



JAPAN SOON TO STAGE COSTLY NAVAL MANOEUVRES

Two of the largest naval units soon to be tried in the forthcoming Japanese naval manoeuvres. The large picture shows the Nagato, largest and most heavily armored battleship; the smaller one shows the Ise, a first line craft, corresponding to our New Mexico. Map shows the field of practice—the Sea of Japan.

Plans for September Fleet Drills Include Problems in the Open Pacific as Well as the Sea of Japan—Economy Move in War Material Does Not Halt Building Programme, Though Heavily Taxed Populace Resents Added Burdens—Three Divisions, Including Newest Sea Monsters, to Operate Entire Month



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DURING the past twelve months a number of Japanese politicians, headed by Mr. Ozaki—who was recently expelled from the Nationalist Ken-sei-Kai party on account of his anti-navy propaganda—have been waging a vigorous campaign for the reduction of expenditure on naval armaments. This movement is receiving so much popular support that the Imperial Government has found it expedient to enjoin strict economy on all departments of the navy.

In May last Admiral Baron Kato, the Minister of Marine, summoned all the senior officers of the fleets and naval stations to Tokio for a conference on this question. As a result of this meeting it has been decided to scrap many old ships, to reduce the number of ships in full commission and to take such other measures as will curtail expenditure without reducing the fleet's readiness for war. This new policy has not been adopted a moment too soon, for even the docile Japanese masses are beginning to revolt against naval and military budgets, which between them absorb no less than 45 per cent. of the entire revenue.

On the other hand the Government has refused point blank to modify the "eight-eight" shipbuilding programme, which is really responsible for the abnormal inflation of the navy estimates; nor is it willing to abandon the scheme of intensive sea training which has been in force since 1918.

This Year's Manoeuvres Will Outscale Those of 1919


This scheme is proving very costly, because it involves the maintenance in full commission of practically all serviceable ships, the consumption of huge quantities of fuel, stores, &c., and the holding of grand manoeuvres at least once a year. Hard on the heels of Admiral Kato's economy conference comes the news that this year's autumn manoeuvres are being planned on an unusually large scale and will surpass in scope those of October, 1919, which were the most extensive peace exercises that the Japanese Navy had ever carried out.

Before proceeding to describe the forthcoming manoeuvres, a few remarks on Japanese naval organization will not be out of place. At the present time no other navy in the world is keeping such a large proportion of its vessels in active commission. It is true that the ships of the United States Navy nominally on this footing make an imposing list, but it is common knowledge that many of them have reduced complements and would not be available for some weeks, if not months, in case of emergency.

The Japanese system is very different. Thanks to an abundant supply of officers and men and a very large body of reserves, no difficulty is experienced in finding complete crews for every ship that retains a fraction of fighting value. On May 1, 1921, there were approximately 3,900 line officers, including engineers, who do not, strictly speaking, enjoy "line" status in the Japanese Navy. This figure is only about 1,200 less than that of the United States Navy, which has nearly three times as many ships to man. The disparity is greater in the case of enlisted men, of whom Japan now has 75,000 and is budgeting for 80,000 two years hence. In short, she has enough trained officers and men to furnish a full-size war crew to every battle-worthy ship she possesses, with a margin over to provide complements for every new vessel as it leaves the building



Admiral Shimamura, Chief of the Japanese Naval Staff, who will watch the practice from Admiral Tochinai's flagship.



The First Fleet is headed by the Nagato, which, with her displacement of 33,800 tons and main battery of eight 16 inch guns, is for the time being the largest battleship in the world. She is more than 1,000 tons heavier than the United States steamship Colorado, similarly armed, and was put into commission last January as flagship of Admiral Tochinai, commanding the first fleet. A sister ship, the Mutsumi, now completing at Yokosuka, is expected to begin her trials shortly, but it is improbable that she will be ready in time for the manoeuvres. Other battleships in the first fleet are the Ise, Higura, Yamashiro and Fuso, which correspond in size and power to the United States steamship New Mexico class, and the older dreadnought Settsu, armed with 12 inch guns. This latter ship will be transferred to the third fleet when the Mutsumi joins up. The six battleships are organized in two divisions, each under a flag officer.

Fleet Will Entrain in September in Japan Sea

This year's manoeuvres are to begin early in September and continue to the end of that month. The principal manoeuvre zone will be the Japan Sea, but certain of the operations will extend to the open waters of the Pacific. Ever since Rodjestvensky's armada was annihilated at Tsushima in 1905 the Sea of Japan has been a Japanese preserve in fact no less than in name. Japanese supremacy in that area is unchallenged and unchallengeable, for each of the narrow straits giving access from the Pacific is under her control and so heavily fortified that none may pass without her warrant. A glance at the map reveals the important bearing which this strategic control of the Sea of Japan exercises on Japanese policy on the mainland. With her flank thus secured Japan need fear no serious opposition to her aims in China or Siberia. The development of submarines, aircraft, torpedoes and mines has strengthened her hold on the Sea of Japan by rendering her approaches virtually impregnable to attack.

The leading role in the manoeuvres has been assigned to the first and second fleets, based respectively on Yokosuka and Kure, but the third fleet, with its headquarters at Sasebo, will also take part in the programme. Excluding minor craft and auxiliaries, upward of forty large ships will participate, besides several destroyer and submarine flotillas and airplane squadrons. Twelve of these ships will be dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, the remainder comprising older armored ships and scout cruisers.

these vessels as the most important units of the fleet because they are the only battle cruisers in the Pacific, and in that respect will remain unique till the U. S. S. Constellation and her sisters come into service two or three years hence. Working with the Second Fleet battle cruisers are the fast scouts Tatsuta and Tenryu, of 32 knots speed, and Hirado and Yahagi, of 27 knots. The Second Fleet has its proper complement of destroyers, viz., 16 first and second class boats and a submarine flotilla, but no aircraft carrier. Several of the larger ships, however, carry small single seater scouting planes on platforms over the turrets.

The Third Fleet, which is to take part in the closing stage of the manoeuvres, is

Japan against enemy invaders. Chosen and Tsushima Straits are to be heavily patrolled, for attempts will be made by submarines of the "enemy" fleet to slip through the cordon and work havoc among shipping in the Sea of Japan. Midway in the straits stand the islands of Tsushima and Iki, both of which are fortified; but on either side is a channel from 30 to 40 miles wide which it would be difficult to render submarine proof, especially as the depth of water is considerable.

In the event of war with a Power owning large submarines Japan would therefore be faced with much the same problem that confronted the British at Dover in the great war. Considering that it took four years of work to make the narrow

superdreadnoughts, and until recently the second fleet was commanded by a Vice-Admiral aged only 48.

When summing up the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war, Count Okuma, the veteran statesman and thinker, wrote: "Our victories at sea must be attributed in large measure to the youthfulness of our naval officers. Modern naval warfare is too strenuous a game for graybeards. Youth alone possesses the zeal, the initiative, the enterprise, the readiness to assume responsibility which are qualities of overwhelming importance in the naval officer. Our destroyer captains were on an average ten years younger than their Russian confreres, and much the same ratio obtained in other commands. The world saw the result. On one side the restless, fiery enthusiasm of youth, with its iron will to conquer; on the other the sloth and disillusionment of middle age, aversion to activity and the pessimism that meets defeat half way. If we are wise we shall make the imperial navy of to-morrow a young man's service. Let the old men stay at home to plot and plan if you like, but give the ships to the young men. That is the secret of victory."

Entire Force of Airplanes To Be Used in Real Work

Practically the whole of the aviation resources of the Japanese Navy are to be mobilized for the coming manoeuvres. The flying corps at Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo are expected to send a total of 80 machines, many of which will be employed in patrolling the Tsushima Strait and in anti-submarine duties.

Last year the navy machines carried out a series of attacks on the coast towns; as much, perhaps, to impress public opinion as for any other purpose. Be this as it may, the sight of big squadrons of bombing machines swooping down on the great seaports and dropping scores of indiarubber "bombs" on the most densely populated quarters was not without effect. It produced a loud outcry in the press for the immediate expansion of the flying service, and there is every reason to believe that the Government is shortly to introduce a big programme of aviation both for the navy and the army.

Nor was this the only direction in which former naval manoeuvres have subserved the purposes of propaganda. Prior to 1919 the Imperial Diet had resisted the Government's proposals for modernizing the fortifications along the coast. In that year, however, the manoeuvres were held in the vicinity of Sagami Bay, south of Tokio, and the official report stated that the coast defences had proved to be too weak to resist the approach of the "enemy" fleet.

"In these circumstances," it added, "the safety of the capital itself, to say nothing of that of other large cities on the seaboard, cannot be guaranteed unless the outlying forts are reconstructed and rearmed with modern artillery."

The hint was not wasted. Money was speedily voted for improving the coast defences and the work has gone on so rapidly that the inhabitants of Kobe and Osaka now complain of the noise and concussion produced by the firing of the new forts.

The approaches to Tokio Bay, including the islands to the south of that point, have also been armed with high powered ordnance. By degrees the whole of the Japanese coast defence will be reorganized on the latest principles. The work will cost a huge sum, but apparently a few millions more or less make very little difference in view of the formidable total which Japanese expenditure on armaments has already reached.



Admiral Baron Kato, Japanese Minister of Marine, who has full charge of Nippon's navy.

strait between Dover and Calais inaccessible to German U-boats, the Japanese could scarcely hope to keep enemy submarines from using the wider Tsushima channel, though the presence of such craft in the Sea of Japan would be highly embarrassing to Japanese communications with the mainland.

If the precedent of 1918 and 1920 is followed the manoeuvres will culminate in a great action between the contending fleets and a lavish expenditure of blank cartridge. Last year, especially, there was a tremendous amount of firing, and photos taken on that occasion show the battle cruisers rushing into action at full speed and firing eight gun salvos from their main batteries. It was during a similar sham battle in October, 1919, that the superdreadnought Huga had one of her 14-inch turrets blown up by a flareback, which set fire to bags of powder. The turret was hurled bodily overboard and nearly fifty casualties were caused.

At the close of the manoeuvres the results are sifted and analyzed by a commission of Admirals and staff officers, who award praise and censure in accordance with their findings. The work of this commission is thoroughly businesslike, and its judgments are in no way influenced by personal considerations. Efficiency is the sole standard by which officers are measured, whether their rank be high or low. The Emperor of Japan never meddles with technical matters. In this he is unlike the ex-German Kaiser, who, although innocent of practical knowledge, never hesitated to pronounce final judgment on the most complex problems of sea strategy.

Manoeuvres Often Are Fatal To Promotion of Officers

Manoeuvre time is an anxious period for the fleet and squadron commanders of the Japanese Navy, whose prospects of promotion depend very largely on the verdict passed on their conduct during these exercises. More than one officer holding high command at sea has found himself, politely relegated to an obscure shore billet on account of an error of judgment which he committed at manoeuvres. On the other hand, there have been equally numerous cases of junior officers receiving sudden promotion as a reward for conspicuously good work. Promotion in the Japanese service is by selection, not by seniority, and this system is so consistently exercised that the average age of admirals and captains is lower than that of any other navy. Japanese officers still on the right side of 40 are found in command of the finest

numerically the largest formation. Among its armored ships are the "semi-dreadnoughts" Aki and Satsuma; the Katori and Kashima, which were detailed to convey the Crown Prince to Europe; the big armored cruisers Kurama, Iwaki and Ikoma; and three older battleships. The only modern scouts in this fleet are the Chikuma and Tone, and its torpedo craft and submarines are older than those attached to the First and Second fleets. In case of war the Third Fleet would be held in reserve as a coast defence force, though some of its best ships probably would be promoted to the first line.

Coast Defence Fleet Will Close the Manoeuvres

On the eve of the manoeuvres the First and Second fleets will rendezvous at Salki Bay, in the Bungo Strait, between the islands of Kyushu and Shikoku. Here Admiral Tochinai will assume command of the whole force and take it to sea for a week of strenuous drill. The programme for this opening week includes high speed steam trials, tactical exercises, gunnery practice and destroyer and submarine attacks.

The second phase will begin on or about September 12, when the force will be split into two fleets—one, the strongest, representing the Japanese Battle Fleet, and the other an "enemy force" bent on breaking its way into the Sea of Japan through the Chosen and Tsushima Straits, between Japan and Korea. During this stage of the manoeuvres an officer of the Naval Staff will be present on board each flagship, while Admiral Shimamura, Chief of the Naval Staff, may also embark on Admiral Tochinai's flagship to watch the proceedings.

It goes without saying that details of the problems of strategy and tactics to be worked out on this occasion are shrouded in secrecy, but the fleet movements already announced help to indicate the main idea, which is to determine whether the Japanese Navy is competent to perform the dual function of guarding the eastern (Pacific) coast from attack and simultaneously holding the approaches to the Sea of

Census of Motor Cars

DEALING with the motor industry in 1920, the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce has published statistics showing that this country possessed 2,211,295 motor vehicles. In Great Britain, by the latest return of the Ministry of Transport, 554,000 were in use in that year. About 3,000,000 of the United States total were in use on farms. In passenger cars the number in use was 822,197. Of these about 33 per cent. were owned by farmers. The figures show that 83 per cent. of the world's motor cars are in the United States. To continue the list: Canada with one car to every 21 persons, New Zealand with one to 41, Australia with one to 64, Cuba with one to 94 and Great Britain with one to 110 are the largest users of motor cars in proportion to the population, while Liberia, with a ratio of one car to 250,000 of the population, is at the bottom.