

HONOLULU FROM ITS FRONT DOOR.

Fortification Plans

- Fort at Puuloa.
- Fort at Barber's Point.
- Battery at Old Waikiki.
- Battery Near Lighthouse, Diamond Head.
- Battery at Niu.
- Mortar Battery at Home for Incubables.
- Battery at Waianae Gap.
- Platform for Field Battery at Pali.

According to high military authority, those are the sites for fortifications in and about Honolulu which the government of the United States desires to secure in order that the island of Oahu may be transformed into the Malta of the Pacific.

Of these sites, the property at Puuloa has already been bought and paid for. That is the site for one of the forts that is to be used in the defense of Pearl Harbor. The Waianae Gap property has also been purchased, although the purchase price has not been paid. The money to pay for this property is, however, in Honolulu, and will be turned over as soon as some slight defects in the title have been explained away.

And when the chain of fortifications

in Asia, on the shortest line between Japan and Europe should it ever come that Japan will want to play the part of a world power, past the gate of Oahu there must pour the commerce of the world and close by the forts on Oahu must lie the warpath of the navies of the nations.

The power that holds Oahu, and holds it strongly, will be the power that commands the North Pacific—and the power that holds the key to naval supremacy of the greater sea. That this fact is appreciated by the government of the United States is becoming more and more apparent with each passing day. In a greater way to the Pacific, Oahu must be what Malta is to the Mediterranean. Because Napoleon could not dislodge England from Malta, the man who had conquered the continent of Europe was overcome at last by the persistent enmity of Great Britain. So much does the strength of the fortifications of Oahu mean to the greater America of the future that there is no far-seeing statesman of any party in the United States today who would put a straw in the way of the plans of the administration to fortify this island strongly and effectively.

Honolulu, as it stands in mid-Pacific, is almost two thousand miles from the nearest mainland coast. It is more than twice that distance from the mainland coast of any powerful nation that can by any chance become unfriendly to the United States—and that would have the power to wage effective warfare against

possibilities. Even a landing upon one of the other islands, if that were practicable, would not put the attacking power in a position to endanger the American stronghold in the Pacific.

In the first place, to successfully attack fortified Oahu, the hostile force must be conveyed from the nearest stronghold of any foreign power. The fleet must be maintained and, if any power were mad enough to send a military expedition along with the first fleet, the transports must be guarded. There is no harbor on Oahu where a large fleet could shelter and land, save at Honolulu or Pearl Harbor. Landing on the windward side would be dangerous—and, given that a force were landed there, it must be a tremendously heavy force, with tremendously heavy guns, to force the fortifications at the Pali or at Waianae Gap. It must drag its siege guns and must itself march across country that is all but inaccessible—and it must keep up a line of communication across thousands of miles of deep sea.

But there is no power on earth that would be so mad as to make an attempt like that. The American fleet in the Pacific would be strong enough to meet and destroy the force before it ever came in sight of Honolulu, let it come from what direction it would. The first attempt upon Oahu, if a first attempt even were made, would be a naval force exclusively. The enemy would try to do, as Admiral Dewey did in Manila bay. The American power must first be captured or destroyed before any power, even Japan, would attempt to send a land force to occupy these islands.

And, while Spain was 16,000 miles from Manila, and in no shape to reinforce the fleet and garrison there if they had been closer to the home base, Honolulu is but 2,000 miles from San Francisco, and the American might in men and money is beyond calculation. Of course, with the building of new forts in and around Honolulu, the naval force here will be greatly strengthened also. The North Pacific squadron will always be within call, closer to Honolulu than the fleet of any hostile

The hostile force that has been landed, say on Hawaii, in the meantime, must be fed and clothed and guarded against disease. It is an open military secret that it is a far more grave problem to feed an army in the field than to win victories with it. This army of occupation, thousands of miles from its base and with the wide seas between, would be doubly hard to feed. For the country of occupation would subsist it but a short time. Added to that, its transports must be kept coming and going, and even if the American squadron of battleships had been destroyed, or if it had been bottled up in Honolulu by the attacking fleet, there would still be American cruisers on the seas to harry the transports and make their coming and going without a large squadron of

per month; from Hilo, 3500 to 4500 bunches per month, increasing; from Kahului, 1000 to 1500 bunches per month, recently started.

17. It is unlikely that a banana planter could at present obtain employment here as superintendent of a banana plantation. Any opening would have to be made by the settler himself. We would recommend to you a personal inspection of the field.

Hoping that we have satisfactorily covered your inquiries, we are,



Yours very truly,

C. S. HOLLOWAY.
The same letter as that answered by Mr. Holloway drew from the Commissioner of Public Lands this response: Dear Sir: Yours of the 9th inst re-

I suppose this answer will be very unsatisfactory to you, but it is the best I can do under the circumstance.

Very truly yours,
JAMES W. PRATT,
Commissioner of Public Lands.

It will be seen that in the view of all experts there is no good reason why the culture of the banana should not become, and at once, one of the principal sources of wealth for these islands. In fact, the Hilo experiment—which, in the way, is no longer an experiment—has shown that the thing can be done, and successfully done, and that in spite of conditions that are the reverse of favorable to the shipper. The steamship Enterprise, plying between the port of Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii,



KAAHUMANU PUBLIC SCHOOL.

thus outlined has been completed, it will take a stronger naval force to reduce Honolulu than any power so far has been able to put in the Pacific Ocean. It is doubtful, indeed, whether even England, mauler her strong force at Esquimalt, could do it—and it is becoming more and more apparent as the years go by that England will never try.

The island of Oahu, after the Panama canal shall have been completed, will hold the strategic center of the stage in the North Pacific. On the shortest line between the American possessions on the Isthmus and in the Far East, on the shortest line between the canal that is to open the ocean of the future to the commerce of the future and the possessions of any of the European powers

America on land or sea. It is more than two thousand miles from the nearest German possessions—and men who read the future of the nations have declared that Germany is the only power which pretensions in the Pacific America will ever have need to fear. It is twice two thousand miles, and more, from Russia and Japanese territory—present troubles of their own that they may be counted out of the calculation for the moment.

Honolulu, as it stands strategically, must be made strong enough to resist attack by sea—and then there need be no worry over possible attack by land. Attack by land, in fact, if the forts and the fleet here be strong enough to hold a hostile fleet at bay, is not among the

power can possibly be should war impend and the islands be endangered.

Conceding the possibility, however, of the landing of a hostile force on one of the other islands, it must be kept in waiting for the reduction of Honolulu. The town, when the chain of forts that it is proposed to build are completed, will be next to impossible to capture by sea assault—and, of course, will be largely garrisoned and amply provisioned. The United States government takes nobody into its confidence relative to the strength of the forts it is proposed to build here, but they will be furnished with the most modern guns of the largest calibre. An attacking fleet must stand far outside to escape their fire—and even then will not escape. For the Yankees are good gunners.

guard impossible. If every American warship in the Pacific were to be destroyed, it would not be many months before the iron works at San Francisco had turned out at least cruisers enough for that service. Fast merchantmen, bought and manned and armed, would suffice.

The problem of an attack upon armed Honolulu would be a difficult one for any power. The problem of a land attack would be a problem that could not be solved. Literally, it would be to achieve the impossible.

It will be seen, from this, what is meant when the United States announces its purpose to fortify Oahu so strongly. It is the chief outpost of the mighty growing American power. It will be, when the plans of fortification have been carried out, the most important American stronghold in the Pacific. The power that holds Oahu will hold the key to the ocean of the future. America does not propose to lose the key.

BANANAS IN HAWAII

(Continued from Page 4.)

14. As previously stated, further information in regard to Government lands will be forwarded to you from the Land Office.

15. There are no large syndicates now engaged in the banana business. Most of the fruit is grown by Chinese leasees of small holdings, who sell their fruit to two or three buyers in Honolulu. The latter make the shipments. A number of Americans are raising bananas in the vicinity of Hilo.

16. At present the shipments of bananas are approximately as follows: From Honolulu, 15,000 to 20,000 bunches

received and I hardly know how to answer same. If I only knew to what extent this party desired to go into the banana business I would give a more definite answer to his inquiry. You of course know that the lands above Hilo are producing a fine crop of bananas, but the growers appear to be at the mercy of the California Fruit Growers' Union (I think that is their title), and I am told that these California people handle the market to suit themselves and that the Hawaiian banana grower must take their prices or, if the shipment is of any extent, go outside of the State for a market.

We have many leases falling in soon, all along the Hamakua coast, and so will have much land available for banana culture. The value of the land runs from \$4 per acre for land not cleared, to \$100 or \$125 per acre for land that has been cleared.

The cost of clearing averages about \$80 per acre. This land can be taken up under the various conditions of our law, the amount being 600 acres on time payment and 1000 acres on cash sales. However, you are familiar with our laws and I need not repeat the conditions.


We have smaller patches or remnants at various places about the islands that would grow fine bananas—for instance, I hope to open up several hundred acres in Palolo valley, but in this case I would like to settle this land in small portions, just enough for the ordinary family to handle. You see I am back to the fact that I don't know how much your correspondent wants to handle. I find this difficulty with nearly all those who inquire about our lands—a man wants to go into the cattle business, another wants land to support angora goats, another to raise coffee or pines, and I always have to ask them how much land they can handle before I can give them location and prices.

and the mainland, began carrying bananas to San Francisco a little more than two years ago. It was admitted at the time that this was an experiment, although why it should have been considered experimental is not clear. The Hawaiian bananas are at least as good as any that are raised anywhere else in the world, and the shipment of bananas, even upon comparatively slow steamers, has always been successfully carried on. The bulk of the fruit that is consumed in the United States is shipped by steamer from Bluefields to New Orleans, an ocean voyage about as long as from Hawaii, and then distributed by rail to the consumers all over the States.

Experiment or not, the Enterprise carried on her first trip up from Hilo between 400 and 600 bunches of bananas. The shipment reached the coast in good condition and the increase in the trade has been steady from that time to this. On her last trip up the Enterprise carried anywhere from six to eight thousand bunches of the fruit, which found a ready market upon arrival.

And the Enterprise cannot carry all the fruit that is raised at and around Hilo. The steamer makes but one round trip per month, and the trip from Hilo to San Francisco requires ten days actual sailing time. If boats ran twice a month it is estimated by experts that the shipments would be practically doubled, as many bunches now reach the picking stage between shipments, and are of course useless for shipment by the time the vessel returns. Also, it would be a great advantage to the shippers if a faster boat were put on the run. As it is now between twelve and fourteen days elapse between the cutting and the sale of the fruit, and of course it would be in better condition if it reached the consumer earlier. These, however, are minor difficulties.

(Continued on page 7.)



A SECTION OF A MIGHTY COMMERCE.