

indeed, the main argument of those who support the Federal cause. The majority, they say, elected a president, and the minority was bound to acquiesce. How did Mr. Lincoln respect this principle, when it appeared advantageous to abandon it? By contriving a scheme of government for the conquered States, in which a minority so insignificant as one-tenth was to represent and rule over the majority of nine-tenths! We say nothing of the rights of neutrals, formerly regarded in the United States as so particularly sacred; we pass over the express clause of the Constitution on the issuing of search warrants, on delay in bringing to trial, on the issuing of the writ of *habeas corpus*, &c.; but there are two points that cannot be omitted in reviewing this subject—rebellion and secession.

It seems strange now-a-days to hear of Mr. Lincoln as the advocate of rebellion, as its earnest advocate, on a large scale or a small scale, whether by the whole of a people or a part of a people; but here are his words, delivered in Congress when a member of the House of Representatives: "Any people, anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have a right to rise up and shake off the existing Government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a most sacred right—a right which we hope and believe is to liberate the world. Nor is this right confined to cases in which the whole people of an existing Government may choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people that can, may revolutionize and make their own of so much of the territory as they inhabit."* As the people of the North now regard with affection the memory of their late President, and treasure up all his sayings, it may be well to ponder on these words, not as a proof of astounding inconsistency, but as an invitation to consider whether a people who have been educated in such doctrines are to be greatly blamed for putting them in practice. Mr. Lincoln changed his position—changed his views. It never occurred to him when he held them that they might come home to his own case. But the scholar is to be judged, not by the altered position of the schoolmaster, but by the lesson he was taught. And if the people of the South desire a sanction and a warrant for their action, none could be imagined more cogent, more exactly applicable to the case, or deserving of more respect at the hands of the North than these teachings of Mr. Lincoln. We are not aware that he ever advocated secession, but he did something more than merely to advocate it. He approved of, ratified and adopted secession in the most pernicious form in which it can ever occur—the only form in which it is forbidden by the Constitution. A part of the old State of Virginia desired to secede from the rest and continue with the Union. The Constitution says, Article IV, section 3, "but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State." No words can be clearer than these. In the face of them Western Virginia was permitted to secede, and this new State was formed within the unquestioned jurisdiction of the parent State. At that time it was in the highest degree probable that the South would acquire its independence. In this view it was very important that the frontier of Virginia should not extend, as it did, to the Ohio River, into the very heart of the North. To avoid this danger it was thought politic to cut off that portion of the State. The risk at the time was no doubt serious; the object was of large importance; but motives of prudence or advantage are no answer to the plain fact that the disintegration of a State, secession in its worst form, was accepted and carried out by Mr. Lincoln, when it told in favor of the North.

There is a subject that can never be passed over in reviewing these events—that of slavery. On this subject President Lincoln ever spoke with honesty and candor. He made no hypocritical pretension to other principle in the matter than that of using it as a means of saving the Union. At the outset of the war he referred to the Chicago platform, on which he was elected, in proof that he had no authority to interfere with slavery in the States, and he went further, adding not only that he had no right to interfere, but that he had no inclination to do so. Shortly afterwards the Federal Congress passed, with his approval, an addition to the Constitution, 3d March, 1861, which ran thus: "That no amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give Congress power to abolish or interfere within any

State with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or servitude by the laws of said State. In the rapid progress of events and growth of passion this amendment, though passed by Congress, was not sent to the States for ratification, and therefore fell to the ground. It is, however, on record, to show the readiness of the Federal Congress to debar itself forever from any pretence to interfere with slavery in the States, and this, whilst persons in this country were loudly asserting that it was to destroy slavery that the war was waged. An amendment has recently been passed, the reverse of the foregoing, and declaring the abolition of slavery. It has not yet been ratified, we believe, by the requisite number of States, and if ratified, will be a plain breach of the Federal compact, which reserved to the representative States all powers not delegated to the Government. This amendment would be in direct conflict with the body of the instrument, or rather with a prior amendment, No. 10. Soon after the date we have named, the negro question was presented in an entirely new phase. The Federal generals, finding at that early period some difficulty in appropriating what their own laws held to be private property, invented an escape from this dilemma by declaring the poor negro "contraband of war." Thus the growth of this virtue, which Mr. Beecher would have us to believe is nurtured by bloodshed, proceeded so far as to raise the negro from his former condition into that of a contraband commodity.

The next remarkable step in the progress of the anti-slavery movement was Mr. Lincoln's proposal to get rid of the difficulty by shipping the race away to foreign parts. He selected a district in Central America for the purpose, assuming that its Government would make no difficulty in the matter; indeed, apparently deeming it superfluous to consult them about it. This strange scheme for dealing with four millions of people was actually set in motion, but, as might have been expected, came to nothing. About this time appeared the famous letter to Horace Greeley, in which, with perfect candor, Mr. Lincoln stated that he would free the negroes, or some of the negroes, or none of the negroes, according as he found that, by freeing them, or some of them, or none of them, he could save the Union. Nothing could be more explicit—nothing more honest than this—nor any more direct denial of the shallow pretence that the object of the war was to give liberty to the slave. Then followed the famous slave-proclamation which he was persuaded to issue against his own judgment; for but a fortnight before, it will be remembered that he told a deputation who urged it upon him, that it would be as futile as "the Pope's Bull against a comet." So it has proved. It failed to incite a servile insurrection, the only way in which it could possibly produce a practical result; nor is there reason to believe that a single negro was freed by it who would not have been equally freed by the action of the Federal armies without it. As a war measure, nothing could be more reprehensible than to adopt such a means of fighting an enemy—any enemy—and these were of the same kin; as a matter of moral principle, nothing more inconsistent, for it prohibited the sin to the enemy and permitted it to the ally. It made right and wrong a matter of geographical convenience, for certain counties of Louisiana were to retain the system, whilst the rest were denied it; and more than this, it retained slavery where there was power to end it, and it pretended to sweep it away where there was no power to touch it. On this subject, as with the others already considered, we find constant verification of the remark of Wendell Phillips, that Mr. Lincoln, as a ruler, was "a man without a back-bone." There is an entire absence of fixed principle or persistent action; nothing but getting along with the affairs of the day—now yielding to the pressure on this side, and now on the other; adopting no great principle without reversing it; advocating in theory that rebellion which he resisted in practice, and accepting in practice that secession which he denounced in theory.

We have pointed out what appears to us the deplorable original error of employing the sword as a means of maintaining a Union. Another soon followed it. The basis of the Federal action, as alleged, was the belief that a loyal party existed in the South, held down in terror by a minority of violent men who had obtained "command of the situation." That such a party did exist was true; but it was still more clear that the edge of the

sword would destroy it. In the rebellion of these States, when colonies, there was at first a large party of loyalists; but it vanished in the excitement of war. There was ample evidence that this would be the effect now, for the decision to shed blood at once drove the loyal border States over to the opposite ranks. But admitting the theory of a loyal party—a large portion of the Southern people sound at heart but under restraint—it was then imperative that the war should be conducted as an act of calm judicial necessity, and so as to produce the smallest possible amount of exasperation or abiding hate. It has been conducted in a manner exactly the reverse of this. No war of modern times has been urged in a spirit so bitter, so unsparring, so ungenerous. The sinking of stone fleets to destroy harbors; the bombardment of dwelling houses with Greek fire; the cutting of levees to inundate great districts and drown the inhabitants; the shooting of prisoners, on more than one occasion, in cold blood; the official insulting of women and of clergymen; the avowed attempts to destroy by famine; the burning of mills, farm-houses, barns; the plunder of private property—these, apart from those incidents of individual outrage which ever accompany invading armies, have made memorable the names of Butler, Turchin, Pope, Sheridan, Blenker, Hunter, Milroy, McNeill, as a band of generals, of all human beings the least fitted to restore a fraternal Union. It is plain that Mr. Lincoln was not personally responsible for these things; it is probable that in his own breast he deplored them. But they are part of the history of his rule, nor did he disavow and forbid them. Some of the generals named, were discarded on failure in the field; but we know of no case, even one so revolting as the murders of Palmyra, where punishment was visited on the crime. We pass from this irksome criticism. Such reflections are little heeded in the hour of triumph; but the exaggerated and fulsome tone of much that has been written invites some expression of independent thought. There are those whose recent admiration of Southern valor is now exchanged for admiration of Northern success. All have not the power to mould their views of right and wrong, so as to sympathize now with those who are expected to win, and now with those who prove to be the winners.

The death of Mr. Lincoln was in itself a sufficient calamity to the world, occurring at a time when the kindly qualities of the man, and the experience of affairs he had acquired, would have been of inestimable value. That calamity is greatly increased by calling to his place one even less fitted for it by education or knowledge, and without the redeeming personal qualities of his predecessor. That Mr. Johnson is a man of considerable natural ability we cannot doubt, for without it no man could have worked his way from the condition of a journeyman tailor to the position he held at the outbreak of the war. But there are many kinds of ability; and there is one kind which has usually been regarded in the North as by no means beneficial to the country—that of the professional politician, the man who adopts politics as a trade to live by and thrive by. Such was the occupation of Mr. Johnson, and it was successful under these circumstances. In the South, although universal suffrage prevails, the lead in political affairs is usually taken by men of education and leisure, who, as in this country, are in the habit of thus employing their time, not as a money-making trade, but as an elevated pursuit. Hence, as a rule, the leading men of the country are to be found in the political ranks. But there are exceptional districts. Tennessee, one of the younger States, contains a very mixed population, and a great proportion of small farmers, who are usually men of extreme prejudice and narrow education. These, from their number, could always swamp the educated classes; and with such a constituency, no man was more likely to succeed than Andrew Johnson. With the energy necessary to go through the work, views and habits suited to their own, and unlimited command of words, he gradually attained all the honors and emoluments their votes could confer. He was an ardent defender of slavery, and a slave-owner himself to the extent of his means; a believer in "manifest destiny;" and, in the midst of complete democracy, something more than a democrat. A remarkable specimen of the oratory by which he convinced the intellect of his constituents may be found in the *New York World*, of the 18th of April. We forbear to give the quotation. And what judgment is to be formed by the speeches he has made

so frequently since his elevation? They ring the changes in three notes—first, the boast of being a plebeian; secondly, the malediction of all traitors; thirdly, the disparagement of mercy. Was ever such a creed presented to the world? We have sought in vain for one noble sentiment, for one generous emotion, for the faintest trace of a recollection that he ruled over the sons of rebels, that his own position was the fruit of rebellion, that the first and great President he had to follow had been a traitor. When it was the business of the statesman to pour oil upon the troubled waters, the cry is for vengeance, confiscation, blood.

It has been said that this war was a struggle between aristocracy and democracy, in which the latter has triumphed. No delusion could well be greater than to speak of the South as an aristocratic country. Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Johnson, both Southern men, are they to be termed aristocrats? It is very true that men of property and refinement in the South have usually a conservative spirit; but as regards the country at large and its institutions, what more utterly democratic? The State Constitutions are such as no Chartist could improve upon. Vote by ballot, universal suffrage, payment of members, short terms of office, popular election even of judges—are these the features of aristocracy? It seems to be unknown or forgotten that the South was the leader in the downward course of democratic progress, and that Thomas Jefferson was a Southerner. Believers in democracy ought surely to love the country for his sake. If the embodiment is to be sought of what is invidiously represented as the aristocratic spirit, it would not be found amongst the planters of the South, who lead at home the simple lives of country gentlemen, but amongst the millionaires of the North, where alone are the purple and fine linen, the luxury and extravagance, the exclusiveness and self-esteem regarded as the characteristics of the aristocrat. The doctrine of State Rights has indeed been stoutly maintained in the South, but not as part of an aristocratic, nay, expressly as part of the democratic creed. State Rights are the only protection against the abuse of the central power; level them, and one man wields power over a continent, and commands its resources, who is irresponsible for four years, and whom there would be nothing to restrain but the strength of private individuals, equal to that of so many grains of sand. We have seen in this war that the moment State Rights were disregarded, every barrier set up by the Constitution went down with them. It is as the bulwark of defence against despotic power and infringements of the Constitution, that the people of the South have clung to State Rights. This contest was, therefore, no conflict of political principles, but, as Earl Russell described it, a struggle for independence on the one side and for empire on the other. If, indeed, this were in reality a triumph of democracy, then democracy must be sorely in need of something on which to plume itself, when it is thought to be a matter of pride and glorification that it has enabled twenty-two millions of people to overcome five millions of the same race.

The question naturally arises, what caused the failure of this great effort of the South to possess a Government of its own? The principal cause is indeed obvious enough—the great superiority of the North in numbers and resources. If we add to the free States the four slave States that followed their lead, under more or less compulsion—Delaware, Maryland, Missouri and Kentucky—and to these the districts at Federal command from an early period of the war, say half of Tennessee and Louisiana and a third of Virginia, we have a population, by the census of 1860, of 23,485,722 on the Federal side. This leaves under the rule of the Confederacy 7,662,325. Here the disparity of numbers is enormous. On examination, it will be found even greater than it appears; for these are the numbers of the entire population, and that of the South included rather more than three millions out of the four millions of negroes who appear in the census. Now, although these displayed remarkable fidelity, and maintained the whole Southern people in food by their labor, still it is clear that the ranks of the Southern army would have been better filled if the whole population had supplied recruits. And the Federals had great advantages in addition to superiority in numbers. Their command of naval force, practically exclusive, was soon felt in a country intersected by great rivers. Looking back to the early stages of the war, it seems doubtful whether they could have made any progress

without this advantage. The fleet was of invaluable service as a means of movement, and on two occasions saved an army from ruin—that of Grant at Shiloh, and that of McClellan on the James River. There was, too, that special weapon, the blockade, which caused the disorganization of the Confederate finances, and prevented the importation of munitions of war, except at so much cost and with so much irregularity as to compel manufactures to be established when every man was required to meet the superior numbers of the enemy. And whilst a great immigration from Europe into the North recruited its armies or filled the place of recruits, the South was entirely cut off from this resource. If the attempt be made to estimate the value of all these elements, it will appear that the odds against which the South has maintained this contest, were in effect not less than five to one. There was also a great contrast in the effects of the war on the two people. The North, with its ports open, with California supplying gold, and petroleum stimulating speculation, soon discovered in the war a mine of sudden wealth. Those who guided the current of public opinion grew rapidly rich, for patriotism and profit went together. The vast expenditure of the Government created a lucrative market; the railroads flourished with the transport of troops and stores; the creation of currency had the effect for the time of the creation of so much wealth; and never was known a period of such prosperity and exhilaration. In any

country, a war will be maintained with vigor by which every one believes he is making a fortune. In the South, there was the reverse of all this. With its commerce sealed up; at times in dread of actual famine, (by which, indeed, it was ultimately reduced;) with districts one after the other devastated by the enemy; cut off from all the comforts, of which, in such a climate, some are necessities of life—the whole history is a record of suffering and endurance, of ruin to many, privation to all.

It was expected generally that when the day of need drew nigh, the Confederate Government would arm the negroes, and thus reduce the disparity of force. There does not appear to have been, latterly, any strong opposition to the step on the part of the people, but the Government—thwarted, we believe, by the Congress—delayed until it was too late. Out of three millions of negroes, one hundred and fifty thousand might have been spared and brought into the field; and considering how evenly the balance hung in the early campaign of last year, it can hardly be doubted that this addition would have turned the scale in favor of the South. From the first, its rulers ought to have seen, as it was seen in Europe, that separation from the Union must needs be fatal to slavery. Whether or not war might destroy it in the conflict of arms, it was certain that independence would be fatal by bringing it into direct collision with the civilized world. Slavery is essentially a colonial system; and within the Union the South held very much the position of a region for the growth of colonial products—cotton, tobacco, sugar, rice; and its commercial interests were, as we have shown before, systematically sacrificed to the selfish policy of the North. But when the Southern people desired to emerge from this state, and to take the position of an independent power, it should have been seen that this change involved another change. A nationality would require a metropolis, a literature, a substantial middle class; it would attract immigrants, enterprise and capital from Europe. But every one of these would be an anti-slavery element; and against these at home, with the hostile opinion of Europe in front, and the whole weight of the North upon the flank, it was mere self-delusion to imagine that such a system could be maintained. The great majority of the Southern people had no interest whatever in slavery; many of the best men of the South were opposed to the system; indeed, the first Secretary at War, in the Cabinet of Jefferson Davis, General Randolph, was well known as an abolitionist. Throughout the history of the United States, the ablest opponents of slavery, such as Thomas Jefferson and Henry Clay, and its most rancorous foes, such as Brownlow and Helper, have all been Southern men. Had it ever been placed before the Southern people that either slavery or independence must be abandoned, there cannot be a doubt what the choice would have been.

Slavery was doubtless the real cause why the independence of the South was not recognized by the European powers, when the great effort of the

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