An Interesting Document.

Letter from Ex-President Buchanan.—Review of the Last Four Months of His Administration.—Reply to Lieutenant General Scott.

The National *Intelligencer* publishes a letter from Ex-President Buchanan, wherein he defends his conduct during the last months of his administration. The letter is in reply to General Scott's letter recently published. The *Intelligencer* says:

"In the paper now placed before our readers the venerable Ex-President shows that he was not unmindful of the obligations placed upon him by the trying events through which he was compelled to pass in the closing months of his administration, and he clearly states the considerations of public duty under which he acted, as also the limits within which he had power to act at all. At the same time he places in a clear light some facts which, from the commanding position he then held at the head of affairs, he is able to present in a collocation that redeems his conduct from certain misapprehensions which may have been entertained at the time by observers less cognizant of all the circumstances which made up the situation, as well civil as military, at the outbreak of Secession:"

LETTER FROM EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.

To the Editors of the National Intelligencer:

On Wednesday last I received the National "Intelligencer" containing Gen. Scott's address to the public. This is throughout an undisguised censure of my conduct during the last months of the administration in regard to the seven Cotton States now in rebellion.—From our past relations I was greatly surprised at the appearance of such a paper. In one aspect, however, it was highly gratifying. It has justified me, nay, it has rendered it absolutely necessary that I should no longer remain silent in respect to charges which have been long vaguely circulating, but are now endorsed by the responsible name of Gen. Scott.

1. The first and most prominent among these charges is my refusal immediately to garrison nine enumerated fortifications scattered over six of the Southern States, according to the recommendation of Gen. Scott, in his "views" addressed to the War Department on the 29th and 30th of October, 1860. And it has even been alleged that if this had been done it might have prevented the civil war.

This refusal is attributed without the least cause to the influence of Governor Floyd. All my cabinet must bear me witness that I was the President myself, responsible for all the acts of the administration; and certain it is that during the last six months previous to the 20th of December, 1860, (the day on which he resigned his office after my request,) he exercised less influence on the administration than any other member of the cabinet. Mr. Holt was immediately thereafter transferred from the Postoffice Department to that of War, so that from this time until the 4th of March, 1861, which was by far the most important period of the administration, he performed the duties of Secretary of War to my entire satisfaction.

But why did I not immediately garrison these nine fortifications in such a manner, to use the language of Gen. Scott, "as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or *coup de main* ridiculous?"—There is one answer, both easy and conclusive, even if other valid reasons did not exist. There were no available troops within reach which could be sent to these fortifications. To have attempted a military operation on a scale so extensive by any means within the President's power, would have been simply absurd. Of this Gen. Scott himself seems to have been convinced, for on the day after the date of his first "views" he addressed (on the 30th of October) supplemental views to the War Department, in which he states: "I have no one (regular) company in Boston, nothing (at the Narrows,) one at Pittsburg, one at Augusta, Ga., and at Baton Rouge"—in all five companies only within reach to garrison or reinforce the forts mentioned in the "views."

Five companies—four hundred men—to garrison and reinforce nine fortifications in six highly excited Southern States! The force "within reach" was certainly inadequate; nothing more so! It is sad even to think on the subject. To have attempted such a military operation with so little a force, and the Presidential election pending, would have been an invitation to collision and secession. Indeed, if the words A certain army, consisting then of only such a handful as these, had been "within reach," they would have been scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Such was our want of troops, that, although Gen. Scott, hoping, in opposition to the opinion of the committee raised by the House of Representatives, that the arrangement of Mr. Lincoln might be interrupted by military force, was only able to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th of March, six hundred and fifty-three men, rank and file of the army. And, to make up this army, even the sappers and miners were brought from West Point.

But why was there no greater force within reach?—This question could be better answered by General Scott himself than by any other person. Our small regular army, with the exception of a few hundred men, were out of reach, on our remote frontiers, where they had been continuously stationed for years, to protect the inhabitants and the emigrants on their way thither against the attacks of hostile Indians. All were insufficient, and both Gen. Scott and myself had endeavored in vain to prevail upon Congress to raise several additional regiments for this purpose. In recommending this augmentation of the army, the General stated in his report to the War Department of November, 1857, that "it would not more than furnish the reinforcements now greatly needed in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Washington, (T.) Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving not a company for Utah." And again in his report of November, 1858, he says:

"This want of troops to give reasonable security to our citizens in distant settlements, including emigrants on the plains, can scarcely be too strongly stated; but I will only add that as often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to reinforce another, the weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion."

These "views" of Gen. Scott exhibit the crude notions then prevailing even among intelligent and patriotic men on this subject of secession. In the first sentence, the General, whilst stating that, "to save time, the right of secession may be conceded," yet immediately says "this is instantly balanced by the correlative right on the part of the Federal Government against an interior State or States to re-establish by force, if necessary, its former continuity of territory." (For this, he cites "Paloy's Moral and Political Philosophy, last chapter.") It may be there, but I have been unable to find it. Whilst it is difficult to ascertain his precise meaning in this passage, he renders what he did *not* mean quite clear in his supplementary "views." In these he says: "It will be seen that the 'views' only apply to a case of secession that makes a *gap* in the present Union."

The falling off say of Texas, or of all the Atlantic States, from the Potomac South, (the very case which has occurred,) was not within the scope of General S.'s "provisional remedies;" that is to say, to establish by force, if necessary, the continuity of our territory. In his "views" he also states as follows: "But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of recruiting the fragments except by the laceration and despotism of the sword. To effect such result the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play." In the General's opinion, "a smaller evil (than these intestine wars) would be to allow the fragments of the great republic to form themselves into new confederacies, probably four."

He then points out what ought to be the boundaries between the new Unions; and at the end of each, goes so far as even to indicate the cities which ought to be the capitals of the three fires on this side of the Rocky Mountains, to wit: "Columbia, South Carolina," "Alton, or Quincy, Ill," and "Albany, New York," excluding Washington City altogether. This indication of capitals contained in the original, now in my possession, is curiously omitted in the version published in the "National Intelligencer." He designates no capital for the fourth Union on the Pacific. The reader will judge what encouragement those views, proceeding from so distinguished a source, must have afforded to the secessionists of the cotton States.

I trust I have said enough, and more than enough, to convince every mind why I did not, with a force of five companies, attempt to reinforce Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi; Fort Morgan, below Mobile; Forts Pickens and McRea, in Pensacola harbor; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah; Forts Moultrie and Sumpter, Charleston harbor, and Fort Monroe, in Virginia.

These "views," both original and supplementary, were published by General Scott in the National Intelligencer of January 18th, 1861, at the most important and critical period of the administration. Their publication at that time could do no possible good, and might do much harm. To have published them without the President's knowledge and consent, was as much in violation of the sacred confidence which ought to prevail between the Commanding General of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief, as it would have been for the Secretary of War to publish the same documents without his authority. What is of more importance, their publication was calculated injuriously to affect the compromise measures then pending before Congress and the country, and to encourage the Secessionists in their mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union into fragments. From the great respect which I then entertained for the General, I passed it over in silence.

It is worthy of remark, that soon after the Presidential election, representations of what these "views" contained, of more or less correctness, were unfortunately circulated, especially throughout the South. The editors of the National Intelligencer," in assigning a reason for their publication, state that both in public prints and in public speeches allusions had been made to them, and some misapprehensions of their character had got abroad.

II. and III. General Scott states that he arrived in Washington on the 12th and, accompanied by the Secretary of War, held a conversation with the President on the 15th of December. Whilst I have no recollection whatever, of this conversation, he doubtless states correctly that I did refuse to send three hundred men to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie, who had not then removed to Fort Sumter. The reason for this refusal is manifest to all who recollect the history of the time. But twelve days before, in the annual message of the 3d of December, I had urged upon Congress the adoption of amendments to the constitution of the same character with those subsequently proposed by Mr. Crittenden, called the "Crittenden compromise." At that time high hopes were entertained throughout the country that these would be adopted. Besides, I believed, and this correctly, as the event proved, that Major Anderson was then in no danger of attack. Indeed, he and his command were then treated with marked kindness by the authorities and people of Charleston. Under these circumstances, to have sent such a force there would have been only to impair the hope of compromise, to provoke collision and disappoint the country.

There are some details of this conversation in regard to which the General's memory must be defective. At present I shall specify only one. I could not have stated that on a future contingent occasion I would telegraph "Major Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the Forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attacks," because, with prudent precaution, this had already been done several days before, through a special messenger sent to Major Anderson for this very purpose. I refer to Major Buel, of the army.

The General's complimentary note of the same day, presenting to me Gen. Jackson's conduct, in 1833, during the period of nullification, as an example, requires no special notice. Even if the cases were not entirely different, I had previously determined upon a policy of my own, as will appear from my annual message. This was, at every hazard, to collect the customs at Charleston, and outside of the port, if need be, in a vessel of war. Mr. Colcock, the existing collector, as I had anticipated, resigned his office about the end of December, and immediately thereafter I nominated to the Senate, as his successor, a suitable person, prepared at my personal risk to do his duty. That body, however, throughout its entire session, declined to act on this nomination. Thus, without a collector it was rendered impossible to collect the revenue.

IV. General Scott's statements allege that "the Brooklyn, with Capt. Vodges' company, alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about January 22d, and on the 29th President Buchanan, having entered into a *quasi* armistice with certain leading secesh, Pensacola and elsewhere, called Secretaries Holt and Toucey to unite, in a joint note, the commander of the work and Lieut. Slemmer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Capt. Vodges' company unless the fort should be attacked. He afterwards stated, within a few days, that no such joint note I never saw, but suppose the armistice was consequent upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and confessed to terminate with it."

These statements betray a singular want of memory on the part of General Scott. It is scarcely credible that they could have been presented in such various forms to the President and submitted to General Scott on the day it was (29th January,) and met his entire approbation. I cannot yet venture to make this assertion. I had no positive contrary evidence to prove it. On the day Secretary Holt addressed me a note from which the following is an extract: "I have the satisfaction of saying that on submitting the paper to General Scott he expressed himself satisfied with it, saying that there could be no objection to the arrangement in a military point of view or otherwise." This requires no comment. The General had every reason to be satisfied with the arrangement will appear from the following statement:

A formidable outbreak had occurred in Florida; the forts of the United States had been expelled from Pensacola and the adjacent navy-yard; and Lieutenant Slemmer, of the artillery, with the brave little command, had been forced to take refuge in Fort Pickens, where he was in imminent danger every moment of being captured by a vastly superior force. Owing to the interruption of regular communications, Secretary Holt did not receive information of these events until several days after their occurrence, and then through a letter addressed to a third person. He instantly informed the President of the fact, and reinforcements, provisions, and military stores were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pickens without a moment's unnecessary delay. She left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of January.

Well founded apprehensions were, however, entertained at the time of her departure that the reinforcements, with the vessels of war at no great distance from Fort Pickens, could not arrive in time to defend it against the impending attack. In this state of suspense, and while Lieutenant Slemmer was in extreme peril, Senators Mallory, of Florida, and Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, (the former a member of the Peace Convention at Washington,) had addressed to him a telegraphic dispatch from Senator Mallory, of Florida, dated at Pensacola, on the 28th January, with the urgent request that they should lay it before the President. This dispatch expressed an earnest desire to maintain the peace, as well as the most positive assurance that no attack would be made on Fort Pickens if the present status should be preserved.

This proposal was carefully considered, both with a view to the safety of the fort and to the unhappy effect which an actual collision either at that or any other point might produce on the peace convention, then about to assemble at Washington. The result was that a joint dispatch was carefully prepared by the Secretaries of War and Navy, accepting the proposal, with important modifications, which was transmitted by telegraph on the 29th of January to Lieut. Slemmer, and to the naval commanders near the station. It is too long for transcription; suffice it to say, it was carefully guarded at every point for the safety of the fort and its free communication with Washington.

The result was highly fortunate. The Brooklyn had a long passage. Although she left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of January, she did not arrive at Pensacola until the 6th February. In the meantime Fort Pickens, with Lieutenant Slemmer (whose conduct deserves high commendation) and his brave little band, were placed, by virtue of this arrangement, in perfect security until an adequate force had arrived to defend it against any attack. The fort is still in our possession. Well might General Scott have expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement. The General was correct in the supposition that this arrangement was to expire on the termination of the Peace Convention.

But we now come to an important period, when dates will be essentially necessary to disentangle the statement of Gen. Scott. The South Carolina Commissioners were appointed on the 22d, and arrived in Washington on the 27th December. The day after their arrival it was announced that Major Anderson had removed from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. This rendered them furious. On the same day they addressed an angry letter to the President, demanding the surrender of Fort Sumter. The President answered this letter on the 30th December, by a peremptory refusal. This brought forth a reply from the Commissioners on the 2d January, 1861, of such an insulting character that the President instantly returned it to them with the following endorsement: "This paper, just presented to the President is of such a character that he declines to receive it." From that time forward all friendly, political and personal intercourse finally ceased between the revolutionary Senators and the President, and he was severely attacked by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr. Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had previously been of the coldest character, ever since the President's anti-secession message at the commencement of the session of Congress.

Under these changed circumstances, Gen. Scott, by note on Sunday, 30th December, addressed the following inquiry to the President:

"Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York harbor to reinforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition and subsistence? It is hoped that a sloop of war and cutter may be ordered for the same purpose 'to-morrow.'"

The General seems not to have then known that Mr. Floyd was out of office.

Never did a request meet a more prompt compliance. It was received on Sunday evening, December 30th.—On Monday morning I gave instructions to the War and Navy Departments, and on Monday evening General Scott came to congratulate me that the secretaries had issued the necessary orders to the army and navy officers, and that they were in his possession. The Brooklyn, with troops, military stores and provisions, was to sail forthwith from Fortress Monroe to Fort Sumter. I am, therefore, utterly at a loss to imagine why the General, in his statement, should have asserted that "the South Carolina commissioners had already been many days in Washington, and no movement of defense (on the part of the United States) was permitted." These commissioners arrived in Washington on the 26th December, General Scott's request was made to the President on the 30th. It was complied with on the 31st, and a single day is all that represents the "many days" of the General.

Again, General Scott asserts, in the face of these facts, that the President refused to allow any attempt to be made to reinforce Fort Sumter—because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina Commissioners. And still again, that "afterwards Secretary Holt and myself endeavored in vain, to obtain a ship-of-war for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer "Star of the West." Will it be believed that the substitution of the "Star of the West" for the powerful war steamer Brooklyn, of which he now complains, was by the advice of General Scott himself? I have never heard this doubted until I read the statement.

At the interview already referred to between the General and myself, on the evening of Monday, the 31st of December, I suggested to him that, although I had not received the South Carolina Commissioners in their official capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, yet it might be considered an improper act to send the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter until I had received an answer from them to my letter of the preceding day, that the delay could not continue more than forty eight hours. He promptly concurred in this suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and the orders were not transmitted to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning of the 2d of January, I received their insolent note, and sent it back to them. In the meantime, however, the General had become convinced by the representation a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and the Navy informed me, to secure secrecy and success and reach the fort, would be to send a fast side wheel mercantile steamer from New York with the reinforcement. Accordingly the "Star of the West" was selected for the duty. The substitution of this mercantile steamer for the Brooklyn, which would have been able to defend herself in case of attack, was reluctantly yielded by me to the high military judgment of General Scott.

The change of programme required a brief space of time, but the Star of the West left New York for Charleston on the evening of the 5th of January. On the very day, however, when this ill-fated steamer left New York, a telegram was despatched by General Scott to Captain Vodges to countermand her departure, but it did not reach its destination until after she had gone to sea. The reason for this countermand shall be stated in the language of Secretary Holt, to be found in a letter addressed by him to Mr. Thompson, the late Secretary of the Interior, on the 5th March, 1861, and published in the National Intelligencer. Mr. Holt, says:

"The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thompson) was not more cordially sanctioned by the President than it was by General Scott and myself; not because of any dissent from the order on the part of the President, but because of a letter received that day from Major Anderson, stating in effect, that he regarded himself secure in his position; and yet more from intelligence, which late on Saturday evening (5th January, 1861,) reached the Department that a heavy battery had been erected among the sand hills at the entrance to Charleston harbor, which would probably destroy any unarmed vessel (and such was the Star of the West,) which might attempt to make its way to Fort Sumter. This important information notified the government that there was no present necessity for sending reinforcements, and that when sent they should go, not in a vessel of commerce, but of war. Hence the countermand was dispatched by telegraph to New York; but the vessel had sailed a short time before it reached the officer (Col Stone) to whom it was addressed."

A number of these facts, established by dates, prove conclusively that the President was not only willing but anxious to the utmost period to reinforce Fort Sumter.

On the 4th of January, the day before the departure of the Star of the West from New York, as General Scott in his statement admits, succor was sent to Fort Pickens, Key West and to Fort Jackson, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their security. He nevertheless speculates on the consequences which might have followed had the reinforcements not reached their destination in due time, and even expresses the extraordinary opinion that, with the possession of these forts, "the rebels might have purchased an early recognition."

I shall next advert to the statement that the expedition under Captain Ward, "of three or four small steamers belonging to the coast survey," was kept back by something like a truce or armistice, [made here,] embracing Charleston and Pensacola harbors, agreed upon between the President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, &c. And this more fanciful to the end of the administration"—Things altogether distinct in their nature are often so blended in this statement that it is difficult to separate them. Such is eminently the case in connecting the force relative to Charleston with Pensacola.

Having already treated of the charge of having kept back reinforcements from Pensacola, I shall now say something of the charge of having also kept them back from Charleston. Neither a truce, nor *quasi* truce, nor anything like it, was ever concluded between the President and any human authority concerning Charleston. On the contrary, the South Carolina commissioners, first and last, and all the time, were informed that the President could never surrender Fort Sumter, nor deprive himself of the most entire liberty to send reinforcements to it whenever it was believed to be in danger, or requested by Major Anderson. It is strange that General Scott was not apprised of this well known fact. It was then, with some astonishment, that I learned from the statement of the General that he had, on the 12th of March, 1861, advised that Major Anderson, should be instructed to evacuate the fort as soon as suitable transportations could be procured to carry himself and his command to New York. A military necessity for a capitulation may have existed in case there should be an attack upon the fort, or a demand for its surrender, but surely none such could have existed for its voluntary surrender and abandonment.

Probably that to which the General meant to refer was not the *quasi*, but the actual, truce of arms concluded at Charleston on the 11th of January, 1861, between Gov. Pickens and Major Anderson, without the knowledge of the President. It was on the 9th of January that the Star of the West, under the American flag, was fired upon in the harbor of Charleston by order of Governor Pickens. Immediately after this outrage Major Anderson sent a flag of truce to the Governor stating that he presummed the act had been unauthorized, and for that reason he had not opened fire from Fort Sumter on the adjacent batteries, but demanding its disavowal, and, if this were not sent in a reasonable time he would consider it war, and fire on any vessel that attempted to leave the harbor.

Two days after this occurrence, on the 11th of January, Governor Pickens had the audacity to demand of Major Anderson the surrender of the fort. In his answer of the same date the Major made the following proposition: "Should your Excellency deem fit, previous to a resort to arms, to refer this matter to Washington it would afford me the sincerest pleasure to depute one of my officers to accompany any messenger you may deem proper to be the bearer of your demand." This proposition was promptly accepted by the Governor, and, in pursuance thereof, he sent on his part, Hon. J. W. Hane, the Attorney General of South Carolina, to Washington, whilst Major Anderson deputed Lieut. Hall, of the United States army, to accompany him.—These gentlemen arrived together in Washington on the evening of the 13th of January, when the President obtained the first knowledge of the transaction. But it will be recollected that no time intervened between the return of the Star of the West to New York and the arrival of the messenger bearing a copy of the truce at Washington within which it would have been possible to send reinforcements to Fort Sumter. Both events occurred about the same time.

Thus a truce, or suspension of arms, was concluded between the parties, to continue until the question of the surrender of the fort should be decided by the President. Until this decision Major Anderson had placed it out of his own power to ask for reinforcements, and equally out of the power of the government to send them without a violation of the public faith. This was what writers on public law denominate "a partial truce under which hostilities are suspended only in certain places, as between a town and the army besieging it."

It is possible that the President, under the laws of war, might have annulled this truce upon due notice to the opposite party; but neither General Scott nor any other person ever suggested this expedient. This would have been to cast a reflection on Major Anderson, who, beyond question acted from the highest and purest motives. Did Gen. Scott ever propose to violate this truce during its existence? If he did, I am not now, and never was, aware of the fact. Indeed, I think he would have been one of the last men in the world to propose such a measure.

Colonel Hayne did not deliver the letter which he bore from Governor Pickens, demanding the surrender of the fort, to the President until the 31st of January. The document containing the reasons for this worrying delay, were communicated to Congress in a special message of the 8th of February, to which I refer the reader. On the 5th of February, the Secretary of War, under the instructions of the President, gave a peremtory refusal to this demand in an able and comprehensive letter, reviewing the whole subject, explaining and justifying the conduct of the President throughout. Its concluding sentences both the eloquent and emphatic.

"It (says Mr. Holt,) with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault Fort Sumter and imperil the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them, and those they represent, must rest the responsibility."

The truce was then ended, and General Scott is incorrect in stating "that it lasted to the end of that administration."

An expedition was quietly fitted out at New York, under the supervision of General Scott, to be ready for any contingency. He arranged its details, and regarded the reinforcements thus provided for as sufficient.—This was ready to sail for Fort Sumter on five hours notice. It is of this expedition that General Scott thus speaks:

"At that time, when this (the truce) had passed away, Secretary Holt and Toucey, Captain Ward, of the navy, and myself, with the knowledge of the President, settled upon the employment, under the Captain, of three or four steamers belonging to the Coast Survey, but he was kept back by the truce."

A strange inconsistency. The truce had expired with Mr. Holt's letter to Col. Hayne on the 5th of February, and General Scott in his statement says:—"It would have been easy to reinforce this fort down to about the 12th of February." Why, then, did not the reinforcements proceed? This was simply because of communications from Major Anderson. It was most fortunate that they did not proceed; because the three or four small steamers which were to bear them would never have reached the fort, and in the attempt must have been captured or destroyed. The vast inadequacy of the force provided to accomplish the object was demonstrated by information received from Major Anderson at the War Department on the last day of the administration.

I purposely forbear at present to say more on the subject, lest I might, however unintentionally, do injustice to one or more of the parties concerned, in consequence of the brevity required by the nature of this communication. The facts relating to it, with the appropriate accompaniments, have been fully presented in a historical review, prepared a year ago, which will ere long be published. This review contains a sketch of the last four months of my administration. It is impartial, at least such is my honest conviction. That it has not yet been published has arisen solely from an apprehension, no longer entertained, that something therein be perverted into an interference with the Government in a vigorous prosecution of the war for the maintenance of the constitution and the restoration of the Union, which was far, very far, from my intention.

After a careful retrospect, I can solemnly declare, before God and my country, that I cannot reproach myself with any act of commission or omission since the existing troubles commenced. I have never doubted that my countrymen would yet do me justice. In my special message of the 8th January, 1861, I presented a full and fair exposition of the alarming condition of the country, and urged Congress either to adopt measures of compromise, or, failing in this, to prepare for the last alternative. Both aspects my recommendation was disregarded. I shall close this document with a quotation of the last sentences of that message as follows:

"In conclusion it will be permitted me to remark that I have often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now surround us. This may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officially. I feel that my duty has been faithfully, though it may be imperfectly performed; and whatever the result may be, I shall carry to my grave the consciousness that I at least meant well for my country."

Your obedient servant,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

Wheatland, near Lancaster, Oct. 23, 1862.

For the Journal.

List of Captured Yankees

On Tuesday afternoon, 4th inst., information having reached Fort Fisher that some Federals had landed at Masonboro' to destroy an English barque that had grounded, the Colonel took a detachment of the Scotland Neck Cavalry, under Sergt. Baker, and dashed up the beach after the enemy. Just at twi-light they came upon the following party, who surrendered without resistance:

FROM STEAMER MOUNT VERNON.

Officers—Ensign* Orlando Roberts

Seamen—Henry Richardson, Michael Holahan, Joseph Thompson, Jno. Moore, Geo. Thompson—5.

FROM STEAMER DAYLIGHT.

Officers—Paymaster Allen J. Clark, Ensign Thos. M. Peake.

Seamen—Andrew Newman, Jno. Murphy, Henry Wright Michael Coyne, Henry Duffie, James Kelly, Patrick Haggerty, James Phalin, Jas. McGregor, John Kearney, Isaac Whitley, Francis McQuade, Robert Roberts—13.

The following men were found with the Yankees, and represented themselves as being connected with the Salt Works:

Wm. Barber, Wm. Richardson and John Johnson.

One of the crew of the barque was also found with the Yankees, and released. None of the crew perished on the vessel as reported. Three splendid barges, besides some Enfield rifles, cutlasses and pistols, and a stand of colors, were captured.

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*An Ensign is the new title for Passed Midshipmen.

From the United States.

Northern papers to the 11th instant have been received in Richmond. *They* say that Gen. McClellan had been removed, and Gen. Burnside put in command of the Potomac. The reasons given for this step are that McClellan refused to advance, and the Harper's Ferry Commission having censured him in their official report.

The Scotia has arrived, with Lord Lyons and Simon Cameron.

No Cabinet Council was held in England on the 22d October, as summoned. It was postponed indefinitely on the morning of the meeting.

The London *Times* says Sir G. C. Lewis expressed the opinion of the English Government. That the communication of the French Minister related to matters at New Orleans, and was not likely to lead to any complication.

"Ion," the usually well informed correspondent of the Baltimore *Sun*, says: "Lord Lyons will visit Richmond in ten days."

Cameron, the former United States Secretary of War, and afterwards appointed Minister to Russia, and now returned, thinks there will be intervention in American affairs by the meeting of Parliament. He says the Confederates are getting a fleet ready in English ports to attack New York.

Gen. Hunter returns to the command of the Department of South Carolina, in consequence of Gen. Mitchell's death.

Several new iron-clads have been advertised for construction by Lincoln.

A gentleman who has just arrived from Washington, says he read in the Chronicle of Sunday last, that McClellan had been removed.

Particulars of the Raid on Greenville.

We met a gentleman from Pitt county at the depot yesterday evening, from whom we learned the following facts: A gunboat ascended the river to within a mile of Greenville on Sunday last, when it stopped, and they transferred some artillery pieces to a flat and came up to the town. The party of Federals that took possession of the place, consisted of about 80 only, and they only remained two hours. They fired the bridge near the town, but on being remonstrated with suffered the fire to be extinguished, and so it was saved. They took off as prisoners nine citizens of the county and town—Messrs. Joel Hodges, Ex-Sheriff; Joseph Daney, Clerk of Superior Court; Edward Howell, Wm. Stocks, James Cobb, Benj. Corry, Charles Green, Allen Tyson, and one other, whose name our informant had forgotten. We had no troops there, and no opposition was offered them. They retired and returned, no doubt, to Washington the same day. The town is now occupied by our troops, and all is quiet.

We obtained these facts from a Mr. Evans, who lives near Greenville, and who has been there twice since the Yankees left, once but a few hours after they had cleared the town, and they may be relied upon as being in the main correct.

If 80 Yankees can take quiet possession of Greenville, how many will it take to capture Goldsboro' or Weldon? We hope we are to have a change in the management of military affairs in North Carolina. Do give us an active, *fighting* commander.

Daily Progress, 13th inst.

Will Charleston Fall?

The hour draws nigh which must decide this question so momentous to the State of South Carolina, and to our whole Confederacy. We do not profess to know anything of the real state of our defences there. But supposing them to be all that we have a right to expect, it is nevertheless natural to feel some degree of anxiety as to the final result, when one considers what formidable preparations the foe has been long making to take that metropolis. It is supposed that the enemy expects to make the attack both by land and sea, and that the naval force which is to assail us will be composed of a whole fleet of iron-clad steamers. It is reasonable to conclude that whenever the battle shall be fought, it will be one of the most terrible fights ever witnessed on the earth. On our side brave men under the most skilful leaders will fight for all that ever did animate the soldier's courage, and if there ever was a desperate resistance to the invader's approach it will be made then and there. On the enemy's hand the utmost bitterness of hate will stimulate the assault. We suppose no event would give greater satisfaction to the whole of Yankeedom than the fall of wicked and rebellious Charleston, and the floating of the stars and stripes once more over Fort Sumter. If they ever do make the attempt it will be with the most ample preparation, and in the greatest force, and with the most determined and earnest resolution.—*Southern Presbyterian.*

SALT.—People putting up meat will find that they can save and make bacon out of their fresh meat with a very small quantity of salt. The process is to use brine alone—covering the meat with it after packing closely. The time for the meat to remain, of course, is determined by the thickness—a few days for light meat, just killed, will answer. In this way the same brine can be used again and again, boiling it after using it on the meat. Tubs, barrels, &c., to put it in is all that is wanted to save a large quantity of salt that is now wasted. One bushel, with ordinary care, will go as far as five with the most careful management by the ordinary process. Cold water will not dissolve so much salt as warm, by about one-fourth. The meat will take only enough to cure it in this way.

Jackson Mississippian.

THE last *State Journal*, has the following rumour which we sincerely trust is not true:—

REPORTED DEATH OF CAPT. W. J. HOUSTON.—We regret to learn by a gentleman by the Northern train last evening, that it is reported, and generally believed, so far as he has enquired, that Capt. Wm. J. Houston, of the 1st N. C. Cavalry, was killed in a charge on Friday last, in Northern Virginia. The only particulars we could learn, were, that in the charge his horse was killed under him, and that he himself was also killed. We give this painful rumor without vouching for it in any particular and trust it is not true.

The United States Elections.

The Black Republican party of the North drove the Southern States into secession, and made the war from which that section now suffers. The existence of the party is staked upon bringing the war to a successful termination. Failure to overpower the Confederate States and restore the Union must be fatal to its popularity and power for all time. Hence the gigantic efforts put forth to achieve success, and the desperate measures through which the Administration proposes to bring the South to submission. The policy of the Black Republican party is, therefore, *war*—savage and relentless—at any rate, successful war.

The Democratic party of the North was not immediately responsible for secession or the war. Although it favors a restoration of the political Union and of the trade and business desirable from the Confederate States, it is opposed to the desperate policy of carrying on the war as proclaimed by Lincoln. Being a party of opposition and moderation, it must, to the extent of its power at the North, hamper and clog the policy of the rival Black Republican party. It must drift in the direction of practical antagonism to the war, as waged.

Taking this view of the subject, we are gratified at the Democratic success and Black Republican defeats in the late elections. We by no means expect this result to put an end to the war. But it is the elevation of the *expedient*, in place of the *fanatical*, as the governing principle of the Northern people. It is likely to bring distraction and division in the conduct of the war and among the people of the North. So far, so good.

Charleston Mercury.

A Yankee paper tells the following exemption story:

"Doctor, if the lame foot won't answer, I have another all-sufficient reason—one that you cannot refuse me exemption for." "What is it?" asked the doctor. "Why, the fact is, doctor, I have not good sense; I am an idiot," solemnly replied the applicant. "Ah!" said the doctor, "what proof have you of that? What evidence can you bring?" "Proof conclusive," said the applicant. "Why sir, I voted for Abe Lincoln; and if that isn't proof of a man's being a d—d idiot, I don't know how idiocy could be proven."

Clothe the Soldiers.

We heartily endorse the following, from the *Daily progress:*

"In every part of the Confederacy our noble women are actively engaged in making, collecting and preparing clothing for the soldiers. We cannot but believe but what there is enough material in the South to clothe and shoe the soldiers, and if the State and Confederate Governments will take the proper steps to suppress extortion and speculation, and effectually put it down, it would not be many weeks before every man in our armies would be comfortably clothed and shod. Let those in authority wrest the material from the Shylocks who are speculating in the life-blood of the nation, and our patriotic women, even if unaided by the sterner sex, will see that the soldiers do not suffer.—There is leather and cloth in the country, but the bulk of it is in the hands of heartless speculators, and hence cannot be reached. As a general thing, we favor the supremacy of civil authority and individual rights; but if the soldiers cannot be clothed and shod by any other means, we would have the strong arm of military authority stretched forth for their relief. If any body is to suffer, let it be those who remain at home, and not our noble soldiers in the camp.

AN APPEAL TO THE PATRIOTIC.

A MILITARY COLLEGE FOR ORPHANS.

Fellow Citizens,

ON THE DAY last appointed by the President of the Confederate States as a day of Thanksgiving to Almighty God for His blessings upon our arms, a few gentlemen in the Town of Wilson, North Carolina, subscribed over $5,000 (since increased to over $8,000) as the beginning of a fund to be not less than $100,000, to be devoted to the endowment of a Military College in Wilson, N. C., for the education of the orphan boys of such soldiers as have fallen, or may hereafter fall, in defence of the Confederacy. The plan so far as matured is as follows:—

1. Not more than one-fifth of the amount obtained is to be devoted to the purchase of buildings for the opening of the College. Ample arrangements have been made to secure suitable property on these terms.

2. The balance of the fund is to be invested in some safe and profitable manner,—the principal never to be invaded and the interest to be devoted to the support and education of orphan Cadets.

3. The institution is to combine the characteristics of a thorough Collegiate and a thorough military course, and is to receive paying Cadets on terms usual in Military Academies, and all the profits from this department are to go to swell the endowment fund, and thus increase the capabilities of the College to educate orphans.

4. The first fund of $100,000 is to be obtained as follows: Every gentleman making a donation of $50 or more, is thereby to become a Trustee of the College, and to have one vote in the Board for every $50 given by him to this fund. It is apparent that this at once secures the College from ever becoming sectarian or sectional. Any lady making a donation of $50 or more, may designate some gentleman as Trustee to represent this amount. The donations may be made in bonds of five equal amounts, payable annually, and bearing interest from January 1, 1863. Thus a gentleman gives five bonds for $200, each payable severally on Jan'y 1, 1864, Jan'y 1, 1865, Jan'y 1, 1866, Jan'y 1, 1867, and Jan'y 1, 1868, all bearing interest from Jan'y 1, 1863. This is a donation of $1,000. None of these bonds are to be considered binding until $100,000 be thus secured.

5. Every donor may designate the County or State to which his donation is to be assigned: and orphan cadets will be taken as nearly as practicable from different sections of the Confederacy, in proportion to the amounts received therefrom.

6. Any individual contributing $2,500, shall have the designation of one orphan cadet, to receive the benefit of his fund during the donor's natural life.

7. When there shall be no longer any claim upon the fund in behalf of orphans of soldiers who fall in the wars of the Confederacy, other orphans shall receive the benefit of this endowment, in some manner hereafter to be designated by the Trustees.

This, fellow-citizens, is the enterprise to the accomplishment of which we respectfully solicit your co-operation. It is a *philanthropic* project. Boys who would otherwise grow up in neglect, will be trained into excellent citizens and many an anxious widowed heart will be made glad. It is a *patriotic* project.

The College will train accomplished soldiers to take the places of those who are cut off, and many a man will more freely enter our armies, and our men now in the field will be still more ready with a glad heart to sacrifice themselves for their country when they know that their boys are to be handsomely cared for. It is a *Christian* project. The God of eternal truth says "Blessed is he that considereth the poor; the Lord will deliver *him* in time of trouble." And He also says, "He that hath pity on the poor lendeth to the Lord, and that which he hath given, will He pay him again." Let all who love their land and trust their God come up to our help speedily.

The Rev. Dr. Deems has been appointed the Financial Agent. All communications may be addressed to him at Wilson, N. C. Persons sending subscriptions will please specify the amount they desire to give, and their Post Offices. Proper bonds to be filled will be sent them.

Now is the time for action. *Let us remember that every subscriber to this fund gives assurance to all his fellow citizens that he has faith in the final success of our cause, and thus helps to increase the trust of our friends and to awaken the confidence of our enemies.*

EDMUND MOORE,
ZENO. H. GREENE,
JOHN T. BARNES,
S. S. SATCHWELL,
JAMES W. DAVIS.

Wilson, N. C., 26th, Sept. 1862.

*** All the papers published within the Confederate States are respectfully requested to give this Appeal a few insertions.

Sept. 29th, 1862

DISTRIBUTION OF THE SCHOOL FUND.

OFFICE OF THE LITERARY BOARD,
RALEIGH, October 9th, 1862.

The President and Directors of the Literary Fund, having made distribution of said Fund, have directed the following tabular statement to be published showing the Fall distribution to each County.

The amount of the said Fall distribution will be paid to the persons entitled to the same on application to the Treasury Department.

The Counties of Clay, Mitchell and Transylvania will receive their shares from the Counties out of which they were respectively formed, there having been no report from said Counties under the law of the General Assembly.

ZEBULON B. VANCE,
*President ex officio of Literary