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Baaiay Horning. January 13,1873
asitdttoa oX Jndg?.
We perceive that the election of Judge
tor the Eighth Judioial Oiroait boa been
fixed for next Tuesday, 14th instant.
Several candidates havo been mentioned,
from among whom tho Legislaturo can
hardly fail to make a good choice. We
. know that there are some sound lawyers
of ripe experience, floe attainments and
high character, whose fitness for the
position .none can question. We bare
not thought of political considerations
in conneotion with a position of this
sort. What is wanted ia an upright
Judge.* learned in the law, profound in
thought, industrious in research, and
capable of commanding the respect of
the bar, and of giving satisfaction in hie
oirouit. ' Whether he be Republican or
O jnaervativo, or indifferent and s.verse
to polities, is, in onr judgment, a matter
of indifference, and we had hoped that
the proper qualifications only would be
kept in view. In fact, we oannot asso
oiata a proper discharge of the high and
i solemn fanotiohs of the judioial office
with a heated, partisan spirit. The
Jadge should dwell in a coot atmosphere,
maintaining his own equipoise, juet as
he judicially holds the scales even.
We regret to see that both the Repub
lioan journats of this city have sounded
the party gong and raised the party cry
in this election. One says that Demo?
crats hare offered factious and bitter
opposition to measures which tended to
advance the interest and protect the
rights of the colored people. It pro?
fesses to regard it as unsafe "to trust
the interests of our newly enfran?
chised citizens" in their hands. It asks
Republicans to sustain one of their
_ own faith exclusively for this high office.
Here we see a recommendation of the
wrong thing, and if the advice should
be followed, possibly an exclusion of
those merits wliiph alone constitute fit?
ness for the place.' This is a speoimen of
a sort of political intolerance, whioh, we
hope, the electors will haye the good
sense to disregard. The other Republi?
can newspaper?the Herald?gives sub?
stantially the same advice, although it ia
couched in more decorous terms. It is
"matter of political life and death" to
fight the Democratic organization at all
times and under all oiroumstanaes. We
are oonoaruod to learn that the Republi?
can pigrty, in this State utands upon so
. precarious a footing. Eternal vigilance,
we know, is the price of liberty; but we
thought the Republican party in South
Oarolina rested securely upon the broad,
unquestioning, unreasoning, stereotyped
majority Of 4.0,000 to tee. We should
think it could afford to eleot s judge of
law upon merit such as we have de?
scribed, and 'still live intact and un?
harmed as a party. The Herald also
does the Oooserative element a wrong in
saving that if it were in power, such a
thing as a Republican in office would be
impossible. On the contrary, it has
sought several times to eleot such Re?
publicans as were least obnoxious to
^offices of honor and trust. The trouble
has been, that as soon as we find some
merit in a man, and show a willingness
to support him as.a choice of evils, it has
killed him in his own party. Now, we
say to our Republican neighbors, let us
eleot to this office of Judge the best man
we can And?a man who will adorn the
station and promote the public good, in
maintaining the public justice, no mat?
ter what he may have been in his politi?
cal or party affiliations heretofore. That
is fair, we think, and that is what will be
good for the ooautry.
< m ??-?-.
Ktacoaragement of Manufacture!.
We had the'pleainre, nearly a month
ago, of giving onr approval to the main
features of a bill to aid and encourage
manufactures and internal improve?
ments, introduced by Mr. Browley,
Chairman of the Committee of Ways and
Means in the floueo of Representatives.
We are grateful to learn that Mr. Levy,
of Charleston, on Tuesday last, intro?
duced a bill of similar oharaoter, and
having for object the same desirable ro
sult?of the investment and employment
of oopital in the manufacture of cotton
and woolen fabrics and yarns within the
State. The bill of Mr. Levy, as well as
the one previously in the hands of the
Committee of Ways and Means, pro?
poses to exempt from taxation all capi?
tal and property employed in the manu?
facture of cotton and wool, for a poriod
of ten years. This is a measure whioh
is urgently called for, and whioh pro?
mises to be prodnotive of the most val?
uable consequences. It will induco capi ?
tal to come in as we have often shown,
?nd it will open a new industry to large
numbers of poor persons, who, as things
stand, are shat out of decent and suita?
ble e^oymeut; ;
The mode, of remitting the tax, we be?
lieve, is to onaot that the individual or
?fir ii wfeggagB^^^^gl^^ii
association of individuals who shall in?
vest, &c, shall be entitled to reoeive
from the State Treasury, jmuaally,i a
sum equal to the aggregate amount of
Stato taxes, which shall be levied* add
collected upon the property or capital
employed or invested directly or indi?
rectly in such manufactures.
Tb? Hryenuo Baad Scrip C???.
The following are notea of the remarks
of Mr. Pope, delivered on Friday:
It baa been agreed by counsel in the
argument that it should be divided so as
to throw a portion of it upon each. The
portion assigned to me will involve the
questions arising ander the Constitutions
of the State and of the United States.
I. We annoanoe, then, as our first pro?
position, that the Aot of 1872, authoriz?
ing the emission of the revenue bond
sorip, is agaiuat the Constitution of the
United States, and, therefore, nail and
The olanso of the Constitution ia in
those words: "No State aha!? * * *
emit bills of credit." 10 Sec, I Art.,
Con. U. S.
1. In considering this olause, one of
the first canons of construction is to
arrive at the intention by the true mean?
ing of the words, and the words mast be
taken in the sense in which they were
UBed at the time. The intention must be
drawnfrom the words, but the rale of
evidence is to let in the light of sur?
rounding oiruainstances. This rule may
be gathered from the case of Sturgea vs.
Crowningshield, (4 Wheat., 202. Fletch?
er vs. Peck, (6 Oranob, 139.)
If we go back to the Convention which
framed the Constitution of the United
States, we shall find the intention which
aofcoated that body while using the inhi?
bitory words, "No State shall emit bills
If we refer to the old articlea of con?
federation, we shall find these words:
"Congress shall have the power to bor?
row money and emit bills of creditor the
United States." The report of a com?
mittee was mado in the Convention of
'89, in which was embodied a recom?
mendation to incorporate the same power
in the Constitution then under conside?
ration. Vide the Madison Papers, (2
vol., p. 1232;) and the letter of Luther
Martin, (1 vol. Elliott's Debates, p.
Now, what was done by the Conven?
tion? Mr. Curtis, in his history of the
Constitution, (2 vol., p. 305.) says, re?
ferring to the Madison Pupurs: "Fears
were entertained in the Convention that
an absolute prohibition of paper money
would excite the strenuous opposition of
its partiaana against the Constitution;
bat ib was thought best to crush it, and,
accordingly, the votes of all the States,
bat two, were given to a proposition to
prohibit absolutely the emission of bills
If the history gives as the contempo?
raneous spirit whiah actuated the framers
of the Constitution, as to withholding
this grant of power to Congreaa, we are
prepared to understand the energy with
which, in express terms, it prohibited
this power to the States. For Congress
to have the power, it must be granted; for
the States not to have the power, it must
be inhibited. Hence, the Constitution
as it now stands; the power not granted
to the one and inhibited to the other.
2. The next question is: What was the
character of the thing called a bill of
credit, which the framers of the Consti?
tution wished to crush; to emit which
they would not grant to Congress and
prohibited to the States? Its aharacter
was well understood by Chief Justice
Marshall, a contemporary of tho Con?
vention and of tho Constitution.
When tho courts came to act upon
this clause of the Constitution of the
United States, two things were neceu
sary: 1. It was necessary to discover the
particular thing struck at aud to be
crushed. 2. Having discovered the
thing, it became necessary in apt words
to detine the thing prohibited.
Some things wereolear. Tho Constitu?
tion did not mean to iuolude bills of ex?
change, bunk bills of Stato, banking
corporations which had been long before,
and were thon, in circulation. All suoh
wore bills of credit, undoubtedly, in om<
sense; but they wore not tho "bills of
oredit" embraced withiu tho meaning of
the inhibitory words.
The history of what was mount had to
be resorted to, and the thing itself thus
traced and identified. This Was first
authoritatively done by Chief Justioe
Marshall in the leading oase of Craig vs.
Missouri, (4 Puters 437.) aud by Mr.
Justioe Story, in his dissenting opinion,
in the case of Brisooe vs. the Bank of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky, (11
Peters, 332 to 337,) and by Mr. Justice
McLean, in the same case, delivering
the opinion of the majority of the court.
Ia this connection, I refer to the case of
the State vs. Bdlis, (2 MoCord, 14;) to
the history of bills of credit, by Dr.
Cooper, in his appendix to the statutes
at large of South Carolina, (9 vol., p.
766;) aud to Judge Story's commenta?
ries on the Constitution, (2 vol., ? 1358 )
Bat, as wo have said, the court was
obliged to do/me a bill of credit within
the meaning of the Constitution. The
first authoritative case was by tho Su?
preme Court of tho Uaited States iu the
oaso of Craig vs. Missouri, (already re?
ferred to.) In that case Chief Justice
Marshall defined it to be as follows:
"Bills of oredit signify a paper medium
intended to circulate betwoea individuals
and between Government aud indi?
viduals, for the ordinary puposes of so?
ciety." The majority of tho court con?
curred io this definition. Three Jus?
tices? McLean, Thompson and Johnson
?delivered separate opinions, each giv?
ing his own views ajion a grout, questiuu;
euch ondeavoring to give a definition
more complete, as will appear by the
oaae; bat none of which have ever been
adopted as a rale. , ' .
'The leading case of Craig vs. Missouri
has never been over-ruled, although a
portion of the definition of Chief Joj
tioe Marshall has been somewhat nar?
rowed by eubaeqcent decisions. Tbe
chief: of these decisions may be found
In the oasta 61 Bfisooe vs. the Bank of
Kentucky, (11 Beters,) already referred
to; Darlington vs. the State Bank of
Alabama, (13 Howard, p. 11;) and in
several oases arising in State courts,
generally known as the oases of the
Bank of Illinois, the Bank of Arkansas,
and the State Bank of South Carolina,
already referred to.
The points made in all these cases are
made not to overrule tho reasoning or
conclusion roached in the leadingoase of
Oraig v$. Missouri, but are intended at
ones to confirm the ruling in that oase,
and to show that the later oases do not
come within the principle of the leading
oase. But the great argument of Judge
Story, in his dissehtiog opinion in the
|case of Briscoe es. the Bank of Ken?
tucky, in whioh he says that Chief Jus?
tice Marshall, then dead, had agreed
with him, seems to overwhelm even the
distinction taken in latter class of oases.
But the later oases are law. Let us,
therefore, take tho case of the Bank of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky as our
guido; and what are there deolared to be
bills of credit within tho meaning of
the Constitution? 1. They must be bills
issued by the State. 2. They must be
issuod upon the credit of the State. 3.
They must be intended to circulate as
\7o are willing to rest this argument
upon the definition of a bill of credit,
recognized by a majority of the court in
the Kentucky case. By that case let as
test the revenne bond sorip, issued under
the Act of 1872. The name is uothiug.
The Constitution is dealing with things,
not names, as Chief Justice Marshall has
well expressed it. 1. Is this bond Borip
issued by tbe State? I refer to several
sections of the Aot of 1872. Is it issued
ou tbe credit of the Statu? Let the Act
of 1872 uuswer this question. I? it in?
ten ed to ciroulute us money? Again we
refer to provisions of the Act of 1872.
The intention must be drawn from the
words and general provisions of tbe Aot.
To these we appeal. As to what is "cir?
culation," is also a question of construc?
tion; and the test is givon by Chief Jus?
tice Marshall, whioh has never been de?
parted from, viz: that which passes be?
tween "Government and individuals,
and between individuals;" and as to what
is "money, "I do not know that it is
possible to improve npoo what has beeu
said in tbe judgment of Mr. Justice Wil
lard in the case ex relatione Gary. 1 con?
sider that complete. The form of the
bill, its uses, the mode of its being han?
dled, the denominations of tbo bills,
from one dollar upwards, are all there,
and distinctly und ably set forth.
We have, thou, in this oase, all the
element;, present?the issue by the State
on the credit of tho State, with the in
tention that it should circulate, and that
suoh circulation should bo us vione.y. At
this point, it may be useful that the
court should compare the Missouri bill,
which ia culled u "certificate," by the
Missouri Act, and is set out iu Craig's
case, with the bond scrip, which is also
called a "certificate," by the Act of 1872,
a copy of which is in the possession of
3. Tho only remaining question under
this general division of the argument is:
Are these bills absolutely void? To say
that tbey are unconstitutional is simply
to say that tho bond ecrip is void for all
purposes. An Aot may bo void in part
under tbe Constitution, und good iu
part; but when the thing named in the
Act itself bus been declared unconstitu?
tional, I do not understand bow euch
thing can be nop crated into puts The
uucoustitutioutclity taints it fur all pur
Mr. Cooloy, in his work on Constitu?
tional Limitations, ut page 180, says:
"When a statute is adjudged unconsti?
tutional, it is us if it had never been."
When the bond tsorip itself is deolared
to be unconstitutional, it is the samo as
if it had never been. The case of Craig
vs. Missouri is full to the same point; the
"certificate" iu that case was adjudged
unconstitutional, and the hills, together
with tue coutract founded upou them,
wero utterly Bet aside as unlawful; and
the coutract itself was declared to bo u
void contract. Mr. Sedgewiok, iu his
work on the Construction of Statutes
aud the Constitution, is full to the same
point. I refer, also, generally to the
New York cases, citod and commented
upon by the counsel who preceded me,
In the petition and in tho argument,
wo have the words "State" and tbe
"coutract of tho State," &c, used aud
repeated as if tbe "State" aud tbe "Le?
gislature" were, in fact, the same thing;
whereas the very point we make is that
1 tho "L3gislature" is not tbo "Stato;"
aud that tho "State" ouunot be bound
by un unconstitutional Act of the "Le?
If tbe Aot be unconstitutional, it is no
lauf; und that whioh is no law caunot
bind tbo State, nor can it support any
coutract. But struug-dy enough it has
been seriously argued that the bond
sorip may be unconstitutional, and yet
that it may be good as a contract, aud
as suoh it should be received for tuxes,
because the State may direct in what
tbe public dues may ba paid. Direot
what to be received? That which bas no
existeuoe? We have heard the oaso of
Woodruff vs. Trupuull, (10 Howard,
308.) given as authority. It is true, iu
that case it was held that the bills of u
certain corporation (bunk bills) should
be received for tbo taxes of the State,
according to a previous Act of the Le?
gislature; but it wus first held that these
bills wero constitutional; that this
being so, tho Aot was a contract, and
that the subsequent Act repealing the
provisions of tbo first Act was unconsti?
tutional. A refer once to tbe case will
show thut it is un authority iu our favor
on this point; and very much in our
favor ou another point hereafter.
II. Onr next proposition is that the
Aot of 1872 (culled the Bond Scrip Aot)
U la violation of the Constitution of the
State of South Carolina.
i* This aspect of ,the ease has been
very folly presented (by Mr. Haskell;)
bat as it is so important, Ire shall enter
upon it again.
To understand how this constitutional
argument applies, it will be necessary to
disoass, as a preliminary, some of the
principles of the Stato Constitution of
One of the chief of these is that the
Legislature is a body possessed of limit
ed powers, well marked out by the Con?
stitution itself. It is not a British Par*
liament, nor hi it a Legislature sitting
under the Constitution of 1790.
We refer to Art. I, Section 41, of the
State Constitution. These are the
words: "The enumeration of rights in
.this Constitution shall not be construed
to impair or deny others retained by the
people, and all powers not heroin dele?
gated remain with the people."
Whatever may be the construction of
i the word "delegated," as a goneral re?
striction upon legislative powers, we
know that the Legislature under tho
Constitution of 1868 is most particularly
limited and oiroumsoribed in its power
to ooutruot dobt, levy taxes, or bind the
State. Ita power here runs within
narrow limits. It can no more go
beyond those powers as marked out to
it than n court caa go boyond its juris?
Now, what are theBO powers? How
have they been limited? beyond which
liminations the Legislature may not go?
What powers of taxation? What powers
to contract debt? What powers to
isBue evidences of debt? I refer gene?
rally to Art. IX of the State Constitu?
In discussing these questions, tho
Court will find those powers narrowly
defined. They aro first divided by the
Constitution into two general classes:
1. Tho power to provide for ordinary
expenses: Art. IX of tho State Constitu?
tion, Sues. 3 and 4.
2. The power to provido for extraordi?
nary expenses: Art. IX of the sums
Constitution, Sec. 7.
These embrace everything that could
be necessary as a mero grunt of power.
All expenditures must be oithcr ordinary
or extraordinary. But underlying theso
are two other classes of power necessary
to carry out the first two:
1. The power to levy taxes for ordi?
nary expenses and such deficits as may
2. The power to borrow money to de?
fray extraordinary expeuses.
These exhaust all of tho powers, pri?
mary and secondary, under tho 9th Art.
of the Constitution of tho State.
But how shall theso powers bo ex?
orcised? The Constitution does not
seem to have contemplated any great
danger from taxation as such. Tho vote
of the constituency was supposed to
furnish a sufficient cheok upon tho Le?
gislature. Taxation is, therefore, limitod
in two respects only: 1. There shall be
an estimate of the expenses, and the tax
should be levied only to meet such ex?
penses. 2. The tax shall be laid for a
single object; that object shall be ex?
pressed iu the Act, and the tax shall bo
applied to the object named.
But when tho Constitution is dealing
with tho power to borrow money, then
it puts limitation upon limitation. Great
duuger was apprehended hero, and with
1. It is directod that tho cause of tho
extraordinary expenditure shall be
2. That tho Act to become a law shall
be passed by u two-thirds vote.
3. That a tax should boat once levied to
keep dowu the interest.
All this appears iu 7th Section of the
9th Article of tho Constitution.
Tho next thing looked to by tho Con?
stitution was to the shape which tho
debt so contracted should assume. This
is pointed out in 14th Section of tho
name article. It shall be by bonds, and
bonds only; not by stock, not by scrip,
but by boudo; aud theso bonds shall
uot bo under a certain sum named, and
shall not ruu longer than twenty years.
Each bond shall bo numbered and
registered, and the name of the party
to whom tho boud is mudo payable shall
bo recorded. ( Vide 14th Sec, 9th Art.,
Con. S. O.) The Constitution of 186S
intends that the bonds of the State shall
not bo hawked about in the stock mar?
Tho next thing the Constitution looks
to is, how the dobt thus created und rep?
resented by bonds shall be redeemed.
This is pointed out iu tho 10th Section
of the sameartiolo, whore two things are
1. The old debts of tho State, duo bo
fore the adoption of tho Constitution of
1868. 2. The debts expressly authorized
iu that Constitution, then under consi?
deration. For the first, sorip may bo
issued to redeem them; and for the se?
cond, scrip also, whou tho debts created
aud iu tho shape of bonds, according to
the Constitution, shall becomo due. If
the Stute finds itself, at tho day, not in
funds to pay the bonds, and if the hold?
ers of the duo bonds will not take new
bonds issued as for a new debt, to re?
place the duo bonds, then sorip may
issue to redeem such due bonds.
Iu no other way can South Carolina
now contract a dobt, and no scrip can be
issued exoept to redeem saoh a constitu?
tionally created dobt by bond. Tho
ninth article of the Constitution is in?
tended to lead to tins very result, viz:
To make it difficult for tho Legislature
to involve the Stato in debt. Give ns
this ninth article of the Constitution of
South Carolina in its purity, aud wo
could ask no more It is absolutely per?
fect, if enforced, to prevent extravagance
Now, was the bond scrip ever a bond
created under tho limitations of tho
seventh and fourteenth sections of the
uiuth article of the Constitution? This
will uot be oven pretended.
Having shown how only a debt can bo
created, our next duty is to show that no
saoh debt over existed; and inoro than
that, no debt of aoj kind ever existed;
and more than that, no liability ever
existed; and more than that, no contin?
gent liability ever existed on the pert of
the <BUte. We propose to show that
there never was a debt dae by the State,
at any time, upon which to bottom this
revenue bond scrip, authorized (as it is
said) by the Aot of 7th March, 1872.
This involves some reference to the
legislation touching the Blue Ridge Rail?
1. We will oommenoe with the Aot of
1868. (Vide Act of that year, 15th Sep?
tember, page 25, Seotions 1, 2 and a.)
That Act contained an express condition
that the guaranty by the State of the
bonds, and the bonds themselves, should
be issued only in case the Congress of
the TJuited States or private capitalists
ahould let the road have $8,000,000 for
$3,000,000 worth of bonds, or a less
sum at the same rate; in other words,
every dollar of bonds was to secure and
bring in a dollar of money. (Vide the
paoviao in the Aot.) This was a public
Act, and this condition went out with
the bonds. Trapnel's ease is authority
od this point.
This Aot, we say, created no debt by
the State. There was not even a contin?
gent liability until dollar for dollar was
realized upon the bonds. Even then,
there would be no ''debt" of the State;
aud for the first time, the transaction
would assume tbe shape of conditional
liability. The Legislature did not re?
gard the Act of 1868 as creating any
debt, because they provided no tax to
moot the interest, as they were compelled
to do, if tho Act. created a debt. (Vide
Section 7, Artiole IX, Constitution 1868.)
The bonds were prepared, and tbe
State endorsed them. They were use?
less. The State was a ganraator upon
condition. The ompany could not get
oue dollar of money for one dollar of
bonds. With this condition unper?
formed, tho State could at any time
have withdrawn .its conditional accom?
modation ?-anty. When, therefore,
tho Act of la', :' was proposed to the Le?
gislature, the only place in whioh these
bonds could lawfully and honestly have
been was uuder look and key, in the iron
safe of the Blue Ridge Railroad Com?
pany. To hypothecate them, even,
would bo a fraud upon tho State, and an
unlawful use of her guaranty.
But it is said that the State has re?
pealed this important condition, found
in tho Act of 1868. Wbea, where and
how? We are referred to the sixth sec?
tion of the Act of 1871.
Now, does this sixth section repeal tbe
"express proviso" of the Act of 1868?
We answer, no.
1. Because tho sixth section of the
Act of 1871 is in direct violation of the
twentieth section of Artiole II of the
Constitution of 1868, viz: "Every Act oi
resolution having the foroe of law shall
relate to but one subject, and that shall
be expressed in tbe title."
2. Becauso all of tbo provisions of the
Act oi 1871 are made to depend npoc
tho consolidation of the Greenville and
Columbia Railroad and the Blue Ridge
Railroad into one road, with a new cor
porato name, whioh has not been done.
3. Because tho consolidated road is re
quired to endorse tho bonda of the twe
old roads, respectively, which it is ad?
mitted has not been done. ( Vide 7 sec,
Aot of 1871.)
4. Because tho Aot of 1871 was but i
charter conferred or offered by one con'
trading party aud not accepted by the
other, which rendered the whole Act in
operative and void.
This last ground appears npon mj
notes of argument as a most importanl
point, but by some means it escaped mi
while actually addressing the oourt, and
as it was most ably nsed by my friend
(Mr. Momminger) in bis concluding ar
gument, I shall add nothiog further upot
Tho third ground above stated, wil
fully appear by tho words of tho section
of the Act referred to, and need not b<
enlarged upon in these notes required bj
the court. The. liue of argument can, J
doubt not, bo readily recalled.
The secoud ground was elaborated ir
tho argument before tbe oourt verj
much, in reply to the views suggested
by tho oonnsel who opened the argu
moot, (Mr. Chamberlain.) Tho words o
the Act furnish the key to the reply
They oan mean but oue thing. Th<
whole Act does but set out the terms of I
ooDtraot. The consolidation was to bt
tbe ooneideration of the roads. Witl
the non-performanoe of that considera?
tion tho contract fell, and the whole Ac
became a nullity. If, therefore, the sixtt
section of the Aot of '71 had, in law, re
pealod the previous oondition in tbe Ac
of '68, still tho Act of '71 enacted a new
oondition, to wit: consolidation, whiol
condition preoedont has never been com
Tbo first ground turns upon the con?
struction of tho words of the Oonstitu
tion as cited. The same words appeal
iu tho Constitutions of many of th<
States; and in tho Constitution of the
State of New York are found the samt
words, except that in that State they an
confined to local or private bills. The
words have rooeived judicial interpreta
tion. Tha two leading principles o
these casosaro: 1. That tho oonstraotiox
must be rigid and precise, to give then:
the value intended by tbe framers of the
Constitution. 2. That words cannot b<
interpolated, but effect must be given tc
tho olauso as framed in the instrument.
The oonstruotion contended for by ui
is fortified by the following authorities,
all agreeing, except one authority fron
California, whioh I have not been able
to examine: The People vs. MoCuan
(N. Y.;) the Town of Fishkilles. tht
Fisbkill and Beekman Flank Road Com
pauy, (a leading oaso in Now York, do
cided in 1856 Q Smith vs. the Mayor ol
New York, (deoided in 1868.) 3* Howard,
P. R., 508; Williams vs. the People, 24,
N. Y.,405; tho Mayor of New York vs.
Colgate. 2 Koruun, 146; tbe San Mutual
lusuranoe Company vs, tbe Mayor ol
New York. I refer also to 4 Hill, N. Y.
It., 118, for its general reasoning. The
court m ay also bo aided by the case of
Baldwin vs.-tho Mayor of Now Ydt\, in
1864; by the Supreme Courk of that
State. ?? ? ?? I p? ?
In conclusion, we come to the moot
extraordinary argument of all, via: That
under the Aot of 1872, thia court jnay
hold the bond scrip to be unconstitu?
tional, and yet compel the Comptroller,
by a mandamus, to levy the tax to re?
deem it. Under any law, to levy a tax
to redeem that whieh does not exist,
would be an absurdity. Bat with one
hand to strike the object oat of the Aot,
and with the other to enforce that which
hat no meaning without the abject,
seems to be more absurd, if possible.
The 4th Section of the IXth Art. of tho
State Constitution, apart from general
reasoning, sets that matter at rest. It
direots that any Aot laying a tax shall
state the object of the tax, and that it
shall contain no other object; that the.
tax levied shall be applied to that object,
and to no other object. And yet it is
gravly asked to itrike the bond ?crip
(the only object) ont of the Act of 1872,
and still to levy the tax. Tho preamble
to the Act (which ia no part of the Act)
we have shown to be false* io fact and
wholly unrounded in law. This court
oapoot be deoeived by false recital*, in?
troduced to cover public robbery by the
forms of law.
Other points of the argument will bo
disoassed by ooaasel who are to follow
Considerable progress was made in the
bond tcrip case before the Supreme
Ooarl, yesterday. Attorney-General
Melton and O. G. Memminger, Esq.,
representing the State, delivered able
aud eloquent arguments on that side.
The former was particularly strong iu bis
presentation of the ground that the
Circuit Court decision was binding until
reversed. There had been no appeal
from it, and it was to-day the insupera?
ble difficulty in the way of the relatora.
, Mr. Melton's peroration, in wbioh he re
, newed and reiterated the pledges of the
; State Government in all its departments
to a reform of abuses, was listened to
with much satisfaction. He spoke on
behalf of the Governor, the Comptroller,
the Treasurer, and in his own behalf as
. tho law officer, and in the name also of
i the people at large, urging upon the
I court that this was a matter which con?
cerned the Executive Department of the
Government exclusively. Upon them
i rested its responsibility, and, unless the
? court was to assume other fanotions
than those which properly belong to it,
i with them should be left its manager
> ment. They wonld exhaust every meant,
> employ every expedient, before they
r would over recognize this scrip as a valid ,
I obligation of the State.
I Mr. Memminger argued that manda?
mus cm only issue against one who has
i done wrong. It was not maintained, in
i this case, that any wrong had been done..
1 He quoted from authority to show that
i the demand for mandamus must be aup
. ported by affidavits; and must, there?
fore, have relation to a particular date.
. This court, he said, cannot stultify itself
> so much -as to order the Comptroller
. General to collect a tax wbioh another
, oonrt has declared illegal and void. Nor
can any tax-payer be compelled to pay a
i tax whioh has this brand upon it. Mr.
. Memminger was earnest and truly elo
3 quent in impressing upon the court a
justseo80 of its high functions, and the
necessity, as well as immense public ad
r vantages, of its sustaining its well de
i served character for equity, justioe and
3 right. The Constitution of the State, he
1 said, was an admirable one, and we had
1 bat to live aouording to its provisions to
. have a healthy political life. The peo
i plo are sovereign, and all departments of
too Government must find and show
I their delegation in tho Constitution for
t tho powers they olaim to exeroise. The
) court had its duties, but to pass on a case
whioh came before it with the features
[ of the present one, was beyond its
sphere, and ultra vires.
i Mr. James B. Campbell will olose the
argument for the relators on Tuesday
t Bumed A live. ?A terrible story comes
from Savannah. A colored man, named
3 Andrew Dow, who was supposed to be
i dead, bat whopo body continued warm,
, was, owing to the drunken and boister
i ous condition of tho watchers, placed in
. a reoeiving vault, met with a terrible
t fate. The Savannah Advertiser says:
i "Yesterday, the vault was opened, and
. the coffin brought oat for permanent
t burial elsewhere, when it was noticed
r that the strong screws whioh had been
x tightly driven in three days previously
. were strained, and tho top of tho coffin
pried half open. Tremblingly, and with
. the most dreadful anticipations, the box
. was opened, and horrible, most horrible
P to relate, the body was found turned and
) twisted over, the faoe downward, one
> hand clutching the bair of the bead, the
3 other reaching oat, with the nails driven
3 into the wood; the tooth clenched, the
3 eyes glazed and distended, and even the
. feet giving evidence of having been used
I in the last hopeless and frightful effort
i to escape suffocation!"
3 Some of the mercantile firms of Bos
3 ton, whose houses escaped untouched
, daring the late fire, have since devoted
a good deal of attention to the subjeot
, of fire extinguishing appliances. One
of the leading dry goods houses has jast
[ been provided with force pumps of such
3 power as to bo capable of sending water
from the eDgine-room, through iron
3 pipes, to the top of the building, each
floor having a oonncotion to admit of
. tbo use of a special hose. The clerks,
f to the number of sixty-five, are boing
drilled, so that upon the slightest alarm
' they may be available for duty.
Mr. Goo. Doby, a well-known ai d
1 popular engineer on the Georgia Rail
T road, shot himself accidentally on Fri?
day last, and it is feared the wound is