Daily Eagle

GETTYSBURG.

How the Famous Battle Has Been Fought Over on Paper.

WORDY CONTROVERSIES.

A Summing Up of the Most Important Statements.

The controversies about Gettysburg began before the blood was dry, for the fame of many a great commander, of Hancock and Warren, of Slocum and Howard, of Lee and his lieutenants, Longstreet, Stuart and Ewell were involved, as well as the reputation of Meade. The severest allegations were made, in the interest of the Virginia generals, to the effect that Longstreet lost Gettysburg to the south. Now Longstreet and Sickles were opposed. Longstreet led the attack on Sickles and he made the fatal one on the third day, known as "Pickett's Charge." Thus the fame of two very able corps' commanders rests upon the question so boldly put before the country by Gen. Sickles in his speech on the battlefield, at the reunion of his veterans in 1886.

GEN. MEADE.

But incidental to all this is the question of the boldness of Reynolds, in bringing on the battle by his action on the first day.

The first real battle was fought between portions of the Union corps of Reynolds and the Confederates under Hill, the divisions of Doubleday and Heth. The cause of it is explained by Gen. Heth in the "Annals of the War." "As I opened the battle of Gettysburg, stumbled into it, going to Gettysburg to get shoes, not to fight, I claim I should know as much about the opening operations and whom I fought as any man living. * * * The first force I struck was infantry (Reynolds' corps).

"On July 1, my division, accompanied by Pagram's battalion of artillery, was ordered to move (from Cashtown) at 5 a. m. in the direction of Gettysburg. On nearing the town it was evident that the enemy was in its vicinity in some force. * * * At this time (9 a. m.) I was ignorant what force was at or near Gettyzburg, and supposed it consisted of cavalry, probably supported by a brigade or two of infantry. * * * Archer and Davis were directed to advance with their brigades, the object being to feel the enemy."

The enemy was Reynolds' men.

The presence of Reynolds at Gettysburg was due to an order from Meade to find the enemy and detain him. Maj. J. G. Rosengarten, ordnance officer, First army corps, and one of Reynolds' staff, quotes Meade as having said at the beginning "that he meant to engage the enemy whenever and wherever he could find him."

Reynolds was a fighting man, and Meade sent him to Gettyburg with three corps subject to his orders, and the challenge of Heth, soon supported by Pender with his division, was one no soldier of the Army of the Potomac would evade, much less Reynolds. He accepted, and the battle began, to end three days later in a splendid victory for the Union forces, but a victory sealed in his own blood. His movement, audacious as it was, seems on the whole to have been suited to the crisis.

Howard's responsibility for the misfortunes that befell Reynolds' corps is a question that has been noticed at length by every critic. The First corps fought against odds for several hours, and was finally outflanked by a new force, and it is said that if Howard had obeyed the orders which he acknowledges to have received at 3:20 a. m., on the 1st, to move his corps to within supporting distance of the First corps, he could have come to Reynolds' relief. Before the fighting began one of Howard's aids met Reynolds on the edge of the town, and was directed to tell Gen. Howard to hurry his men up at double quick and place two divisions on the right of the First corps, leaving another in reserve on Cemetery Hill, and Maj. Rosengarten affirms that "if these orders had been promptly obeyed, in connection with the support Sickles should have given, Reynolds could have held his own, while the other corps might have been quietly concentrating on the hills back of Gettysburg."

GEN. REYNOLDS.

Gen. Wadsworth, who had a division under Reynolds, reports: "On the morning of July 1, at 8 a. m., the division moved from Marsh Creek on Gettyburg, under the immediate direction of our deeply lamented commander, Maj. Gen. Reynolds. We struck the Cashtown (Chambersburg) road about three-quarters of a mile west of Gettysburg at about 10 a. m. * * * The right became sharply engaged before the line was formed, 10:15 a. m." Howard reports: "At 3:20 a. m., July 1, orders were received from headquarters (Meade) to move the Eleventh corps to within supporting distance of the First corps, which was to move to Gettysburg. I immediately sent an aid-de-camp to Gen. Reynolds to receive his orders." That is, when Gen. Howard received orders from the general in chief in the rear of Taneytown to go to the aid of Reynolds at Gettysburg at 3:30 in the morning, he did not make a move to execute the order, though he was eleven miles distant from the point where he was ordered to reach and join Reynolds. Instead of moving he sent an aid to Reynolds for further orders (the aid mentioned by him as having met Reynolds). Howard's report continues: "At 8 a. m. orders were received from him (Reynolds) directing the corps to march to Gettysburg. The column was at once set in motion, my first division, Gen. Barlow commanding, following the First corps by the direct route, my Third, Gen. Schurz, and my Second, Gen. Steinwehr, in the order named, taking the route by Horner's mill. The distance by the direct route was eleven miles, and by the other thirteen miles. As soon as the corps was set in motion I pushed on with my staff by the direct road, and when within two miles of Gettysburg received word from Gen. Reynolds, pointing out the place where I was to encamp; but on approaching the town, heavy artillery firing was heard. For some little time I endeavored, by sending in different directions, to find Gen. Reynolds in order to report to him in person." The report states in brief: That while Gen. Howard had not gone beyond the town in search of his commander, word came at 11:30 a. m. that Reynolds was dead; that at 12:30 the head of the Eleventh corps passed through the town, and that at that hour also, Gen. Buford, commanding the cavalry, reported that a new enemy was massing north of Gettysburg between the Harrisburg and York roads. This new enemy was Ewell's corps moving west by south, with the view of joining the main Confederate army at Cashtown. Maj. E. P. Halstead, an aid to Gen. Doubleday (who succeeded Reynolds in the command on the field), asserts, in a pamphlet on the first day's battle, "That the Eleventh corps did not reach the field until 2 p. m.; that it then formed in line of battle at about a right angle to the general line of the First corps, but did not connect with its right by several hundred yards, and both the flanks were in the air (that is, they did not rest in a defensive position and had no supports). When Ewell's troops approached from Carlisle and York, they struck the Eleventh corps in front and on both flanks almost at once, resulting in an easy victory for the enemy, and giving them possession of Gettysburg before the First corps had ceased fighting or left its position west of the Seminary."

Maj. Halstead states the case in its baldness, but he is true to the official records. Howard was acting under the same orders as was Reynolds, whose corps was in marching trim soon after daylight on the 1st, obeying promptly the very spirit of Meade's order, and this promptness of Reynolds with his First corps, accounts for the difference between his arrival at Gettysburg and that of the Eleventh corps—a difference of some three or four hours, yet both had the same distance to go!

GEN. HOWARD'S ERROR.

As to the disposition of his troops on the field, this official report makes no mention of any orders received from Gen. Reynolds to Howard, and there seems to be no question but the latter made a mistake in allowing Rodes (Confederate) to occupy Oak Hill on Reynolds' right flank. Swinton, the first of the critical historians, charges Howard with the error of trying to cover too much ground, and says that this faulty placing of his troops had a powerful influence on what followed. At 3 p. m., when a general advance was made by the Confederates, Rodes speedily broke the Union center, carrying away the right of the First corps and the left of the Eleventh and entering between them, disrupting the whole line. The left of the First corps alone drew back in some order, making a stand on Seminary Ridge until the artillery and ambulances had been withdrawn. The Comte de Paris makes this criticism on Howard's movements: "Since he declined to occupy Oak Hill, Howard should have brought back the Eleventh corps to the rear, in order to form a strong connection between his left and the right of the First. * * * Consequently it is unjust on the part of Howard, after having neglected to assume the proper direction of the First corps, to have accused it (as he did), in his first dispatch to Meade, of having allowed its left to be turned, and, by yielding ground, to have forced the Eleventh to a premature retreat. On the contrary, it was the disorderly disbanding of this latter corps, and especially of Schimmelpfennig's division, which compelled Robinson (Second division, First corps) to abandon the position, which, until then, he had so bravely defended, thereby involving the loss of Doubleday's position on Seminary Ridge."

GEN. HILL.

The appearance of Sickles' column marching in on the Emmitsburg road late in the day, had the effect of impressing the Confederates with the strength of the enemy before them, and had a general moral effect on affairs after the First and Eleventh corps had retired to the heights, preventing their traditional "sundown attack." Sickles had received no orders to go to Gettysburg, but went there from Emmitsburg at the call of one of Reynolds' subordinates after that general had fallen.

The battle of the first day rendered two Union corps, the First and Eleventh, temporarily unfit for action, and cost several thousand men. But it placed the army on Cemetery Ridge.

Right here the southern controversies begin. It is asserted that the defeat of the First and Eleventh corps should have been followed up by Ewell, whose troops were freshest, had suffered the least, and had moreover gained foothold at the base of the slope of Cemetery Hill by following the Eleventh corps into the town. This hill was the key to the northern extremity of the ridge and the right of the Union army during the two days following. As soon as Ewell entered the town he received orders from Gen. Lee, who now made the Seminary cupola his observatory, as Reynolds had done earlier, to press on and seize Cemetery Hill. The order, however, made it discretionary for Ewell, because Lee, as stated in his report, saw artillery and infantry in force on the heights. This was the Third division of the Eleventh corps under Gen. A. von Steinwehr, who had not advanced north of the town. Ewell concluded to await the arrival of his own Third division under Gen. Edward Johnson. In the meantime, the capture of a courier with a dispatch from Gen. H. W. Slocum revealed the fact that the Twelfth corps was at hand, so the advance was not made. The severest critic of this over caution on Ewell's part is the Confederate Gen. Longstreet, who says: "Pursuit, pell mell, is sometimes justified in a mere retreat and is the accepted principle in a rout. Gen. Early, in his report of this day's work, says: 'The enemy had been routed.' He should therefore have been followed by everything that could be thrown upon his heels, not so much to gain the heights, which were recognized as the rallying point, but to prevent his rallying at all in time to form lines for another battle. Hays had received orders through Early from Gen. Ewell to halt (with his brigade) at Gettysburg. But he saw that the enemy was coming round by the Baltimore road and were making for the heights—the Cemetery Ridge. This ridge meant life or death, and for the possession of it the battles of the 2d and 3d were fought."

GEN. SLOCUM.

It is asserted by some, Gen. Early among the rest, that had "Stonewall" Jackson been in his old place at the head of the corps led by Ewell at this time, the assault on the hill would have been made, and, once successful hero, the Confederates would have been masters of the situation, and Gettysburg, as this now known, would not have been fought.

THE HERO OF THE FIELD.

Though Cemetery Ridge stretched out its long line of formidable crests, inviting the Confederates to further efforts, there was not, in "nick o' time," a superior commander on the Union side to seize and man the positions of vantage. But while Ewell was pushing on his reconnaissances, posting batteries to shell the heights, and moving up his infantry for attack till everything looked shaky to the disorganized mass that had taken refuge on the hills, a little cavalcade came dashing in from the Taneytown road, having for its central figure a man who, once seen on the battlefield, could never be forgotten. His very bearing revealed the presence of a master of war—Gen. Hancock. The soldiers recognized the leader at once, and fell into position as though by magic. Hancock's entry changed anxiety and fear into hopeful certainty, and decided at once the fate of Gettysburg. Yet the controversy as to who the hero was that did this will doubtless go down to posterity, for congress honored Meade for the whole campaign, while it gave Hancock praise for his brilliant conduct on the field. Maj. Halstead, the only witness of the meeting of Hancock and Howard, thus describes it: "I returned to where Gen. Howard sat just as that brilliant, dashing soldier, Gen. Hancock, the hero of Gettysburg, approached at a swinging gallop, and when near Gen. Howard, who was then alone, saluted, and with great animation, as if there were no time for ceremony, said that Gen. Meade had sent him forward to take command of the three corps. Gen. Howard woke up a little and replied that he was the senior. Gen. Hancock said: 'I am aware of that, general; but I have written orders in my pocket, which I will show you if you wish to see them.' Gen. Howard said: 'No, I do not doubt your word, Gen. Hancock; but you can give no orders here while I am here.'

GEN. HANCOCK.

"'Very well, Gen. Howard, I will second any order that you have to give, but Gen. Meade has also directed me to select a field on which to fight this battle in rear of Pipe creek.' Then casting one glance from Culp's Hill to Round Top he continued: 'But, I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw, and if it meets your approbation I will select this as the battlefield.' Gen. Howard responded: 'I think it a very strong position, Gen. Hancock, a very strong position.' 'Very well, sir, I select this as the battlefield.'

"Gen. Hancock immediately turned away to rectify our lines, and from that moment till the close of the battle he was the inspiring genius."

Meade reports: "About the time of this withdrawal (4 p. m., Howard had just issued the order for retreat to Cemetery Hill) Maj. Gen. Hancock, whom I had dispatched to represent me on hearing of the death of Gen. Reynolds, arrived. In conjunction with Maj. Gen. Howard, Gen. Hancock proceeded to post the troops on the Cemetery Ridge."

GEN. HOWARD.

Gen. Doubleday, in his official report, says: "Arrived at the cemetery, our lines, with those of the Eleventh corps, were reformed under the direction of Gen. Howard. Our batteries were placed upon the summit of the hill, the First corps having been directed to occupy the ground to the west of the road, the Eleventh corps being on its right. A portion of the troops were placed behind the hill in reserve. Maj. Gen. Hancock then rode up and informed me that he had been placed in command of both corps. He at once directed me to send a force to support a battery which had been established on a lower range of hills some 100 yards to the east of our position, protecting our flank in that direction. I complied with the order and sent the remainder of Wadsworth's division there. Immediately afterward orders came from Maj. Gen. Howard, who ranked Hancock, to send the troops in another direction. This occasioned at the time some little delay and confusion." Gen. Hancock says his orders were to "Proceed to the front and assume command," to move the "troops and horses to the rear, toward the line of battle he (Meade) had selected," or, "if the ground were suitable and circumstances made it wise, I was to establish the line of battle at Gettysburg." Arriving on the field at 3 p. m., "orders were at once given to establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill." This hill "was already partially occupied on my arrival by direction of Maj. Gen. Howard." Hancock then sent a messenger to Gen. Meade, "to say that I would hold the position until night." Later on another messenger was sent to Meade "informing him that the position at Gettysburg was a very strong one, having for its disadvantage, that it might be easily turned and leaving to him (Meade) the responsibility whether the battle should be fought at Gettysburg or at a place first selected by him." Between 5 and 6 o'clock the First and Eleventh corps and one division of the Twelfth corps were in position, and the head of the column of the Third corps was in sight. Gen. Slocum, of the Twelfth corps, ranked Hancock, and the latter turned the command over to him at once, and rode back to Taneytown, thirteen miles distant, reporting to Meade in person. Orders, however, had been already issued by the commanding general of the corps in the rear, the Second, Fifth and Sixth, to advance immediately to Gettysburg.

Gen. Sickles had arrived on the field in advance of his corps and before Slocum came, and he was the superior of both Howard and Hancock. "I yielded to Howard," he says. "Howard thought it an act of grace on my part, but Hancock would not yield. I said: 'Let it all go; a good thing has been done (by the first day's fighting) and now let us hang on to it.'"

Gen. Meade states in his report that he learned from the front that the enemy was bringing his whole army to the attack, and hearing "from Maj. Gens. Hancock and Howard the favorable character of the position, I determined to give battle at this point, and issued orders to all the corps to concentrate on Gettysburg."

Before midnight Lee became satisfied that the Army of the Potomac was in front of him, and would make an effort to hold its ground. At this point the Southern controversies again enter in, and the Confederate statements throw a light upon the occurrences of July 2 and 3. The public all along have had glimpses of the inner workings of the Union camps, through the investigations and the official reports; but on the Southern side the controversy still awaits the publication of Lee's private papers. It has been in this case, as in many other important instances, appeals to the Lee family have been met with the response that "Lee's plans and purposes were kept to himself." This much, however, is admitted in the matter of Gettysburg: Lee promised his corps commanders a campaign of strategy, in which he would place his army in such a position as to compel the Union army to fight him, he keeping on the defensive. Meade meant to observe similar caution, as his own testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war shows. Here, then, were two great captains confronting each other and awaiting attack. That is to say, neither was committed to a battle until he could see that circumstances favored him. Meade, however, did order an examination of the ground held by Ewell, in front of Slocum's position, on Culp's Hill, with a view to an attack on Lee's left wing the morning of the 3d. The plan was reported against by engineers as impracticable. On the southern side the chief of artillery, Gen. W. N. Pendleton, has formally declared that he received orders from Lee to examine the ground on Meade's left, in front of Sickles' Third corps, with the design of making an attack there early on the 3d, and this was the attack which, when delivered, decided the nature of the battle. Up to that time Meade might have taken the offensive, but the onslaught came with such vigor, bringing with it consequences of such a character, that attack from the Union side was no longer thought of.

GEN. EWELL.

Every great triumph in war or in discovery finds a score of claimants for award, and every failure, every Waterloo must have its scapegoat. And because Gettysburg was not a final Union victory, Gen. Sickles, who met the most formidable assault delivered by Lee on that field, has been severely criticised, while Gen. Longstreet, who was the assailant, has long been held responsible by the Confederates for the disasters to the Southern arms, disasters which date from that attack.

SICKLES' SALIENT — LONGSTREET'S RESPONSIBILITY.

A salient on the battlefield is a point in the line of battle which presents an angle to the enemy's fire so that it will take effect in two directions from any given place. Now, on the extreme left of the Union line along Cemetery Ridge—the line from Round Top to Cemetery Hill—there is a depression in the ridge that makes it lower than the ground within easy cannon range, just west of it. Along the first ridge west runs the Emmitsburg road, the road by which Sickles had marched in to Gettysburg, and beyond this, still further to the west, is a second ridge, higher than the one followed by the Emmitsburg road. This second ridge was covered with forest extending from the front of Round Top northward into Lee's lines as they stood the night of July 1, when Hill's corps and Longstreet's, all but one division, had arrived. It was this elevation, known as the Warfield Ridge, which it was necessary for Lee to occupy in order to counterbalance the advantage that would accrue to Meade from the possession of Round Top, so soon as he discovered it. All the morning of the second day, Warfield Ridge, Little Round Top, and the Emmitsburg road remained unoccupied by any force. Gen. Sickles says that he could not have forestalled Lee on Warfield Ridge, as he had not troops enough; that he wrote Meade on the evening of the first day, and told him personally as soon as he saw him—frequently repeating the warning on the morning of the second day—that the weak point in Gettysburg was the Union left, the ground here described, with its approaches covered all the way from Lee's main camps. Sickles maintained a skirmish line along Emmitsburg Ridge, sending out Berdan's sharpshooters into the woods beyond the Warfield Ridge; and made aware by their reports that Longstreet and Hill were massing behind the forest, he finally moved his whole line forward, occupying Emmitsburg road with Humphrey's division as far to the left as Sherfey's Peach Orchard. His second division, Birney's, was placed at right angles with this, its line extending southeast toward Little Round Top. This was contrary to orders, but it was plain then, and in the light of Southern official records appears still plainer now, that Lee was pushing Longstreet's troops toward this same point at the same time. Longstreet's critics, headed by Gen. Pendleton and followed by Lee's biographer, Gen. A. S. Long, of Virginia, assume that he, Longstreet, acted contrary to orders in that he did not get the high ground at the Peach Orchard first. The Peach Orchard was Sickles' salient. About 4 o'clock, after Meade had inspected what Sickles had done and resolved to hold on to it, Longstreet made the attack and fought until dark to gain the salient. The first official criticism on Sickles came from Gen. Hallock, the Union general in chief at Washington. In his official report he says that Sickles, misinterpreting Meade's orders in placing his lines, committed "an error which nearly proved fatal in the battle." Gen. Meade did not break the force of this censure by any word of his, but stated in his report that the Third corps sustained the shock of a vigorous assault "most heroically."

GEN. SICKLES.

Now Gen. Sickles claims that his course, by its very imprudence, saved the two Round Tops to the Union cause, and through them saved the battle. In his speech at the reunion of the Third corps at Gettysburg, July, 1886, he said: "The best thing in my line was the salient position, except the men who held it. Why? Because it meant fight, fight right there and then. Lines of battle are controlled by the contour of the ground where you must fight, unless you can force your enemy to come and fight on ground you choose. If I had waited on the line extending from the left of the Second corps, toward Round Top, a line affording no advantage for defense and none for attack, the enemy would have seized the Round Tops without a blow, and the Round Tops were the keys of our position. The enemy would have gained all the commanding ridge in my front to the Emmitsburg road for their artillery, the ground Gen. Lee says he wanted to occupy to enable him to assail our left. It is a cardinal maxim in war to seize the enemy's vantage ground when you know he means to attack. By helping myself to the ground he wanted, and covering the Round Tops, I held the enemy until the Round Tops were occupied by the Fifth corps, and until Caldwell's division of the Second corps could come into position on the left. I held the enemy until 30,000 men were marshaled on our left flank, enough to hold it and repulse the enemy's assault and win the battle.

But my line was a salient, say the critics. So be it. The enemy found it to be a wedge, a bolt, a spear and a thrust." Gen. Longstreet frankly admits that he did not favor an assault in force on Meade at any point. He asserts that he advised Lee against assailing Meade, and at the same time he denies that he wasted away any time, or was lukewarm, or lacking in true spirit. He claims, and others confirm this claim, that Lee was acting on the principle of fighting Meade in detail, and that he (Longstreet) was maneuvering so as not to be beaten in detail himself. The delay caused by Sickles' watchfulness and aggressive movements deferred the Confederate attack some hours, and as Warfield Ridge was the first consideration, it cost the Confederates a bloody struggle to secure it. From here the salient at the Peach Orchard was enfiladed on two sides at once and ultimately fell, while the effort made to get to the rear of it led to the discovery of the unprotected condition of the Round Tops, and brought on a new phase of the battle.

ON TO THE ROUND TOP.

Longstreet also upholds Gen. Sickles in the statement that Lee was particularly anxious to get the Peach Orchard for his artillery, and says: "There in front of us was the Third corps of the Federals, commanded by Gen. Sickles." Of Round Top, he continues: "The importance of Round Top, as a point d'appui, was not appreciated until after my attack. Gen. Meade seems to have alluded to it as a point to be occupied 'if practicable,' but in such slighting manner as to show that he did not deem it of great importance. So it was occupied by an inadequate force. As our battle progressed, pushing the Federals from point to point, subordinate officers and soldiers seeking shelter, as birds fly to cover in a tempest, found behind the large bowlders of its rock-bound sides not only protection but rallying points. These re-enforcements to the troops already there checked our advance on the right, and some superior officer arriving just then, divined from effect the cause, and threw a force into Round Top that transformed it as if by magic into a Gibraltar."

GEN. LONGSTREET.

In attacking Sickles' salient at the Peach Orchard, Lee acted in ignorance of the real line of battle opposed to him, for he supposed that if Longstreet could turn the position on the Emmitsburg road, Meade's left would be broken. The feat looked easy and promised great things when accomplished. This gives point to Sickles' quotation from Lincoln's own lips, that the man who brought on the battle did a great thing. If such forceful logic is to be considered conclusive, Sickles has the best of the argument, although it leaves the Southern end of the question more knotty than ever.

On Longstreet's part the matter rests to his credit, if Lincoln's view be correct. Longstreet opposed the attack on Sickles. So, if the position of Sickles in advance invited attack and opened a battle which turned out in consequence a Confederate defeat, Longstreet is exonerated. On the part of Lee the critics of Longstreet contend that Lee consistently adhered to his promise; that is, in attacking Sickles he was simply putting himself in Meade's way and inviting attack. Sickles on July 2 was between Lee and Washington, but the remainder of Meade's army was not, and the defeat of Sickles would open a road to the Union rear and compel Meade to attack or see Washington exposed to the Confederates. This was why Lee, in the face of remonstrance and notwithstanding the fact that Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps was not yet on the field, pushed Longstreet on to Sickles and the Emmitsburg road. The success of the attack made Lee's situation, which had heretofore been critical, really favorable, and Sickles' defeat and Meade's discomfiture in consequence were a signal triumph for Lee and his personal policy.

The attack by Longstreet on Sickles was to have been sustained by further assaults against Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill on Meade's right. At these points Ewell was expected to do the work which he had failed to undertake on the previous day. The assaults, vigorously made, could have drawn Meade's attention from Sickles' battle and so favor Longstreet's movement. But they were delayed so long that Slocum was enabled to send over all but one division of his Twelfth corps, also Sykes' Fifth corps, which belonged to Slocum's right wing, as support, while Hancock stripped the center along Cemetery Ridge for the same purpose. Notwitstanding all this, Longstreet did the work assigned him, secured the Peach Orchard and Emmitsburg road, and would have gained the Round Tops and thus destroyed Meade's line but for the fresh troops which he met in front of the mountains, the very troops that Ewell had failed to keep occupied on the right. Ewell did, in fact, storm East Cemetery Hill and carried it with Early's troops, and he pushed Johnson's division across Slocum's abandoned breastworks at Culp's Hill, but he was driven off at Cemetery Hill, and the effort at Culp's Hill was made so late that night put an end to Johnson's movements.

GEN. LEE.

Longstreet's critics, among them Long and Pendleton, assert that Ewell's attacks were timed by those of Longstreet, and the delay of the latter on the left caused the miscarriage on Ewell's ground. But Longstreet began between 3 and 4 p. m., Early, at Cemetery Hill, waited till sundown, about 7 o'clock, while Johnson did not get fairly to work until dusk.

An Effective Combination.

Grace—Isn't that your fiance, Kate?

Kate—Yes. Why?

Grace—Isn't he awfully dark, dear?

Kate—Quite; but old gold, with the accent on the gold, being the contrasting color, the combination is an agreeable one and quite harmonious. See?—Judge.

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

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