep Russia away from Constantinople. France would like to have the Poles acquire this region, Polish ethnically, because a stronger Poland would benefit France. Italy is playing the role she played in the Sardinian period, during the Crimean war, for her own legitimate interests.

But naturally the British, the Italians and the French would like to have American support and are making the very best possible appeal to so-called American idealism along the road. And at Paris there were

few crimes which were not momentarily enhanced by the approval of American idealism, which did not understand but never hesitated to act. As for the German, his case is in good hands and the Pole, now, as always, finds himself the victim of a world which is prepared to keep the peace of Europe no matter what sacrifice it entails upon the Pole, the Serb, the Bulgarian or any other small people. A similar policy found its ultimate expression in the Congress of Berlin, but it also found its logical outcome in the world war, begun as a consequence of the Bosnian episode.

Secretary of State Hughes's refusal to permit this country to be drawn into the discussion, even on the appeal of the Poles, was wise and to be expected, but it did not prevent Lloyd George from asserting that American public opinion, as expressed by the newspapers, stood with the French and the Italians, and it did call forth certain British suggestions that it would have been better if we had acted, of course, on the British side.

But the whole Upper Silesian controversy must serve to indicate how essential it is for us, now we have gone back to Europe, to "watch our step." At Paris we were made nothing more nor less than tools of British policy, because the British were wise enough to study, not only Mr. Wilson's fourteen points but Mr. Wilson himself, and make every appeal for American support on a carefully calculated arrangement of their case to meet both the fourteen points and Mr. Wilson's own personal views.

There was nothing unfair in the game, no marked cards, but only one nation was represented by supreme players, and that nation took all the tricks and won all the prizes. We are back in the game and any one who was at Paris can see familiar signs.

Our vote will still be decisive. What remains to be settled is who will cast it? (Copyright, 1921, by McClure Newspaper Syndicate.)

## "Confidence Is World's Greatest Need"

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ity that promise will be kept. The existence of the promise is known, as I have said, to every man on the place, and he works for the fulfillment of it.

"When it is possible to make a quick delivery to the man who wants it quick we try to oblige him and we do as a rule, but we accept nothing for doing this favor. We don't expect to be paid for doing the right thing and we don't ask to be paid for being obliging.

"That as a business policy extends further than this shop. The upshot of carrying it out is that we generally get our kindness returned in kind, and so will every man or institution.

"Here it is not a matter of volume of customers. That effort to make a big showing doesn't interest us. We are after pleased customers. They are the kind that stick whether they are buying locomotives or baby-carriages.

"In 1917 they sent for me to go to Washington; they asked me to be chairman of the cars committee and cooperative committee of locomotives of the Council of National Defense. I said they didn't want me, who had so many irons in the fire, naming them. But they replied that because I knew these things and must know them by my associations they needed me. So of course I served. I tell you this to be able to add that I went to Washington sharing the general belief—I think it is prevalent in the country at large—that the heads of departments were pretty incompetent and managed the business of the Government in its various departments in a slovenly fashion. Well, I found that these heads knew their business and went right along doing it, keeping at it and working hard to carry it through, working far harder than many a self-satisfied and successful 'big business' man. That taught me not to accept the general judgment when it leaned toward ignorant criticism.

"This knowledge of the way things are really done in the Government departments, all the time liable to the old red tape criticism, is what makes me get out to say that this country has nothing to worry about either in its present or in its future. It is going on like a well ordered business and there isn't any higher praise to be accorded.

"Owing to general conditions all over the world great precautions and much wisdom will have to attend our political course, but these are, I think, at present working. Business affairs, to come back to them, are about the same all over the world, quiescent, if not passive, but it is a temporary condition. To hasten the change from this quiescence to normal activity everybody has got to get to work. That is personal to all businesses and to all persons—it isn't up to the Government.

"As a locomotive man I may be excused if I put the situation this way: There's got to be fire in the fire box or the engine will stand still.

"Our people are a lively people and quick to understand. They know that idle men, loafers, incompetents, are a menace, but they also know that the proportion of such detrimental to the real workers everywhere is very small. And they know, too, that these idlers can't be driven to toil by Washington.

### Praises Secretary Hughes For His Views on Russia

"In Secretary Hughes we have a man whom I consider second to none who ever held that portfolio. The expression he gave when the resumption of trade with Russia was being discussed was the finest I ever heard. He said in turning down the proposition that 'Russia was an economic vacuum' and in five words he said everything.

is paralyzed and helpless. If ever a country needed a doctor it is Russia.

"Idealism may be very well as an amusement or a theme for talk when a nation is in health, but idealism, false or true, is futile applied to a nation in the throes of death."

"Bringing his gaze from far off, unhappy, sick Russia to his own country, Mr. Vauclain said:

"The outlook for America is good, only the trouble is that at the moment there's nothing but outlook. This nation is very rich and it can't help growing richer, only the people must get busy. Everybody has got to go to work. We need to put on steam, and to do that needs coal. The work of our people furnishes this coal. What I say is to coal up and go ahead. That's all that is required to assure business everywhere.

"The railroad situation is precisely the same as the situation of every other widespread business. It is spurred by labor, it frets under idleness. Like every other trade, manufacture or profession, it draws the breath of life from mutual confidence. That is what I am constantly saying is the panacea for all the evils of the world—Europe and America and every other inhabited part where civilized man is to be found. Confidence in each other, man to man; good will to one another—that destroys wars at their egg, that quiets quarrels between capital and labor, that sets the wheels of production going at a normal speed.

"By next November, or at the latest December, these wheels will be revolving. Then it will be a wild bid for materials and for labor; then prices for both will soar, and our difficulty will be in trying to keep both within natural bounds so as not to have a return of what we have just weathered through.

"I see this feeling of confidence slowly but surely growing all over the world and I think that this country, even while this feeling was somewhat low in degree, never actually had anything to worry about. If it had the necessity has passed and now that the people are going back to work earnestly they are taking the best steps possible to prevent its recurrence. Prosperity comes from a resumption of work, and as was said about specie payment, the way to resume work is to resume."

"The impression given by Mr. Vauclain is that he would give any subject that came before him for consideration an ample amount of it, but when asked for a deci-

sion he would give it at once. The consideration would not be repeated. In effect he said that this is the kind of mind he admires and what a man admires he usually tries to emulate.

But quick on the trigger as his answer may be to any question he has thought over and decided on, his speech is fluent is not hasty. He takes time to develop his thought and to give ample phrase to its expression. And he is always, it is safe to say, a rather slow speaker.

Not that his speech is ponderous. It isn't. It is colloquial in the extreme and he is not above lightening it by a joke or quip intellectual and is not intended to excite laughter; in fact so serious is his manner that it is only after the interview is over that one is apt to appreciate what an amusing turn was intended.

His speech and manner, indeed, justify his physical appearance, for he stands several inches more than six feet in shoe leather and his weight is proportionate. He does not emphasize points by changes in voice but neither is he a monotonous speaker. He knows the value of infection, but doesn't push it to extremes. What he has to say is said almost without a gesture. As he said some of the trenchant things in this dialogue which attempts to give a faint likeness of how the man looks to a stranger he did not raise or lower his voice and his hands lay quietly on the desk in front of him.

Once he was called to the telephone by New York, and then, as he was evidently speaking to a friend, the voice sounded like that of another man altogether; it was big and hearty, full of good fellowship and a genuine contentment with life. Everybody in his New York office speaks of him and to him as "S. V." and perhaps they do the same in Philadelphia.

This is a sign that seldom if ever fails to prove that the man so initiated is liked by his fellow workers, of whatever degree, and that he reciprocates their liking.

An impression of permanence, if that may be said of anybody in this transitory life, is what Mr. Vauclain conveys. It doesn't seem likely that he could be moved from a thing he had made up his mind about any more than the eternal hills could be. But it must be admitted that he isn't as picturesque as the hills have a way of being, and therefore he is not easily described. One can't talk about his mannerisms unless it be to remark that he hasn't any.

## Women Noted for Odd Reasons

SHE was kissed by Lincoln. This is a bright recollection of her girlhood days that cheers the declining years of Mrs. Charles F. Wilcox of Brooklyn and as the anniversary of Lincoln's birth rolls around each year she lives over again the events of that red letter day in the calendar of her youth. For, as may well be imagined, Abraham Lincoln is to Mrs. Wilcox, as to most good Americans, the greatest man who ever lived, and so she prizes more keenly the reminiscence of the Great Emancipator and the part she played in the inaugural ceremonies of 1861.

Mrs. Wilcox, then Susan Duval, a golden haired, blue eyed Southern girl of 12, was one of the thirteen girls selected to represent the original thirteen States at the inaugural ceremonies. The idea was to pick the prettiest girl from each of the States, and to Susan Duval, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Amos Duval of Baltimore, fell the honor of representing Maryland. A large float, gaily decorated with the national colors, was furnished for the bevy of beauty, and, as may be imagined, it created a sensation along the line of march. After the ceremonies were over and the White House was reached Lincoln made a pretty speech to each representative from the various States and kissed them all around.

MISS HAZEL MILLER, daughter of Sheriff Miller, the only woman jailer in Alabama, showed her nerve recently when fifteen members of an alleged moonshiners murder ring were placed in the Colbert county jail.

Some of the desperate characters had already been convicted of the murder of Don Stevenson, a prohibition officer, and the serious wounding of Ed McPeters and Calvin Highfield, two other officers. They were guarded by Miss Miller while her father and his deputies were scouring the countryside for other members of the band. With steady hand and firm tread she made her rounds inside the jail to see that all was well. No man could have displayed more self-possession.

Miss Miller is a student at the State Normal College at Florence, Ala. She is a winsome girl, well known and much admired. She says she likes her job as keeper of the jail.

"I am not the least bit afraid of any harm while alone with the prisoners," she declares. "I am often called upon at night to make the rounds of the cells alone to see that all is well while my father is out in the county attending to his duties, but I always manage to keep my nerve."