THE WILMINGTON JOURNAL.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA.

WILMINGTON, N. C., SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1862.

A WRITER in the Richmond *Enquirer* comes forward with a vigorous defence of the officials at Richmond, and especially of the Secretary of the Navy, against the charge of negligence in not having had larger means provided for the defence of Roanoke Island, as also in not having used more energy in providing a gun-boat force to resist the advance of that class of vessels sent against us by our Northern foes. We so far approve of the course of "A Georgian," in defending the Richmond authorities, as we like to see fair play done to all, and we admire the manliness that prompts any one to assume the defence of those upon whom a general torrent of fault-finding is poured. But while we admire the spirit that prompts this defence, we cannot say that we regard it as wholly successful. The whole ground of defence is that the Secretary of the Navy can do little without the authority of law, and that this authority has not been granted—the necessary funds have not been appropriated, and therefore the Navy Department is not only not responsible for the absence of all adequate effort to fit out a fitting flotilla or flotillas, but that all those who find fault with this absence ought to be ashamed of themselves. Such is the language of a defender of Mr. Mallory, in the Richmond *Enquirer* of yesterday, in reply to an editorial article which recently appeared in the Norfolk *Day Book*, in which the apathy and want of vigor, or even appearance of interest on the part of Mr. Mallory, is pretty severely commented on.

Now let us ask if this excuse is a valid one? If all the defects in the Navy Department—the want of vigor in its administration, and the want of interest in its chief, who never yet has visited the Portsmouth Navy Yard since it has been in Confederate hands, are to find their excuse in the failure of Congress to make certain appropriations? Let us go a little farther and ask if, for that failure Congress is indeed responsible, if there be a responsibility; or whether for good or evil, such responsibility does not attach to the Executive Departments, especially that of the Navy? We think these questions can be easily answered.

Surely no one who understands the feeling of the country, who recognizes and appreciates the manifestation of generous confidence extended to President Davis and to those whom he had called around him, as well on the part of Congress as of the people, doubts for a moment that if the Navy Department had called upon Congress for the necessary appropriation and the necessary authority, and this call had been backed by the recommendation of President Davis, it would have been responded to. It is evident that this excuse will not do, and that Mr. Mallory is rather unfortunate in his advocate. It was not that Congress *would not give* but that the administration *did not ask*. President Davis, absorbed in affairs with whose vastness those of the first revolution bear no comparison, might well leave this matter to that member of his cabinet specially and officially charged with it. That this officer has not pressed its claims with more vigor is deeply to be deplored, as the want of at least a gun-boat navy is felt to be *the* want, the failure to have it any cost to be *the* weak point of our belligerent policy. It might be argued, and we are willing to give force to the argument, that our skilled labor, our seasoned wood and iron were wanted for land defences and military purposes. This, we think, and not the flimsey excuse of the failure of Congress, is the true ground upon which Mr. Mallory based and may possibly justify his do-nothing policy.—That that policy was unfortunate, we think is now generally admitted, and if that is to be the policy, we hardly see the use in having a formal Secretary of the Navy to carry it out, for it is about carried out already.

But we know that miscalculations *must* and *will* be made by the wisest and best of men, and we are unwilling to attribute fault where to fail is human, and to be infallible would be to be something above or below humanity. It is human to subside into a state of comparative apathy, and it is providential when something occurs to drive away that apathy, even although the experience be a painful one. That providential occurrence in this case was the affair of Roanoke Island, following on the heels of the raid of the Yankee gun-boats up the Tennessee River. Apathy has given place to vigor, and an appreciation of our real wants to fantastical *Merriman-ical* experiments.

THE AFFAIR AT ROANOKE ISLAND cannot influence the result of the war. It cannot subdue the people of the Confederacy, or of the State of North Carolina; it cannot bring subjugation one whit nearer, but it may put peace and recognized independence farther off.—It may tend to protract the struggle; it may bring many sufferings and difficulties in its train. With regretful feelings we learn of the reverses of our arms and the captivity of our citizen soldiers, but we look to the future with assured confidence as to the result. With a confidence that never has wavered or faltered from first to last. The boastful career of the foe has been checked in Tennessee, and his cohorts will be rolled back by the fierce reflux of the Southern tide. Missouri and Arkansas again pull together, and the disgraceful Halleck will find that even with the assistance of "the Flying Dutchman," Zeigel, he will be unable to capture Price, or resist Van Dorn, or escape the Marion-like inroads of Jeff. Thompson.

Savannah and Suffolk are now the most fearfully menaced points. To obtain the control of the two roads which, uniting at Suffolk, connect Norfolk with Weldon and Petersburg, would be to isolate the force at Norfolk, and compel the abandonment of that place.—A fearful fight must be had before *that* be done. We do not think it *can* be done. Much is said about Savannah. Evidently something has been wrong. We trust that there may yet be time to make all right. We must await the news as quietly as we can, hoping for the best. If their gunboats can get within range of the city they will probably shell it, for it is said on good authority that it will not be surrendered. No progress can there be made on land, and neither cotton nor treasure be found in or near Savannah. The enemy may possibly be able to spread ruin and desolation, but they can do nothing for themselves, and they will only add fuel to the flame that has already consumed all the cords that once united the North and the South.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.—We have several communications on our table which we have not yet had time to attend to. We will do so at the earliest moment.—Of course, even in the case of our best friends, we must still retain to ourselves, the decision of what we can or will publish, else-wise we might as well quietly withdraw.

RE-ENLISTING.—We are pleased to find that nearly the whole force on General Holmes' line of the Lower Potomac and Rappahannock is now or will soon be in for the war. With a very few exceptions, all the twelve months regiments have turned themselves over for the full term, and the balance, no doubt will. This is cheering.

SERIOUS COLLISION ON THE CENTRAL RAIL ROAD.—A collision occurred on the North Carolina Rail Road on Tuesday last, between a freight and mail train.—The two Engines were totally destroyed, and several of the cars badly damaged. Three passengers were also badly crippled, two having their legs broken. One gentleman had to submit to the amputation of a leg.—Another was expected to have to go through the same operation. Others were more or less injured. The collision happened about 11 miles East of Charlotte. The cars were detained for several hours.

We have been unable to gain further particulars.

From Roanoke Island.

This morning we had the pleasure of meeting Lieut Smith, of Wise's Legion, who has kindly given us some details of the affair at Roanoke Island. The most pleasing part of his information is that the number of the killed on our side has been greatly exaggerated. Some one or two from nearly every company engaged, and nearly every one of our companies *was* engaged, succeeded in making their escape, after the battle had closed. From them Lt. Smith obtained details of the killed and wounded, and from all he could learn he could not find that our loss in killed could much, if at all, exceed fifty The number of wounded would no doubt exceed that of the killed.

The forces at the post, at the commencement of the fight or before its close were

8th N. C. Troops,	Col. Shaw	700
31 " "	" Col. Jordan,	600
1st Reg. Wise Legion,	Col. Anderson,	500
2d " "	" Col. Richardson,	300
Battalion, "	" Col. Green,	500
		2600

This is not the full strength of any of the commands named, but many were sick and had been sent off or were at Nag's Head in Hospital. Some were in a battery on a flat near the main land, three small companies were at Nag's Head.

The number that escaped, including the sick at Nag's Head, might be not incorrectly stated about 450, or at the utmost 500. Of these, 250 or 300 retreated along the beach from Nag's Head, on Saturday night, after having set fire to the buildings. Some got over in a boat to the main land; nearly or quite all of those on the floating battery also got off to the main land.

Of the loss of the enemy, it is almost impossible to speak. They were mowed down in their attempt to land, and must have suffered terribly. Had we possessed a field battery or had proper breastworks been thrown up, the result might have been different; or had we had sufficient force, or in fact had there not been grievous mismanagement somewhere. General Wise had remonstrated in vain with the Secretary of War.—He had asked more forces from General Huger, in whose immediate department he was placed. He had been refused in both cases, save that Gen. Huger had finally consented to let him have the two artillery companies of his Legion, under the command of Col. Henningsen. Gen. Wise ordered the batteries to march down the beach to Nag's Head. This, Gen. Huger countermanded, and told them to go to Elizabeth City, *where there was no transportation*.

When on Saturday morning a courier from General Wise, who had ridden all night, reached Norfolk, he got only a rude answer from Gen. Huger. "They've got plenty of men. Tell them to stand to their guns, and d—mn 'em we'll whip 'em," or very nearly these words

Why Commodore Lynch did not carry his boats to Norfolk, through the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal, instead of running them up the Pasquotank River, is remarkable. He *could* have done so. On Saturday night, a boat did leave Nag's Head, and did get to Norfolk, showing that the navigation was open. The whole affair appears like a Tragedy of Errors.

Daily Journal, 14th inst.

THE MAIN strategical object of the Burnside expedition is to obtain control of the great through route at Weldon, as once there the interior as well as the coast line of roads would be cut off.

Suppose, and it is not only supposable, but almost certain that this movement should fail, as we have no doubt it will fail, then some attempt might or might not be made on Norfolk. That might possibly succeed, but it would be at a cost most difficult to calculate, and such a cost as we very much doubt the disposition of the enemy to pay.

Failing to reach the Weldon junction, now the great strategic point aimed at, some other point might be struck for and this point in the interior would be Goldsboro' via Newbern, because of Goldsboro's being the nearest point on the lower line from which the upper could be aimed at. For all these purposes, light gunboats would not only answer the purpose, but they alone would answer it. We trust that that attempt too, could and would be frustrated.

Where is the mortar fleet and the Butler expedition bound for? It is asserted by the Northern papers that the mortar-fleet is destined for an attack on some strong fortification. If not to co-operate in a front attack on Norfolk with a rear attack by Burnside, for what point is this fleet designed? It appears hardly probable that it is for the gulf. The first stone fort South of Norfolk, is Fort Macon at Beaufort Harbor in North Carolina, but that is comparatively unimportant while an attack upon Newbern or any other point higher up on the railroad remains undisposed of. Is it for our Forts? The strategic value of Wilmington is unquestionably known, with the peculiar character of our water approaches by reason of which works that might be out of ordinary range might not be safe from *thirteen inch mortars*. Possibly the forts in Charleston Harbor may be aimed at. These and a new and still unfinished work at Fernandina are about all on the Atlantic coast, for Pulaski has already been turned, and the fate of Savannah already trembles in the balance.

Again and again, we must be permitted to urge the necessity of having a larger number of our guns casemated or otherwise protected, having no island fortifications without means of retreat, and above all, due care that we do not fail when success is within the grasp o our forces for want of ammunition and that of the right kind. Rifled ammunition must be just so. Without enough of the very thing, the oldest smooth bores, we are informed is preferrable;—if there are shot or shell that can be placed more conveniently than they are; if there are magazines that can be made more available; if there are resources then can be developed, *now* is the very time for bringing all these things to bear. Who knows what a day or an hour may produce? Who says that this or that expedition may not be destined for us? We are very much at war. Let us not for a moment forget that fact, and be ready to sell what of ours the foe seeks to have so very dearly, *if we part with it at all*, that the cost will be well counted and long remembered.

We say all this in no complaining or fault-finding spirit. We are not used to look only at the dark side of the picture or to think that everything is not right, when it does not seem to be so to us. We have no doubt and no reason for doubt of the devotion and care with which General Anderson attends to the duties of his position, or of the zeal of the authorities, still the co-operation of all, the mutual confidence and the mutual understanding of all, are desirable and right and proper.

FOR THE DISASTER at Roanoke Island, a deep responsibility exists somewhere, and it would be as useless to attempt to deny or disguise this fact as it would be wrong to do it even were it in our power. The complishment possible.

The defences of the position clearly bore no proportion to the force likely to be brought against them, nor were they at all commensurate with the real importance of the post or the advantages which its maintainance would have secured.

There was no hurry—there was no surprise. The authorities had full warning. The post had not been recently occupied. The mighty force brought against it had been delayed, apparently by the direct interposition of Providence, as if to give every chance for preparation, and no excuse for the want of it, and yet the post was no stronger when attacked than it had been months before, if as strong. No new guns were mounted. No attempt made to put additional gunboats in the Sounds, to throw more men on the island, to have any light artillery; nay, even the few gunboats we had were short of ammunition. It is said that Col. Henningsen, with some field artillery, did arrive at Elizabeth City on Thursday night, but could get no transportation, and did not get to the island at all, and we don't know where he is. The Island was in the department assigned to General Huger, commander at Norfolk, and deep censure is attached to him for his delay in providing reinforcements. Indeed, so far is the feeling said to have risen at Norfolk that there was talk of mobbing him, or at least, of making some very public demonstration. Col. Green's battalion of North Carolinians and Georgians which recently left this place, arrived just in time to be too late. They rushed forward to the succor of their friends only to find them prisoners. And, perhaps, the worst feature about it is that with the battalion come a reinforcement of powder, *that* also too late, as before the surrender of our men their ammunition had began to fail. Had the battalion with the ammunition got up in time, say even half an hour, or an hour sooner, the invaders might have been kept at bay until further reinforcements could have come up, and, perhaps, the post still have been saved. Such dilitoriness is too painful to think of, resulting as it has done.

There is a report that after the fight at Elizabeth City and the firing of the town, the Federal troops landed with fire engines, extinguished the flames and occupied the best dwellings in the place as hospitals for their own sick and wounded. A Confederate, who in some way, best known to himself, visited Elizabeth City after its occupation by the enemy, was unable to learn what disposition had been made of the Confederates who were wounded, or taken prisoners He could not find that any of them had been brought to Elizabeth City, at least none of them had been landed there. It was said at Elizabeth City that Burnside reported 2,700 prisoners, 400 killed, and 600 wounded. We think possibly there is some mistake, and that the first number of 2,700 may include all, killed, wounded and prisoers, and even that would be a large number. What number of Federals was killed and wounded, is not stated, the Federals themselves admit in conversation that it was very large, the killed being close to a thousand, our cannon having thinned them terribly.

Although a large proportion of the defenders of the Island were North Carolinians, yet not the name of a North Carolina company appears in any Virginia paper, one way or the other. Not the name of a man that we can find. We have telegraphed to Norfolk, and got others to do so, with the view of getting information about friends from this place, for our own satisfaction and the satisfaction of others, especially those most directly interested, but have failed,—so far. We hope still to obtain early information. We have heard painful street rumors, for which we feel certain there is no foundation.

About this thing of the failure of ammunition, ought that not to have been seen to. While it is yet time, let us take the liberty of calling direct attention to this matter at other points. Is there no sueh danger elsewhere? Now is the time to ask the question, while there is yet time to so provide that a negative answer can be boldly given. We are indeed at war, and in the midst of it. It is no time for false delicacy.

THE Raleigh *Standard* has some remarks, with reference to the limited exemption extended to the employees of the Daily Press, in connection with the alleged suspension of the *Washington Dispatch*.

We will take it for granted that neither the *Standard* nor any other paper desires to do gratuitous injustice, and have not the slightest objection to having the brief letters written from this office to the Governor and Adjutant General published, as we know this would place matters, so far as we are concerned, on a very different footing than that upon which the *Standard* seems to think they stand, or we, at least, desire them to stand. We must confess that, situated as things are, with the universal anxiety felt for the latest information, we believe the public would regret the pursuance of such a rigid course as would compel the discontinuance of any paper, especially where, at a leading point, there is but one, while at the same time, in case of actual invasion or absolute necessity, every man ought to go, and every other consideration be waived in obedience to that necessity. We think the discontinuance of the *Dispatch* at Washington works a greater inconvenience, and perhaps loss to the community in which it was published than would the slight deviation from rule in its favor which would have enabled it to continue its publication.

We say this in no controversial spirit and from no desire to either find fault or make an issue with anybody, but we say it because it appears to us to be so.—We would certainly desire no peculiar privilege or invidious distinctions, no benefits to ourselves at the expense of others, but we know, as everybody acquainted with the matter must know that the pressure of a daily publication is more continuous and exacting than that of a less frequent issue. As for mere partizan favors we know nothing of them—we do not solicit them nor are we conscious of receiving them. Our Newbern cotemporary certainly, from the position it has occupied is even less amenable to this charge than even we are, nor do we think that any such considerations entered into the thoughts or actions of the Governor or any other person, and we trust that the *Standard* itself will see that it is wholly mistaken in supposing that they did.

We are not always so much opposed to replying with as much sharpness as we think exists in any reference to which we do reply; but now we feel that squabbling and wrangling beseem none of us, especially none of us, who, living within the sound of the enemy's guns have our all at stake, Daily Paper and all else. Surely our *three* Raleigh cotemporaries need not feel so much put out when they know that two-thirds of the printers who formerly belonged here are now in the actual service, leaving barely enough to keep one office open for the accommodation of the public and the public service. If from considerations of public convenience, they are not included in the first preliminary draft, we feel assured that when the actual necessity comes they will not need to be included in *any* draft.

P. S.—Since the above was written the mail has brought us the Washington *Dispatch* in question, which is *not* discontinued, but comes out on a half-sheet for *want of paper*, but will procure some at the earliest moment and then, and not until then greet us with its usual size and amount of reading matter. The tender sympathies of the *Standard* have been rather wasted on the desert air.

IT IS EVIDENT that one of the great objects of the Federal war policy, that for which they will spare no expense in men or means, is to get possession of or destroy the railroad communication between the more Northern and more Southern States of the Confederacy. Primarily their object is to cut off Virginia from the cotton States. For that object their agents tried to burn the railroad bridges throughout East Tennessee; for the same object secret missionaries were induced by promises of reward to issue from the prisons of Boston and other Northern Cities, aiming at the destruction by fire of the bridges on the great Southern seaboard line of railroads. For that same object Burnside is pressing on, and although Norfolk would sound largely, its capture is less near to the heart of the invaders than is the control of the great through line of railroads.

In truth, whatever advantage it may be to keep the foe out of Norfolk and Portsmouth, and we do not underrate that, the possession of the Navy Yard there, save for its guns, has been little or no use to us. Money has been bungled away on the Merrimac and some other ruined hulks, while materials lay idle, out of which good serviceable gun-boats might have been built; and, with brave officers, as recent events have shown, with brave and chivalrous men, like Lynch, Tattnall and others, our navy department, as a department, has been a by-word and a reproach. Whose fault is it or whose fault has it been? The people will ask these questions, and the official that does not give a satisfactory answer will be invited to resign.

REINFORCEMENTS TO SHIP ISLAND.—BOSTON, Feb. 8. The ships Ocean Pearl, Idaho, and North America, with troops and stores, (forming a part of General Butler's expedition) sailed this morning for Ship Island.

RE-ENLISTING FOR THE WAR.—We learn from an Adjutant in one of the Mississippi regiments, at Centreville, that some sixteen Mississippi and Louisiana regiments have re-enlisted for the war, and that the good work is going forward with great alacrity. He estimates that some 50,000 troops on the Potomac have already enlisted for the war. He says that the late news has given a great impetus to the work.

Lynch. Republican.

HOUSE BURNT.—We regret to learn that the dwelling house of Maj. Wm. A. Blount, in this county, was consumed by fire one night last week with all his furniture It is supposed to have been the work of an incendiary. We learn that the dwelling of his father, Gen. Blount, was also set on fire the same night in two or three places.—*Washington Dispatch.*

We are requested to state that the article that has gone the rounds of the papers purporting to have been written by Capt. Booth, Commanding the Arsenal here, to the Baton Rouge Gazette, was not written for publication at all, but was contained in a private letter, and published without his knowledge or consent, and very much to his regret.—*Fayetteville Observer.*

From the Norfolk Day Book, 12th inst.

Further Particulars of Our Reverses in North Carolina.

FROM THE FLEET.

To a gentleman attached to the Fleet in the waters of North Carolina, who reached this city yesterday morning, we are indebted for the following particulars:

The fleet, after falling back from Roanoke Island, ran up the Pasquotank river for the purpose of receiving ammunition which was expected from Norfolk. On Sunday, the enemy's vessels crossed the Sound, and early on Monday morning advanced up the Pasquotank river. Our vessels had then gained the battery on the river and were drawn up for the purpose of co-operating with it if occasion should require it. Captain Parker, of the Beaufort, was detailed by Commodore Lynch to the command of this battery.

Owing to the dense fog which prevailed on Monday, the Federal fleet came within two or three hundred yards of our fleet and battery before being discovered. Our fleet was therefore compelled to retire again, and the battery was abandoned. Before it was left, however, all the guns were spiked.

The fleet proceeded towards Elizabeth City, closely pursued by the enemy. After proceeding some distance, three of the vessels were overtaken and captured, and Commodore Lynch, together with their officers and crews made prisoners. The Beaufort, Empire and Raleigh, however, succeeded in making their escape, and are now safe near the south-end of the Canal.

Captain Parker, who was in command of the battery on the river, is thought to have escaped with his men in the direction of Edenton. Captains Hunter and Simms are reported to be on board their vessels at the end of the canal, and Capt. Cook is supposed to have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

FROM ELIZABETH CITY.

The report of the burning of Elizabeth City and its capture by the Federalists is fully confirmed. The town was attacked on Monday morning about 8 o'clock, and was set on fire and evacuated after a fight of a couple of hours duration. The torch was applied by the patriotic citizens themselves, and although the destruction was only partial yet a sufficient display of self-sacrifice has been made by these gallant Carolinians to satisfy the enemy that they are fighting a people they never can subdue.

The Confederate steamer Forrest, attached to Commodore Lynch's fleet, and which was undergoing repairs at Elizabeth City, we are glad to say, was not left to the enemy, as at first reported, but was burned by the citizens before they left the town.

CONDITION OF GEN. WISE.

It affords us much pleasure to announce that General Wise is safe, and all reports to the contrary are without any truth whatever. We are also much gratified to announce that instead of increasing his malady, as was feared, the excitement through which he has passed has had a contrary tendency, and the indications of a speedy recovery are now apparent. The Gen. is more determined than ever, and is represented as all eagerness for an opportunity to avenge himself for the wrongs he has suffered. He bears the death of his son manfully, and derives much consolation from the fact that he perished in the defence of his country.

DEATH OF CAPT. O. JENNINGS WISE.

This brave officer was among the killed at Roanoke Island. He was in command of the Richmond Blues and received a wound shortly after the engagement began, which disabled him. While his comrades were bearing him from the ground, a shot from the enemy penetrated his body, inflicting a mortal wound. He died almost immediately.

Capt. Wise was a brave and efficient officer and much beloved by those under his command. It is related that after he had fallen on the field one of his men approached him and enquired if he was badly hurt. His reply was: "Never mind me! Fight on men! fight on! and keep cool!!"

DEATH OF CAPT. SELDEN.

Capt. Wm. Selden, of this city, attached to the Engineer Department, was also among the killed. His conduct on the field is spoken of by those who witnessed it in the most exalted terms. Daring and bold, he feared not the overpowering forces of the enemy, but fought them bravely, disputing their right to every inch of ground.

He leaves behind him for the consolation of his friends, a name and fame, of which, they may be justly proud. He died a brave Virginian, defending his country from the attacks of a brutal and insolent foe, and he now fills a patriot's grave.

NOBLE CONDUCT.

The Richmond Blues and McCullough's Infantry are represented as having conducted themselves nobly during the battle. Not a man among them but displayed the utmost coolness and intrepidity and the greatest havoc was made by them among the foe. They kept at one time two regiments at bay, and finally at the point of the bayonet drove them up to their arm-pits into the Sound. Before surrendering each man coolly broke his gun against the trees, determined that though they fell into the hands of the enemy they should be useless.

The casualities among the first mentioned command have been greatly exaggerated. Only one of the entire company—its commander—was killed and only eight or ten of them wounded.

ARRIVAL OF THE SICK FROM ROANOKE ISLAND.

About five o'clock yesterday afternoon the steamer Roanoke having in tow a schooner and several barges, arrived at the Quartermaster's wharf in this city. On the schooner and barges were those of our forces at Roanoke Island who were sick and who were removed from the Island previous to the attack upon it. There were about one hundred of them. They left Currituck Bridge last night—did not see anything of the enemy.

The arrival of these men created considerable excitement in the city, and before the boats had made fast quite a crowd had collected on the wharf to welcome them. They seemed to be in as fine spirits as could be expected.

OUR LOS

Our loss was not over one hundred killed and wounded while that of the enemy is estimated at least one thousand killed. Indeed we have information that at Old Point the number is estimated at fifteen hundred killed. The beach is represented as being strewn with their dead bodies and the probability is that when the truth comes out it will be found that this victory has been purchased by the Yankees with a fearful outlay of life.

THE ENEMY AT EDENTON.

A special train of the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad arrived in Portsmouth, yesterday, about one o'clock. Information was brought that the enemy had entered Edenton and taken possession. This news was communicated through Dr. Warren, of Edenton, to the people of Suffolk and forwarded by them to us. We have received no confirmation as yet of the statement, and it may be that the intelligence is premature.

The enemy was represented as being on the way to Blackwater, and the non-arrival of the boat due from there yesterday seemed to corroborate the statement.

TREACHERY THE CAUSE OF THE DISASTER.

We learn that a man named Doe, who lived on Roanoke Island, and who knew of a landing place on the marsh that others were ignorant of, deserted, went over to the enemy and piloted them into the landing, after giving them all the information about our forces and fortifications.

It appears that Col. Shaw got wind of his intended desertion, and told him that if he attempted to desert he would blow him out of the water; but Doe afterwards got a chance and made his escape, and in consequence o that escape we have this terrible disaster.

From the Norfolk Day Book, 12th inst.

The Roanoke Island Disaster—the Inaction of the Navy Department.

The fact cannot longer be concealed that criminal negligence is chargeable somewhere for the disastrous overthrow of our brave and gallant men at Roanoke Island.

The fact cannot longer be concealed because it is upon the tongue of every reflecting man. As a public journal, devoted to the public cause, a cause in which all possess and realise the deepest interest, this paper is averse to the suppression of a grievance of such magnitude from any sicklied or sentimental fear that injury is to accrue to the true interests of the people by a free comment and exposure. Thus to wield the engine of the press we regard as the true glory and noble aim of the press of a free people. When it ceases thus to speak, the benefits of its mission are lost or unattained and it becomes but the panderer to power. This is the position which it now occupies under the heel of the Northern despotism.

If the public press is to be muzzled or to muzzle itself from fear of bringing down upon the heads of those in authority the merited condemnation which mal-administration justly demands—if it is to maintain silence from fear of exposing even to our enemies the patent fact that some of our men in authority are derelict in duty and lack the qualifications which their positions demand—then, the printers' type may be as well sent back to the foundery, abuse of power in high places go unexposed, the perpetrators continue their mal-administration, the public interests be suffered to languish, be disregarded and criminally imperilled. The brave men who fought the enemy at Roanoke Island, and many of whom poured out their blood like water in the futile attempt to maintain their stand against an overwhelming force, were sacrificed to a criminal neglect to reinforce them. This is the fact which has impressed itself upon the public mind and to which we hesitate not to give utterance and an objective form.

Notwithstanding the knowledge possessed by every man in our midst and within the bounds of the Confederacy, of the fitting out of the Burnside Expedition—notwithstanding its reported presence hovering off the Carolina coast—notwithstanding its proclaimed arrival off Roanoke Island, disclosing the manifest intention of the enemy to attack that devoted Island and to possess it as another stragetic base for future and more important operations,—notwithstanding the fact, known to our men in power, that this important post was not sufficiently manned—that the force there was inadequate to defend it against the attack by which it had been menaced for weeks—notwithstanding this and more, which might be stated, yet that handful of brave and devoted men were suffered to remain there insufficiently reinforced, and to await the moment when, apparently uncared for, they were to be "butchered to make" a Northern "holiday," and to furnish the demoralized press of the savage and soulless North a fit theme for their truculent boastings and fiendish huzzas. Such is the culpable neglect which demands ventilation and calls for remedial interposition of the executive arm of the government at Richmond. If the vulnerable points on our extended coast are to be defended at all, let them be defended effectively, or, at least, with some reasonable regard to the overpowering forces which have hitherto been concentrated against them. To garrison them with a force so inadequate as that which fought to the death at Roanoke, is to convert them into slaughter pens, and criminally sacrifice the lives of our brave and devoted men. Such, it is melancholy to reflect, was the lamentable fate of O. Jennings Wise and his Spartan band, seven of whom escaped to bring the tidings of their untimely doom.

But more. We ought to have had in the Sound twenty gunboats or more—such even as could have carried, each, one effective rifled gun.

Ten months have elapsed since the Navy Yard here came providentially into our possession by desertion—and fifty such gunboats might have been easily constructed there, armed, manned, and placed at the mouths of the numerous and small streams in the sound and elsewhere. But there has not one single one such been here constructed. This is a startling fact and evinces what the public regard as culpable negligence. Although within a few hours ride of this great and inestimable depot to the Confederacy, Mr. Secretary Mallory has not once visited the Navy Yard since he warmed his official seat, nor has he manifested that administrative energy in the matter of these gunboats which the time demands from him and from all who have been placed in positions of importance such as he and others occupy in these perilous times. The disaster at Roanoke Island by no means consists alone in its mere capture, nor in the loss of the band of braves there sacrificed.

Its most important and designed results are yet in the womb of futurity, and unless they are at once thwarted by diligence, foresight and energy, manifested in the proper quarters, the intentions and hopes of the Burnside expedition may yet be fully effected and realized.—Let it never be lost sight of for a moment at a time, that this point—this Navy Yard—is one of incalculable importance to the Southern Confederacy.

From the Norfolk Day Book 13th inst.

Further from Our Fleet.

An officer of our fleet who was in such a position as to enable him to see all that was transpiring around him, furnishes us with the following account of the engagement:

The advance forces of the enemy, consisting of twenty-two large steamers and one tug-boat, began the attack upon the Island at half-past ten o'clock on Friday morning. The battle continued throughout the day, and whenever our steamers drew near, to lend assistance, the whole of the enemy's flotilla, excepting three in shore, concentrated their fire upon them.

About four o'clock in the afternoon, the Curlew was disabled by a shell from the enemy, and was compelled to make for shoal water where she sunk.

During the cannonading the enemy were busily employed in landing their troops below Pork Point Battery. Two of their steamers ran into a slough in the neighborhood, and succeeded in covering their landing. The enemy continued the attack until about dark, when they withdrew.

A little after four o'clock, the ammunition of our squadron getting short, an application was made for a supply to the upper battery, but the commanding officer could spare only about ten charges. As it was essential that ammunition should be had and as there was no more to be obtained from the batteries, a steamer was sent to the upper battery with a dispatch to the officer in command informing him that the fleet was without ammunition, and that it would repair to Elizabeth City—thirty-five miles distant—for the purpose of obtaining a supply, and that it would return without delay. Previous to leaving, information was received by the fleet from Captain Tayloe, of the Navy, who had been at Pork Point Battery during the day that they had only one killed and three wounded, and there was every reason to believe that they would be able to hold out if the rear of the batteries was not turned.

The fleet reached Elizabeth City, on Saturday morning, and finding very little ammunition there sent an express to Norfolk for it. On Sunday afternoon, having put all the ammunition and fuel which could be obtained on board the Seabird and Appomattox, these two steamers were sent forward to Roanoke Island. On arriving at the mouth of the river they met a boat and learned from it that the Island had been surrendered, and shortly afterward discovered five of the enemy's gunboats standing for Pasquotank river. They returned immediately to the battery at Cobb's Point, about a mile and a half below Elizabeth City, and after sending an express to Gen. Henningsen, distributed all the ammunition among four steamers and a schooner and formed a line just above the battery. A company had been detailed the day previous for duty at this battery, and the object of the fleet was to co-operate with them.

Shortly after daylight the enemy appeared in sight and a messenger was sent from the fleet to ascertain the condition of the battery. Finding only seven men there and supposing that the enemy would first attack the battery, the officers and crew of the Beaufort were sent ashore to man two of the guns—these being as many as they had ammunition to supply. The Beaufort was sent to the mouth of the canal, where the Raleigh had been previously sent.

Instructions were given by the Commodore to the commanding officers of all the vessels that when all means of resistance failed, and they found themselves unable to escape, they should run into shoal water, set them on fire and save their crews.

The action commenced at forty-five minutes past seven in the morning, and resulted in the enemy passing the battery and overwhelming the Seaboard and Alice.

The last mentioned vessels were the only ones known to have fallen into the hands of the enemy. The Fanny was burned by her commander, and the Appomattox is believed to have escaped up the river. The Forrest was on the ways at Elizabeth City, repairing damages, and if the information we received yesterday be correct, she too was burned to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy. As far as known, there was only six killed and three wounded among the entire naval force which we had in the action.

We omitted to mention that the guns at Cobb's Battery were all spiked before being possessed by the enemy.

North Carolina's Quota of Confederate Troops.

The following is a copy of the "ordinance to raise North Carolina's Quota of Confederate troops," reported by the Committee on military affairs, Geo. Howard Jr., Chairman.

AN ORDINANCE TO RAISE AND ORGANIZE NORTH CAROLINA'S QUOTA OF CONFEDERATE TROOPS.

Be it ordained, &c., That during the existing war with the United States, the Governor be, and is hereby authorized to keep in the service of the Confederate States a force of not less than thirty-five nor more than sixty regiments of soldiers. The said force to be raised under the following rules and regulations:

1. Each regiment which has not been already organized shall conform in its organization in all respects to the rules and regulations of the Confederate States as to the number and kind of officers, non-commissioned officers and privates which it may contain. The said regiments shall be infantry, cavalry, riflemen or artillerists, as the Governor may determine, and he shall have power to cause the same to be armed and equipped, and also supplied until he shall deem them prepared to enter the Confederate service, and shall then tender them for such service; and all sums of money necessary for that purpose, he shall have power to draw from the Public Treasury; *Provided* it shall be the duty of the Governor to make arrangements at the earliest practicable day, with the Confederate States to arm, equip and subsist such troops as may be raised for the service of the said Confederate States while being organized for such service, at the expense of said Confederate States, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed for the government of the Confederate Army.

2. The troops now in service for three years or the war shall be deemed a portion of said force, and in raising the remainder, the counties of their residence at the time of their enlistment, shall have credit for the same.

3. All enlistments shall be for two years: *Provided, however*, That persons heretofore in service shall have credit for the time they have actually served.

4. The Governor shall require each Captain in the service, on or before the —— day of ——, to return to the Adjutant General a list of all the officers and men under his command, with the county of the residence of each at the time of his entry into service.

5. The Governor shall require each commanding officer of a regiment, battalion or independent company of volunteers for 12 months, to have distributed to his command, the terms proposed by the Confederate States and this State for voluntary re-enlistment (the same having been printed and furnished to said commanders by order of the Governor,) and five days after said distribution, to take a list of all such officers and privates as are willing to re-enlist, and return the same to the Adjutant General's office, and the signatures of the persons re-enlisting shall be as binding as if they had been re-mustered into service.

6. Volunteer companies now in service, re-enlisting may retain their present organization or re-organize at their option.

7. Volunteers re-enlisting not by companies, shall be thrown into companies, and proceed to elect their company commissioned officers, who shall be commissioned by the Governor.

8. Should a sufficient number of troops not be tendered under the foregoing provisions, the Governor shall call upon the counties to furnish either by volunteering or drafting the necessary number of troops, according to white population, (after crediting them with their troops already in service for three years or the war, and their volunteers under this ordinance) to complete their respective quotas.

9. The drafts shall be made from the entire military population of the several counties, between the ages of 18 and 45, (with the exception of the exemptions hereinafter specified,) and each captain's district shall be credited with the number it has furnished previous thereto: *Provided, however*, That in each county drafted the unmarried men shall be first exhausted before the married men shall be made liable to the same: *And Provided further*, That it may be lawful for any one so drafted to tender to the commander of the regiment a substitute for himself, if he desires so to do, and if said substitute is received by said commander, the person drafted shall be excused from going into actual service and shall return to the body of the militia.

10. The Adjutant General shall accompany each call upon a county for its quota, with a list of all the volunteers from said county, officers and privates, who have failed to re-enlist, and the same shall be embodied with the militia and be subject to draft as other citizens of the State: *Provided, however*, That when drafted, they shall only be required to serve for two years, including the time they have been in actual service.

11. The Governor shall throw into companies all persons drafted under the provisions of this ordinance, and appoint over them the necessary commissioned officers.

12. All field officers shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of a board of one from each judicial district in the State, to be chosen by this Convention.

13. After the original organization, all vacancies shall be filled by promotion, according to grade and seniority, except in case of disability or incompetency: *Provided however*, That the Governor be authorized to depart from the prescribed rule, where any person may be especially distinguished by his commanding general for great merit or some signal act of military skill or prowess.

14. The following persons shall be exempt from draft: All ministers of the gospel, the officers, judicial and executive, of the Confederate States, the Judges of the Supreme and Superior Courts, the Secretary of State, Comptroller, Treasurer, High Sheriffs, all the necessary employees of Railroad companies, all telegraph operators, all stage drivers and mail carriers employed in carrying the Confederate States' mail, one experienced practicing physician for every thousand of the aggregate population, (to be decided by lot,) the superintendent, assistant physician, and necessary attendants of the Insane Asylum.

From the Norfolk Day Book, 14th inst.

SECOND NORTH CAROLINA BATTALION AT ROANOKE ISLAND.—In a conversation yesterday with Quartermaster A. H. Shuford, of Col. Green's Second North Carolina Battalion, who made his escape from Roanoke Island, we gleaned the following account of the part borne by said battalion in the recent engagement with the enemy:

The Battalion, consisting of about 600 men, arrived in Portsmouth, from Wilmington, on Sunday night week, and proceeded to Norfolk. They remained here until Wednesday about noon, at which time they embarked on board schooners and barges and started by way of the canal for Roanoke Island.

Owing to detentions on the way, over which they had no control, they did not arrive at the Island until about ten o'clock on Saturday morning. When about 400 yards from the shore they proceeded to land by means of small boats. During the landing they were in full reach of the enemy's guns, and had they turned them upon them, they would have done great havoc. The brave men, however, did not feel at all alarmed by the position in which they were placed, but on the contrary, seemed willing to face even greater danger in order to assist their comrades in the defence of the Island. In their eagerness so share the battle, many of them jumped into the water and waded up to their armpits to the shore, and on reaching it, immediately threw themselves into line and opened fire on the foe.

In a couple of hours all the men had landed, and soon found their way to the hottest of the fight. After firing several rounds, however—which had