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tion of question? for the mere purpose of delay, while it did nc
prive them of any substantial right I submit that Judge Boc*
his action thus took a correct view of the order. I was so mud
pressed with it myself, that if we could have got before your Hone
should have moved to dissolve the injunction, and I have great
that were the circumstances the same, I could successfully make
I have said all I ought to say, but it would not be doing justic
the case, and particularly to the vendible Judge who has been ass
here, were 1 to omit further allusion to the several grounds on w
our opponents claim that the proceedings in the case before him
irregidar, illegal and void. I have already referred to two. 1
third ground is : " That the Legislature of the State of South Cali
" in the Act No. 42 did not intend, either in express terms or by
" cssary implication, to give to any railroad corporation the powi
"disturb, invade, affect or destroy the franchises of another cor]
.'tion, unless thereto specially authorized by the proper departmei
" the State government. That in the eighth section of the same
" the Legislature dir1 not intend to do more than bv express enact
" assert ita rights and powers to subject all land and rights of way
" liability to condemnation. But that the right and power was ar
" the right and power of eminent domain, itself one of the highes
"tributes of sovereignty in the State; the exercise and contro
" which resides in the legislative department of the government of
" State, and the delegation of which, when claimed by a person or
.' poration, must be shown by express enactment or implicatioi
"necessary that it is equivalent to express enactment, and that
" State government would so disregard this high power, that any
"son or corporation, by obtaining a charter to build a railroad, wt
" thereby obtain a delegation of the sovereign power of the State
" impair, and, perhaps, destroy not oifly existing rights of property,
" also the pre-existing grant of a franchise by the State to other
I pass to the " fourth."
"That there could be no legal condemnation of lands or right?
" way under said Act No. 42, until the legal right of thc Columbia
" Augusta Railroad Company to take the lands and rights of way pra
"for had been adjudged by the competent tribunals of the State. 1
" the ascertainment of the legal right was a prerequisite to the opi
"tion of the Act of 1868, and that according to the settled law of
"State of South Carolina, whenever the right of the petitioner is c
? tested, there must be a preliminary trial and adjudication of t
"question before the order for impanelling a jury can be made."
I submit that that is a mistake, and that tho order by the Judge i
matter for his own discretion. When or how trial is to be Ltd, is i
a matter for his determination. If he had seen fit tc have ordere
ferial before a jury, he could have done so. It rested entirely with h
and it was for him to determine how the preliminary trial should
- had, if had at all. That such an investigation of- the right must
preliminary, is an assumption of the counsel on the other side ; a
where do the gentlemen find in any one of the 'statutes grounds for si
a proposition ? If the Judge, seeing the railroad in a certain conditi
a case pending that had to be continued, witnesses wanted that coi
not be present, and delay a necessary consequence, he certainly coi
go on, impanel the jury, obtain the compensation money and resei
his decision. This is what Judge Platt has done, and we claim tl
because he has exercised that right the result of his action is not, the
fore, the subject of prohibition. But to continue.
"Fifth. That in and by the return of the South Carolina Railrc
" Company, and the answer and return of the same company, filed bef<
"Judge Platt, the legal right of the Columbia and Augusta Railrc
" Company was traversed and put in issue, and it was the duty of 1
" Honor Judge Platt to have heard and decided the question of rig
" or cause the same to have been heard and decided, before granting t
"'order to impanel a jury.
. " Sixth. That proceedings having been instituted on the equity side
"the Circuit Court for Richland County to test the legal right of t
" Columbia and Augusta Railroad Company to condemn the lands a
" rights of way of the South Carolina Railroad Company, and notice
" said proceedings in equity having been brought to the attention of 1
"Honor Judge Platt, in the return of the South Carolina Railrc
" Company, it watrthe duty of said Judge to withhold the order for
"jury until the question of legal right had been adjudged in sa
" equity canse."
That may be the opinion of counsel, but Judge Platt thoug
differently. Prohibition is to stop something, and I do not know ho
you are to get at this matter by such a writ. He has already decide
a question, and consequently you are to prohibit, if at all, somethir
" Seventh. That although his Honor Judge Platt, in his order of D
, " cember 4, did declare that under the Act 42 his functions were ' ji
" dicial,' and not merely ministerial, and that he was ' the only const
" tuted judicial agent of the State under the Act 42 to enforce i
"mandates/ he refused to entertain and decide upon any asserted righ
" or objection, exe-ept the simple one of hindrance ; and thereby refuse
" to hear and decide the question of law, but did hear and decide tl
" question of fact, which should properly have been heard and decide
- "by a jury."
Your Honors will permit me to observe, that the whole discussion i
reference to the opinion of JudgeJPlatt is entirely outside of the matte
The question before us is his mandate-the order. Judge Platt migl
- have based his order upon very erroneous reasoning. Your Honors ai
well-^Sware that it is not a matter of course to allow the opinion of
Court to be read. The mere opinion is not the judgment, it is th
decree, the order with which we have to deal ; and what did Judg
Platt order ? That a jury should be impanelled and decide the que:
tion of compensation. When he determined not to entertain my thin
but the question of hindrance, it was, of course, a decision against ou
friends on the other side, and the only way in which that can be coi
rected is by taking the matter before the Court which sits next week a
Edgefield. I apprehend that the appeal covers everything. Whei
?ou appeal on compensation the whole case again comes before Judg
..'latt, and if an error has been committed, he mil then and there corree
h. The law upon this subject is : " That from the verdicts so renderec
?.it shall be the right of either party to appeal to the first term of tin
'."Circuit Court next ensuing in the county, and upon the hearing o
"such appeal, if the Court shall be satisfied of the reasonable suffic ie nc
" of the grounds, an issue shall be ordered in which the appellant shal
" be - t he actor, and the question of compensation shall be thereupon sub
" mitted to a jury in open Court, whose vei^ict shall be final and con
. "dusive, unless, on writ of error, a new trial shall be ordered by the
" Supreme Court."
This Whole matter, therefore, must be reviewed by J udge Platt, and
if he still rules wrongly the remedy is not by prohibition, but by i
writ of error. Why should you undertake to change this law ? Is it
not sufficient that the case may be brought before you by a writ ol
" Eighth. That his Honor Judge Platt, in granting the order ol
" December 17, impanelling a jury, did declare in the opinion acconi
" panying said order, that no injustice could result to the South Carolina
" Railroad Company, and no prejudice to their right, because after the
" assessment of compensation had been made, the Columbia and
" Augusta Railroad Company must apply for a dissolution of the in
"junction; and show that they had 'acquired the right,' and that the
" question of legal right would then be decided ; when in fact, the
" order for the jury, followed by its assessment for compensation and
" the tender by the Columbia and Augusta Railroad Company, of the
" sum assessed, (all of which rests upon-the legal right of the applicant
" to the interference of the Court), affords the claimant the evidence of
" having acquired the right, and thus remits the South Carolina Rail
"road Company to-another tribunal for the protection of its rights,
a after those rights have been judicially prejudged."
I submit again, that the opinion of Judge Platt is not before us. It
is his judgment, his order which we are to consider and alone bear in
mind. I presume that, in the benevolence of his heart, Judge Platt
was led to suppose that he could satisfy the losing party, and in a kind
spirit he undertook to give some reasons which would make them bear
their disappointment without mortification, and he, therefore, stated a
great deal without intending that what he said should operate on the
judgment he might pronounce. I see nothing in the opinion calculated
to modify that judgment.
" Ninth. That the declaration of his Honor in said opinion, that the
" appeal would bring the case again before him, and that he could con
" tinue it from term to term to prevent injustice, affords no protection,
" because the plain, manifest and express language of the Act 42
" limits the appeal to an appeal only from the amouut of compensation,
" and expressly gives to the claimant the right to enter and go on with
" (he construction of the road."
Here our friends agree with us for once. This they do concede, that
we have a right to go on with the construction of thc road. What,
then, are you going to prohibit ? They concede the right to enter for
construction. That is all we claim. As to thc question of appeal, that,
as I have said before, will come before his Honor next week, and the
case, perhaps, will then be considered in full.
" Tenth. That his Honor had no right or authority, under the con
" stitution and laws of thc State, to prejudge by an order the full
" hearing and decision by a Court of competent jurisdiction of the
" question of legal right fairly made and presented to him ; and that
" his order being a preadjudication of questions of legal right without
" hearing, and yet divesting rights of property, is in violation of the
" Constitution of the United States, and of the constitution and laws of
" this State, and should be set aside."
Well, when the question comes here be it so, but it cannot be deter?
mined by prohibition.
" Eleventh. Because the urgency with which the proceedings were
"conducted by the Clerk of the Court of Edgefield County; the
refusal to grant time to procure the attendance of important and
"material witnesses; the summoning of jurors who were not legally
"competent to act; the administration of an improper oath, and the
" refusal to administer the oath according to the Act ; the absence of
" all sworn testimony on the part of the Columbia and Augusta Rail
" road Company ; the exclusion of all testimony on the part of the
" South Carolina Railroad Company, and the condemnation by the
'.jury of a greater quantity of land than they were authorized to con
'. demn ; and the omission by the jury to take testimony and report
'.' upon ; the special damage which the owner may sustain by reason of
M the construction of the highv/ay through his lands,' arc all acts
;: illegal and oppressive, and tend to the injury of your relators."
Now, may it please your Honors, these are al' facts.. We have never
known what affidavits they were going to ofL. iure. We did not know
they were to be offered, and we deny the whole of them. The record
read to your Honors denies the greater part of them, and we affirm
that we are able to prove the opposite of each of these allegations.
We desire to bc heard upon them ; we travers? them ; we take issue
upon them and wish to produce testimony ; and if your Honors should
pass over the other points, the rule to show cause must he made. You
must give us a hearing. I have argued the questions of law fully upon
the record, but when it comes to matters outside of the case based upon
alleged facts, we desire to be heard. As regards prohibition, Chief
Justice Eyre says that the Court must first be satisfied that there is
ground for prohibition, and there being ground, they then put the
party either to declare or show cause and send the facts to the jury, and
have them found before they venture to decide upon matters outside of
the record. Will your Honors then sit there and try a case and give
final judgment upon questions of fact, upon which we have not been
heard ? Never !
Finally, may it please your Honors, I urge upon this Court the great
necessity of avoiding this class of cases. Every foot you tread in the
path where you assume original jurisdiction will be regretted,. You
may be obliged to do so in some cases ; but you all know the difference
between a Court of Appeal and an original Court, and it is of great ad?
vantage to the justice of the country, and it is due to yourselves, that
cases should come here, if possible, on appeal, and that if prohibition is
to be filed it should he filed in the Circuit Court. I submit to your
Honors that if you allow these cases to be brought before you the more
you will be incapable of discharging the high duties devolving upon
you in their final adjudication. Your policy, in my judgment, is to
avoid original jurisdictien and allow each of the Circuit Courts to dis?
charge the share of duty imposed upon it.
With these remarks I submit this case to your consideration, having
no doubt that justice will be fully administered. If the South Carolina
Railroad Company has a right to that land it will be decided by your
Honors, because there will be an appeal from the Court of Equity. The
whole gravamen between these two great corporations, be it said to their
shame, has been declared by a jury of twelve men to involve the simple
matter of $110. The chief difficulty with which we have to contend is
that the South Carolina Railroad Corporation confound the loss of brui
ness with the loss of land. The loss of business is not involved here,
but it is the loss of two or three acres of old pine land not fit for culti?
vation and not worth 85 per acre. I submit that if you will let sueh a
case take its course, justice will be aolministered upon its final hearing.
ARGUMENT OP EX-CHANCELLOR CARROLL.
May it phase the Court : It was not my intention tb participate in
this discussion ; and I am not, therefore, prepared to present the cause
in a manner due to the Court and to myself. Still, in the course of the
argument, I have received some very strong and decided impressions,
especially with reference to one bmuoL of the case-and to this, with
your Honors permission, I will address a few observations.
Throughout the entire argument, the cause has been treated as though
the question of legal right on the part of these defendants had never
been considered and adjudged by his Honor Judge Platt. It has been
assumed, on both sides, that the question which, it is averred, ought
primarily to have been considered and determined, as to the legal right
of these defendants to proceed under the Act of 1868, was, in truth,
never investigated by Judge Platt. I apprehend, however, that if his
opinion be fairly construed, it will be seen that this assumption is utterly
The relators were served with due notice of the application made to
Judge Platt, by petition, to have the necessary proceedings instituted in
order to ascertain the amount of compensation to which the South Caro?
lina Railroad Company were entitled for the appropriation of their land.
They were opposed co the prayer of the petitioner.
According to the ordinary and regular course of procedure as indicated
in Blake's case, (9 Richardson,) the party resisting the application was
bound in his return to state the grounds of his objection, and to set forth
the reasons relied upon, why the prayer of the petitioner should not be
granted. The relators conformed to that rule, and did make a formal
answer to the notice served upon them, wherein they set forth their
grounds of objection to the proposed application. Your Honors will
observe, however, that these reasons are given in various forms with
much amplification and a multitude of words, but after all, when summed
up, are few in number.
First, is a general denial of the right of the defendants to enter for
the purpose described ; next, is a specific denial that by any act or
authority of the State has power been given to the defendants to pro?
ceed under the Act of 1868, No. 42. Then follows a recital of the re?
lators' title to their land, and the allegation that their lands and right
of way, and the exclusive use of the same, are now and must always be
necessary for their road. Next, it is alleged that the right to hold these
lands and the right of way is derived from the Legislature of the State,
and that the charter is a contract inviolable under the Constitution of
the United. States. Then follows the declaration that the powers, rights
and privileges granted by the Legislature have been confirmed by the
judicial tribunals of the State in thc most ample form, and that said
powers, rights and privileges in their nature, and by express enactment
exclusive for the purposes of the South Carolina Railroad, are not only
threatened with but have actually been encroached upon ?ind interfered
with by the Columbia and Augusta Railroad Company ; and so the re?
Now, may it please the Court, if the different grounds of objection
set forth in this return he considered, it will be found after all that
they -lo not sustain their case.
First, they object that these defendants have no right, either under
the Act of 1868, No. 42, or under any other law of the State, to enter
upon the land of thc relators with a view to appropriation for the pur?
poses of a railroad.
That point was undoubtedly submitted to Judge Platt, and the specific
ground upon which they relied was that thc Act of 1868 had reference
merely to corporations to be created in the future, and did not apply to
corporate bodies already existing. It was considered explicitly and for?
mally, and by his Honor adjudged against the relators.
Then they suggest that according to the terms of their charter the
use of their road to a distance of one hundred feet belongs solely and
exclusively to the South Carolina Railroad Company, and that conse?
quently that corporation cannot be considered as within the scope of the
Act of 186S, when it refers to those parties whose lands are liable to
condemnation. His Honor Judge Platt also decided that point against
the relators, and declared the South Carolina Railroad Company not to
be exempt from the operation of the Act.
They further contend that the power in question of appropriating
land against the consent of the owner, is a power which can only be
delegated under the right of eminent domain, and that to be granted
effectively, it must bc in express terms, or in terms implying a manifest
application of such grant. I call your attention. to the language of
Judge Platt: "A formal answer has been put in by thc South Carolina
" Railroad Company, setting forth their objections thereto, and among
"others this one, to wit, that thc entering by the Columbia and
" Augusta Railroad Company upon the lands at Graniteville, where the
" respondents' depot is situated, for the purpose of constructing their
" road thereon, and also its entry upon their lands and right of way
" between Graniteville and Hamburg for like purpose would be a serious
" hindrance to the use and enjoyment of thc highway, for which said
" lands or right of way were previously procured." *****
"After hearing argument by counsel thus far, and examination of
u law authorities quoted by them, my mind has been led to thc following
" conclusions :"
" That it was the manifest intention of the General Assembly in the
" passage of said Act No. 42, to enact a law which should bc appli
.. cable to and bc obligatory upon all railroad companies in thc State of
" South Carolina, whenever the one in the construction of its road
" claimed the right of entering upon and using a portion of the lands
" and right of way of the other. The South Carolina Railroad Coni
" pony is not made an exception to thc operation of this enactment,
" but, on the contrary, section eight of said Act declares affirmatively
" that: no lands or right of way which have been heretofore procured
" for the construction or use of any highway shall be considered ex
" empt from any liability to condemnation, but the right of way over
" thc same may bc condemned for the construction of any other
" highway.' "
Surely that seems to be sufficiently distinct.
The only other ground assumed in the answer of the relators is that
the proposed appropriation by these defendants of their land within
one hundred feet of the centre of their road has operated as a hin
drance to the use and enjoyment of -their right of way over that pori
of their property. If there be any other objection to be found in
mass of statement than those I have indicated, made in the returr.
the relators, I have been unable to discover it. There is?much of ?
plification. The same proposition is presented first in one form and tl
in another, first associated with one circumstance and Tight and tl
with another circumstance and right ; but they resolve themselves ai
all into the general objection that under the law of the State, and m
especially the Act of 1868, no authority whatever is conferred on th
defendants to enter upon and take the lands of the relators.
Now, I beg your Honors to observe that in thia return the alie
tion is no where to be found, that these defendants are perverting
power conferred upon them by the Act of 1868. There is noth
which savors of such an allegation. They deny the right out and c
but they do not intimate that the defendants are misusing thc po\
thus bestowed, or that the land they proposed to take is not necessi
for the purposes of the Columbia and Augusta Railroad. If there
such an objection, I beg that the counsel for the other side will
their finger upon it.
What objection was there, then, that Judge Platt ought to have a
sidered, which he did not consider and adjudge ? So far as relates to 1
possession of power on the part of the General Assembly to frame BU
an Act as this, no question is made. The Act is not sought to be i
peached, because in conflict with the provision of the constituti
which prohibits any State from passing a law impairing the obligati
of contracts. It is conceded that the State had the power to do t!
thing if it saw fit; that the General Assembly had the right to auth
ize the Columbia and Augusta Railroad Company to take the land
the South Carolina Railroad, although covered by their right of wa
that is to say, to take the Luids of that company within one hundr
feet of the centre of their track on either side, if the entry of tl
land were necessary for the construction of the Columbia and Augui
Railroad. It ia conceded that the Legislature had a right to do th
but the ground of objection-is that they have, not done it. The relate
say the defendants have no authority under the Act because thc gra
of such power must appear by express enactment. Judge Platt sa;
in effect, it does so appear. The South Carolina Railroad Compai
is not made an exception to the operation of this enactment ; but,
the contrary, section eight of the Act declares affirmatively that "
lands or right of way which have been heretofore procured for the cc
struction or use of any highway shall be considered exempt from 1
bility to condemnation, but the right of way over the same may
condemned for the construction of any other highway."
I ask again, then, what was there remaining to be considered 1
Judge Platt in order to determine whether these defendants had a rig
to proceed under the Act of 1868 ?
It was the duty of these defendants to set forth specifically the pc
tion of land desired for their road, and they have done so. It was thi
incumbent upon the relators to set forth the grounds of their objecti<
specifically and distinctly; but they have not done so in their return,
repeat, then, there is no allegation that these defendants are claimit
land not needed for the purposes of their road. That point was n
presented to his Honor Judge Platt. What, then, is there which Jud;
Platt ought to have decided which he has not decided, in order to enab
these defendants to proceed under the Act of 1868 ?
He has adjudged that that Act is applicable to all corporate coi
panies, those now in existence and those heretofore existing ; that tl
South Carolina Railroad Company is not an exception to the enactmer
and hence tho objection falls that such a grant of power can only 1
effective where it is conferred in express terms or by necessary imp
Allow me to call your Honors' attention to what is further announce
in Judgje Platt's opinion.
" It is apparent from the reading of the entire Act that the Legi
" lature intended to encourage and invite capitalists from other Stat
" to invest their money in railroad enterprises and other works of i
" ternal improvement in South Carolina, by affording them all propi
" facilities in the construction of their railroads, and in tho removal, i
" far as they could, of all pre-existing obstacles; and also to assure the
" that no other objection but the one of 1 hindrance to their use ar
" enjoyment,' etc., of their own road should be successfully urge
u against them by any company, whose lands or right of way were thi
" entered upon and thus used."
Now, when Judge Platt made this decision and determined the,'
Soin ts, did it not follow, as a necessary and legal consequence, thatthei
?tendants thereupon were entitled, under the Act of. 1868, to ente
upon the lands of the relators, and have it condemned ? - They pursue
the course of procedure indicated by the Act What more was required
There was no question as to the constitutionality of the Act ; none as I
any perversion of power conferred by it. What, then, remained to I
decided ? Nothing. Those points being determined, there was nothin
more to adjudge.
But let us proceed further with the consideration of the opinion pre
nounced by Judge Platt : "It is equally manifest that the Genen
" Assembly intended to confer and impose upon the Circuit Judge, an
"on him only, the power and responsibility of adjudicating upon th
" petition, and of granting or refusing to grant the order prayed for. 1
" bill of complaint has beeu heretofore filed on the equity side of th
" Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, by those respondent
"against these petitioners, in which all their rights and claims nen
" asserted before me are set forth and insisted on. Such suit is sti]
" pending in said Equity Court."
*' It was euggested at tho lato Loaring of thia matter boforo me, thut thc suret
" mode of scouring tho just rights of both parties, would bo to postpono any decisio
" by me upon the petition aforesaid, until tho rights of both had been investigate
" and adjudicated npon by that Court. Thia suggestion struck me favorably at th
" time, and I was inclined to adopt it and to rulo accordingly; but on subsequent rc
" flection and rereading of the Act No. 42, I became convinced that such ruling b;
" mo would bo a departure from my plain path of duty. The ' Circuit Judge
" named in section two, has no right to transfer or delegate any portion of his powc
" and responsibility to any other tribunal ; neithor would bo be justified in dclayinj
" tho operation of tho Act of General Assembly aforesaid, because ho felt desirous o
" first knowing what some other Circuit Judge would deem and decido to bo legall;
" right and.proper."
Surely, may it pleoso thc Court, we cannot doubt as to the legal effect of what wa:
done by Judge Platt. He was constrained to make tho judgment ho did that the Co?
lumbia and Augusta Railroad Company were entitled to come.In under the Act o
1363. How could he make tho order he did unless he adjudged that the lands of thi
South Carolina Railroad Company were subject to thc liability imposed by tho Act o
1S6S? Ho was obliged to decide all tlieso questions boforo he could grant the order
and bis Honor clearly recognized tho obligation imposed npon him to do so.
But I proceed with thc reading of Judge Platt's opinion : " Regarding myself
therefore, as the utily constituted judicial agent of tho Stute, under tho Act No. 42
to enforce its mandate.?, I do nut feol at liberty to entertain and adjudicate upon most
of the various questions raised by tho South Carolina Railroad Company in oppo?
sition to thc petition."
Why '( " Beeauso I cannot consider them legitimately involved in tho case."
In other words, they were not necessary to be adjudged so far as tho purposes ol
tho application were concerned. If there was any question suggested which did riol
involve tho right of the defendants before him, sitting as he was in a Court of law,
that question wus not relevant, and his Honor treated it accordingly. But in regard
to all questions pertinent to thc case, the Judge was bound to decide, and he did de?
His Honor proceed* now to indicate the character of tho various questions which
he passed by aud declined to consider.
" I am not sitting as a Court of Equity to hear and decido upon general matters
"of difference existing between these two companies, but as tho judicial officer indi
" catcd by the General Assembly, and specially instructed by said Act to aid in en
u forcing its provisions ; and, therefore, do not consider myself at liberty to entertain
" and decide upon any asserted rights or objections, ozcept thc simple one of ' hin
" drance,' particularly specified in tho Act."
Now, it is as clear us sunlight that these words are not to bc understood literally.
His Honor obviously means to say, "and, thcrofuro, I du uot consider myself at
liberty to entertain and decide upon any asserted rights ur objections, not herein
above adjudged." Will your Honors understand him to reverse and retract what he
has just decided ? Only tho moment before his decision was that tho Act of 1868
was applicable to all companies ; that the South Carolina Railroad was no excep?
tion ; that thc power to appropriate and liability to bc appropriated in respect to
lands, was formally declared by the Act; and that tho Legislature intended by that
statut? to assure all persons that no other objection but tho ono of " hindrance "
should bc successfully urged against them by any company whoso lands or right of
way were thus entered upon and thus used. Did Judgo Platt menu so soon to recede
from and reverse his previous judgment? Why, tho idea is an absurdity. Can it bo
possiblo to impute to his Honor that ho mciint to decido nothing at all except the
fact that tho proposed appropriation of land wuuld operate as a hindrance to the
enjoyment and use of the South Carolina Railroad '! Such a construction is inad?
Now, what else is there iu the opinion of Judge Platt which conflicts with this
Ou p. 12, at tho conclusion of tho first decision, we find thc following language :
" No injustice can possibly result to respondents, and no prejudice to their rights
"is manifest fruin theso two considerations: fl.) That after petitioners shall have
" ascertained tho quantum of compensation, and have paid or tendered it, they must
" necessarily go back to thc Court of Equity in order to get tho injunction removed ;
" and before they can ask its removal they must show not only that they have ten
"dercd tho compensation, but that they have 'acquired tho right' (as provided in
"Judgo Willard's injunction urdor.) Their suit in equity now pending on the
" equity side ut' thc Court of Cummon Pleas of Richland County, embraces tho
" whole issue as tu ' right,' and every point must necessarily bo adjudicated upon
" when they apply for leave to proceed with their road."
Now, may it pleaso your Honors, suppose the interpretation olaimed by tho other
side was adapted, it would simply oomc tu this, that Judgo Platt fell into un error as
to the effect uf his own decision. If thc view suggested by thc counsel associated
with mc bc correct, then what is said in the passage I have recited is not obnoxious
to tho charge ul' inconsistency at all ; it is all right. If the effect of his order was
simply to admit these defendants to tho right of entry upon the road, and to proceed
with thc construction without u final determination of tho qucstiou of legal right,
then what is said by Judge Platt here is entirely consistent with each and everything
said by him before. If Judge Platt intended merely to decide upon tho question of
the legal right of these defendants to enter for the purpose of construction, leaving, for
final determination hereafter, thc question of final and ultimate right, then tho view
taken by my friend harmonizes entirely with thc observations of his Honor in the
passage I last referred to.
I do nut know that I can utfer any further suggestions which will aid your Honors
in thc consideration of this cause, but before, I take my scat, I desiro to call thc at?
tention of the Court to what was said in the decree pronounced in tho first contest
between these companies, in respect to tho construction ol' thc defendants' road from
Czrauitevillc tu Hamburg. I read from pago 22:
" The lino fixed by the defendants for their projected road, passes likewise by
" Graniteville and thence also along thc same valley to Hamburg, parallel to the road
" of thc plaintiffs, and in close proximity to it. It is contended on behalf of tho
" plaintiffs that their exclusive privilege to establish and main lain railway commu
" nication between Charleston and Hamburg, attaches to every foot of their road
" connecting those places, and that thc construction of another road side by side and
" parallel with their road from Graniteville to Hamburg, a distance of ten or twelve
" miles, cannot operate otherwiso than as a palpable invasion of such oxclusive
Your Honora will perceive that the precise point was made there which is made
here in ono of thc grounds of objection, namely, that it is impossible to have this
road constructed on the proposed line without depriving tho relators of their right?
under their charter.
"In proposing to adopt that route, it has* not been shown that the defendants are
acting otherwise than in good faith, and becauso they, in truth, regard that route as
tho most desirablo and the best."
Your Honors will further observe that in tho original case, as here, it was not sug?
gested that tho defendants were acting otherwise than in good faith ; it was not sug?
gested that under the pretenco of this appropriation they wero seeking out lands not
to be used for the purposes of said road; and there is gravo doubt whether before
Judge Platt thore was any such intimation. What was the objection in substance^
made to the right claimed by tbese petitioners to enter upon the land of the relators
and condemn it? Was it not competent for his Honor to dee'do that question with?
out submitting it to a jury? Whore was tho necessity of impanelling a jury and
making a formal argument as to thc meaning and intent of the Act of 1868 ? Surely,
it was competent for Judge Platt to deoido that question for himself. A jury haef
nothing to do with it. ' It was a question of law, of statutory .instruction, peculiarly
fit for tho examination of a Judge, and of a Judge only. I repeat again, therefore,
and finally, that each and every matter necessary to determine and ascertain tile
rights of these petitioners under the Act of 1868 to enter upon tho land of the South
Carolina Railroad Comp any for the purpose of construction, was considered and
adjudgod by his Honor Judge Platt.
NOTE.-The foregoing arguments are published at the instance of
the South Carolina Railroad Company for a double purpose-first, to
present to the public'the issues involved in a legal question which has
been misunderstood and used to tho prejudice of that corporation ; and
secondly, to refute the allegations so persistently published throughout
the country, that the South Carolina Railroad Company have in this
controversy any other design than to protect themselves in the enjoy?
ment of a right granted by the L-0islature, which has been infringed
upon by the Columbia and Augusta Railroad Company.
It is believed that these arguments of counsel on both sides, when
thus fairly presented, will not be without a wholesome influence with
those who desire to understand, the real merits of the controversy; and
that the official correspondence between Presidents Magrath and John?
ston, now first given to the public, will effectually put ati end to the
statements so often made, that the South Carolina Railroad Company
have persistently refused fair offers for the use of its valuable privileges
between Graniteville and Augusta.
Baltimore and Charleston
TO AND FROM
Baltimore, Philadelphia, Washington
City,Wilmington, D?L, Cincinnati,
Ohio., St. Lords, Missouri,
AND OTHER NORTH-WESTERN CITIES, '
Leaving- ea cir Port every ?5 thi Day.
FALCON".,.JESSE D. HORSEY, Commander.
SEA GULL. .i...N. P. DUTTON, Commander.
MARYLAND........J. V. JOHNSON, Commander.
These favorito and swift screw Steamships are regularly on the line, averag?
ing 67 hour passages between the two porte,-over a period of
two years and a half, insure at the lowest rates, And have
complete freight arrangements for all points in ; .
SOUTH CAROLINA, WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA,
ALABAMA, MISSISSIPPI AND TENNESSEE.
THROUGH BILLS OF LADIN?
Also given to and from Philadelphia, the frequent dispatch of Steamers OB
this line affording facilities which have given great satisfaction "
to shippers during the past year.
For further information, apply to
COURTENAY & TRENHOLM, .
Shipping and Commission Merchants,
UNION WHARVES, CHARLESTON, S. 0.
Messrs. MORDECAI & CO.,
Corner Gay and Lombard Streets, Agents in Baltimore.
>. . XOR . ? .," -i
New York via Charleston, S. C.
THROUGH BILLS OF LADING AND THROUGH CABS.
Connecting at Charleston with first-class 'ocean Steamships, unrivalled
in speed arid comfort by any one on the coast, consisting of the'"'
MANHATTAN, CHAMPION, CHARLESTON, JAMES
ADGER, MAGNOLIA, SARAGOSSA'.
Leaving CHARLESTON and NEW YORK on TUESDAYS, THURS?
DAYS and SATURDAYS.
Shippers of Cotton and Receivers of-Goods are. guaranteed as Low Rates
as by any competing Route, and SAVING OF TIME.
INSURANCE ONE-HALF PER CENT,
BSg~: RAILROAD AGENTS at all principal points in South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama and Tennessee, will give THROUGH
BILLS OF LADING and Passage Tickets.
H. R. MORGAN & CO., JAS. ADGER & CO.,
ARTHUR LEARY, RAVENEL & CO.,
Agts. of Steamers at N. Y? Agts. of Steamers at Charleston, S. C.
W. T. J. 0. WOODWARD, 1 ^,..n Tmm11.w w.,f
H. M. COTTINGHAM, '4 ^SS??^^''
W.J.ENGLAND, j ?nd Passage Agents, . .
Walker, Evans & Cogswell,
Hos. 3 BROAD AND 109 EAST BAY S?S.,
CHARLESTON, S. C.
i X mi^ll I
2H ci ?s ll sm wm ?1 H a
*>* lllfl %?
HH j?4 tEEj i qja??> y-y '? 31
THE L. JOHNSON & CO'S TYPE FOUNDRY,
R. HOE'S & CO'S MACHINERY,
HERRING'S FIRE PROOF SAFES.
Tile Largest Establishment of the Kind in the South.
Walker, Evans & Cogswell,
Charleston, S. C.