

THE KEY TO THE PACIFIC

BY ATHERTON BROWNELL IN PUBLIC OPINION



The slight ripple of excitement recently caused by an expression of opinion that Japan was looking upon our Philippine possessions with longing eyes—thereby threatening to involve us in a war in the near future with the new power of the east—has happily passed away. It has left behind it a surface of sufficient smoothness for reflection, and in that we may see a new argument for the necessity of so strengthening our hold upon the Pacific Ocean that we shall not be found unprepared, when the increasing keenness of the rivalry for the trade of the orient precipitates a conflict for the mastery of a situation to which we hold the key.

As world-events go, the steps in the development of the Pacific Ocean, and of trade with the far east, have followed each other with marvelous rapidity. The markets of the orient mean a trade with 500,000,000 people, and no commercial nation intends to be a laggard in the race to secure this rich prize. The chapter in our commercial history that tells of our disastrous defeat in the effort to secure an influence on the Atlantic is one from which we turn in the belief that the new one that is to be written regarding the Pacific will reach a conclusion more satisfactory to every patriotic feeling. On the Atlantic our influence has almost reached the vanishing point. England and Germany have pushed their advantages until today that ocean is gridironed by the wakes of the steamships of our rivals, carrying ninety-two per cent of our commerce, while there is not a single regular line of American-owned ships engaged in that traffic.

But the present situation on the Pacific is full of portent. The trading nations may be said to be deploying for position. Already in the arena may be seen England, with her Canadian and Asiatic possessions, Australia, New Zealand, the Fiji Islands, and her protectorate over the Gilbert Islands, and her interest in Hongkong and Singapore; France appears with the extension of her dominion in Indo-China, Siam, and Madagascar, as well as in New Caledonia and the Society Islands by the taking of the Marquesas Islands and the Low Archipelago. Germany, by her acquisition of a controlling interest in Kiaochau and its 20,000,000 people, has a footing here as well as at Shantung, and, her appetite whetted for more power, has added the Bismarck and Marshall Ar-

chipelagos, part of the Solomon Islands, German New Guinea, the Caroline and Pelew Islands, the great Marshall group, midway between the Australian steamship lines from British Columbia and the possible Asian lines of the future from the isthmus. She longed for Samoa, but was obliged to be content with a part. She coveted the Philippines and suffered keenest chagrin that they passed from her presumptive control. To these must be added the large and rich Pacific possessions of Holland in Borneo, Sumatra, and Java; but of greater significance is the rapid advance of Russia to the seaboard, now checked by Japan, which power, in turn, becomes an important factor with its home island empire and its possession of Formosa. Nor should an estimate of the situation and the alignment of the nations fail to take into account the completion of the great military highways from Halifax to Vancouver, across the American continent, and from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, the rapid peopling of British Columbia and our north Pacific states and of Amur and Manchuria districts, all of which, to quote Honorable John R. Proctor, "tend to change the front of the world and to transfer to the Pacific the national activities which for centuries past have rendered the Atlantic the theater of stirring events."

While Russia has been coming overland to this center of future activity, created by the acquirement of island footholds by the other nations, the United States has come over seas. In two great strides, the first step resting on Hawaii, the second on the Philippines, we are in the very heart of the situation and in a position to take the dominion that manifest destiny has evidently had in mind. Our Pacific Coast development demands an outlet. The annexation of Hawaii and the extension of our coastwise restrictions thither; the acquirement of the Philippines after the Spanish war, the results of our diplomacy in opening the markets of the far east have created a commerce which has stimulated our carrying trade enormously, and, while on the Atlantic our merchant marine has become a nonentity, on the Pacific we have four regularly established lines carrying our flag, our merchandise, and our influence into the very center of the new markets. What may be called the express trade, the trans-Pacific transportation of passengers and fast freight, is now largely in American hands, as the tonnage of that character under our flag exceeds that of England about three times, though British tramp ships carry the bulk of the low-grade freights.

The effect upon our commerce of these imperial westward steps has been commensurate. During the year preceding the outbreak of the Spanish war, our exports to the Philippines were less than \$100,000, and our imports a little more than \$4,000,000. In six years after the close of that war our exports had increased to nearly \$30,000,000 and our imports to nearly \$35,000,000, not including the carrying of government supplies. Similarly with the Hawaiian Islands, in 1897, our exports were a little more than \$4,500,000 and our imports a little over \$13,500,000. Six years saw our trade doubled, our exports having reached nearly \$11,000,000 and our imports more than \$25,000,000. On the Pacific slope our commercial increase owing to the extension of our influence to the far east, has been almost phenomenal, quite so in certain instances, such as Tacoma, where the exports have multiplied six times in seven years, and during that period the activities of the Puget Sound district have increased from \$5,500,000 to over \$32,500,000 annually. In the past decade our exports to Europe have increased 51 per cent; to South America, 50 per cent; to North American countries, 100 per cent; but to the orient 200 per cent.

NAVAL STRENGTH THE BASIS OF COMMERCIAL SUPREMACY.

This country can not afford, therefore,—even if so inclined—to neglect the care of these great and growing interests; nor is it expected that any other of the nations that are aligned in this race for commercial supremacy will abate in the least their efforts to capture and control the rich markets of the east. In the situation are all the elements of jealous rivalry that have led, and probably always will lead, to the final issue of a trial of strength. Captain A. T. Mahan, in his widely read "Influence of Sea Power," has made it too clear to require further argument that upon a nation's naval power rests its commercial supremacy. With at least six great powers confronting each other on the Pacific, each reaching out for the richest commercial prize yet offered to the world, it is rather more than altruistic to believe that the day will never come when the dominance of this ocean and its trade will not be settled by the force of naval and military power. In such an event the advantage lies with the United States through the holding of Hawaii, which may properly be called the key to the Pacific. It has already

been called "the Gibraltar of the Pacific," and, just as the holding of that famed fortress by England has been an immense factor for peace and for England's commercial supremacy, so must the Hawaiian Islands, occupying as they do the commanding position in the Pacific, be a large determining factor in any conflict of nations which may arise through a desire to dominate that ocean, provided always that we are able to hold them.

No such unique situation, strategically, exists elsewhere as that held by the Hawaiian group. By a glance at the accompanying chart it will be seen that these islands occupy a central position in a vast expanse of sea, an outpost to our Pacific coast. Using them as a center, as a base for naval operations, a 2,500-mile radius touches our Alaskan territories, our entire Pacific coast line, and equally the French station at Tahiti, the German possessions in the Marshall group, and the British protectorate over the Gilbert Islands. They lie directly in the great trade routes from British Columbia to Australia, New Zealand, and the Fiji Islands, and, in the future they must lie in the new trade routes from the Panama Canal to Yokohama, Shanghai, and Hong-Kong. Directly south of Alaska and south-west from California they stand sentinel to our coast, solitary and alone, with no vantage point beyond them to afford an enemy a foothold or a refuge. In the entire expanse of the Pacific Ocean north of the equator there is no other spot where a ton of coal can be obtained, a loaf of bread or a gallon of water. Were there no Hawaii, no war fleet, save that of Great Britain, could successfully operate against our Pacific coast. The nearest foreign station is Tahiti, 3,600 miles distant. The others are from 4,000 to 5,000 miles away. When it is considered that battleships of modern construction have a coal endurance at ten knots of but 5,000 miles, it will be seen that the physical condition of a fleet on reaching our coast, without touching at Hawaii for coaling, would be such that extended operations would be difficult and retreat impossible.

But the Hawaiian Islands exist. Our possession of them in time of peace is undisputed. In time of war that possession would be challenged at once, for they become an imperative necessity as a base for an enemy from which to attack our Pacific coast line. Under present conditions our possession is not easy to support, for their possible defense is by no means proportionate to the weight of the attack that would be thrown against them. To protect them, and thereby prevent an inestimable advantage to us from being turned into a base for an enemy, would require the withdrawal from more extended naval operations of a powerful fleet for their defense. For these islands in hostile hands would become a menace instead of a defense, and from them as a base our entire coast line could be open to attack in five or six days.

The annexation of Hawaii was urged as a national necessity, not that we needed the islands so much as that we could not permit them to be held or taken by another nation. Aside from being a sentinel for us they are to the Pacific Ocean and to the Panama Canal what the island of Malta is to the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. The connection between Hawaii and the canal is indissoluble. Without Hawaii, defended and used as a base, the canal would lose one of its strongest points. Without the canal, Hawaii is far removed from our principal naval bases. Were Japan, for instance, free at the present moment and anxious to make war against us, our plight would be a sorry one. Her entire naval strength could be thrown at our weakest point. From Japan to the Philippines is less than 2,000 miles, and from her station at Formosa, nearer at hand, extensive operations could be carried on against us. From Japan to Hawaii the distance is 3,400 miles, and these islands would be at once the point of strongest attack, thereby intercepting our fleet in its effort to protect the Philippines, and securing a base 2,000 miles from our coast. Against the entire naval force of Japan there would be our Asiatic squadron alone, our main fleet separated by the 15,000 miles around Cape Horn.

HAWAII THE STRATEGIC CENTER.

With Hawaii as a base, fortified so that it could withstand attack until reinforced from the sea, our commanding radius of action of 2,500 miles would sweep the Pacific Ocean and strike the nearest foreign stations as well as protect our coast. Because we hold these islands now in time of peace, a feeling of fancied security has caused the more important question of continuing to hold them in time of war to be neglected. All that was true regarding the necessity of acquiring these islands, in order to prevent their falling into other hands, is true now in a greater degree. The increase of our Pacific commerce, as well as their own industrial increase, gives to them a greater intrinsic value than they form-

erly possessed, while in no way decreasing their military value.

In time of war they may be a burden and a menace, or a tower of strength, according as we leave them in their present defenseless condition or take advantage of the value they offer us as a base of operation which increases our effective striking distance by 2,500 miles. Undeclared save by our fleet, our navy is decreased in size by just the number of ships required to prevent an enemy from establishing a base here against us. Used as a base for our own operations, that base defended by land batteries, and high-power coast-defense guns, our navy is released from the defense of the islands and the radius of activity of each ship is doubled, thereby increasing the efficiency of our naval force. With Hawaii in the hands of an enemy, our fleet would be driven back to the defense of our coast-line—a line 2,000 miles in extent—instead of being centralized at a single point. A triangle, having its base at the extreme ends of our coast line, would have its apex at Hawaii. From the apex of this triangle any attack must come, and it scarcely needs deep learning in the art of war to realize that our first defense should be at the point rather than at the more extended base line.

Should a war-cloud appear on our horizon and develop with the rapidity of that which overspread our relations with Spain—especially with any nation having a foothold in the Pacific—it would then be too late to establish a naval base at the Hawaiian Islands or to defend them except by the use of a strong fleet detached for the purpose. Under present conditions that fleet would be practically at the limit of its radius of action when at the islands, if operating from a base on the Pacific coast, with no adequate facilities for repairing and for coaling—save at sea—and for general supplies. With the ex-

(Continued on page 6.)

Mrs. Kearns's Hawaiian Chutney

Better than the foreign article because it is fresher and because the favorable climatic influences tend to give the ingredient a richer flavor. Every boiling is made under personal supervision.

TESTIMONIALS.

Messrs. Lewis & Co. say: Four years ago Mrs. Annie Kearns commenced making "HOME MADE HAWAIIAN CHUTNEY" for us, and we have been entirely satisfied with her make, and cheerfully recommend the same to anyone.

Messrs. Henry May & Co., Ltd., say: Mrs. Annie Kearns makes our "HAWAIIAN MANGO CHUTNEY," and we are quite satisfied with it. The quality leaves nothing to be desired.

Messrs. C. J. Day & Co., say: We carry Mrs. Annie Kearns's Mango Chutney in stock, and are happy to testify to its excellent quality.

The Manager of the Moana Hotel Co., Ltd., says: Mrs. Annie Kearns's "HAWAIIAN MANGO CHUTNEY," is very good, and is much appreciated by the guests of the hotel.

Dr. Herbert, who is an authority on Chutney says: Your Chutney is very good, it is all right.

Copy,
Moana Hotel,
June 20th, 1905.

To whom it may concern,
We have been using Mrs. Annie Kearns's Mango Chutney for some time past, and I can truthfully testify to its excellence. It is in fact superior to any Mango Chutney we have been using. Our guests, after having once tasted it, will order it again and again.

Very respectfully,
MOANA HOTEL,
Per J. H. GERTSCHE,
Manager.

To Mrs. Kearns, Manager Mango Chutney Co.,

I have much pleasure in stating that the supply of Mango Chutney you supplied to the C. S. Restorer is being greatly relished by all, it being most palatable and appetizing, and all agree they have never tasted any Chutney to equal it in all their travels around the world.

BASIL C. COMBE,
Commander C. S. Restorer.


Mrs. Annie Kearns
Hotel Street, corner of
Adams Lane.

A Savings Bank In Every Home

One of our little self-registering home savings banks to every depositor who wants one. Just start a savings account of one dollar with this bank and we will give you one of the new self-registering steel banks, retaining the key. You slip in the dimes and nickles and even larger coins, as you can spare them. Bring the little bank to us each month and we will deposit the contents to your credit, paying you 4-2 per cent. interest compounded twice yearly. Do this every month and your financial condition will never be a source of worry to you.

First American Savings and Trust Co. of Hawaii, Ltd.

Young Building. : : : Corner Hotel Street.



OLDSMOBILE

The OLDSMOBILE is the car that takes you when you want to go—where you want to go—as fast as you want to go and stops only when you want to stop.

It runs smoothly, noiselessly, without perceptible vibration—is simple in mechanical construction—easily controlled and luxurious in its appointments.

The 20-horse power

OLDSMOBILE TOURING CAR

holds the Around-Oahu record.

Inspect these cars at our new garage on Alakea Street.

Von Hamm-Young Co., Ltd.

ALEXANDER YOUNG BUILDING.

REPAIRING WOVEN WIRE BEDS

Telephone White 1661. Quick Dispatch.

HONOLULU WIRE BED COMPANY,

ALAPAI STREET.

Makers of R. & V. P. WIRE BEDS.