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THE CHILDREN.

The following beautiful poem was written by Charles Dickens:
When the lessons and tasks are all ended,
And the school for the day is dismissed,
And the little ones gather round me,
To bid me good night and to kiss me;
Oh, the little white arms that encircle
My neck in a tender embrace!
Oh, the smiles that are halos of heaven,
Shedding sunshine of love on my face!
And when they are gone I sit dreaming
Of my childhood, too lovely to last:
Of love that my heart will remember,
When it wakes to the pulse of the past—
Ere the world and its wickedness made me
A father of sorrow and sin;
When the glory of God was about me,
And the glory of gladness within.
Oh, my heart grows weak as a woman's,
And the fountain of feeling will flow,
When I think of the paths steep and stony,
Where the feet of the dear ones must go;
Of the mountains of sin hanging o'er them,
Of the tempt of Satan blowing wild;
Oh, there is nothing on earth half so holy
As the innocent heart of a child!
They are idols of hearts and of households;
They are angels of God in disguise;
His sunlight still sleeps in their tresses,
His glory still glows in their eyes.
Oh, those trants from home and from heaven,
They have made me cry manly and mild;
And I know how Jesus could I love,
The Kingdom of God to a child.
I ask not a life for the dear ones,
All radiant as others have done
But that life may have just enough shadow
To temper the glare of the sun;
I would pray God to grant them from evil,
But my prayer would bound back to myself,
Ah! a sinner may pray for a sinner,
But a sinner must pray for himself.
The twig is so easily led,
I have insisted the rule and the rod;
I have taught them the goodness of knowledge,
They have taught me the goodness of God;
My heart is a dungeon of darkness,
Where I shut them from breaking a rule;
My frown is sufficient correction;
My love is the law of the school.
I shall leave the old house in the autumn,
To traverse its threshold no more;
Ah! how I shall sigh for the dear ones
That met me each morn at the door!
I shall miss the "good night" and the kisses,
And the hush of their innocent sleep,
The group on the green, and the flow-ers
That are brought every morning to me.
I shall miss them at noon and at evening,
Their song in the school and the street;
I shall miss the low hum of their voices,
And the tramp of their delicate feet.
When the lessons and tasks are all ended,
And death says, "The school is dismissed!"
May the little ones gather round me,
To bid me good night and to kiss me.

The Law of Divorce.

John H. Walker vs. Mary J. Walker—In the Common Pleas—Equity side, Greenville, May Term, 1869—Petition for Divorce—*Vinculo Matrimonii*.
The Petitioner, John H. Walker, filed his petition on the 31st March 1869, against Mary Jane Walker, his wife, praying "a divorce *a vinculo matrimonii* from the said Mary and that she be permitted to resume her maiden name of Mary J. Walker." On the ground, that a few months after their marriage, his wife became exceedingly unhappy in her disposition, unkind in her treatment to him, used violent, abusive and menacing language towards him, and constantly manifested a determined malignity towards him. She accompanied her language with blows on several occasions. "Her hostility, violence and malignity to him increased, until at length it became intolerable, and they willfully separated about November, 1860, since which time they have lived apart."
The parties were duly married on the 31st July, 1856, and a deed of separation executed by them the 30th January 1861. The Defendant having failed to plead, answer or demur within the rule, the petition was taken *pro confesso* on the 17th May, 1869. Testimony was taken before the Clerk in support of the allegations of the petition and reported to the Court. One of the witnesses says of Defendant: "She had a cross crabbed disposition." "It was impossible for any reasonable minded man to have lived in peace and happiness with her." Another witness says "she is a high tempered woman hard to get along with; wanted her own way entirely;" thinks it utterly impossible that they will ever live together again." Another witness says the petitioner "treated her kindly and affectionately; attempted to live in peace with her; she became dissatisfied without cause; became ill and cross to him; at one time struck at him; she constantly got worse in her disposition and actions toward him till their separation."

Before entering upon the consideration of the legal principles involved in this case—an application of the Court to make a decree of

divorce—which has been heretofore uniformly refused by the Legislature and Courts of this State in all similar applications, it is proper to determine whether the Courts of the State are now invested with jurisdiction to hear and determine such cases:

In the Kingdom of Great Britain the jurisdiction of matrimonial questions belonged to the Ecclesiastical Courts, and divorces *a vinculo matrimonii* were restricted in England to causes which existed at the time the marriage was contracted, such as *causa metus, causa impotentia, causa affinitatis, causa consanguinitatis, &c.*; and though the marriage was unlawful, a sentence of nullity of marriage was necessary to dissolve the bonds of matrimony.

Marriage was regarded a sacrament of the Church, and the Pope, exercising a controlling temporal power of Europe, required that the cognizance of such subjects should be confined exclusively in the Ecclesiastical Courts, and that divorces *a vinculo* should not be granted even by that Court for causes arising subsequent to the marriage. The dispensation of the head of the Church being the only recognized authority to dissolve a marriage for causes arising subsequent to its contraction, though the temporal power of the Pope has long since ceased in England the original jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts has not been enlarged; they are restricted to granting divorces *a mensa et thoro*, and the Parliament alone can grant a divorce *a vinculo* for adultery or any other cause arising after the marriage. This, however, is not the law in all the British Empire. In Scotland, the Reformation exploded this rule of the Romish Church, and divorces *a vinculo matrimonii* for adultery and wilful or malicious desertion have been uniformly granted.

For the same causes, divorces *a vinculo* are granted by all the States of the American Union, regulated most generally by statute, but having the authority of the common law as administered in a part of the British Empire; and for the first cause, adultery, the positive authority of the Scriptures—which furnish to all Christian nations the highest, purest and safest rules for social and moral action. Matthew, v: 32.

All religions under the Federal and State Constitutions are protected in their full and unrestrained exercise, but none are established, and therefore the tenets or canons of none should control the determination of the question when, how and for what causes the bonds of matrimony should be dissolved. It is a question to be solved by considerations of moral, social and political expediency and propriety. When the responsible relation has been entered into, and one of the parties utterly fail, from base depravity or other grave cause to fulfill its high and sacred duties, it is not the duty of the State to provide some tribunal to adjudge the failure and order the dissolution of the relation. This tribunal should be restricted in the exercise of such powers to causes of the utmost gravity only; those which are temporary or frivolous, ought not to be listened to by Court.

"It is the policy of the law, and necessary to the purity and usefulness of the institution of marriage, that those who enter into it, should regard it as a relation, permanent as their own lives; its duration not depending upon the whim or caprice of either, and only to be dissolved when the improper conduct of one of the parties shall render the connection wholly intolerable or inconsistent with the happiness or safety of the other." Griffin vs. Griffin, 8 B. Minn. 120.

Judge Swift observes: "The rendering of the contract of matrimony indissoluble, is running into the opposite extreme from that of permitting divorces at the pleasure of the parties. There are many persons who, on the idea that the marriage contract cannot be vacated for any misconduct, will not behave with the propriety they would, if the continuance of the contract were dependent on their exertions to render themselves agreeable to the persons with whom they are connected.—It is a great hardship, that a person, who has been unfortunate in forming a matrimonial connection must be forever precluded from any possibility of extricating himself from such a misfortune, and be shut out from enjoying the best pleasures of life. This consideration, instead of adding to the happiness of the connection, must frighten persons from entering into it

It is therefore the best policy, to admit a dissolution of the contract, when it is evident that the parties cannot derive from it the benefits for which it was instituted, and when instead of being a source of the highest pleasure and most endearing felicity, it becomes the source of the deepest woe and misery." 1 Swift's System, 191.

Whether the jurisdiction should be extended in granting divorces *a vinculo matrimonii* beyond the causes pre-existing at marriage, and to adultery, and malicious desertion subsequent thereto, need not now be discussed. Up to this point, at least, the judicial tribunals of most civilized countries exercise jurisdiction.

In this State heretofore, marriage, from any cause and under all circumstances, has been absolutely indissoluble—the Courts taking the ground that the Legislature had not invested them with power to declare a divorce, and have uniformly declined to exercise it. The Legislature has steadily refused to grant a dissolution of the marriage tie. There is, perhaps, no other civilized country, either protestant or catholic, that has not made some provision, either legislatively or judicially, for dissolving marriage for adequate cause, except this State. In England the Ecclesiastical Courts grant divorces *a mensa et thoro*, and the British Parliament a *vinculo matrimonii*. In Scotland the marriage is dissolved for adultery or malicious desertion, by the Courts, and in the States of the American Union, the same powers are exercised by most of the Courts for causes already enumerated, and for others not mentioned.

In *Rhame vs. Rhame*, McCord's C. R. 197, Judge Nott, in a bill filed for alimony, admitted that, in England, such cases belonged to the Ecclesiastical Courts, but considered that alimony was an exception in this State by the practice of the Court of Equity, and, by necessity, held that "the jurisdiction of the Court must be limited to the allowing of alimony and to such orders as are necessarily incident to the effectual execution of such a decree." Again he says: "Although our Courts of Equity have not the power to grant divorces, yet as two subjects—divorce and alimony—are inseparable companions in England, we must look to the *causes of divorce* to ascertain the grounds on which alimony will be allowed."

In *Prather vs. Prather*, 4 Dess. C. R. 34, in considering a bill for alimony, Chas. DeSaussure says: "And this from the necessity of the case, and to redress an injury not otherwise remediable—I allude to several cases which were decided in this Court some years since—expressly on the ground that no other tribunal could give redress and it would be unseemly and highly mischievous if the Court did not interfere."

Chief Justice Dunkin, in the case of *Mattison vs. Mattison*, 1 Strobhart, C. R. 387, which was a bill to declare a nullity of marriage, said "that there was no distinction in such a bill and a bill for divorce; that the Legislature had not conferred any such jurisdiction on the Court, and that there was no inherent power in the Court to exercise it." He adopts the ruling of Judge Nott, that the allowance of alimony and incidental orders for carrying it into effect, was properly cognizable by the Court of Equity from "practice and necessity," but could not be extended to a divorce or declaring a marriage null and void.

In all the cases in this State, jurisdiction in alimony is taken by the Court from "necessity and the practice of the Court." There was no "practice" of the Court in such a case until "necessity" induced its introduction, and therefore the only ground for assuming jurisdiction was "necessity." The Court of Equity in this State takes jurisdiction in cases of alimony without any legislative authorization when such cases are cognizable in the Ecclesiastical Courts of England, because the Legislature of the State has not specially conferred jurisdiction on that Court to hear and determine divorce cases!—Judge Nott says "divorce and alimony are inseparable companions in England," and yet assumed jurisdiction of the one from "necessity," and denies it to the other for want of legislative authority. Does not the "necessity" to exercise the jurisdiction to annul or dissolve a degrading marriage, plead to the Court as urgently as the "necessity" to provide food, clothing and shelter for a helpless wife who has been discarded by an impious or cruel husband?

Is not the "necessity" as great to exercise this jurisdiction of declaring a nullity of marriage where the revolting fact is exhibited of an incestuous marriage between father and daughter, mother and son, sister and brother? or to grant a divorce *a vinculo matrimonii* to an injured and outraged wife, whose husband had introduced into his house and seated at his table

a sable paramour—who shared his bed and received his attentions, while the offending wife received the crumbs and endured the indignities and abuse heaped on her by the faithless husband and his degraded mistress? Such were substantially the facts in the case of *Jellican vs. Jellican*, 2 Dess. C. R. 45, and the Court, in the graphic language of Bishop on Divorce and Marriage, 288, refused "to sever the living body from the putrid carcass," and exhausted the powers of the tribunal by decreeing, simply, that the husband should maintain the wife he had so shamelessly wronged!

Chancellor Kent, in an able opinion delivered in the case of *Wightman vs. Wightman*, 4 Johnston, C. R. 313, reaches a conclusion exactly the reverse of that decided by the Court in this State. He holds that no legislative authority is needed to confer jurisdiction on the Courts of Equity in divorce cases—that the power in the Court is inherent. He says: "All matrimonial and other causes of Ecclesiastical cognizance belonged, originally to the temporal courts; and when the spiritual courts cease the cognizance of such cases, it would seem, as of course, to revert back to lay tribunals." "Divorces *a vinculo* says Lord Coke, are *causa metus, causa affinitatis, causa consanguinitatis, &c.* These causes, and that of lunacy, are not within the Statute (N. Y.) giving to this Court jurisdiction concerning divorces." Notwithstanding that fact, the learned Chancellor says, that the Court of Equity "is competent, not merely collaterally, but by a suit instituted directly and for the sole purpose, to pronounce a divorce in such cases."

Whatever opinion may be entertained of the soundness of the judicial decisions, or the practice of the Courts in this State, on divorce heretofore, all doubt is now removed, by the explicit language of the New Constitution. Article IV, Section 15, provides that "the Courts of Common Pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases of divorce, &c.; and in all matters of Equity." Article 14, Section 9, provides that "divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed but by the judgment of a court, as shall be prescribed by law." It has been suggested that this clause restrains the courts from exercising the jurisdiction conferred in the fourth article until the General Assembly shall by statute prescribe the causes respectively, for partial and entire divorces and the rules and practice in the court to regulate the same. If hereafter had been inserted in the latter clause of the section so as to read "as shall hereafter be prescribed by law" such construction might have been admissible but the language used in a constitution, which must define general propositions, embraces the existing laws as well as amendments, and modifications hereafter to be made by the Legislature. The object of this section, when ascertained will remove all doubt as to its proper construction. The convention framing the constitution, profiting by the experience of other States, where Legislative divorces have been granted, and where caprice, favoritism and impotency controlled the enactment in disregard of all general principles of law and oftentimes totally inconsistent with the previous acts of the same body, intended to prohibit all divorces by the Legislature—confiding the power exclusively in the courts which would be bound to decide such cases conformably to law and not by Legislative caprice. If the phraseology of the section had been "as now prescribed by law" it would have precluded the Legislature from amendments in the future, if "as may hereafter be prescribed by law" it would have excluded the enforcement of the existing law by the courts and thereby defeated the grant of jurisdiction contained in the fourth article. The word "law" in the section embraces ecclesiastical and common law as well as statute law. If the section should be construed to refer alone to law hereafter to be enacted by the Legislature it excludes all except statute law. The phraseology covers what was intended by the convention that the courts in determining divorce cases should be governed by the existing common law and such statute laws as may hereafter be enacted. The phrase could not be construed more perspicuously to embrace existing law and future enactments. Any other construction defeats the other provisions of the constitution giving present jurisdiction to the court of common pleas in all cases of divorce and is in palpable conflict with the well established rule of construction that remedial legislation must be liberally construed. "No statutes can be more manifestly remedial than those which authorize divorce; and, therefore, according to established principles, they should be liberally and equitably construed to give effect to the

remedy?" Bishop on marriage and divorce, 290.—The same liberal rule of construction applies to remedial provisions in the constitution as to statutes.

But it may be objected that although the constitution gives the Court of Common Pleas jurisdiction, it does not provide how it shall be exercised—whether in the Common Pleas or on the Equity side of the Court. It might be sufficient answer that the Common Pleas Courts are invested with jurisdiction in all matters of Equity, and that the Equity side of the Court is the only forum where such cases can be heard, and the various orders passed to give effect to its judgments. Hence the Equity side of the Common Pleas is the only appropriate tribunal to exercise the jurisdiction conferred. In *Perry vs. Perry*, 2, Page 591, Chancellor Walworth says: "But whenever the Legislature (or constitution) distinctly gives the right without creating or appointing any particular tribunal to administer the remedy, it is fairly to be inferred, that they intended to vest their power in some of the existing tribunals of the country." Here the constitution gives the right of present jurisdiction, expressly prescribed the Court of Common Pleas as the tribunal, and the inference is that the power is vested on the Equity side, because of the adaptation of the practice of that Court, to give effect to all necessary decrees and orders in determining such cases. I conclude, therefore that the Equity side of the Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction of divorces *a mensa et thoro* and *a vinculo matrimonii*. In the latter class, not only in cases where the cause arose prior to marriage as defined by Lord Coke, but also in cases of adultery and wilful permanent desertion in cases arising subsequently. That the proper practice to proceed by bill. That the allegations must be sustained by proof taken before the clerk and reported to the court. That to avoid collusion or connivance between the parties, the allegations of the bill are not to be taken as true on a *pro confesso* order, or by the consent of the parties, the prayer for an absolute or qualified divorce only being grantable upon proof of the existence of defined and established legal cause.

It follows, hence, that the petitioner in this case, John H. Walker has not set forth any sufficient legal cause in his petition which has prayer for a divorce *a vinculo matrimonii* should be granted; and upon the proof submitted, it is not admissible to grant a divorce *a mensa et thoro*.

The proof establishes the ill-temperance and stubbornness of the Defendant, and upon one occasion that she struck at him. Was it such violence and legal cruelty practiced by a woman towards a man that entitles him to claim even a qualified divorce *a mensa et thoro*? "Cruelty is any conduct in one of the married parties, which forms his reasonable apprehension that the continuance of the cohabitation would be attended with bodily harm to the other." *Evans vs. Evans*, 4 English, E. R. 310. The learned judge (Lord Stowell) in the same case says: "What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where not accompanied with bodily injury either actual or menaced.—Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do no threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty. They are high moral offences in the marriage state undoubtedly, not innocent sallys in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on one side as well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection—must endure by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence."

In *Lockwood vs. Lockwood*, 7 English, E. R. 114, it was held that "there must be either actual violence committed, attended with danger to life, limb, or health, or there must be a reasonable apprehension of such violence." Again in *Evans vs. Evans*, Lord Stowell says: "In the older cases of this sort which I have had an opportunity of looking into, I have observed that the danger of life, limb, or health, is usually inserted as the ground upon which the Court has proceeded to a separation. This doctrine has been repeatedly applied by the Court in the cases that have been decided. The Court has never been driven of this ground."

Chancellor Walworth, in *Perry vs. Perry*, 1 Bart, Ch. R. 516, says when the husband is complainant, "it is not sufficient to show a single act of violence on her part towards him, or even a series of such acts; so long as

there is no reason to suppose that he will not be able to protect himself and family by a proper exercise of his marital power." From these authorities, it is manifest that the petitioner has not alleged, or proven any sufficient legal cause, entitling him to a degree of separation against his wife.

Chancellor Kent lays down the rule against the application of the petitioner in broader terms than any of the foregoing authorities. He says in *Van Vechten vs. Van Vechten*, 4 Johns, Ch. R. 501, that "the husband cannot file a bill against his wife for a divorce *a mensa et thoro*, on the ground of cruelty, desertion or improper conduct," and assigns as the reason therefor, that the common law has given to the husband sufficient power and control over the wife to protect himself from such conduct."

Application to the Court for divorces should be by bill and not petition, though the form in this case, will not enter into the judgment to be pronounced.

I adjudge that the petition be dismissed at the costs of the Petitioner.
JAMES L. ORR.
12th August, 1869.

EX-PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

Speech in Knoxville—Moral of the Late Election in Tennessee—Emphatic Declaration About the Public Debt—"Preserve the Republic and let the Debt Go."

Ex-President Johnson was serenaded at the Lamar House, in Knoxville, Tenn., on the 17th inst., and in response to calls from the assembled crowd, addressed them as follows:

EX-PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH.
FELLOW-CITIZENS: I am not in Knoxville at this time for the making of a studied address to the people; but being called upon, and unexpectedly, to-night, I will tender you my thanks for this reception. I assure you I know how to appreciate a reception of this kind, for an impromptu gathering of the people to listen to one who has been so often honored by them, always means to me more than the dry and forced reception, gotten up to order. But being called upon, and finding this large assembly waiting to hear me, there are one or two things which I will say.

We have just passed through an important and excited canvass. The verdict of the people of Tennessee has been rendered, and of the decision you are all aware. A popular revolution has taken place in our State.

Ours is a popular Government, both State and Federal. There have been but two popular forms of government since the earliest history of the world. One an absolute government, in which the power is vested in one man, who wields entire sway over his subjects. Such a government is an empire or a despotic monarchy. The other is one in which all power is lodged in the hands of the people. Such is a republic. In our Government we assume that all power is lodged in the great mass of the people, and the ballot box is the medium or conductor which converts tyranny from the heads of the people. For the purpose of illustrating the subject I shall consume a little of your time.

A POPULAR FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

This is a popular Government. It is a democratic form of government. I use the word "democratic" in a governmental sense. But the government we have had since the war closed has been somewhat removed from that of a republican form. This is a representative republic—a representative democracy. In the recent election in this State the people, in the exercise of their power, through the ballot box have decided in favor of a constitutional republic. There is, following citizens, no liberty without a constitution. It was a maxim laid down by the old Greeks that "the soul of liberty is law." Prior to the late election we have had, here in Tennessee, powers administered, in part, as of a limited monarchy.

So in the Federal Government, Congress has been for the past four years, omnipotent. There has been no restraint upon Congress. In their actions they have consulted merely their own discretion. When we examine closely the principles which underlie monarchical government has been swinging from one extreme to the other of both forms of government.

THE PUBLIC DEBT—"SAVE THE REPUBLIC, LET THE DEBT GO."

In our present condition we see the history of the world proved. We started with a representative democracy. The fathers of the country conceived the Constitution which, as it has truly been said, was "an inspiration from on high." Lately we find that great efforts have been made to change our form of government and to divide the Government. Now that we are endeavoring to get back to our old mooring and our true position, the danger lies in our going too far the other way. I trust in God the good sense of the people will prevent it from being merged into a despotism. It is even now being attempted. Your attention, AN EMPIRE ON THE RUINS OF THE REPUBLIC.

Men in power in this Government are even now attempting to create an empire on the ruins of this republic. There is a debt owing by the United States amounting to \$2,500,000,000. These men who are engaged in this conspiracy to change our republican government into an empire say that this debt was created to "preserve the republic."

"Now, what is assumed?—Simply that we must destroy the republic for the purpose of paying the debt, by converting the republic into an empire. My countrymen! before God and this people to-night, I would rather that the republic be preserved and the debt go. [Loud cheers.] This debt was created to save the republic. For the republic must be destroyed to pay the debt. Rather let the Government be preserved and let the debt go. [Cheers.]

THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT.

Our Government is one in which the people do the voting and are the source of power. They are sovereign. As long as the power is in the people the State can determine its status and powers. Now it is assumed by Congress to propose an amendment to the Federal Constitution which prohibits the State from fixing the qualifications of its voters. Then, if this amendment is adopted, Congress takes the power away from the State, that body becomes sovereign and the country is swinging towards empire.

The Constitution of the United States, in arranging for representation of the several States in Congress, determined that Congressmen should be elected by the electors in the State qualified to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. The fifteenth amendment proposes to lodge this power in Congress.

Let us look at the present condition of Virginia, Mississippi and Texas. After it had been demonstrated that they had no power to secede, it is now proposed by the Federal authorities to keep them out of the Union. Now the Constitution, in giving permission to amend itself, says, "Provided that the Constitution shall not be so amended as to deprive any State of its equal suffrage in the Senate." The Government now turns to Virginia and says that until she ratifies the Fifteenth Amendment she shall not be represented in the Senate.

THE REAL PARTY.

The time is now come when we should consider the elementary principles of our Government, and where they are tending. Away with these shallow cries for party! Let us save the Constitution and the country. Let us rally under the Constitution. Let us know no party animosities engendered in the days gone by.

The speaker here addressed the colored men present, advising them of their true condition and their interest in voting *en masse* with the white population of Tennessee.

THE BONDHOLDERS.

Where is all the gold and silver in the country? Our paper money is from thirty to forty per cent. discount. From 1849 to 1852 there passed through the mints, receiving the device of the Government, over \$800,000,000. Where is this gold and silver? As the paper money has been pushed out, the gold and silver has been taken into the safes and the vaults of the men who control this \$2,500,000,000 debt. When the paper money vanishes into thin air, these men will demand, seize upon and control the property of the country. It is the

best contrivance ever made to make "chaff of the king better than the poor man's corn." It is cracking the nut, taking out the contents and throwing the shell to the people.

A COMPARISON.

How does this matter stand? Take the widow of a soldier—what money do they pay her in. The bondholder goes to the Treasury, presents his coupons and is paid in gold and silver. At the next desk the poor widow's pension is paid in shipplasters. She goes to market and pays a dollar and a half's worth for a dollar. I tell you to place the right men in power. It is the deliberate design of men at the head of your Government to change its character. Unless you get back into the safe mooring of the Constitution within the next four years you are gone. You may talk of parties, but this is the great question.

CONCLUSION.

I thank the people of Tennessee for the kindness and regard with which I have been welcomed all over the State. I have no concealments to make. I never played false to the people. I never concealed my motives. If our Government is ever restored then will the principle enunciated in my two last annual messages to Congress be the basis of the restoration.

In Tennessee I will live; here I expect to die. My heart's wish is to occupy a proper place in your esteem. When passions shall cease and reason resumes her sway, I will have no fear of the position I will occupy in your regards. Good night.

The Local Paper.

The following tribute to the local paper, from the "Chicago Republican," contains so much truth that we transfer it to our columns and commend it to the careful consideration of our business men and those interested in our town:

What tells us so readily the standard of a town or city as the appearance of its paper? And its youth or its age can as well be defined by the observing as by personal notice. The enterprise of its citizens is depicted by its advertisements, their liberality by the looks of the paper. Some papers show a good, solid, healthy foundation, plethoric purses, and well to do appearance generally; others showing a striving to contend with the grasping thousands around them. An occasional meteoric display in its columns of telegraphic or local, or of editorial, shows what it can do if it had the means, but it can't continue in the expensive work until support comes which ought to be readily granted. Take your home paper, it gives you more news of immediate interest than New York or other papers; it talks for you when other localities belie you; it stands up for your rights; you always have a champion in your home paper; and those who stand up for you should certainly be well sustained. Your interests are kindred and equal, and you must rise or fall together. Therefore, it is to your interest to support your home paper, not grudgingly, but in a liberal spirit; as a pleasure, not as a disagreeable duty; but as an investment that will amply pay the expenditure.

Mr. BELMONT.—It is reported, among other party reforms, that Mr. Belmont is to be discontinued as Chairman of the National Democratic Executive Committee, a position which he has held since the time of Mr. Buchanan. The charges brought against Mr. Belmont are inefficiency, indifference and unpopularity. The defeat of Seymour is partially ascribed to him, and it is thought that the time is ripe for a movement in this direction. Of course, a meeting of the Committee will have to be called in order to depose Mr. B. The rumor as to his resignation or removal may be a canard; but we are of the opinion that a change is necessary.

Parties from Mississippi were in Baton Rouge, La., last week, engaged in hunting up places of a hundred acres, with improvements, for sale. Wood land does not appear to be much demanded, but it will be if a few hundred settlers move in this winter. The white population of the parish is on the increase, and, railroad or no railroad, the unimproved land must soon be in demand.