as being a leading one in a case in which by law a leading question cannot be put.

J. C. FREMONT,
Lieut. Col. Mounted Riflemen.

The Court was ordered to be cleared. When the doors were opened—

The Judge Advocate stated that he had withdrawn the question; and so the Court did not come to any decision upon it.

The Judge Advocate continued:

Question. State all facts within your knowledge concerning the order of Com. Biddle to Capt. Gillespie, in the latter part of May, 1847, ordering him to be detained at Monterey?

Answer. I left Los Angeles on the 13th of May, 1847; Lieut. Gillespie left there the same day. I reached Monterey on the 27th of the month; Lieut. Gillespie reached there, I think, the evening previous. Before leaving Los Angeles I understood Lieut. Gillespie had rented the room or the house which he then occupied for the ensuing six months. I left Monterey for the United States on the 31st of May. The evening previous Col. Mason, upon whom was to devolve the management of the military and civil affairs in California—or, in other words, who was to relieve me in my authority—came to me and told me that he had understood that Lieut. Gillespie was making arrangements, or about to leave Monterey for San Francisco or the Sacramento, or one or both, which I do not remember, and that he feared Lieut. Gillespie's appearance in that district of country might serve to produce an excitement among the people. I told Col. Mason of what I had understood at Los Angeles, of Lieut. Gillespie's renting a house there, and if he apprehended any difficulty from Lieut. Gillespie's moving through the country to San Francisco or the Sacramento, I forget which, I advised him to go to Commodore Biddle and to make a statement of it. I wrote to Com. Biddle an unofficial communication. I have no copy, and I took no copy of it; but the purport of it was, as I remember, that, inasmuch as California was then quiet, I thought the quiet would be best preserved by preventing Lieut. Gillespie from going about the country. I will add, that I arrived at Johnson's, the frontier settlement in California, on the 17th of June, where I met Mr. Bryant, who accompanied me home, and from him I first learned that Lieut. Gillespie had any wish or expectation of coming home by land at that time.

Question. State all the facts within your knowledge in relation to the detention of Midshipmen Wilson and McLane with the squadron in the Pacific.

Answer. I know nothing whatever in relation to the detention of Midshipman Wilson. In relation to Lieut. McLane, of the navy, he told me that he was desirous of coming home with me. I have a very high opinion of Mr. McLane, and I was extremely desirous of the pleasure of his company. One day, in conversation with Commodore Biddle, I remarked to him that several of his officers, Lieut. McLane amongst them, were desirous of accompanying me home by land, and I added that I would be pleased or gratified if he would permit it. His reply to me was, that officers of the navy were much better off when serving in their own element, or on ship-board, or something to that purport. I urged the subject no further upon him.

Question. Will you state all the orders and instructions that you gave in California to officers of the quartermaster's department, or to any other officers or agents in regard to public or other horses which had been in the use of the battalion of California volunteers?

Answer. A few days before leaving Monterey I was informed by Lieut. Col. Fremont that there was a band of public horses on the Cosumné river, about twenty-five miles from Nueva Helvetia, and that those horses might be serviceable for us on our expedition homewards. I gave directions that they should be driven up to Nueva Helvetia, and I directed that they should be turned over to Major Swords, quartermaster, who was with me, that he might select from them such as were necessary for us. That order, that verbal order, together with two written orders of mine, are the only ones that I remember to have given in California on the subject of horses. The written orders I have copied from the copies which I sent to the Adjutant General's office. All officers know that copies of all orders issued by officers in command of departments are sent to the Adjutant General. I will read these orders, if you will receive them, or take them.

They were read, as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS 10TH MILITARY DEPARTMENT,
"*Monterey, California, March* 8, 1847.

"III. A number of horses, saddles, bridles, &c. having been forcibly taken from the Californians by the volunteers raised for the United States service under instructions of previous commanders, some of which have been turned over to the quartermaster's department, the officers in charge thereof are hereby directed to restore all such property to the owners, upon their identifying the same and giving an acknowledgment of their having received it.

"S. W. KEARNY, Brig. Gen."

"HEADQUARTERS 10TH MILITARY DEPARTMENT,
"*Monterey, California, March* 17, 1847.

"II. It having been reported that there are several horses in the quartermaster's charge at this place which belong to the inhabitants near the Bay of San Francisco, such horses, if any, will be sent to Capt. Folsom, (assistant quartermaster,) at San Francisco, who will endeavor to see that they are returned to their owners.
S. W. KEARNY, Brig Gen."

Question. What conversation did you have with Colonel Russell at the Angeles in May, 1847, in regard to your having served under the orders of Com. Stockton, and in regard to Com. Stockton's rank as compared with your own?

The defence objected to this question, as follows:

Mr. President: Lt. Col. Fremont is advised by his counsel to object to this question, because it does not refer to new matter introduced by the defence; and because the witness (Gen. Kearny) has had full opportunity, both on his direct and on his cross-examination, to testify to the point of the inquiry as to his having served under the orders of Com. Stockton; and because the question of relative rank between Gen. Kearny and Com. Stockton, according to the recollection of Lt. Col. Fremont and his counsel, was introduced by Gen. Kearny himself in his testimony, and, so far as mentioned by Colonel Russell, was in answer to questions from the Court. Lt. Col. Fremont and his counsel believe (relying on recollection) that the defence never asked a question upon that point, of any witness whatever, at any time; and desires the minutes to be examined, if the Judge Advocate or any member of the Court thinks otherwise.

J. C. FREMONT,
Lt. Col. Mounted Riflemen.

The Court was cleared. When the doors were opened, the decision was announced that the question should not be put.

The Judge Advocate stated that he had no more questions to ask.

Cross-examination of Gen. Kearny by the defence.

Question. Have you drawn up any questions on the matters to which you have been testifying, and brought or sent them to this Court to be answered by yourself?

The Court was cleared. When the doors were opened, the decision was announced that the question should not be put.

Question. Did you know the points on which you were to be examined by the Judge Advocate on this day? and did you come with answers ready prepared in your own mind to meet those points?

The Court was ordered to be cleared. When the doors were opened, it was announced that the question should not be put.

Lieut. Col. Fremont read the following paper:

Mr. President: Lieut. Col. Fremont desires to say to the Court that it is now near the time of adjournment; that he cannot finish his re-cross-examination of Gen. Kearny in the little time that remains, and would prefer to offer his questions to-morrow.

J. C. FREMONT, Lieut. Col. M. R.

A member objecting, the Court was ordered to be cleared. When the doors were opened—

The Court adjourned to 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT BY GEN. SCOTT.—The following letter from Major Gen. SCOTT to the Secretary of War, specifying some corrections to be made in one of his official reports, has been handed to us for publication.—*Union.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Mexico, December 13, 1847.

SIR: Information subsequent to my report of the battles of September 13 has developed some facts, which, in justice to the officers concerned, I request may be incorporated in that report.

1. In the mention of "officers and corps most distinguished" at the storming of Chapultepec, the name of Captain Howard, voltigeurs, should immediately precede those of Captains Barnard and Biddle, of the same corps, in these terms: "Captain Howard, of that regiment, one of the foremost in the assault."

2. In the same operation, Lieut. Selden, 8th infantry, is reported to have been "early on the ladder and badly wounded." Please substitute "the first on a ladder and badly wounded."

3. Under the same head, honorable mention is made of "a portion of the storming party (Twiggs's division serving with Quitman) under Lieut. Steele, 2d infantry;" it should read "Lieuts. Westcott and Steele, 2d infantry."

I have the honor to remain, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

To the Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR.

THE LATE DISASTER ON THE OHIO.

The Maysville Eagle of the 1st instant says:

"We are constrained to believe, from additional facts that have reached us, that the number of the lost by the explosion of the boilers of the steamboat *A. N. Johnson* is greater than has generally been estimated. An intelligent gentleman gives it as his opinion that there were 150 passengers in the cabin and sixty on deck, besides the officers and crew of the boat. A number of the passengers who were saved concur with him in this estimate. If this estimate of the passengers be correct, *one hundred and fourteen* souls were hurled unwarned into eternity by this heartrending calamity! What an awful responsibility rests somewhere for this wholesale slaughter of human beings!"

Of the wounded who were taken to Maysville the following have died, viz: Messrs. A. RICHARDSON and P. LONG, of Wheeling, Va.; ROBERT MCGOWAN, of Zanesville, Ohio; and Dr. ALEXANDER C. GILLESPIE, of New Orleans.

IN SENATE—WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1847.

TEN REGIMENT BILL.

The Senate having resumed the consideration of the bill to raise for a limited time an additional military force—

Mr. CRITTENDEN moved to amend the bill by striking out all after the enacting clause and inserting the following:

"That the President be and he is hereby authorized, should the exigencies of the war require a further increase of force, to call for and accept the services of additional volunteers, not exceeding thirty thousand, who may offer their services either as cavalry, infantry, or riflemen, to serve three years after they shall have arrived at the place of rendezvous, unless sooner discharged; to be raised and organized in the same manner as are provided for volunteers under existing laws, and to have the same pay, rations, and allowances, including land or scrip, according to grades; and to be subject to the same regulations and to the rules and articles of war.

"SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted,* That where companies of volunteers, which are now or may hereafter be in service, shall become reduced in rank and file, the President be and he is hereby authorized to discharge a part of the commissioned officers, leaving not more than three for sixty rank and file in the company, and not more than two for forty rank and file: and where the company shall be reduced below twenty rank and file, he may discharge the whole company, officers and men, and receive a new company of not less than eighty rank and file, in lieu of said discharged company: *Provided* nothing herein contained shall require the President to reduce the officers, or to discharge a company, if, in his opinion, the reduced companies can be again filled up by recruits.

"SEC 3. *And be it further enacted,* That where regiments of volunteers, which are now, or may hereafter be in service, shall become reduced, the President be and he is hereby authorized to receive additional companies of volunteers for such regiments: *Provided* the additional companies, so received for any regiment, shall not increase its numerical strength beyond one thousand rank and file.

"SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted,* That the provision in the 2d section of the act entitled 'An act to encourage enlistments in the regular army,' approved January 12, 1847, be and the same is hereby extended to include the recruits who may hereafter enlist for the first and second regiments of dragoons and the regiment of mounted riflemen, and the non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of volunteers, who may engage to serve during the war with Mexico, or for the term of three years, as provided by this act.

"SEC. 5. *And be it further enacted,* That the volunteers raised under this act, and whose term of service may not sooner expire, shall be discharged within six months after the ratification of a treaty of peace with Mexico."

Mr. CRITTENDEN submitted a substitute for the bill, (which was published in this paper of yesterday,) proposing to authorize the raising of Volunteers instead of Regulars. This amendment being before the Senate, we quote the debate upon it from the official report, as follows:

Mr. CRITTENDEN said: I do not propose on this occasion to say more than will be barely necessary to explain the amendment which I have had the honor of offering to the bill now before you. The bill which is now under consideration for raising ten additional regiments, and the bill lying upon the table to succeed it, authorizing the President to accept the services of 20,000 volunteers, have severally been reported from the Committee on Military Affairs in accordance with the recommendation of the Secretary of War, and are supposed to be necessary to meet the requirements and exigencies of the present war with Mexico. The bill now before you, sir, proposes to raise 10,000 men, or ten additional regiments; and what I propose is to give to the Government the necessary numerical force, only changing the form of its organization from a regular to a volunteer force; and I desire to assign very briefly the reasons which have induced me to adopt this course.

The bill before you for raising the ten regiments places upon Congress the responsibility of declaring that, under the present existing circumstances, it is proper and necessary that this force should be raised. Is there any such present necessity perceived by the Senate of the United States? I think not, sir. We have from the Secretary of War a discussion of various plans upon which it has been suggested that this war ought to be prosecuted. The Secretary, in discussing them, recommends the plan which he prefers, viz. to hold all those portions of Mexico which are now in our possession; and, in addition to the force which would be necessary to accomplish such a purpose, to have an active force raised, not with the view of marching over and conquering the whole country, but with the view of being prepared to make occasional conquests, should circumstances require it. This is his plan. Now, is an additional force necessary, I would ask, to accomplish the designs of the Secretary, taken even in their utmost latitude? This, sir, would be a question of a very indefinite character indeed, if our experience had not in some degree become a practical one. And what is our experience? What has been our experience in this war, and what have been the results of the war?

General Scott landed at Vera Cruz with a force of about twelve or thirteen thousand men, a considerable number of whom were volunteers. With this force he succeeded in taking the strong castle of San Juan de Ulua and the city of Vera Cruz. Pressing forward with his victorious army, from Vera Cruz he entered the capital, breaking in pieces and scattering to the winds, with a force of less than 10,000 men, the armies of Mexico in his triumphant career. General Taylor, with a still smaller comparative force, at the battle of Buena Vista completely broke the power of Mexico; and so in every action would, no matter, sir, how disproportionate in number, the American troops have been victorious. And, sir, with what a small amount of force these achievements have been accomplished!

General Scott, as I have already stated, fought all those distinguished battles before the city of Mexico and took the capital of the country with less than 10,000 men; and General Taylor, with not more than 6,000 or 7,000 men, the most of whom were volunteers, gained several distinguished victories. Indeed, General Taylor, with less than 4,000 men, beat Santa Anna with an army 20,000 strong; and that, too, not by a sudden surprise, not by a sudden burst of valor, not in a moment of enthusiasm on one side and panic on the other, but in a hard-fought battle, continued from the rising to the setting of the sun, occupying in fact the whole of nearly two days. Thus we see that not only are the sword and shield of Mexico broken and cast into the dust, but her Government is dispersed and almost annihilated by our conquering army. She has no army, and scarcely can she be said to have a Government; it consists of nothing more than disorganized factions. And if Mexico now lies prostrate before you, without an army or Government, with here and there only a body of guerrillas instead of an army to oppose you, what, in the name of Heaven, if this is all that is left to her, do you want with 30,000 more troops? Sir, since these conquests have been achieved, what has been done? Our army now reposing on the Rio Grande consists of three or four thousand regulars. Nay, I will give the exact number, it consists of 3,937 regulars. At the battle of Buena Vista you had but 200 or 300 regulars, all the rest were volunteers. In place of that army, less than 5,000 strong, which constituted the force in that portion of the country upon that field of battle, you have now, sir, a force amounting in the whole to upwards of 10,000 men. Do you want any more there?

I have already stated the force with which General Scott obtained possession of the capital. how is it with him now, sir? He has been receiving additional reinforcements almost daily since that time; and there is now at Tampico and Vera Cruz together a force amounting to 32,156 men, 17,101 of whom are regulars, and the remaining 15,055 volunteers. These statements are extracts made from the report of the Adjutant General.

General Scott's army has been almost trebled in number since he gained those battles. His force is larger by 15,000 men than when he landed at Vera Cruz. It is this much stronger than at the time when he conquered the whole region of the country between Vera Cruz and the capital; and cannot he hold this country with the same force with which he conquered it? How, upon the facts declared to us in official public documents, can any argument be found to prove the necessity of sending any further troops there? General Scott took possession of the city with 6,000 men, and of that whole region of country with not more than 12,000; and now, when he has with him 32,000 men, what more can he require? Suppose it requires as many men to hold a country as it does to conquer it, has not General Scott already doubled the number of his force since he entered the Mexican territory? Make what deduction you please on account of casualties and disease; make a deduction of 5,000, and it leaves you 15,000 men for active service. Where, I ask, could 15,000 of such men as ours be employed? What fortress is there that will not open its gates at the sight of our banners? There is not one that will not. And yet we propose to add 30,000 men to the force already there. Sir, these facts lead my mind irresistibly to the conclusion that, for any purpose of conquest even, it is not necessary to have more men in Mexico. If you have done what you have with that number of men, if they have accomplished such victories, surely you have a positive rule established by actual achievement as to what your army can do. Cannot double the number of force with which these victories have been gained conquer all Mexico? Why did you lead your armies from Vera Cruz to the capital? Because there you expected to find the more vital party of the Republic. Well, you have done all this, and still the cry is for more troops. You have had your forces doubled, and you want to double them again. If you press this bill, sir, what will then be the strength of your armies in Mexico? What number of men have you there now? I have shown you that under General Scott there are upwards of 32,000, and under General Wool upwards of 10,000 more, making an aggregate of 43,000 American soldiers now within the limits of Mexico. I reckon only those who are in the heart of Mexico, leaving out those who are stationed in California and at other distant posts. There are, southward and westward of the Rio Grande, from 42,000 to 43,000 American soldiers; and during this whole time the recruiting service is going on rapidly. Scarcely a week passes by in which reinforcements of troops are not being landed in Mexico. Now, there are 43,000 troops, as I have said, independently of what these bills propose, and the laws of this country now authorize the enlistment of some 8,000 or 9,000 more, to fill up the ranks of your armies. There is also still a deficiency of upwards of 6,000 men in your volunteer service, which may at any time be supplied. This, then, is your state of preparation in Mexico. So far as the authority of law extends, these troops are at your command. Besides these, there is an addition yet to be made, by which your army will be still further increased. The regiment called for from the State of Michigan has not yet appeared in the field; two other battalions, also, one from Alabama and the other from Mississippi, from some cause or other, have not yet been mustered into the public service, and are not included in the calculation. These regiments, added to those which you have the legal authority to send, will make our force there about 60,000 strong. Add these ten regiments, and you will then have 70,000 American soldiers beyond the Rio Grande, exclusive of those distributed throughout the United States, at various posts, and in California and New Mexico. Add, again, to this estimate the number that is proposed to be raised by the other bill which has been reported to us, and you will have an army of from 90,000 to 100,000 men. Sir, can all these troops be necessary? Does not this estimate startle the ears of Senators? I confess, for one, that I have been greatly startled while reading the reports from which I have gathered these statements, at the vast army which we are now maintaining. And another more startling consideration, which ought not to be forgotten or omitted, is the enormous cost of every regiment. I am told by those who have entered into calculations on the subject that the average cost of officers and men is nearly one thousand dollars per man. This subject becomes, then, a matter of some consequence to us. Suppose our object be to conquer Mexico, and to incur no unnecessary expense, these ten regiments will add to our expenses nearly ten million dollars; no small item in the aggregate expenditures of such a contest. I think, therefore, for these reasons, that it is highly necessary for us to determine whether all these troops are to be raised and all this cost incurred.

I am perfectly willing to meet every possible contingency of casualty or disease, but I confess I cannot foresee, at present, any contingency which will justify this increase. I am willing to authorize the President to call out whatever force he may require, under such contingency as may hereafter occur; but I would not authorize that force to be raised now. I am willing to lodge in the hands of the Executive the power, if an emergency demand it, to call out 30,000 additional men for the war; and I would have such force consist of volunteers.

Now, are not volunteers as good, have they not proved themselves as efficient, as regulars? Is not Buena Vista a bright and burning evidence of their efficiency in the field? They may be called out for the same period of service, and are entitled to a discharge under the same circumstances, and the difference in cost is great. I would substitute them, therefore, for these ten regiments of regulars, and I would accordingly give power to the President to call out the 30,000 additional troops, in case circumstances require the adoption of such a course. In my view, there is no necessity for any thing else than this to be done.

Gentlemen have appealed to the authority of information obtained from officers of the army. Why are they here, sir? Why are they here, reposing in Washington and all parts of the country, if it is not that they are satisfied that the war has closed; that no more battles are to be fought, no more laurels to be won? They have given us ample evidence, by the bravery which they have heretofore displayed, that they would not leave the field of their victories if they were not fully convinced that nothing more remained to be done. There is not one who does not believe that the war is at an end. There may be a few skirmishes here and there with parties of guerrillas, but so far as armies are concerned that will stand before American forces, they are never to be seen again in Mexico. This is the opinion of every officer I have spoken with, and it is also my opinion. From all the facts to be gathered from official reports, we can come but to one inevitable conclusion, viz: that their armies are broken to pieces; that the country is given over to the control of factions; and that they can no longer make head against us. You have now an army there of 43,000 men. They are capable of going where they please, and staying where they please, in all the wide domains of Mexico. I therefore can see no necessity for a further increase of force at present, even if it were the conquest of the whole country that was contemplated; but when it is to limited assaults only, to which it is proposed to confine this war, there appears still less necessity for such increased provision. It is with these views, and with no feelings of captiousness, from no spirit of opposition, and no disposition to scan the merits or conduct of this war, but simply taking it as it is, that I have been induced to offer the amendment which I have presented, whilst I question the propriety of any additional force being now added to our already large and increasing army in Mexico.

Mr. CASS then rose and remarked that he wished to correct one or two errors into which the Senator from Kentucky had fallen; and having shown from the returns of the Adjutant General that the number of men under Gen. Wool was only 6,700, and not 10,000, as had been stated by the Senator, he was interrupted by—

Mr. CRITTENDEN, who observed that he had fallen into an inaccuracy in summing up the forces of Gen. Wool, on account of which he readily admitted a reduction of upwards of three thousand men was to be made from the aggregate number which he had stated.

Mr. CASS proceeded. The Senator had taken one position, and eloquently supported it, on which he begged to differ with him. The Senator seemed to think that an additional force was entirely unnecessary, after the country had been conquered. But all experience showed they might gain a battle and get possession of a country without being able to retain it. Portugal and Spain were full of lessons upon this subject. To march to the capital of a country was one thing, and then to diffuse the forces over it, in various positions, in order to hold the people in subjection, was another and quite a different thing. Our armies in Mexico had gained a series of victories as brilliant in themselves as honorable to the national character. But they were now to break up as a mass, to spread themselves into various detachments, else it would be impossible to hold the Mexican people in obedience.

They would be now exposed to popular tumults, and liable to be cut down by detachments, and still the more the further they would be compelled to march. Besides, it was important that the Mexican people should be convinced by the exhibition of our overwhelming force that resistance was out of the question. What we wanted was to produce a moral effect upon the people of Mexico—to satisfy them of our strength and their weakness, and to avoid fighting battles, by showing them that, if fought, they would certainly be gained by us.

It was also important to note that the regiments now in the field did not average more than eight hundred and fifty men to each, which was nearly three hundred short of the legal establishment. This bill would not give more than 7,500 men to the army. The calculation of the honorable Senator was based on the legal establishment. Now, no legal establishment can be kept full. The reports of the Adjutant General show that there must be a deduction of more than one-quarter, leaving the force on foot less than three-fourths of the legal establishment This is the result of experience. It is not probable, therefore, that the number of the regular army in Mexico can be much if at all increased but by raising new corps, and establishing new recruiting rendezvous.

The honorable Senator in all his calculations looks to the numbers on the statute book, not to the numbers on the returns. The continually recurring casualties of battle, of climate, and of all the other circumstances which make war hazardous, are a perpetual drain, which keeps down the force far below the strength authorized by law.

With respect to the cost, the Senator or himself must be under a misapprehension. The cost of a regiment of infantry was about $279,000 per annum. It was true that all the expenses might be charged upon the soldiers—bounty lands, medical staff, and quartermaster's staff; but the actual cost of each regiment of infantry was the sum he had stated. A regiment of dragoons, of which they had three, cost something like $700,000. If he understood the Senator from Kentucky aright he proposed to raise 30,000 men at the discretion of the President, to be called out by him when he pleased. So far as regarded himself, he (M. C.) was perfectly willing that it should be left to the discretion of the President; but the demand of the Senator that all the force should be composed of volunteers brought up the old question. He (Mr. C.) had no disposition to do injustice to the volunteers. Far from it. No man had a higher opinion than he of the gallantry and efficiency of volunteers; but the addition to the regular force which the bill proposed was entirely justified alike by experience and the exigencies of the present time.

Mr. CRITTENDEN said that the Senator from Michigan had introduced rather a new principle, which made war more alarming than ever. It was this: that it would require a much greater military force to be kept in a subjected country than had been required to conquer it. The Senator said that there might be a sudden rising of the people, and they must be prepared at all times and every where to suppress such hostilities. How many men would be required for that purpose? The gentleman had given them no information as to that. He had prescribed no rule, and there was no experience, military or civil, on such a subject. Now be (Mr. C.) thought that it was pretty reasonable to suppose that those who had gone into country prepared for their reception, and had taken all its fortresses and dispersed its armies, were able to hold that dismantled country and defy that conquered people. Had the Senator attempted to show that what was done by 12,000 men could not be repeated by 30,000? It was admitted that Scott had about 30,000 men—double the force which he had when he conquered and took the city of Mexico. Was there any pressing emergency now? What did the gentleman want? He was one of great intelligence and great weight in that body—acquainted, as might be supposed, with the peculiar views of the Secretary of War; and what reason, it might then with propriety be asked, did he assign for this immediate increase of the forces in Mexico? What did he propose to do with them? Was there any thing to be done for which the present force was not perfectly competent? Did they want to take Queretaro, the present seat of government? Did they want to go to San Luis Potosi? to Zacatecas? Well, was there any where to which the forces now in Mexico could not go? He contended that they had proof in what had been already accomplished, that the forces now in Mexico were adequate to any emergency.

But the Senator from Michigan seemed to think that they ought not to be content till they had force enough to act by intimidation and terror. Well, how many men did that require? He believed that neither the great Frederick nor any other warrior of ancient times had drawn any rule as to the amount of force by which a people could be terrified into submission. They had beaten the Mexicans when they were not terrified; they had conquered them in field after field; they had broken them into pieces like a potsherd; they had doubled their forces since that day, and yet they were told that they were not in safety unless they had more troops—more forces. It was not a military effect that the gentleman wished to accomplish, for he could not point out any military operation which could not be effected by the army now in Mexico. But the Senator wanted an army large enough to produce a great moral effect. A religious effect could hardly be expected, it was to be supposed, in a Catholic country like Mexico by such means. It was a moral effect, then, that was intended; and to produce it they were called upon to make this addition to the army. He (Mr. CRITTENDEN) could not consent to raise armies for such a purpose. He was willing to raise armies to fight battles, but not to produce a "moral effect." For all military purposes they had ample forces now in Mexico. Yet, in order to meet any possible contingency, although he did not apprehend any danger, still he was willing to provide for any possibility of danger, and give to the President the power of calling out thirty thousand volunteers, if, in the exercise of his discretion, they should be deemed necessary.

The Senator from Michigan seemed to think, though he was not very distinct on the subject, that these regulars were much better than so many troops enlisted for the same time and called volunteers. Why? Both were subject to the same laws, engaged for the same term of service—to some extent consist, perhaps, of the same materials. Why, then, were they to be regarded as better when called regulars than when styled volunteers? Was there any thing in the name? Not at all. The volunteers would be just as effective as if they were called regulars. Their obligations to their country would be as strong and as sensibly felt. There can be no difference as to their capacity to render service, or in their preparation. If the President were of opinion to-morrow that there was an exigency which demanded it, he would be authorized to call for thirty thousand men, and no expenses would be incurred until they were mustered into the public service. But pass this bill for ten thousand regulars, and there would be at once from five to six hundred officers under pay, and each of the men under pay, as fast as enlisted. Not so with volunteers.

Again: which description of force was most easily raised? The volunteers of course. There was something in the name of volunteer that appealed to the hearts of their free-born countrymen with a force much greater than that which belonged to any argument or appeal employed by the officer recruiting for the regular army. If expedition was the object, the volunteer was undoubtedly the force which should be raised The call on Kentucky for two regiments of volunteers was received there about the first of October, and the Governor, to give opportunity to those living in distant parts of the State to participate in the honor of serving the country, gave as long a period as possible for the rendezvous—about twenty days—and by the first of November two full regiments embarked at Louisville for the seat of war. How long would it take, he asked, to enlist two regiments in Kentucky? Every other gentleman could easily turn to his own State and answer that question for himself. He did not believe that two regiments of regulars could be raised in two years in Kentucky; yet two regiments of volunteers were filled within thirty days, and ten or a dozen captains went away with tears in their eyes because there could not be assigned them places in the army. Such men went to the wars with spirit, courage, and ambition. They had homes to which to return, and trusted to bring back good names. That was the feeling that sustained them, and enabled them, with but little discipline, to accomplish every thing in the field. For all the reasons which he had urged, he therefore hoped that the amendment would be adopted in preference to the original bill.

He had already said that he had no captious spirit about this thing at all; and he had avoided any allusion to parties. He did not wish to revive the controversy about the war. The question before them did not require it. Supposing the war to be ever so just—their desires of conquest ever so unlimited—in his judgment they had already a force capable of accomplishing every thing. He was therefore opposed to the additional expense, and the exposure of additional thousands of his countrymen to the dangers of that climate. Let the President have the power of calling for thirty regiments of volunteers, and he can have them immediately, if he believed that they were needed.

Mr. CASS said he had but one remark to make. The honorable Senator from Kentucky, with an emphasis not to be mistaken, talked about the moral effect to be produced by the presence of the army in Mexico. He (Mr. CASS) had used the term "moral effect," but he did not say an effect of morality. He did wish to produce a moral effect as contradistinguished from the physical effect of their military operations. There was nothing at all in the remark to justify the little slur of the Senator, and surely it must have been apparent to all that it was a great deal better to intimidate than to kill the Mexicans. The Senator had asked him how many troops were needed to produce that moral effect, and in reply he could only say that he intended to vote for the bill because it provided such an augmentation of the military force in Mexico as would be likely to produce that desirable effect. The Senator could hardly expect a statement of the force necessary to be given with mathematical precision.

Mr. CRITTENDEN only wished to know how the Senator would employ his additional force?

Mr. CASS said he would answer the Senator with a great deal of pleasure. They might suppose a case in which a nation might set down every man, woman, and child to be killed. But it never has been so and never will be so in Mexico. The national obstinacy will stop at a point far short of this. He believed that they must occupy the posts which they had taken, and extend their lines of communication as far as necessary, on the great roads to the east and to the west. There were other great positions also to be occupied. No man could point them out who was not well acquainted with the topography of their country. There were some positions that appeared very advantageous; among these would appear to be Quaretaro, which stood at the junction of the joint line of communication between northern and western Mexico, and it would probably be difficult to open the communication between that region and the country now held by us. As he remarked yesterday the rich mineral region of Zacatecas and San Luis must also be taken and held. They must either withdraw or extend their operations and remain inactive. The former course was out of the question, and the latter would leave an interminable war upon our hands. We must of necessity extend our operations, wisely indeed as circumstances might require, but rapidly as the amount of force would allow.

With respect to the remarks of the Senator with reference to the volunteers and regulars, he had only to say that he believed that a mixed force was by far the best. He believed that the regulars submitted better to wholesome discipline and restraint than men who elected their own officers. The honorable Senator himself knew the fact from his own experience. The enlisted soldier became a part of the army, part of a great machine, and the principal duty he had to learn was the duty of obedience. All this was known and felt by every man who became a recruit in the regular army. Not so with the volunteers. The honorable Senator here did not volunteer with any such state of feeling, nor indeed could it be so, from the composition of both officers and men. They were formed of the very best material our country afforded. They had gone into battle and had fought, he was about to say, as men never had fought before. They would do stern duty to the utmost, so long as they were kept in motion, and would do it with the more alacrity as the danger was the more pressing. But the moment they stopped, then a spirit of dissatisfaction would begin to spread, increasing the more the longer they remained stationary. The duties of the camp and the post, of police, and of all the routine of stationary service, was irksome to them. And for the reason that they yielded more readily to the diseases of the climate than the regular soldiers. Every one knew that the strict subordination in which the regular soldier was held contributed essentially to the health and efficiency of the army.

Mr. CRITTENDEN said he did not wish to continue the discussion, much less a controversy on the subject. He confessed that he did not yet understand exactly what the Senator meant by the moral effect which he intended to produce. Had the Senator ever sat down, and, according to any rule of philosophy, calculated how many men, with arms by their side, were necessary to produce the moral effect of which he spoke, or how many men, with arms in their hands, were needed for the same purpose? Did he not see that if war was to be carried on, or military objects effected in that way, how completely they were under the moral influence of the Mexicans? There they were, ten or fifteen thousand strong, in the heart of Mexico, with ten millions of people. Mexico had, therefore, an hundred thousand to one, and therefore, in order to counteract the "moral effect," if mere numbers produced it, it must be necessary for the United States to send nine or ten millions to Mexico. It would certainly be necessary to do that in order to counteract the moral influence of the present overwhelming number of Mexicans. No, it was not mere numbers that produced "moral effect." It was the battles of Buena Vista, Chapultepec, Contreras, and Churubusco. These were the great witnesses which produced effects—witnesses of the power of one party, the subjugation and conquest of the other. It was the arms of the United States that had produced the moral effect. They had prostrated Mexico. She felt it and knew it. She was now nothing but a huge undigested mass of vanity and faction. Her armies had been scattered, her authorities broken to pieces, and it was to protect themselves in the midst of such a people as that that 30,000 men were pronounced insufficient, needing a reinforcement of 10,000 regulars and 20,000 volunteers. The law at present gave the privilege of recruiting 8,600 men for the regular army. When these men were raised where would be the necessity for more? Would they recruit more than that number in the course of the present year? They did recruit a few more during the last year—11,000 men. But in six months was it likely that any more would be recruited by two sets of recruiting officers at the same places?

Mr. CASS. The Senator had asked if more could be raised by two sets of recruiting officers in the same places. But it was not intended to send the two sets to the same places.

Mr. DAVIS, of Mississippi, then said: It is not my purpose at this time to go into a discussion of the ten regiment bill, but to address myself especially to the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky. I have been surprised at the introduction of that amendment; I certainly did not expect it.

The gentleman has not anticipated the ground upon which I would oppose the substitution of the amendment for that bill. He seems to rest it on the supposition that we are to oppose the substitution of volunteers for regulars because regulars are better than volunteers. I take no such ground, and fortunately stand in an attitude in which I can have no prejudices for one or the other, having served with both. But, sir, the question lies deeper, and far beyond the mere availability of the one over the other. And I would say to the honorable Senator from Kentucky, who has seen service, that if he will revert to the period when he returned from his campaign, and met the aged patriot, who wrung his hand and inquired for his son who had died on the field of battle—when he met the mother who, with tears streaming down her cheeks put to him the same question, he will at once say, however necessary it may be to call forth the chivalry of the country to fight its great battles, let us not send such men, to be wasted in the mere duties of the sentinel, by the attacks of disease and an unfriendly climate, whilst engaged in a service where neither patriotism is elicited nor glory is to be won. If this country were invaded I would turn to the great body of the militia—for I use the terms "volunteers" and "militia" as synonymous—for its defence. But when we carry on a foreign war, and especially when defensive operations merely are carried on, we have reached a point where regulars are the force which should be employed in the nice routine of the service, in which the duties are not sufficiently important to justify that disruption of society, that injury to the commercial interests of the country, which would result from bringing out men of that high class which the Senator from Kentucky has correctly said constitutes the great body of the volunteers. There is a great difference in the material of the volunteers and the regular force. There is an enthusiasm which spreads over every neighborhood when the call for volunteers goes forth. When Kentucky is called on to send her regiment, and every county its company, an enthusiasm bursts out every where, and the State pours forth its best material—material too good for common use.

The gentleman inquires why it is that we prefer regulars? I will answer: we prefer regulars, first, because they are cheaper; secondly, because they can be maintained in better discipline. They will maintain a better state of police. They will be healthier, and therefore more effective, in proportion to their numbers, for mere garrison duties. As long as you keep the high-bred gentlemen for battle they will bear any privation, submit to every restraint, and discharge to the utmost every duty; but do you expect that those men, who have broken all the endearing ties of home in order to fight their country's battles, will sacrifice themselves to the mere duties of the sentinel—will be content with the performance of the police of a garrison? Will they be suited better for the one, or as well for the other, as men of a lower grade in society and more accustomed to such duties?

But the gentleman has made an argument which I regard as more congenial to his feelings. He has alluded to the gallantry of the army and the battles won by small forces, affording evidence against the necessity of this increase of our force. But it is one thing to beat the enemy and another to hold him in subjection; and the argument of the honorable Senator, which rests upon the supposition that Mexico is conquered, I hold to be by no means indisputable. Is Mexico conquered? Is any part of it conquered? Conquest, as laid down by some writers, is of three kinds. Ruin is one of these kinds of conquests: but we have not ruined Mexico, and God forbid we ever should! The moral feeling of this country would never justify such a course. Another mode of conquest is to hold a country by controlling its government. That is not suited to the genius of our country. We send no pro-consul abroad, no provincial army to direct the government of the country. We recognise as the great basis of all institutions self-government. The other mode of conquest is by colonizing a country. We cannot do that. In neither of these modes, then, have we conquered Mexico; we have not even suppressed the hostility of the Mexican people. I hazard the assertion that there is more hostility against us in Mexico now than there was at the beginning of the war. Mexico is not conquered.

But the honorable Senator asks how will you employ this large force? Not to take cities, not to fight battles. And I agree with him that our army could now march through all South America and defeat every enemy. But we want this force to hold towns and posts in Mexico; to convince the Mexicans that resistance is idle; and, beyond all this, to afford protection to all the citizens of Mexico who are ready to recognise our authority and give us supplies. These are some of the great objects to be obtained. To effect them large bodies of men will be needed. We must garrison our posts with forces adequate to make a sortie if necessary, and not to be shut up when any partisan chief chooses to come and sit down before their gates.

Again: the army of Gen Scott, which achieved such victories before the city of Mexico, did it at a heavy sacrifice of blood, and that resulted from the want of force. The length of their lines was far inferior to that of the enemy's. Our gallant men fell under the converging fire of the foe, and therefore their blood was spilled like water. American courage, the skill of the officers, and the science of our incomparable staff, achieved those victories; and God forbid that they should ever be tested again at such a fearful sacrifice! But that army in its present state is not combined, whilst there are many posts without a garrison which we ought to hold.

Then, again, the resources of Mexico must contribute to the support of that army. We cannot afford to keep down anarchy in Mexico at the expense of our Treasury. We must not depend on the petty amount of property that might be wrung from the poor rancheros. Such a thing has never been contemplated by our Government nor practiced by our officers. In Zacatecas you can have possession of the mint. In Potosi are the richest mines in Mexico; and if, as has been stated, the annual produce of these mines amounts to nearly twenty-five millions, and we claim the revenue which the Mexican Government extracted from mining operations, and, by protecting the entrance of goods into the country, furnish a new source of revenue from the duties on imports, then we have something to support our armies, without touching private property, and the expenses of the war are borne by Mexico herself.

The object now is, not to prepare to fight a battle, but to prevent a battle. The great object now is to allow the ability which yet remains in Mexico to establish federal government on republican principles to exert itself. We have taught the Mexicans salutary lessons. We have convinced them that they are not what they supposed they were, and I hope it will not excite a laugh when I mention that supposition to have been that they were the greatest military Power on the continent; for it was not until after the battle of Buena Vista that they began to doubt it. Let us now give them an opportunity to create a Government somewhat stable, and capable of adhering to its obligations. I reject the idea of taking her Federal Government under our protection as altogether impracticable, and because it would certainly tend to render it odious to the people. Our policy should be directed by the purest reason and most patriotic motives to that end which will hasten a peace and leave Mexico the power to erect again her nationality.

If I believed that this additional force were unnecessary, I should vote against the bill. If I believed that regulars were not better calculated to occupy garrisons, and that the gallantry of our volunteers in the field should decide this question, I would vote against it. But I believe the force to be necessary, and that these regulars are the proper force. The Senator from Kentucky spoke of giving a discretionary power to the President to call out 30,000 volunteers. Well, I doubt not the wisdom of the Executive—I doubt not his nerve to encounter that responsibility. I would be quite willing to make him responsible, and to rely upon the good feeling, patriotism, and intelligence of the country to sustain him in calling out these men for the present purpose, and still further for the ultimate object, when the forces may be reduced, of recalling the volunteers, now making sacrifices beyond the duty which they undertook to perform. And at this moment, sir, the honorable Senator from South Carolina before me, recalls to my mind, appropriately, in this connexion, the fact that the regiment which has covered the Palmetto State with laurels and cypress, now numbers only about one hundred and fifty fit for active service. I would recall that regiment at once. I would return its members to their social and commercial duties, and substitute for them a regular regiment, equally able to perform, at all events, the duties they have now to discharge.

I did not rise for the purpose of making any extended remarks, and have been led to say more than I intended. I hope the amendment will not be adopted.

Mr. CALHOUN said that there were two or three points of difficulty still unexplained in answering the objection to the bill. If he understood aright the Senator from Kentucky, during a period of the last fifteen months not more than about eleven thousand recruits had been enlisted.

Mr. CASS here interposed and said that the Senator from Kentucky was in error. More than twenty thousand had been enlisted in the course of little more than a year.

Mr. CRITTENDEN referred to the report of the Adjutant General, to show that the number was but a little over eleven thousand.

Mr. CASS explained that that was exclusive of the new regiments which had been raised.

Mr. CALHOUN continued. He would then assume the number stated by the chairman of the Military Committee. If only twenty thousand men were raised during the last year, it was very evident that in the present state of the market—for the recruiting had taken up a great deal of the loose portions of society disposed to enlist—it would be very difficult, indeed, to raise during the present year the men necessary to fill these ten additional regiments. Well, they had been told that this additional force was required immediately, when, in all probability, with the strongest recruiting force, it could not be obtained in less than six or eight months after the passage of the bill, allowing the greatest success. Yet they had been emphatically told that this force was so immediately necessary that not a day could be allowed here for debate. He did not doubt that regulars were the best description of force. He wished to know if the eight thousand included the entire deficit?

Mr. CASS replied that the general deficiency amounted to eight thousand men.

Mr. CALHOUN. That, added to the ten regiments, would make 18,000 or 20,000 to be raised. Then the defect must be in the recruiting service. Eight thousand was very near the number which it was proposed to raise by this bill, and yet a deficit to that extent existed in the present force. The remedy seemed to be in the creation of a sufficient number of recruiting officers—not of generals nor colonels, not of officers of the higher grades, but of officers suited for that service.

This business of war was a serious one. War created the means of its own continuance; it called into being mighty influences which were interested in carrying it on, and few nations ever terminated war so long as they possessed the means of carrying it on. A single regiment could not be raised without the creation of new interests in favor of the war. If these views were correct the cheaper plan would be to strengthen the recruiting service rather than create additional regiments, officers and all. The volunteers, if their services were needed, could be called out at once. The spirit of gallantry which characterized the people was not yet exhausted, notwithstanding the disasters of the war as far as deaths were concerned, and all the regiments had been thinned to an extraordinary extent. He presumed that the mortality had been not less than twenty per cent.; yet recruits, he had no doubt, could be still had plentifully. If, then, the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs wanted an immediate augmentation of the military force he should ask for volunteers.

He (Mr. C.) was glad to perceive that the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. DAVIS) was not averse to a defensive line at the proper time. In his (Mr. C.'s) opinion the present was the proper time. In view of that policy he would prefer regulars to volunteers. He objected though to regulars, because that force gave greatly increased patronage, and greatly added influence to the support of the war. He knew not how other gentlemen felt; but as for himself he was convinced that the patronage of this Government had gone beyond all bounds, and already exercised a most dangerous control over the deliberations of Congress. He felt the awkwardness of his position. He was utterly averse to pursuing this war for any view yet presented, even taking the strong view presented by the Senator from Mississippi. He put it to that gentleman, was there any certainty of peace? and, if not, where would the country stand? That was the question. It would be in a position worse than ever. Every step they took only plunged them deeper and deeper into difficulty. If his memory served him, the Secretary of the War Department stated 70,000 men as adequate to conquer and hold in subjection all Mexico. Was that not the view of the Secretary? He could not at the moment lay his hand on the report of the War Department, but if he had not correctly stated the views of the Secretary any Senator could set the matter right. The Secretary then disavowed the plan of entire subjugation. The Executive disavowed it; and yet a force, according to the Senator from Kentucky, of ninety or one hundred thousand men was demanded. He could not believe that it was the intention of the Executive, because it had been again and again disavowed. But when he saw such a force asked for in the report of the Secretary; when he saw in the President's message the declaration which he had quoted yesterday, to the effect that he himself believed that unless in a certain contingency they must take possession of the country, and take the measure of the indemnity into their own hands, he could not but think that there was a strong impression on all sides that the end would be to conquer and hold Mexico.

If they could have the question first submitted to the deliberative consideration of that body, and it were decided what was to be the proper course of conducting this war; if it were known whether they were to go on, or take a defensive line, they would then act understandingly. But voting and voting, without knowing what was to be ultimately done, threw him, and he believed every member of the Senate, in a state of great difficulty to determine how to vote.

The question was taken on the amendment, and decided in the negative, as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Badger, Baldwin, Bell, Berrien, Clarke, Clayton, Corwin, Crittenden, Dayton, Greene, Hale, Mangum, Miller, Pearce, Phelps, Spruance, Underwood, Upham, Webster—19.

NAYS—Messrs. Allen, Ashley, Atchison, Atherton, Bradbury, Breese, Butler, Cameron, Cass, Davis, of Mississippi, Dickinson, Dix, Douglass, Downs, Felch, Foote, Hannegan, Hunter, Johnson, of Maryland, Johnson, of Louisiana, Mason, Rusk, Sevier, Sturgeon, Turney, Westcott—26.

Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland, suggested an amendment containing a provision to the effect that if in the opinion of the President the exigencies of the war should require such a further increase of force, &c.

Mr. CASS acquiesced, and the bill was so amended, and reported to the Senate.

Mr. BALDWIN moved that the Senate adjourn.

On this motion Mr. CASS demanded the yeas and nays, which appeared as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Badger, Baldwin, Bell, Berrien, Butler, Calhoun, Clarke, Clayton, Corwin, Crittenden, Dayton, Greene, Hale, Johnson, of Maryland, Johnson, of Louisiana, Mangum, Miller, Pearce, Phelps, Spruance, Underwood, Upham, Webster—23.

NAYS—Messrs. Allen, Ashley, Atchison, Atherton, Bradbury, Breese, Cameron, Cass, Davis, of Mississippi, Dickinson, Dix, Douglass, Downs, Felch, Foote, Hannegan, Hunter, Mason, Rusk, Sevier, Sturgeon, Turney, Westcott, Yulee—24.

The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.

The following are the provisions of the bill, as it was ordered to be engrossed:

"That, in addition to the present military establishment of the United States, there shall be raised and organized, under the direction of the President, for and during the war with Mexico, if in his opinion the exigencies of the war require such a further increase of force, ten regiments of infantry, each to be composed of the same number and rank of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates as are provided for a regiment of infantry for the war under existing laws, and who shall receive the same pay, rations, bounties, and allowances, according to their respective grades, and be subject to the same regulations and to the rules and articles of war: *Provided,* That all the commissioned officers authorized by this act shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

"SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted,* That there shall be appointed one surgeon and two assistant surgeons to each regiment authorized by the foregoing section, each of whom, previous to such appointment, shall be examined and approved in the manner prescribed by the first clause of the first section of an act to increase and regulate the pay of the surgeons and assistant surgeons of the army, approved June 30, 1834."

It having been suggested that several Senators desired to be heard on the bill, on motion, the Senate adjourned.

On Thursday, when the consideration of the bill was resumed,

Mr. HALE rose and addressed the Senate at considerable length against the bill, in all its phases, and against the war.

Mr. BERRIEN demanded the yeas and nays on the passage of the bill; which were ordered.

Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland, moved that the Senate adjourn; but subsequently withdrew it, to allow of a motion to go into Executive session, which was adopted; and, after some time spent in Executive session,

The Senate adjourned to Monday.

GRAND SCHEMES FOR JANUARY, 1848.

J. W. MAURY & CO., Managers.

ALEXANDRIA LOTTERY,
Class No. 5, for 1848.
To be drawn in Alexandria, Saturday, January 15, 1848.

CAPITALS.

1 prize of......$40,000	3 prizes of.....$2,000
1 do..........10,000	3 do........1,500
1 do..........6,000	3 do........1,500
1 do..........5,000	5 do........1,250
1 do..........3,500	200 do........500
1 do..........2,243	&c. &c. &c.

Tickets $10—Halves $5—Quarters $2.50.

Certificate of a package of 25 whole tickets $130
Do do 25 half do 65
Do do 25 quarter do 32 50

ALEXANDRIA LOTTERY,
Class No. 7, for 1848.
To be drawn at Alexandria, Saturday, January 22, 1848.
66 Number Lottery—12 Drawn Ballots.

SPLENDID LOTTERY.

1 prize of.......$30,000	1 prize of $2,780
1 do........12,000	3 do........2,000
1 do........8,000	10 do........1,000
1 do........5,000	10 do........500
&c. &c.	&c.

Tickets $10—Halves $5—Quarters $2 50.

Certificate of package of 22 whole tickets $110 00
Do do 22 half do 55 00
Do do 22 quarter do 27 50

MOST SPLENDID YET!

ALEXANDRIA LOTTERY,
Class 9, for 1848.
To be drawn in Alexandria, Saturday, 29th January, 1848.
78 Number Lottery—13 Drawn Ballots.

MAGNIFICENT SCHEME.

1 Splendid prize of..........$40,000
1 do do..........30,000
1 do do..........20,000
1 do do..........10,000
1 Prize of..........6,000
1 do..........5,000
1 do..........4,000
1 do..........3,243
3 Prizes of..........1,750
75 do..........1,000
200 Prizes of (being the lowest 3 Nos.)..........500
&c. &c. &c.

Tickets $15—Halves $7 50—Quarters $3 75—Eighths 1 87.

Certificates of packages of 26 whole tickets $200 00
Do do 26 half do 100 00
Do do 26 quarter do 50 00
Do do 26 eighth do 25 00

Orders for tickets and shares and certificates of packages in the above Splendid Lotteries will receive the most prompt attention, and an official account of each drawing sent immediately after it is over to all who order from us. Address

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