Lewis and Lilly being wounded, and Colonel Board, of the Fifty-eighth Virginia, being killed. Grant now wrote Halleck to send back to him the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, before Early could get back to Lee; but Early was too quick for him.

On the 22d Early posted himself across Cedar Creek near Strausburg. On the 23d news came which proved to be correct, that Wright's column had returned to Washington, where transports were ready to convey them to Grant at Petersburg and that Crook and Averill had united at Kernstown.

Quick as an eagle swoops upon its prey, Early leaped upon Crook, who commanded the Army of West Virginia, consisting of Hunter's and Sigel's forces and Averill's cavalry, and there where Jackson and Shields had such rough work, he rolled up Crook's flanks, drove him from the field, Colonel Mulligan, a division commander being killed, between two and three hundred prisoners taken, twelve caissons and seventy-two wagons either burned or captured, and the whole army being driven across the Potomac to Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry, in the tracks of Banks's frequent evolutions before Jackson.

This flying and broken army six weeks before had defeated and killed General Jones, of Piedmont. It had now had a second defeat from Early's hands; and when Grant heard the news he sent another division of the Nineteenth Corps to Washington, instead of the troops there continuing their movements to return to him.

The 29th finds Early on the Potomac and McCausland at Chambersburg, where, in default of payment of $100,000 levied upon the town, in retaliation for Hunter's excesses in Virginia, he, under Early's orders, put it to the flames. On the 5th of August Early crossed the Potomac, taking position near Sharpsburg, intending to threaten the enemy's country and keep troops from getting to Grant and to mystify Hunter as to his movements.

GRANT'S PLANS BROKEN UP.

The result shows Early's sagacity. On the 30th of July, while McCausland was at Chambersburg, Grant exploded the mine under a portion of Lee's lines at Petersburg, and on that day Sheridan had joined him there with his cavalry. "The explosion," says Grant, "was a stupendous failure," and he lost 10,000 men in a vain endeavor; but the next day he ordered Meade to take a corps of infantry and the cavalry and to proceed August 1st, before Lee could get back to the Weldon railroad, and destroy fifteen miles of that important line. "But misfortune," says Grant, "never comes singly." He learned that afternoon, July 1st, of Early's movements on the Potomac, and he says: "I rescinded my orders for the division to go out and destroy the Weldon railroad and directed them to embark for Washington city." Thus was Early's draft on Grant's lines again honored, the pressure on Lee to that extent relieved, the second invasion terminated as successful as the first, and now we shall see Grant himself and an army larger than all of Lee's hurrying to look after the irrepressible, redoubtable, and ubiquitous Early.

Grant had been greatly stirred up by Early's movements, and Hunter infinitely mystified, just as Early calculated they would be. On the 4th of August Grant jumped upon the train for City Point, took a steamer, and posted direct through Washington to Monocacy. There he found Hunter, who had started to Richmond and landed at White Sulphur Springs, the Ohio river, and finally at Monocacy.

He asked Hunter an embarrassing question: "Where is the enemy?" He replied that he did not know, and was so embarrassed with orders from Washington that he had lost all trace of the enemy. Grant told him that Sheridan was in Washington with one cavalry division and another on the way, and suggested that he (Hunter) should make headquarters at Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere and give Sheridan command in the Valley. Hunter asked to be relieved, and was relieved, to the equal relief of his foot-sore excursionists. The upshot was that Sheridan was placed in command.

SHERIDAN FORCED BACK TO HALLTOWN.

Grant returned to Petersburg, Hunter passed away, and now for six weeks Early and his new antagonist are chess playing and skirmishing. We have cavalry skirmishes and infantry skirmishes without number. The 7th of August Averill takes four pieces of artillery and about 300 prisoners from McCausland's Brigade at Moorefield. On the 9th Sheridan's whole army is concentrated at Harper's Ferry, and Early hears that he is in command. On the 10th Early formed east of Winchester to cover the roads from Charlestown and Berryville, then goes to Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following. On the 17th Anderson, with Kershaw's Division and Cutshaw's artillery, approaches to reinforce Early, and Early in turn forces Sheridan back to the vicinage of Charleston, skirmishing every day, and is heartily commended by Lee in his dispatches. The Federal historian Pond says of Early's movements at this period: "Holding the line of the Opequon, Early had for weeks not only kept Maryland and Pennsylvania quaking with apprehension, but persistently maintained his grasp on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, checking every effort to open these conduits to the capital and greatly impeding thus travel and trade. His own communications mean time were not cut, and the Virginia Central railroad behind him was in free operation between Staunton and Richmond."

On the 25th of August a heavy force of cavalry is driven through Sheppardstown by Early's infantry and Fitz Lee's cavalry. On the 3d of September Kershaw's Division starts back to Richmond under orders from Lee, but is quickly recalled, the enemy being discovered in line of battle and fortifying. Early now posts himself on the west bank of the Opequon near Winchester, and on the 14th Anderson starts again to Lee, carrying his infantry and artillery. On the 16th Sheridan hears of this through a spy and prepares to advance and give battle. On the 18th Early is at Martinsburg, where he hears that Grant has again visited Sheridan at Charlestown. He divines that a movement is on hand, at once orders a concentration at Winchester, and snuffs battle in the air.

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.

Early was none too quick in his divination, for at dawn on the morning of the 19th Ramseur's Division, at the crossing of the Opequon and Berryville road, is assailed, and from that time till nightfall grim battle raged. The Confederate army was posted across the Berryville 'pike on an elevated plateau between Abraham's creek and Redbud Run, about a mile and a half east of Winchester, with Lomax and three cavalry brigades covering our right and the Valley 'pike going southward, and Fitz Lee covering the Valley 'pike to Martinsburg on our north and left. Sheridan lost an hour in getting his troops well in hand, which Early, as he says, "was not slow to avail of." For, as he pressed upon Ramseur with the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, Wilson's Cavalry Division, which had preceded them as a cover, passed to the Federal left flank to threaten our communications on the Valley 'pike. Early, who had brought up Rodes's and Gordon's divisions from Stevenson's Depot, hurled them upon his flanks in a moment of "imminent and thrilling danger," and concentrated upon them the fire of his artillery under Braxton and Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Carter, its chief. As the massive infantry of the enemy pressed on in three lines they broke and scattered under the counter charge, and were driven from the field. And "it was a grand sight," says Early, "to see this body hurled in utter disorder before my two divisions, numbering a very little over 5,000 muskets."

Lomax on the right had held Wilson's Cavalry Division in check, and with part of his force had gallantly charged the infantry when pressing Ramseur's line. Fitz Lee, from across the Redbud, poured a hot fire into them with his sharp-shooters and Breathed's Artillery, while Nelson's and Braxton's battalions under Colonel T. H. Carter, their guns double-shotted with canister, ripped broad gaps through their lines when they had got close enough almost to feel the hot breath of the tongues of flame upon their cheeks.

VICTORY FOR A TIME—RETREAT.

At midday a splendid victory had been gained; but, alas! that brave and accomplished officer, Major-General Rodes, had fallen; the gallant General Godwin, of Ramseur's Division, had also been slain, and General York, of Gordon's Division, with hundreds of others of brave men, lay stricken. At 2 o'clock Breckinridge, with his division and King's and McLaughlin's artillery, had arrived, and Sheridan was preparing another assault. He had intended to send Crook to cut off Early's retreat southward by the Valley 'pike, but Lomax there had so checked Wilson's progress, and Early had now given him so rough a handling, that he determined to concentrate his three corps on Early's left, while Averill and Merritt, with their two cavalry divisions, were to sweep down the Valley 'pike, also on our left, and in touch with their infantry, and the whole force, with the exception of Wilson, were to decide conclusions there. The most massive concentrative charge of the war (by Federal troops on the open field in Virginia followed.

As this tremendous cavalry force, nearly 10,000 strong, came thundering down the 'pike to the very skirts of Winchester, Fitz Lee fell wounded while gallantly striving against them, and our cavalry, with Patton's Brigade of infantry, were forced back. In double-quick time the two brigades, under Breckinridge, and King's Artillery was thrown into line at right angles to our main line, and the cavalry was again and again repulsed; King's Artillery in the angle firing at the same time to front and flank, until their ammunition was exhausted, and still then sticking to their guns. But our men in front heard the fire rolling to the rear, and with it came the pressure of three corps of 30,000 infantry upon their front, while they were but three meagre divisions. The front line began to wither away—Evan's Brigade broke—and it became evident our men could hold out no longer. Early was everywhere. As the enemy pressed to the very muzzles of Carter's guns, and his officers stood like statues, pistols in hand, for close encounter, there was Early; and now, as the crisis came on the left, he sat his horse amongst King's guns coolly surveying the scene. "Joshua has the sun by the heel," exclaimed some of the men—for it was yet lingering over the weary combatants, and there was no Blucher to come. Early now gave the order to retreat; and, with Wharton on the left and Ramseur on our right, maintaining organization and covering the movement, he deliberately in good order retired with all the honors of war, losing but three guns, which could not be brought off, because the horses were killed. The enemy reported five.

AFTERMATH AT FISHER'S HILL.

On the 20th Early took position at Fisher's Hill, and on the 22d Sheridan again attacked him, Crook's Corps getting in rear of his left flank and his whole army retiring in confusion. But the artillery again distinguished itself by great courage, fighting to the last, and Early had to ride to some of them and order withdrawal of their guns before they would move. Their pertinacity in holding out led to the loss of eleven guns. Otherwise the loss was not great, but Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Pendleton, the distinguished and gallant adjutant-general of the corps, who had served so long with Jackson, Ewell, and Early, fell mortally wounded, leaving a vacuum which it was indeed difficult to supply. Early slowly retired down the Valley to Rude's Hill, between Mount Jackson and New Market, in line of battle, checking the enemy as he advanced, the troops behaving admirably. Sheridan's cavalry followed as far as Staunton, but Early had simply stepped aside to Port Republic while they passed on, and then moved to Waynesboro' on the 30th of September.

In early October he is moving down the Valley again and meditates attacking the enemy at Harrisonburg on the 6th, but he in turn retires. By the 13th he is again at Fisher's Hill and Hupp's Hill, and finds Sheridan posted on the north bank of Cedar creek, and there boldly defies him on the field of his late reverses. The enemy, sending a division across the creek, is met by Conner's Brigade and repulsed, losing their division commander, Colonel Wells, and the gallant and accomplished General Conner on our side losing a leg. On the 15th General Early remains at Fisher's Hill and sends Rosser on a cavalry reconnoissance. On the 17th he displays his full force in front of the enemy's lines to cover Rosser's return, but he is without provisions, and he must either retreat or fight. Well did he appreciate the inspiration of being the assailant, and he determined to assail.

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK.

As the sequel shows, Sheridan had concluded that Early was pretty well used up, and had gone to Washington. General H. G. Wright, of the Sixth Corps, who commanded in his absence, was informed on the 18th that Early had retreated, and the Federal army lay with a feeling of security on the north bank of Cedar creek; but Early was only crouching to spring. Unable to attack the fortified position of the enemy, he determined to take him by flank, and by surprise if possible. He had sent General Gordon, with Captain Hotchkiss, chief engineer to the signal station on Massanutton mountain, to examine the enemy's position, and General Pegram to examine the creek on the enemy's right. Hotchkiss returned with a sketch designating the roads on the enemy's left and rear, and with information that it was practicable to move the infantry between the base of the mountain and the Shenandoah river, into which the creek there empties to a ford below the mouth of the creek. Next morning General Gordon confirmed Captain Hotchkiss's report, expressing confidence that an attack could be successfully made on the enemy's left and rear, and Early resolved to move over the ground designated by Hotchkiss's sketch to the assault. That afternoon the division commanders met at Early's headquarters for final instructions, and Early directed that Gordon should proceed immediately after dark to the foot of the mountain, crossing the river, and move for a house on the west side of the Valley 'pike called "Belle Grove," where Sheridan had his headquarters, taking with him the Second Corps—namely, Gordon's, Ramseur's, and Pegram's divisions. Early in person, with Kershaw and Wharton and all the artillery, was to move along the Valley 'pike from Strausburg and attack the enemy's front and left as soon as Gordon was engaged. Rosser, with his own and Wickham's brigades, was to cross Cedar creek on the enemy's right flank and attack simultaneously with Gordon, while Lomax, with his division, was to move to Front Royal across the river, thence to the Valley 'pike, and strike the enemy wherever the firing might indicate his presence. Colonel William H. Payne, with his small brigade of 300 to 400 men, was to go with Gordon and endeavor to capture Sheridan, who was supposed to be at "Belle Grove."

"THE SUN OF MIDDLETOWN."

At the appointed hour, everything was in motion—Wharton going with Early, at 1 o'clock, towards Strausburg; Rosser starting before day, to attack at 5 A. M.; while Gordon has gone to get in position at nightfall. General Pegram having discovered from the signal station an entrenchment across the road over which Gordon was to advance, Early thought Gordon might have greater difficulty than had been anticipated, and adopted Pegram's suggestion to move toward the enemy's left to attack simultaneously with Gordon and Rosser. The artillery concentrated at Fisher's Hill, at 5 A. M., was to move at a gallop to Hupp's Hill, being thus held back that the rumbling of wheels might not be heard on the macadamized road, and canteens and swords were left in camp, that no sound might startle the enemy.

At 3:30 o'clock in the morning Early, with Kershaw's Division, came in sight of the enemy's fires, and, as the moon was shining, their sleeping camps were in plain view. At 4:30 o'clock, the word forward was given, and Kershaw crossed the creek at Bowman's Hill, and, at exactly 5 o'clock, swept over the enemy's works, taking seven guns, which were at once turned upon them. Rosser was now heard opening up on the left, and as Early, with Wharton's troops, came hurrying to Hupp's Hill, according to appointment, the musketry of Gordon broke out in the enemy's rear; and presently Early and Gordon met in the enemy's camp, for success so far had crowned every effort. Payne's troopers, followed by Gordon's infantry, had swept through the camp, driving and capturing the panic-stricken enemy, for they and Kershaw had been alike victorious. The Nineteenth and Crook's corps, upon which they had fallen, were in complete route and flying the field, abandoning their equipments, with many small arms, and over forty pieces of artillery. As the sun rose, Early, contemplating the wreck, exclaimed: There is the sun of Middletown."

The Sixth Corps, perhaps the steadiest body in the Federal army, however, had gotten under arms, and could be seen like a long, black serpent, moving slowly to the rear. Pegram, attacking one of its divisions, was checked; Wharton's Division was also thrown into some confusion, but Colonel Carter, chief of artillery, concentrated upon it twenty guns, and soon it was in full retreat, Ramseur and Pegram advancing to the position from which it was driven. Some sixteen hundred prisoners had now been taken, and Early was anxious to press forward.

SHOULD WE PRESS FORWARD?

Early now sent Lieutenant Mann Page of his staff, with orders for Gordon and Kershaw to attack, but he soon returned and informed Early that Kershaw stated his division was scattered and not in condition to do so and a cavalry force was pressing on his front. He also stated that Gordon's Division was reforming in the rear of Kershaw, and that it was too scattered to attack. The enemy had now formed their line across the valley 'pike two miles north of Middletown. A heavy force of cavalry was pressing upon our right and Early rode to Middletown to meet this menace, putting Pegram's and Wharton's divisions and Wofford's Brigade in line and repulsing several cavalry charges. He also sent a message to Lomax requiring him to move to Middletown, but the message miscarried, and Lomax, hearing the firing so far in the rear concluded that the enemy were being forced to Winchester, and had moved accordingly in that direction. Early had now gotten Ramseur and Kershaw in line with Pegram's Division, and Gordon coming up, was placed on their left with orders to advance. Without reserve and with more than half his cavalry absent, it was Early's intention to charge with his whole army and stand the hazard of the die. The advance was made for some distance, when Gordon's skirmishers came back reporting a heavy line of battle in front behind breastworks, and Early having given him instructions that if he found the enemy's line too strong not to attack he did not do so. Did Early err in not urging the assault? Some officers of high character, intelligence, and rank, whose opinions are entitled to weight, think so; and it is difficult for one not present to judge. But it is not to be forgotten that his men had been up all the night before and had been fighting over rough ground from the early hours of the morning, and were much jaded; that their ranks had been disordered by their assault, and some of them, alas! had scattered to seize the rich plunder of the enemy's camps. An unavoidable delay in the morning of an hour in Gordon's movements, for which he was not to blame, the miscarriage of the message to Lomax, the strong position which the enemy held, and the fact that he had a cavalry force which hung upon both flanks quite as large as Early's infantry, while we had but 1,200 under Rosser to meet them, that we had on our hands 1,600 prisoners, with many wagons and stores, and had gained a great victory, all these considerations induced Early not to press his men farther. Above all we should not forget that Early was one of the boldest as well as the coolest of men. We had no such opportunity here as we had at Gettysburg when he wanted to advance, and those who exonerate his superiors for not pressing forward upon that occasion should remember his character and be slow to criticise him now.

HIS ARMY IN FLIGHT.

As it happened, Sheridan was in Winchester when Early's attack was delivered, on his return from a visit to Washington. As he rode out of town that morning towards his army he heard the firing, and, galloping towards the field, nearly twenty miles distant, was met by its fugitives. As he arrived on the field he found Getty's Division and the cavalry resisting Early's army. He at once ordered all his troops in line, and late that afternoon, knowing Early's weakness of numbers, he ordered an advance. An interval between Payne's Brigade on our extreme left and the rest of Kershaw's line having been penetrated, the troops there gave way, and presently the whole line followed. Vainly did Gordon try to stay the steps of his thin and weary but now receding lines. Vainly did Ramseur, with a few hundred men, and Major Goggin, of Conner's staff, with as many more of his brigade and Cutshaw's Artillery, try to stem the tide. For an hour and a half they held it in check, but Ramseur fell mortally wounded fighting like a lion, the artillery ammunition was exhausted, and they, too, fell back. Pegram and Wharton and Wofford, on our right, had successfully checked the enemy, but as they now attempted to retire the disorder spread, and the last organized force dissolved into general rout. Vainly did Early try to rally his men on the south bank of Cedar creek and at Hupp's Hill, and he declares that if 500 men had stood by him all his artillery and guns would have been saved, as the enemy's pursuit was feeble, but the bridge broke down at Strausburg, blocking all passage, and they were lost, and Early's army was in disastrous flight from the field of battle.

Thus are we left with the reflection that so often arises, that "war, however crowned by splendid strokes, is commonly a series of errors and accidents"; and thus was illustrated what Napier says that "without fortune, which is only another name for the unknown combinations of infinite power, the designs of men are as bubbles on a troubled ocean."

And so "the sun of Middletown" that had risen so gloriously went down behind the storm clouds that had spent their wrath upon the field of its illumination.

The enemy was terribly shattered, his footsteps weary, his pursuit feeble. Sheridan complains of his cavalry, and that they did not get the full fruits of victory. Terrible as was the shock to Early—wonder 'tis it did not crush him—he was quick upon his feet again, and November 11th; lo! his tattered banners flew again in front of Sheridan north of Cedar creek, near Newtown, the latter retiring to Winchester. At this time Sheridan had 60,000 and Early 14,000 men.

November 27th Rosser suddenly swept down on New Creek, a fortified port on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and captured 800 prisoners, eight pieces of artillery, several hundred cattle, and many stores. In December Sheridan sent back the Sixth Corps to Grant, and Early soon sent Kershaw's Division and the Second Corps back to Lee; and then made his headquarters at Staunton, with Wharton's infantry and Rosser's cavalry, which he alone retained.

Thus ended 1864, Early having some 3,000 men at Staunton, and Sheridan at Winchester, with 43,000, the enemy holding, as President Davis says in his history, "precisely the same position in the Valley which he had before the beginning of the campaign in the spring." Meantime, Sherman had marched through Georgia, and was at Savannah.

WAYNESBORO' AND THE END.

On the 27th of February Sheridan started from Winchester with his cavalry, Early having Rosser, with a few hundred men, and Wharton's two small brigades, and Nelson's artillery, to meet him. Rosser could only hang on the skirts of this column, ten thousand strong, for he was powerless to check it; and Early retired to Waynesboro', where he placed Wharton, with a thousand muskets, and Nelson, with six pieces of artillery, on a ridge, some sixteen hundred men, all told. He did not intend to make this his battle-ground, but only to cover the getting-off of his equipments; but here he was attacked on the 2d of March. His orders to post artillery, in anticipation of the attack, miscarried, as did also his message of warning to Wharton; and, as the event disclosed, most of his command and his artillery was captured, he and General Wharton barely escaping. Sheridan now rode rough-shod through Virginia, destroying as he went, and joined Grant at Richmond. Early, after several narrow escapes, reached Richmond, after passing twice between the enemy's camps and his pickets, and, consulting with General Lee, was sent to Southwest Virginia to organize with General Echols what force might be collected in that section. There, on the 30th of March, he received a telegram from General Lee relieving him from duty.

Notwithstanding the gloomy close of a great career, it cannot be denied that Early demonstrated the qualities of a great commander. No one whose mind is open to light can fail to see in him quick divination of his enemy's plans, prompt and unhesitating decision, indefatigable energy and industry, cool, discerning judgment—the quickness of the eagle's flight in movement, the fearlessness of the lion's heart in action.

He assumed the gravest responsibilities when he might have easily avoided them. He was never dilatory or belated in execution of an order. He never clamored for reinforcements when he knew there were none to send. He detached troops obediently, without complaint, when he knew the peril to which it subjected him. He was never chided, reproved, or blamed by his superiors.

No better fighting was ever done than that of Early at Winchester; no more brilliant plan was ever conceived than that at Cedar creek. Nothing could have shown more boldness than Early's giving battle at Winchester, nor more cool deliberation than his steady retirement. "He deserves," says Pond, the Federal historian, "the credit of great vigor and skill in fighting the battle forced upon him, and in moving his trains and his army out of the ruin his opponent had prepared for him." (Page 172.)

That he rallied so speedily after Fisher's Hill, and struck so splendidly at Cedar creek, and that he always came back with unrelenting and elastic courage is as true a picture of a great man struggling with the storms of fate as the heroic tragedy of human nature has ever presented.

THE ODDS AGAINST EARLY.

In reviewing his campaigns we realize the truth of General Lee's saying, "That it will be difficult to make the world believe the odds against which we fought," and the wisdom of Early's philosophy of the war, when he declined to "speculate on the causes of Confederate failure, finding abundant reason for it in the tremendous odds brought against us." Everything about his campaign has been exaggerated; his numbers, his defeats, his losses, the prisoners taken, and the extent of his disasters.

1. I have said that Sheridan's army was larger than Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, with Early's and Beauregard's troops included.

Here is the proof in Sheridan's return of his muster-roll for August, 1864 (see Serial 90 of the War Records, page 974), showing 173,624 aggregate, present and absent; 114,561, present; and 94,026, present for duty, with 736 seige-guns, and 297 field-pieces.

This was more than Lee had—all told.

Many of Sheridan's men were at Washington, Baltimore, and Chambersburg. But here is the return of what he had actually in the field with him, showing 62,740, aggregate, present, with 37,752 infantry, 14,734 cavalry, and 4,691 artillerymen, aggregate, 57,177 for duty. (See Serial 90, War Records, page 974.)

2. I have said that Sheridan's three infantry corps each outnumbered by average Early's whole infantry force. Here is the proof. In Serial 90 of the War Records, page 61, you will find Sheridan's return of September 10th, showing present for duty, 45,487; the Sixth Corps having infantry for duty, 12,696; the Nineteenth, 12,810, and Cook's army of West Virginia having 7,140; aggregate, 32,646, or an average for each corps of more than all of Early's infantry.

And in Pond's History, page 267, you will find the returns for the month of September, showing the Sixth Corps with 10,967 infantry for duty. The Nineteenth, with 10,862 infantry for duty; Crook's army, with 10,297; aggregate, 31,226, with the same result.

Sheridan says in his memoirs (I, page 471): "The Confederate army at this date (September) was about 20,000 strong, and consisted of Early's own corps, with General Rodes, Ramseur, and Gordon commanding its divisions, the infantry of Breckinridge from Southwestern Virginia, three battalions of artillery, and the cavalry brigades of Vaughan, Johnson, McCausland, and Imboden."

The statement as to the infantry commands is correct; but as to numbers it nearly doubles the force of Early. The latter was remarkably accurate and reliable, and he says of this period (September 19, 1864): "The Second Corps numbered a little over 8,000 muskets when it was detached in pursuit of Hunter, and it had now been reduced to about 7,000 muskets by long and rapid marches and the various engagements and skirmishes in which it had participated. Wharton's Division had been reduced to about 1,700 muskets by the same causes. Making a small allowance for details and those unfit for duty, I had about 8,500 muskets for duty."

Vaughan's cavalry had at this time been sent to Southwest Virginia, and "such," says Early, "such had been the loss in all the brigades in the various fights and skirmishes in which they had been engaged that the whole of this cavalry now under Lomax numbered only about 1,700 mounted men. Fitz Lee had brought with him two brigades—to-wit, Wickham's and Lomax's old Brigade (now under Colonel Payne), numbering about 1,200 mounted men." (Early's book pp. 85, 86.) I have accepted each commander's statement as to his own troops, and they abundantly sustain me.

3. I have said that Sheridan's cavalry equalled all of Early's infantry, and was sometimes more than his whole army. The returns show that Averill had in August 6,472 present for duty, and Torbert in his corps 8,262—aggregate, 14,734.

This was more than Early's whole force for duty, and more than three times our cavalry. And if you choose to pursue the investigation you will find in Serial 90 and 91 of the War Records reports of cavalry strength by divisions fully demonstrating the correctness of my statements.

4. I have said that Early in his campaign killed, wounded, and captured more men than he had ever mustered on a battle-field. Here is the proof:

Hunter lost at Lynchburg 700, Wallace at Monocacy lost 1,959, and Sheridan reports his losses at 16,952. Total, 19,611.

Early had on his rolls 55,949 present and absent counting Kershaw's Division, which was not at Winchester; but with it present, August 21st, his whole infantry for duty was 14,485.

This was before the battles at Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and he never had more at any time.

Nor did his whole army ever equal in number the casualties reported by Sheridan; nor did Early's cavalry ever amount to 5,000.

LOSSES IN THREE BATTLES.

I now present the casualties of losses in the three battles of Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar creek, compiled by Lieutenant-Colonel Fox, of the United States army, and given in his book of War Statistics, pages 547-551.

Battles.	Killed.	Wounded.	Captured or Missing.	Aggregate.
Sheridan:				
Winchester, or Opequon	697	3,983	338	5,018
Fisher's Hill	52	457	19	528
Cedar Creek	644	3,430	1,591	5,665
Aggregate	1,383	7,860	1,948	11,211
Early:				
Winchester or Opequon	226	1,567	1,818	3,611
Fisher's Hill	30	210	995	1,235
Cedar Creek	320	1,540	1,050	2,910
Aggregate	576	3,317	3,863	7,756

Not including Early's cavalry losses.

This does not include Early's losses in cavalry, but during all September they were 60 killed and 288 wounded, and putting them at 1,000, which is very excessive for the three battles, they would show that Sheridan's loss in killed and wounded was much greater than Early's, and Early's losses greater in prisoners, yet all told for the three fights Early's aggregate loss more than 2,000 less.

What such a man could have done with resources to match his genius can be left only to inspire the imagination.

As to prisoners, Grant says, in his memoirs, that Early had lost more men killed, wounded, and captured, than Sheridan had commanded from first to last. How such an absurd statement could have gotten into printer's ink is unaccountable. This is contradicted by Sheridan himself, for he reports that from August 1, 1864, to March 1, 1865, the prisoners received by his provost-marshal were about 13,000. (See War Records, Serial 91, page 60.) Grant forgets he had instructed Sheridan to consider citizens under 50 years old as prisoners of war, and not as citizen prisoners, (see Grant's order of August 16, 1864, Sheridan's Memoirs, first volume, page 486), and this 13,000 embraced all deserters, stragglers, furloughed soldiers of Lee's army, army-agents of all kinds, and all citizens who were carried to Washington, whether soldiers or otherwise. The truth is patent that I have made good my statement that Early killed, wounded, and captured from Hunter, Wallace, and Sheridan more men than he could ever muster upon any battle-field against either of them, and Grant has turned the truth of history upside down, in a manner that no one who reads its records can explain.

CRITICISMS UPON EARLY.

To say that Early had faults is to say that he was human; and, as Marshal Turenne reminds us, "to say that he made mistakes, is to say that he made war." But even at this day it is difficult to take his problem and its resources and say where or when he might have better brought them in conjunction—the one to solve the other. To figure on his case at any time was to demonstrate failure; and so many heroic virtues postponed that failure and glorified it that I leave it for others to search for the mistakes and faults. For my part I am too much filled with honor for the man and the deed to look for or to exploit them, and most of the criticisms upon him are easily answered.

It was said that he should have attacked Hunter on the 18th of June, the day after he got to Lynchburg. Suffice to answer, while he and half his corps were there, Rodes and the other half did not get there until the afternoon of the 18th, and Early arranged to attack next morning. Meantime between two suns Hunter gave leg bail. It was said he should have captured Hunter; this is equivalent to saying that Lee should have captured Pope after Manassas, or Hooker after Chancellorsville, or Grant after Cold Harbor. It was said that he should have captured Washington; this absurdity has been exposed. Grant criticises Early for sending Anderson's troops back to Lee before the battle of Winchester, and two of his own divisions to Martinsburg. As to this criticism Lee, as Early states, requested him to send Anderson back, and he obeyed. Sheridan and Lee alike vindicate him from the second. Early, in fact, got all his troops concentrated for that battle, and Sheridan says in his report: "I had from early in the morning become apprised that I would have to engage Early's entire army instead of two divisions." General Lee writes to a critic of Early, October 10th, that so far as he can judge, Early has conducted the military operations in the Valley well; and again, October 14th, that according to his information, General Early has conducted his operations with judgment, and I am reliably informed that he spoke of Winchester as one of the best fought battles of the war.

Finally, some say Early was reckless to meet Sheridan at Winchester, and to attack him at Cedar creek. In both cases it was fight or run. To run was to disclose and confess weakness. In the latter case, to stand was to starve, for he was without rations or forage. Early had the problem that confronted the Continentals in the Revolution. He knew he was weak, but when would he be stronger? "It may be asked," he says, speaking of Cedar Creek, "why, with my small force, I made the attack? I can only say we had been fighting large odds during the whole war, and I knew there was no chance for lessening them."

Those who dispute this logic had better reassemble the Secession Convention of 1861, and submit the question. Early was heard upon it before the war was resolved on. After that he took the consequences unmurmuringly. And well did he vindicate Honest John Letcher's opinion, when he, as Governor, appointed him a colonel. Some secession members objected on account of Early's stubborn unionism. "I know Early," replied Letcher, "and if you gentlemen will do as well in the coming struggle, your State will have reason to rejoice." If none but those who did as well threw the first stone, it would remain long unflung.

LEE'S FAITH IN EARLY.

General Early had the satisfaction of retaining the confidence and good opinion of his great commander, R. E. Lee. After all reverses in the Valley Lee, on the 20th of February, 1865, extended his command to embrace the department of West Virginia and East Tennessee, previously commanded by General John C. Breckinridge, who had now become the Secretary of War. This brave and excellent officer's service under Early had familiarized him with his merits; he had testified to General Lee in high terms of his capacity and energy, and of his excellent disposition of his troops, and to Early's critics Lee had responded in language, which I have already quoted. (See War Records, s. 91, p. 897.) But Early had now to accept the fate of war, for public opinion unadvised of his difficulties and extremities, clamored for a new leader. Lee himself had seen and felt its frequent injustice, and has stated that public opinion is more likely to be erroneous on military affairs than any other, because of their secrecy preventing complete knowledge.

It clamored against him when he did not win victory in West Virginia; against Jackson before the Valley Campaign; against Albert Sidney Johnston before he fell at Shiloh; it demanded Joe Johnston's removal when he retreated before Sherman, and as loudly demanded his restoration when Hood advanced and failed. On the other hand, when Thomas was defeating Hood, at Nashville, the message was on its way to supersede him for not fighting and was drowned out in the shouts of his victory. While he yielded to the current of opinion respecting Early's operations General Lee, in addressing him the letter relieving him from duty, on March 30, 1865, declared therein his own "confidence in his ability and zeal and devotion to be unimpaired," and concluding with an expression of thanks "for the fidelity and courage with which you have always supported my efforts, and for the courage and devotion you have always manifested in the service of the country."

One week before that, on March 24, 1865, Lee had made a last effort to break Grant's lines in vain, and the Second Corps, under Gordon, had stormed and taken Fort Steadman. There happened then what would have happened had Early taken Washington, and what did happen at Cedar creek. Our troops were brave enough to take; they were not strong enough to hold. The enemy concentrated numbers and drove them back. On the very day of Early's removal Grant moved on the Petersburg lines; March 31st Five-Forks was lost; Petersburg was carried April 2d, and a week later, April 9th, the matchless Lee and the remnant of his matchless army surrendered. When Early heard the news he was sick in an ambulance going home from Wytheville. He said, "without the slightest irreverence I will say that the sound of the last trump would not have been more unwelcome to my ears."

Comparisons have been made between Jackson's and Early's campaigns, sometimes to the detriment of the latter. The differences in their situations should be remembered.

FOUGHT UNDER A PALING STAR.

First, Jackson fought when the prestige of the Confederacy was in the ascendancy. Early, when it was on the decline. Atlanta fell before Sherman the day before he defeated Crook, at Kernstown. Our misfortunes at Vicksburg, Gettysbury, Missionary Ridge, and Knoxville had taken place before Early's campaign begun. The waning resources of the Confederacy and the collapse of its finances had changed the face of affairs. With Mississippi, Kentucky, and Tennessee overrun, the Trans-Mississippi cut from us, and the lower basin useless, the enemy could concentrate at will against our forces in Georgia and Virginia.

Second, the Valley was a garden and a granary when Jackson fought. Early fought in a desert, where "the crow flying over it would have to carry his rations." He had to practice the art of Napoleon—scatter to subsist, and concentrate for battle. He had men seizing and grinding stacks of wheat while battle raged about them. What shall we eat and wherewithal shall we be clothed was the problem of his men, and if they plundered battle-fields it was hunger and nakedness that prompted them.

Third, Jackson's cavalry was not overmatched by the enemy's, as Early's was, three to one. The Valley, now denuded of fences and swept by fire, was a splendid field for cavalry operations; and Early felt and expressed his sense of deficiency in cavalry. His own was more overnumbered than any other arm of the service; it was terribly overworked and overstrained—for instance, Payne's Brigade was under fire every day for a month before the battle of Winchester. The Federal Government supplied its troops with good mounts and bountiful forage, while our cavalry had to make-shift to get horses as best they could, many being absent at all times in search for them. When they got them, it was equally difficult to feed them; and more than once brigades were disbanded to get horses, while their remnants fought dismounted. When Sheridan mustered a cavalry corps that reported over sixteen thousand for duty, finely mounted and equipped, with sabres, pistols, and repeating rifles, our troopers had to procure any kind of weapons they could, while their half-famished steeds reminded us of the poor jades of Henry the Fifth at Agincourt.

"The gum down roping from their pale, dead eyes,
And in their pale, dull mouths the gimmal bit
Lies foul with chewed grass, still and motionless;
And their executors, the knavish crows, fly over them
All impatient for the hour."

It must be remembered that Early's first chief of cavalry, General Robert Ransom, was compelled to retire from ill health, and that he also lost the valuable services of General Fitzhugh Lee by his wound at Winchester. That Rosser and Lomax, McCausland, and their subordinates did so well under the circumstances is wonderful, and I wish I had time to refer more at length to their various exploits. Rosser's movements at New Creek and Beverly—where he lit up the closing scenes of disastrous war with signal victories—deserve especial mention.

Many splendid deeds and names have I left out of my recital which well deserve historic praise. What a glowing page might be made of the brave partisan Mosby's remarkable movement in Sheridan's rear, where, with less than 500 men, he kept many thousands occupied guarding communications of the Federal army and the approaches to Washington. But these will not be overlooked or forgotten. They would adorn but they would not vary the thread of my story.

OUR ARTILLERY DID WONDERS.

Our artillery distinguished itself everywhere. At Winchester, says Early, "it did wonders." It overdid itself in tenacity at Fisher's Hill; it strove desperately at Cedar Creek. Its chief, Colonel T. H. Carter, who was wounded at Winchester, but again in battle at Cedar Creek, knew his business. In Braxton and other battalion and company commanders, he had able assistants; and though Sheridan had 100 guns and Early never had 50 on any field, they were never overmatched on any field.

Our infantry suffered for officers often, for such had been the fatality that the remnants of fourteen Virginia regiments had been put in one little brigade under Terry; Hays's and Stafford's brigades had been consolidated likewise—and often there was not even a field officer in a brigade—while regiments were under lieutenants. Not a single brigadier of the Second Corps who commanded in the beginning of the campaign was there scathless to witness its close.

No reflection, indeed, can be cast upon Early's soldiers of any arm of the service. They could well say:

"'Tis not in mortals to command success,
We have done better—we have deserved it."

Nor did soldiers ever have a truer friend than Early. He was untiring in making provision for them, and his eulogy of them is praise indeed. "I believe," says he, "that the world never produced a body of men superior in courage, patriotism, and endurance to the private soldiers of the Confederate armies. I have repeatedly seen these soldiers submit with cheerfulness to privations and hardships which would appear to be almost incredible; and the wild cheers of our brave men (which were so different from the studied huzzahs of the Yankees) when their lines sent back opposing hosts of Federal troops, staggering, reeling, and flying, have often thrilled every fibre of my heart. I have seen with my own eyes ragged, barefooted, and hungry Confederate soldiers perform deeds which if performed in days of yore by mailed warriors in glittering armor, would have inspired the harp of the minstrel and the pen of the poet."

Through the vista of vanished years I seem to see them now. There they go along the road and over the fields with almost shoeless feet, their slouch hats, their gray jackets, and their battle-flags all tattered and torn, but their steps proud and elastic and their high, expectant faces all eager for the fray. Hark! There rings out o'er the rattling musketry and the thundering cannon their lofty cheer—yonder they are—we see them through the smoke drifts now as they stand defiant and dauntless amidst dead, dying, and falling comrades, weather-beaten and bronzed, sweat-begrimed, and powder-stained, half-starved, half-clothed—without reward, without complaint, asking for nothing but orders—fearing nothing but defeat, hoping nothing but victory. I believe them entitled to eternal glory and everlasting life.

COMPARED TO ENGLISH COMMANDERS.

I have counted Early amongst the great soldiers of history, and as our Mother Country ranks amongst the great military nations, I would ask you who are her great soldiers who might be put before him? Who, in her centuries of battles, would you name as great commanders in the sense of those who have led great forces, and found the delight of battle with their peers?" Marlborough, yes; Wellington, yes. Who next? Trying to discover the next you begin to realize how scant is British history in the names of great commanders. I believe Virginia alone in the late war produced more men for whom that title could be claimed than Great Britain in all her history. Heroes in abundance and accomplished officers she has produced; but her wars have been for the most part against inferiors—against Hindoos, and Persians, Afgans, Zulus, Chinese, Egyptians, Arabs, and Matabeles. The greatest army of her own that she ever mustered was the 30,000 of Wellington at Waterloo. Her forces have generally co-operated with allies; or been swelled by hirelings and dependents, under her well-trained officers; her position has not been such as to develop campaigns such as we had in the late war, or to afford opportunities for such leaders as Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, Ewell, A. P. Hill, Jackson, Stuart, and Early. The fact is that since the battle of Sedgmoor, fought August 5, 1685, between the Duke of Monmouth, some 6,000 strong, and the forces of King James II., under John Churchill, afterwards the Duke of Marlborough, in which Monmouth lost a thousand and Churchill some 300 slain, "no conflict deserving the name of battle has been fought on English ground."

SECRET OF ENGLAND'S DEMONSTRATION.

While it is true that during this domestic peace of over 200 years, the British "have carried the English flag victorious from the Seine to the Indus, from Calcutta to Quebec, from Madrid to Cairo," it has been more by the skill of diplomacy and strategy, and especially more by sea power than by the movements of great forces. If we except the American campaigns and Wellington's operations against Napoleon, all the English fighting done in two centuries would scarce amount to that of General Lee in the single county of Spotsylvania, and would not amount to the fighting done by Early. "A sea shell," says Emerson, "should be the crest of England, not only because it represents a power built on the waves, but also because of the hard finish of the men." She is mistress of the seas; she is the dictator of finance and commerce—there is the key of her ascendancy. Who, then, would you say next?

Would you say Clive, the military statesman who conquered Hindoostan? He, who at the battle of Plassey, on the 23d of June, 1757, in Everett's fine words, "laid the foundations of a subject Empire to Great Britain at the gates of the morning?" When it is remembered that he dispersed the army of the Indian Nabob, estimated at sixty or seventy thousand, with a thousand European soldiers and two thousand Indian Sepoy troops, and that his training was that of a government clerk, his genius and accomplishments are plain indeed. But when we reflect that his loss was twenty-two killed and about fifty wounded, and that his superior artillery broke the masses of the effeminate foe, we see how ridiculous it is to compare such exploits to the great movements of the Confederate war, and how ridiculous it would be to rank their heroes as military commanders with the leaders of such armies as those of Lee, Grant, Early, or Sheridan. What matters it to the wolves how many the sheep be? And how can a romp of the wolves among the cattle be compared to the combats of lions? Would you say Havelock? Christian gentleman, gallant officer, true hero, I admit, but only a little Clive, a brigadier-general who fought the same manner of men and overlaid them with superiority of every kind. Would you say Charles George Gordon, Chinese Gordon, as they call him, who was only a captain of engineers in the Crimean war, and who while we were fighting in the Confederacy was helping the Emperor of China to suppress the Taiping rebellion, and who was finally killed in the Soudan by a handful of Arabs? Brave man he was, indeed; but he never commanded even an English brigade. To compare his skirmishes with the semi-barbarians to such actions as we had in war, or him to any great Confederate leader, would be to belittle—aye, to abandon all ideas of military criticism.

Who would say Lord Raglan, who commanded in the Crimea? He died of disease after incomplete experiences, and cannot furnish a subject of comparison.

LATE ENGLISH MILITARY MAGNATES.

Let us glance at some late English military magnates, General James Thomas Brudenal, Earl of Cardigan, who led the Light Brigade in the famous and fatal charge of the 600 on the Russian guns at Balaklava, "while all the world wondered," was never in a fight before or after the Crimean war, but he was made lieutenant-general, Knight Commander of the Bath, Commander of the Legion of Honor, and lionized generally.

General Sir James Yorke Scarlett, who commanded "the heavies" and succeeded Lucan, had a similar record, and became, too, lieutenant-general and Knight Commander of the Bath.

General George Charles Bingham, Earl of Lucan, who commanded the cavalry division, consisting of these two brigades, beyond some amateur soldiering with the Russians in 1828, never smelt powder before or after the Crimean war, but he became Knight Commander of the Bath, lieutenant-general, and field marshal.

What do these cavalrymen know of war compared to Forrest, Stuart, Hampton, Wheeler, or the cavalry Lees?

Robert Cornelis Napier, Lord Napier of Magdala, as he is familiarly called, had served well in India and China, and he received an annuity of £2,000, was made field marshal, Knight Commander of the Bath, and a catalogue of honors for a little skirmish with and a general demolition of King Theodore in Abyssinia. There were many skirmishes in Early's campaigns, the names of which I have not called, that exceeded all his fighting. His Royal Highness George William Frederick Charles, Duke of Cambridge, field marshal and long time commander-in-chief of the British army, was in two fights, the Alma Inkermann.

General Sir Garnet Joseph Wolsley, viscount, K. P., K. C. B., G. C. M. G., D. C. L., L. L. D., fought the Burmese, the Russians in the Crimean, the Ashantees on the African Gold Coast, and finally Egyptians and Arabs. He is a scholar, a gentleman, and a gallant soldier, twice wounded, and has skirmished around the world in good shape, getting £25,000 from his government for undoing a poor African king, and no end of military and civic honors, and is now commander-in-chief of the British army.

John Bull has bullied the world. He has done the largest real estate business on the smallest piece of land; he has conducted the largest wholesale trade on the smallest retail capital; he has stretched out the longest lines with the fewest men, and has got more military distinction for the smallest lot of fighting than anybody else that ever lived.

In four years the Confederates fought 2,261 battles, an average of nearly two a day. Six hundred of them were fought on Virginia soil. Our American transactions have been on so great a scale; we have produced so many great captains, that we often fail to realize the magnitude of our accomplishments and the greatness of our home-bred heroes. How great a figure would they fill in the world's eye if they were celebrated as the older nations have celebrated theirs with titles and estates, and with artistic and literary monuments?

Wellington's generals in the Peninsula did real fighting. They would furnish the nearest resemblance to our own; but time forbids that I pursue the parallel with other English generals, and I leave you to pursue it for yourselves, confident that you will tarry a long time with Marlborough and Wellington, and will stand puzzled to answer my question, "Who next?" None, I will confidently say, that you will be willing to rank above Jubal A. Early.

SECOND TO LEE AND JACKSON.

I have said, and I have heard it said by one of the best officers that served under Early, that amongst our Confederate-army commanders he was second only to Lee and Jackson. And who, I pray you, may dispute that precedence? We could not say Albert Sidney Johnston, for he never fought a single battle from start to finish; he fell at Shiloh delivering a well-conceived and brave attack, and victory passed from the field with his fall. He lived a glorious hope; he died a glorious martyr; he lives yet a glorious memory, but the deeds he might have done are not.

On the same principle, and for reasons, though in far less degree, we could not say, Joseph E. Johnston or Beauregard.

They divided honors in our first glorious victory at Manassas, and are entitled to the highest distinction therefor. Johnston manoeuvred well at Yorktown, struck McClellan a parting blow with fine address at Williamsburg, and then, like Albert Sidney Johnston, at Shiloh, fell wounded as he was pressing the enemy at Seven Pines, when opportunity vanished. For two years he was not again in battle until 1864, when he took command of a defeated army at Dalton, and conducted a masterly retreat to Atlanta, fighting as he fell back at Dalton, Resaca, New Hope Church, and Kenesaw, and, indeed, all along the way, with courage, skill, and effect. Unfortunately removed from the command, 'ere his plans matured, there was no chance to judge them by the event; and when he returned to a broken but undismayed army, and led it in its last gallant fight, at Bentonville, it was only the prelude of surrender.

General Beauregard defended Charleston and Savannah with great gallantry and engineering skill, but he was engaged in but three great actions during the war—Manassas, in 1861; Shiloh, in 1862, and Petersburg, in 1864. He was victorious in the first, fortune failed him in the second, it perched again upon his banner in the last, when he saved the Cockade City, the very day Early saved Lynchburg, after a three-days' fight against enormous odds, in one of the best-fought battles of the civil war, which followed his skilful "bottling-up" of Butler at Drewry's Bluff. But in his case as in Joseph E. Johnston's, the record is so fragmentary, after Manassas neither of them tried conclusions with an adversary in general engagement (Beauregard at Petersburg excepted), neither of them drove an enemy off the field of combat, and, whatever their abilities, which undoubtedly were great, they were never put to final tests by uninterrupted campaigns, and can hence not be the subject of satisfactory comparison.

Battles unfought and campaigns untried must be left with deeds undone and songs unsung. We may talk forever about the real or assumed greatness of men, but war has one only measure—What did they dare? What did they do? Summing up Early's four years of bloody deeds, of unsurpassed daring, and of long continued and sustained travail and suffering thereto, who I pray you, presents a record superior in all that tests the soldier and the man?

SUSTAINED BY MILITARY TESTS.

By whatever test you try him, Lee and Jackson stand alone before him amongst Confederate army commanders.

If marching be the test, no one in a given time marched so much, so far, so fast.

If fighting be the test, no one fought so steadfastly, so continuously, so frequently, so daringly, so stoutly.

If difficulties and odds encountered be the test, no soldier of the war [illegible] so many to oppose him, or met such great odds man to man in open field fight.

If damage done an enemy be the test, none other but Lee killed, wounded, and captured as many men as he had.

If success be the test, no one can count the names of more victories; or of victories that had more effect.

If result be the test, let this be said, that his desperate campaign of 1864 prolonged the life of the Confederacy a year; the very day he left the field Grant marched to victory—and when he fell at last, the general crash came down upon us all. On these deeds done, and well done, I rest his fame.

Will you tell me that Early failed, and does this bar the door of fame? Hannibal failed. Napoleon failed. Lee failed. If there be a Cedar creek there is also a Pontine Marsh, a Waterloo, and an Appomattox. A great young nation was extinguished like a dying star. A whole people, genius, valor, patriotism, and renown, went down in calamity and ruin. Does not Providence cast down the great, the gifted, and the good to demonstrate virtue, and to instruct us to be careless of fortune? A soldier must take his fate, whether it comes with death, as it did to Charles XII., to Wallenstein, to Gustavus Adolphus, to Hampden and Sidney, to Jackson and Stuart, to Polk, to Cleburne, to Pegram and Pelham, to Wolfe, to Warren, and Sidney Johnston; whether it comes by wounds, as to Joe Johnson, and Ewell, whether in gloom and disaster, as to Hannibal, to Napoleon, to Lee and Early. But the deed lives. What did he dare? What did he do? "Ad parebat quo nihil inquiusest ex eventus famam habiturum," said Livy of old, of one who got fame not from his own deed, but from happy deliverance, and who in the chance medley and motley wear of this [illegible] sphere has not learned that the [illegible] of the fickle goddess which cast down are ever condoned and repaired by the slow and even hand of justice. The harsh decrees in one age are revised by the equity of the next age; and all history tells me with its splendid tale of tragic grandeur and pathetic fate that immortality cherishes for its nurslings the wrecks and castaways of fortune. Failure? That was yesterday; to-day he stands glorious.

PERSONAL QUALITIES OF GENERAL EARLY.

Let me say something ere I say good night of some personal characteristics. Early's courage was supreme. Never did mortal breast hold a braver soul nor one more firmly set. It is as natural to die as it is to be born, and as natural to fear as it is to live, or love, or hate, and many of the bravest men that ever lived have been exercised by apprehensions that caused their hearts to thrill and their frames to quake. Frederick the Great is described by Macaulay as marching through Europe with "a bottle of poison in one pocket and a copy of bad verses in the other." He feared his fate. Napoleon carried an amulet of poison around his neck, and once took it. When Marshall Turenne, on one occasion, was leaping on his horse to meet a sudden assault, his legs shook as his feet sought the stirrups. "Ah, you rascals," he exclaimed, as he smilingly looked down upon them, "if you knew where I was going to take you you would shake worse than that." Chinese Gordon, who, after a life of hair-breadth adventures, fell at Khartoum, writes in his diary that he has always been frightened, and very much so, not at the fear of death, but the fear of defeat and its consequences. "I do not believe," he says, "in the calm, unmoved men. I think it is only that he does not show it outwardly." Early had that supreme courage that shrinks before no responsibility and that dares with composure to face defeat and disaster for his country. Whatever pangs may have stirred his secret breast were never disclosed in outward manifestation. His hand never quivered, his face never changed when he launched the thunderbolts of war or received its rude shocks, and if ever he took account of danger or death or misfortune or blame or shame it was a matter left behind the mask of his impassive countenance between him and his Maker.

MAGNANIMITY, GENEROSITY, AND CHARITY.

He possessed great magnanimity, generosity, and charity. His opposition to secession gave him a commanding political position, and the confidence of the people, when at last his forebodings were realized. But he never uttered the raven's croak, "I told you so"; he never reproached any secessionist that backed his opinions with his service, and he never sunned himself in the approving smiles of the conquerors. On the contrary, he contended that the subsequent harshness of our enemies justified the course that Virginia and the South pursued. It is well known, and I am a personal witness of the fact, that as soon as he occupied the town of Gettysburg in the first day's fight, he earnestly urged the immediate pursuit of the enemy. Unable for the moment to find Ewell, the corps commander, he sent a note to Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, urging him to