Newspaper Page Text
Globe-Republican. B Dodge City,
rH Thursday, October 20, 1898.
WMkm VrwrTack Van aa
THE CONDUCT OP THE WAR
Tbe Tne Sforj of PrefaratiH fir tke Cffflkt, tf Kf
flatties Overawe, ui ef Iipificeit lesilfc,
: . PiaiDlj aii iBfirtiillj Ttli
Haw tke Uarted States la Oae Haadred Days Orzaalzed, Arassd aa Eamtaaad
ad Provided TraasBortattoa for aa Array off Over a Qaarter eff a
MMlioa of Men, Conducted CanpaJcas Separated by 10,000
, Miles of Lead and Water, HussSUted aad Destroyed the
Enemy Wherever Met, Without Oae Slatfe Reverse.
Tbe Mail and Express Bureau,
, Washington, Oct. 11.
MI feel that the American people hare committed these boys into my hands, and
If anybody has wronged tbem, I want to find it out.
"I'do not beliere that any army has ever been watched over more anxiously and con
tinuously than I have watched orer this army, for I spent seventeen hours a day in
my oiBce looking after it."
These were the words President McKtnley nsed when he asked sereral members
ef the Commission, now investigating the war. to undertake that work.
As Authoritative Statement.
. ( It was with the same idea to show the country that the War Department nsed
erery effort in its power before and during the war to guard and care for the army
that President McKinley granted me permission to prepare for The Mail and Ex
press this article. It has been prepared with his knowledge and consent, and all state
ments "made hare been verified by official records.
jEhile the President's words quoted above express his feelings and bis desires
clearly nd concisely, the statement which follows gives authoritatively the true posi
tion and condition of tbe War Department during the last six months.
President's Wisdom Shown.
Already the wisdom of tbe President in ordering an investigation of the charges
made against the War Department has been shown. The Investigating Committee
baa been in session but a short time, and but a few witnesses hare been examined,
traf tbe testimony of officers of high rank bas shown bow utterly unjust and unfounded
Bare been the charges and criticisms of the majority of the critics. , The testimony
has shown that where abuses or neglect were pointed out or discovered, every effort
was! made to correct them.
The Other Side of the Question.
For the first'time the public has bad a glimpse of the other side of the question.
For weeks the maligners of the Administration and the War Department have been
making -reckless charges and complaints, and the country has been stirred up and in
flamed by sensational reports. There bas been no denial of sickness, death or discom
fort among our troops. This could not have been prevented. There have been mis
takes made, but the records of the Department show that' everything possible was
done beforehand to prevent these.
But this has been war and'not a summer outing, and looking over the results and
the victories, the country cannot but be congratulated on the remarkably low death
rate; rta great achievement in raising an army of over 275,000 officers and men in
less than fifty days, and bringing to a successful conclusion a war with a foreign na
tion within three and a half months.
Department Kept Steadily at Work.
During the storm of abuse which blew over the country, and was especially di
rected against the War Department, that branch of the Government, of necessity,
was obliged to remain silent. While politicians and newspapers were spreading
broadcast sensational and. for the most part, unfounded reports in regard to our sol
diers and their camps, the President and the officials of the War Department kept
steadily at work, remedying faults, correcting abuses jond holding the tight rein of
organisation over the troops which were threatened with demoralization by" the sen-'
national and scandalous abuse. It was at this time that tbe President decided that
l&thfcsoldicrs who had been committed to his care had been wronged, be would find.
ittOUt.- as it was due to the public and the country to know the truth, and he would "
give, it to tbem. The only way to do this was to appoint an investigating committee,
composed of men beyond reproach, and who would get at the truth. Every one
knows now the history of the appointment of the War Commission, and its work so
far as It has gone.
Overcoming- Legal Obstacles.
While the public is heariug from the officers of high rank exactly what was done
for the soldiers and their comfort, nothing has been given to the country in regard
.to the work of the Administration, especially the War Department, in preparation for
the war or the legal obstacles which hampered these preparations. The Mail and Ex
press is enabled to-day to present for the first time a clear and authentic statement of
the conditions which confronted the War Department when war was declared; what
was done to overcome these obstacles of law and the willful neglect of past Con
gresses; how the great army was raised, equipped and put in the field: how the Quar
termaster. Commissary and Medical departments worked- to make the new army
fit for the field, and, finally, what was ac complished and tbe results.
.ot a Defense, for That la Jfot Needed.
'-In presenting this stntcment i do not make it as a defense of the War Department,
for it needs none. It is simply an official and authentic declaration of facts, founded
upon .official records and actions. It tells the story of preparation before the war and
what 'the War Department did. and what it accomplished during the war, in language
far the people.- There are no excuses, no elaborations, no exaggeration. It is simply
tbe truth, as told by tbe records, and shows for the first time exactly what the Admin
istration and the War Department did.
it, is official and authentic. The figures, data and statements can all be proven
by records in the Department, while the statements in regard to certain actions, loudly
attacked by ignorant critics, clearly and forcibly answer these charges.
How Preparation Wu Hampered.
Joe story starts with the condition of the army at "the beginning of the year and
tne number of officers and men then on a peace basis. As events of February last
made war seem certain, preparations for the inevitable were begun, but legal
restrictions and lack of Congressional action did much to hamper these preliminary
and necessary steps. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the War Department went on
with its work as best it conld, but it was not until war was actually declared that
authority was given to go ahead with the vast work necessary to put a great army
m the held. It is here shown how, in the short period of five weeks, Adjutant-General
Corblnr with his four assistants, under the direct supervision of the President, organ
ised, commissioned and assigned to duty over 800 generals and staff officers, and
enrolled and mustered into service the regiments of the vast army which sprang Into
''existence in answer to the President's call.
,. The cry has been that politic bad much to do with the appointment of general
and staff officers, bnt is is shown that no party or faction waa recognized. The dem
ocrats asked for and were given as much as the Republicans. The South received
equal patronage with the North. There was no East or Weat: all were treated on
equality, and the best man. no matter where he came from or his politics, was chosen,
o far as in the President's knowledge and power.
In making selections from 18.000 applicants a little over 96 per cent, were chosen
from the regular army. v
Those Soaa of Fathers.
A great deal has been said and printed about tbe appointment of "sons of fathers,"
grandsons and nephews to staff appointments. The President did appoint less thaa
forty young men who happened to have illustrious ancestors, bnt they were all bright,
accomplished men, who ba'd made reputations in their owa sphere and who were anxious
to serve their country by going to the front. With less than half a dozen exceptions
all of these men did good work after they had a few weeks' experience. The records
ahaw, that the young men in the army did the best work; were more energetic aad
ffkeicat'taaa mauy"ottue older ones. A few figures will show exactly how many
favorite sons the President appointed, and like all other criticisms and complaints the
atrial ftgnres will show how a single example has been takes for tbe whole.
, .President Mckinley appointed 836 general aad staff officer. Of these 33 were
nana of distinguished ancestors. 25 were "sons of fathers," as critics hare called tbetfc 4
were grandsons. 8 were nephews. 1 waa a son-in-law aad 4 were appointed, aa the yel
low jourSals declare, by social "pulL"
Of all the staff appointments 40 were chosen by Senators and appointed on tbeir'rec
nuatadation. Ten of these Senators were democrats, and of these more thaa oat
asked for and received more than one appointment. Twenty-six staff officers' were
appointed on recommendations of Representatives in Congress. Certainly it the
representatives of the people could not recommend appointments, to whom could the
President tarn for advice? '
Of all the 836 appointments but three were President McEinley's personal ap
pointments, one waa personal to Vice-President Hobart; six by personal recommends
tJeaef the Secretary of War aad oae by that of Senator Henna, but there were 38' ether
Senators who asked the same favor, aad the President granted what they desired.
Coaare TmriMr to Blame.
A dear statement is made of what the War Department asked of Congress and
what Ooacress granted.
It la interesting to note in this regard that to the failure of Congress tc carry oat
the .War Department's recommendation as embodied ia what is known as tke Hall
??'"l"tioa hm can traced a coed deal of the suffering aad disease of the
ttseaa. ..The War Department wasted the regular army hrcreaaed, bat the puss are
trass the country forced Congress to act otherwise, aad the volunteer service was
asndeae by giving preference to the State altk.
3W eaasaarkoaa given show that the death rate amoag the volaateers aad the
vswa is sadly against the feesser. Thia ia emphasised by the report treat the camp
X"sr"aM bis. There the velastsira sad the regulars were ramaiag side hy aide,
i ' -. '
sassac the Tolaateers aad only eae asteeg the regulars.
The chaster la regard te hew aad Why the castas were ehesea k exceedingly, In
tereetlag, sad gives the reasons of the Department for selecting Chickamauga, Alger
aad Taatpa for places of mohflfajatiom. 'That part zexerrJag to Oemp WlkoS, at Moa
taak, ts also fall of hapertsae jest aew.
Worst of Sjaai Hi mil Bwnartsnestt.
Taw work of the Ordasaee, Qaartenaaster, Bahslsteaee aad Medical departments
Is treated under separate heads. The aaresdiaess of the eeuatry for war Is espe
cially shewn by the Ordaaace Departateafs being saddealy called upon to equip a
qaarter of a asillloa mea with a dasa of articles not produced by private maaa
faetureri. It fa shown why .the Springfield rifles had to be ased aad why smokeless
powder could sot he furnished. Every mesaa waa used to provide the latter ia time,
bat It could not be obtained until the war waa practically ever aad too late to use. The
difficulties inf providing artillery with equipment are explained by the lack of appro
priations provided before' the war began. y
The heroic work dose by tbe Quartermaetera Department la fully shown, to
gether with exactly what that work consisted of. Considering the too few officers pro
vided by law and the action of Congress for years back in insisting upon economical
appropriations for this Department, tbe way the Quartermaster's Bureau equipped
aa army of a quarter of a million ought to come ia for praise instead of abuse.
Tbe troopship question aa well as that of supplying tbe army with everything
that goes to make up as army, except men and food, fell to the Quartermaster's
Department, and in a dear andstraightforward manner the great work of this
bureau is laid before the public for the first time.
The difficulties under which the Commissary or Subsistence Department la
bored for lack of legal power and ability to buy supplies in open market were similar
to those of the Quartermaster's Bureau. Tbe law provides that the Subsistence De
partment shall purchase the food, but it does not allow it to cook it. A great deal
of trouble and disease resulted from this and this Bureau has been blamed. It is
shown that the Commissary Department furnished sufficient and good food to the
soldiers but it is also shown that they coul d not compel them to cook or use it prop
erly. Comparison In Death Rate.
One of the most interesting portions of the article Is the comparisons made of the
death rate of this war with those of former wars in the West Indies, iis-well as
abroad. The first expedition sent to the West Indian Islands was that by
the English. The land forces numbered 14,000. In this expedition the losses
were 1,700 officers and men killed, wounded and missing, while the losses from
disease were about 50 per cent, of the total forces. In 1S02. during the French
expedition to the West Indies, 58,543 men were sent to the islands. In four months
the loss from disease reached the astounding figure of 50,207, or a mortality of 5S5
per thousand. Of the 8,275 survivors 3,000 were reported unfit for duty. Compare
these terrific losses with the almost insignificant loss of our own army in Cuba.
During the same period as the French expedition our aggregate loss from all
causes was but 2,910, out of a total force of 274,717 officers and men, or a per
centage of 1.059.
These figures become more significant when it is stated that during the present war
Spain has carried to the island 135,000 men, of whom but S5.000 remain.
Disease caused this great havoc, for her losses in battle have been insignificant.
The Medleal Department.
The statement in regard to the medical department shows exactly with what force
and lack of preparation on account of legal obstacles that department entered the
war; how it was built np. and at tbe same time clearly explains much of the horrors
and discomforts which our soldiers were
of what is set forth fully below.
The Reaalts of the War.
Tbe results of the war are too well known to require much attention.
To sum them up in a few words the United States, in tbe short space of 100 days, or
ganized, armed and equipped and provided transportation for an army of over a quar
ter of a million of men; conducted campaigns separated by 10,000 miles of land and
water; humiliated and destroyed the enemy 'wherever met, without one single re
verse. And this with tbe small loss of but a little over 1 per cent, from all causes
an achievement unparalleled in the history of warfare, savage or civilized, and which
will be referred to by critics of the future as the military marvel of the century.
OX A PEACE BASIS.
How the Army Waa SItnated Before
the Hostilities Broke Ont.
"Thc-:syear 1898 began with the United
States -at peace with the world: its army
on a peace basis, of 2,164 officers and 25,350
enlisted men, embracing (in addition to the
general staff corps, arid including one bat
talion of engineers) ten re&.ments of cav
alry, five regiments of artillery and twenty
five regiments of infantry, gathered in vari
ous posts throughout the country. The en
tire force was well armed, well clothed.
well houses, well fed, and regularly paid;
all of the men in splendid spirits and ex
cellent physical condition. A state of dis
cipline prevailed which knew nothing bnt
loyalty and obedience, awaiting any call,
ready for any sacrifice.
Coast Defense Incomplete.
An elaborate scheme for coast defense,
devised in 1S80, was not only incomplete,
but just fairly begun: but few guns had
been mounted, and the few others made
ready for mounting with meager appropria
tions had not left their factories, owing to
the failure of Congress to provide the nec
essary funds asked for from time to time
by the Chief of Ordnance.
The devastating war in Cuba which had
waged for the two and one-half years pre
ceding, occupied the minds of the American
people. Neither the Administration, the
War Department nor any of its bureaus
have anything to excuse, but a few words
of explanation touching tbe obstacles to be
overcome, considered in connection with the
results obtained, will appeal to the reason
of fair-minded people who may have or who
would criticise upon imperfect knowledge
or false statements.
Lack of Coaa-reasloaal Aathprltr.
Many legal restrictions hampered and em
barrassed the transaction of business. In
deed, only those conducting tbe affairs of
the war can have any idea of the handicap
placed by Congress on the War Depart
ment and the serious obstades which have
made it impossible to accomplish ready and
effective work at all times.
During the War of the Rebellion the Sec
retary of War exercised to its fullest ex
tent the power which then lawfully be
longed to the heads of tbe several depart
ments Aa controlling and directing tbe ap
propriations voted and placed under his
care. Caa it be questioned that the arm of
tbe great Secretary was strengthened by
this prerogative which enabled him to main
tain complete control and directive power
over the expenditures necessary to a suc
cessful prosecution of his work? This pow
er over expenditure remained with the Sec
retary of War until March 30. 1868. when
Congress. deprived him of it and placed over
him the Comptroller of tbe Treasury, with '
power to reverse his action and disallow bis
payments; tbe effect has made contractors
timid sad slow.
Nine successive Attorney Generals (Wirt,
Berrien - Tanev. Butler. Reverdv Johnson.
Crittenden, Cussing, Bates and Stanbery), '
after elaborate consideration of the same
question, held that it was esaential to the " rV a ?.e Iroat TOnr
proper aad successful administration of the "usly borne the i hardships of war. which
government that the executive heads of !bexPectef nd know are unavoidable,
the several departments, in the matter of w,tn a few complaints. The partisan
expenditures of money, should exercise aad Journals have spread discontent and created
control authoritative direction, not subject 0W,V" sn?,eif ,at bome;
to the reversal of the Comptroller or any FresWeat McKinley nd the officers of his
aecaaatrag officer of the Treasury. Administration, continually since assuming
Red Tan Hampered Preparatleaa.
la the work of organizing, equipping,
subsisting, clothing, sheltering, transport
ing aad providing munitions of war. medi
cal supplies aad surgical aid. the numerous
ad varied expenditures incident to mili
tary operations, require prompt and de
cisive actios ia the matter of expenditares,
wkk -prompt aad certain payment if satis
factory, results are to be obtaiaed.
At the outbreak of the Hispano-Ameri-
-caa war, ao supplies ia large quantities
couai hejsarehased without advertfaemeau
aid essais of advertisesaaata ware required
obliged to suffer. This is but a brief outline
to be submitted to and approved before
publication, by the Secretary of War. or
payment could not be authorized. The
newspapers of the National capital were
excluded-by law-from publishing advertise
'mefits. except for supplies and services to
be used in the District of Columbia.
Th- Any Reaculatloas.
There has been criticism of the army
regulations. It is admitted that as they
are now constructed they are cumbersome,
but they are the product of thirty years'
work and experience. To have changed
them materially when war was declared
or during the campaign would have cre
ated no end of confusion and perhaps dis
aster. What changes could be made at
such a time were made. The army regu
lations under which the War Department
is 'working were revised under a former
democratic Secretary of War.
Cona-reaa Objected to Trained Cooks.
For over twenty years efforts have been
made to secure legislative sanction for the
enlistment of trained cooks for the mili
tary service, but it was denied until after
war was declared.
By the same legal restrictions, the num
ber of cavalry and artillery horses was
limited to the number of mounted men in
the service, not allowing for a single
breakdown, a single death or a single re
mount; and the number of draft animals
was limited to 5,000. a number by no
means sufficient to mobilize the small regu
No law existed which enabled the War
Department to regulate and protect ex
plosive mines and mine fields in the waters
of the United States.
Hampered hy Old Decisions.
At-the present time, a serious embarrass
ment arises to pay for certain advertise
ments which were essentially necessary in
the matter of procuring recruits and volun
teers for the army, and to supply wood for
the troops near Tampa, and to provide
cavalry horses for the service. Notwith
standing the vouchers for these items were
approved by the Secretary of War, the Sec
ond Auditor of the Treasury adheres to a
decision made in 1876, that written au
thority of the Secretary of War must be
obtained before publication, or payment
must be withheld.
Section 3648, Revised Statutes, provides
that no advance of public money shall be
! made ia any case whatever, and agents of
express companies frequently refuse to for
ward goods without payment in advance.
Unheeded appeal to Cona-reaa,
The foregoing are merely a few of the
cases in which it became necessary for the
War Department to apply to Congress for
legislabon. Many instances might be
shown where tbe dispatch of public busi
ness and the workings of the bureaus of the
Department were embarrassed and delaved
by reason of its head being deprived of
final authority in the mater of allowance of
accounts and expenditures.
Attacks from the Rear.
The supply departments have been the sub-
ff 0I D,?"r " Iron? ?, though
oatce, naa oees aierx ana active to bring tni
struggle to a dose and give peace and stable
conditions to Cuba, and sought, if possible,
to accomplish the end without recourse to
Drives Into War.
Jaundiced journals and jingo' orators man
ufactured a restless disposition and impa
tient demand from the people for precipitate
action, and the temper of the Spanish peo
ple waa such that pacific diplomacy became
unpopular hi both countries. Notwith
etaadiac thia nuhOc pressure. the'Presiden
aad his associates wet had iaeessaatiy for, J
aad belfeved that fleece could he abs
tained, most of them having leaned oa the
battlefield what war meant, what distress
and suffering it entailed, aad sought to save
the nation from its dreadful consequences.
Therefore but little was dose, sad but little
eonld be done ia preparatioa for war, with
out increasing its chances. The publication
of the De Lome letter, speaking disparag
ingly of the President oa February 8, added
fuel to a fire which burst late a blase of
wrath and indignation on February IJi,
when the world was horrified by the de
struction of the battleship Maine ia Havaaa
CoasrreM Given m Uttle Aid.
One week following that disaster Con
gress increased the army of the United
States by the addition of two regiments of
artillery. This was hardly a war measure,
however, but merely an additional force
required to care for the extra guns of
costly pattern which had been mounted
along the sea coast, and the need for which
had been shown for a long period previous,
though, through political fear, the legisla
tion had not been enacted into law.
The Defense Bill.
By March 8 the situation bad grown so
grave that Congress, upon tbe request of
the President, appropriated, by unanimous
vote, the sum of $50,000,000 for the Na
tional defense. This act. however, was
viewed as more of a peace than a war meas
ure, and three days later the new Spanish
Minister, Senor Polo y Bernabe, was re
ceived by the President of the United
It was not until April 11 that the Presi
dent asked authority of Congress to Inter
vene in Cuba by force to re-establish peace
and order in the island. After nearly a week
of debate the resolutions were passed. The
President signed them on April 20 and sent
the ultimatum to Spaiu.
On the following day. April 21, the war
broke out, and two days later came the call
for 125,000 volunteers, followed by a second
call for 75.000. In the meantime Congress
had pnoii n law increasing the regular
army to (51.000 and a!o providing for six
teen regiments of United States volunteer
engineers, cavalry and infantry.
Hovr a Vast Army Sprang Up.
Mustering was carried forward vigor
ously in every State of the Union, and in
the short space of one month this vast
army of nearly two hundred and twenty
five thousand men were suddenly gathered
together, and the staff departments had to
be organized and were called upon to
equip and supply them.
Work of tbe AdJutantGeneral.
In the short period of five weeks the Adjutant-General
of the Army with his four
assistants, at their desks constantly from
8 in the morning until after midnight
week days and Sundays, had organized his
working force, issued commissions to and
assigned to duty over 800 generals and
general staff officers, enrolled and mustered
tbe regiments of this vast army into ser
vice of the United States, completed the
papers, gathered them into camps of in
struction and organized them into brig
ades, divisions and army corp". and con
ducted without error the overwhelming cor
respondence arising from the abnormal con
ditions, which ran the averacc of his tele
grams to over 500 and his letters to over
1,000 per day. touching every intricate
legal question affecting personal and pub
lic interests: surrounded too, by throngs of
Congressmen pressing tbe claims of their
constituents, newspaper men eager to fur
nish their papers with accurate and com
prehensive reports of proceedings and prog
ress, and a crowd of persistent callers
seeking personal advantage.
Xo Party or Paction Recoa-nlzed.
There were over eighteen thousand am
plications for appointment of general and
staff officers; the President in his selections
and appointments from this vast number
recognized no party or faction. Of the
830 appointed, 301, or a little over 3G per
cent., were chosen from the regular army
a larger percentage than was ever selected
to officer any volunteer army organized in
the United States; and all would have been
taken from the regular army if possible,
but so large a number could not be spared
without seriously impairing its efficiency.
The regular army wns recognized by mili
tary men, and thoughtful statesmen, as al
ready too small, and its officers had been
reduced by the withdrawal of 200 for mus
tering and recraiting duty.
Majority of Omcers Were Rearnlara.
Of the major-generals appointed, all,
with the exception of five, were from the
regular army, and of these five three were
graduates of the Military Academy and
all of them soldiers of distinction and Na
Of the seventy brigadier-generals ap
pointed, forty-two were from the regular
army, and of the others, five were gradu
ates of the Military Academy and tbe re
mainder men who had won reputations aa
soldiers, on the battlefield.
How StaBT O facers Were Chosen.
Of tbe seven hundred and forty-eight staff
officers, two hundred and fifty-six were
chosen from the army; of those selected
from civil life, many were graduates of the
Military Academy, or had seen service, and
all were appointed upon the recommenda
tion of chiefs of staff departments, other
soldiers, and of the representatives elected
by the people to promote their welfare and
guard their every interest. Of the remain
ing four hundred and ninety-two civilian ap
pointments, over one-half are in the Medi
cal Department, Pay Department and the
Signal Corps, the only field from which men
in such numbers, possessing approximately
the required technical knowledge, could be
The appointment of officers of the staff
would have produced at once an efficient
service, if equal care had been exerdsed by
the Governors of all the States to appoint
none but good regimental and company
officers. A staff officer's work is rendered
futile by neglect or lack of knowledge on the
part of line officers. Over the appointment
of tbe latter Congress gave the President
no power, but instead, reserved it to the
Governors, and in one State tbe Governor
went so far as to disband the National
Guard before mustering began, so that tin
officers' positions in the volunteers might
be more easily bestowed upon political
In all assignments to duty, care was ex
rdsed to see that only trained officers of tht
n-gular army were put in position of high
authority and great responsibility.
What Waa Asked of Conarresa.
Every general commanding the army shier
the Civil War bas induded in his annual re
port from time to time a recommendation t
Congress for a reorganization of the in
fantry arm of the service upon modern
lines; and every Congress for the sam
period has had upon its calendar a bill em
bodying such features: aad ia the spring oi
1866, whea war seemed Imminent and ap
tareatiy Bear, at hand. Mr. Hull, chairman
of the Hease Military Committee, drafted
a bill embodying the ideas of the most ex
perienced osBcera of the army, which pro
vided for aa increase of the regular estab
lishment to about 100,000 men. This, it was
confideativ expected at the War Depart
ment, would, aa a war measure, be enacted
Into law; aad the thought given to prelim
inary preparatioa proceeded with that end
What ConarreM Granted.
The orgaaised militia opposed the passage
ef aueh a measure, fearing that if it became
a law it would destroy their organization
by repUdag It, and Congress failed to
pass the measure. Had this bill become a
Jaw. the splendid recruiting organization
of the remlar armr. with the multitude
of applications for enlistments, could have
been ouicklv recruited to tne tun strengm
from men chosen with peculiar fitness for
military service, without the strong ties
binding them to home, school and business.
which, when excitement wanes, breed dis
content and nostalgia. All of the men so
enlisted would have been quickly githercd
in companies and regiments of the reaulir
army, where, with their veteran comrades,
side by side in the same tents and the srrac
messes, they would have quickly adapted
themselves to the splendid discipline and
thorough instruction under the watchful
care of the trained and zealous officers so
necessary to the health, instruction and
efficiency of an army.
Rea-nlara and Volaateers.
By this failure it became necessary to
send the regular army, small as it was.
in compact regiments, carefully looking
after their own health and comfort, and
side by side were regiment, of men equally
patriotic and zealous but suffering from a
lack of knowledge, which rendered me su
periority of the one over the other, so ap
parent, Deathst Volunteers, 4S5 Reitolara, 1.
In the camp at Chickamauga. where the
volunteers and the regulars were camping
side by side, in the ratio of abont two of
the former to one of tbe latter, there were
425 deaths among the volunteers and only
one of the regulars.
No braver, no more zealous, no more de
voted soldiers ever followed a country's flag
than the volunteer soldiers in'the American
rrmy; but putting a gun in a man's hand no
more makes him a soldier than putting a
plane in his hand makes him a carpenter.
Our people and their representatives have
indulged in this mistake for thirty years.
The science of arms is a profession which
requires a long apprenticeship and careful
training under schooling of a master, and no
amount of patriotism and no degree of brav
ery can make up "for tbe lack of such train
ing and apprenticeship. If without it great
results are obtained it is at the expenditure
of life to a degree so shocking that the true
cause is lost to sight for the moment and
until reason makes it plain.
Congress Acts bnt Too Late
Finally Congress did effect a partial
reorganization and about doubled the en
listed strength of the regular army, but
did it at a time when the States were or
ganizing their own troops and the influence
of friends in regiments already enlisted
carried the men into the State organizations
rather than the regular army, and delayed
Hovr and Why Camps Were Chosen.
After the State troops were mustered into
the United States service it became neces
sary to gather them into large camps of in
struction for the purpose of organization and
formation into brigades, divisions and army
corps. Several points of concentration were
selected, notahly- Chickamauga, on account
of the great extent of country there- owned
by the United States, and ove which 100.
000 men had once engaged in the grand
maneuvers of a great battle. The selection
was influenced by the splendid character of
the roads throughout the park, its adaptabil
ity to camping purposes on nccount of
abnndant shade, open fields, rolling surface
and the splendid water supply, us reported
by Gen. Boynton.chainnanofthePark
Why Camp Alajer Was Selected.
In a great war between two nations the
capital of the country .is always supposed
to be a final objective, and one of the mili
tary weaknesses of the United States is the
location ot its beautiful capital within fifty
miles of the sen, and upon a tide-water
With an adversary having nearly one
hundred thousand troops within eighty
miles of our territory, and a navy supposed
to be as strong if not stronger than our
own, it was but a reasonable precaution to
take measures ngainst the possibility of nn
attack o Washington. For that reason a
force of some thirty thousand men were
gathered together in the vicinity of that
city for tbe double purpose of organization,
instruction and possible defense.
For that reason Camp Alger was estab
lished. The site selected was ten or twelve
miles from Washington, upon which had
camped daring the War of the Rebellion
frequently an equal and at times a vastly
greater fore, without inconvenience or
more than the average death-rate from
Tampa Was Sear Cafaa.
Tnmpa vras selected as a point of em
barkation on account of its proximity to
the Cuban coast, and with the thought
that a sojourn in the Southern latitudes
would in n measure prepare the troops for
a climate it was known they must endure
in a tropital campaign. As soon as possi
ble after the embarkation of a portion, the
remainder of the troops were removed.
When the danger of attack upon Wash
ington had entirely passed, troops were
moved from Camp Alger.
Aa to Montank Point.
Montauk Point was selected because of
its splendid adaptability as a recuperating
point, with salt water bathing, fresh ocean
breezes, excellent artesian water, good sur
face drainage and sufficiently isolated to
protect the centers of population of the
United States from fever infection brought
from the tropics by returning soldiers.
In preraring the camp at that point an
experienced medical officer was put upon
the ground immediately after the selection
of the sit, who bad authority to call upon
the medical supply officer at New York for
verytbinz be needed, and that officer war
directed ?o fill all his requisitions without
reference to the War Department.
It IVa tke Battlefield Brought Home.
To perF0Bs unnsed to the sceres and hor
rors of r-ar, it doubtless presented many
sights or pity and despair, but it must be
Kirne in siind that it was but the rear of
he battlefield of Santiago brought home,
where the terrible privations of that strug
gle wouM be diminished, and some lives
iaved. which if the troops had remained
long In Cuba, or had been transported far
ther, would have been lost.
War and Peace Are Different.
In gathering together large bodies of men
it is hard to impress upon them that their
daily life must be materially changed. Mea
from the village and the rural districts
are not able to understand why practicing
a mode of life to which they have been ac
customed will endanger and develop dis
ease dangerous and fatal And this, as
with many other lessons in life, there seema
to be no master but experience, and the
only lessons learned and taken to heart are
those received in that thorough school.
All Complaints Were Inveatlcnted.
Many individual complaints were received
at the department it various ways anony
mous letters appirently written by soldiers,
newspaper articles prepared far from tho
scene of action, letter-, from friends and
relatives based upon letters, received from
members of their families in the army, and
from members ot Congress, generally bated
upon hearsay evidence. Never was a sir.;:'e
complaint allowed to pr.ss without a thor
ough investigation and report: nearly al
ways with the ronlt that tbe complaint
was trivial and not founded upon fact, but
in the few casf-j which merited remedial
measures they nere at once applied; and if
neglf't upon the pirt of officers was dis
covered, they were promptly admoniohed.
Advocates of War First to Complain.
Hardly had the sensational journals of
the country ceased their exciting ami in
flammatory eI.s:ons crying for war when
they becan to magnifv complaints and
utttr cr.ticfcms i unjust as they were
pernicious and harmful. .pre.idiii!j discon
tent in the ranks and producing slnriu at
Remedial Mrnsnres Instantly Taken.
Immediately upon receipt of reports at
the Department ti it sickness, was preva
lent in the camps, measures were taken to
remove the men and scatter the commands.
Chickamauga and Camp Alger were aban
doned, but after supplies and equipment
had been sent to those points they could
not be entirely piren v.j until the supplies
were properly distributed. And. moreover,
until ithe camp lessons were learned, one
suitable location was as good as another.
Hovr a Qaarter of a Million Men Wcro
Armed aad Equipped.
The bureaus attracting the most attention
are the Ordnance. Quartermaster's. Sub
sistence and Medical departments.
When the first call for troops was made,
the Ordnance Department was called ui"n
to suddenly equip a quarter of a million
men with a class of articles not produe-d
by private manufacturers. Appropriation
of Congress for these equipments for many
years had been barely sufficient for rephc
inc those worn out by the regular army,
which required nbout 5,000 sets of equip
ments per yenr. and to equip 250,000 men
in four weeks required it to increase its
business siv hundred-fold.
Xot Articles of Commerce.
The supply on hand was necessarily vrrv
small, and money for the increase in thee
classes of equipment was only available :i
few days before war had actually begun,
when upon telegraphic orders tbe work of
manufacture- was immediately -commenced
at the various arsenals, and was supple
mented by purchase from contractors:
though it must be borne in mind that
stores of this character are not articles of
commerce, and purehnses from contractors
were delayed by the time required by man
ufacturers to acquaint themselves with the
requirements, specifications, mode of man
ufacture and sources of material for pro
ducing them; and the degree of excellence
required was something for which the con
tractors were not prepared, notwithstand
ing the standard was somewhat reduced.
Volunteers' Equipment I'nHt.
The first levy of troops being made up
largely from the National Guard of the
States, it was supposed from reports that
most of their arms and equipment, though
somewhat worn, were lit for service. This
expectation, however, was not realized, and
before the troops were ready to take tho
field it was necessary to replace three
fourths of their arms and equipment. De
lays, too, were caused by failures on thi?
part of organisations to make requisitions
(although the requisition in this, as in all
the departments, is very simple, requiring
merely to state the number of men, the
number of serviceable equipment on hand
and the number required to complete the
Some delays, it is true, were caused by
the congestion of railways and the inability
to promptly distribute arms and equipment
that bad been sent to the different camps.
Supply depots were established at Tampa,
Chickamauga and Benicia Arsenal, near
San Francisco, with a view to completing
tbe arming and equipping of regiments be
fore they embarked for foreign expeditions,
which was successfully accomplished.
The Work Accomplished.
Between April 15 and August 31. the
Department provided 250.000 sets of infan
try equipments, and 30.000 sets of horse
equipments, and on tho later date was pre
pared to produce infantry equipments at
the rate of 8,000 sets per day, a set includ
ing knapsack, haversack, with knife, fork
and spoon, a canteen, a meat ration can,
tin cup, cartridge belt and bayonet scab
bard. Tbe Spring-Held Rifles.
At the outset of the war t - Department
bad on hand an ample supply of caliber
45. Springfield rifles, for arming the nenr
troops, and was able to supplement the
supply of rifles, carbires anil saber on
hand in sufficient quantities to meet de
mands. The propriety of equipping the troopa
with the 45-caliber rifle was not at first
questioned. Its excellence and accuracy
had been proven by long service: its sim
plicity and certainty to keep in good fight
ing condition under exposure and bad usage
were known. Success with a more compli
cated magazine arm required experience
and time for study upon the part nt the
officers and men. and the troops called out
were already familiar with the Springfield
rifle, and the work in hand was to complete
this armament and re-lace unserviceable
arms with new ones, and, moreover, mag
azine rifles were not on harm and could
not be provided otherwise than by man
ufacture. Many unjust criticisms of tbe Springfield
rifle have appeared in the public prints. It
may be stated that its rate of fire and ex
treme range are practically the same as the
best-known military magazine arm; and the
-hock of the blow imparted by the bullet at
its extreme range (3.200 yards) is greater.
its disadvantages are summed up in the
height of the trajectory and the tieUht of
the cartridge carried, which is nearly dou
ble that of the- smaller bore.
Little Snsokcle Pornler.
Trior to the war the Ordnance Depart
ment had. after a long series of experiments.