

a Territorial Government to exercise them. It could confer no power on any local government, established by its authority, to violate the provisions of the Constitution."

Again the Court says:  
"It seems, however, to be supposed that there is a difference between property in a slave and other property, and that different rules may be applied to it in expanding the Constitution of the United States. And the laws and usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon the relation of master and slave, and their mutual rights and duties, and the powers which Governments may exercise over it, have been dwelt upon in the argument."

And they say that the idea got abroad through the country through the speculations of foreign political writers. But the Court goes on to say that the rights of persons and property under American laws, is defined by a written Constitution, and, finally, they say:

If the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the masters in a slave, and makes no distinction between description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of the Government."

And who will deny that a Territorial Legislature is a legislative tribunal acting under the authority of the United States. "And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power, coupled with the duty, of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights."

Now, fellow-citizens, what is the authoritative decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, to whom we agreed to refer this disputed question about the power of the Territorial Legislature. They decide that whatever territory the Federal Government acquires as trustees for the citizens of all the States, with their property, must enjoy it as common citizens of common States. Nothing else than a sovereign being competent to define, determine, or impair property. They declare that the citizen enters the common territories with the Constitution in his hands. They declare that the Federal Government can confer no protection to the citizen beyond what the Constitution has given, and they say still less, can it authorize a Territorial Legislature to exercise powers which are denied to itself. Then, for the purpose of clinching the whole subject, they go on and say, "the only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights."

Let us see if that is so. The Senator from Illinois says: "Congress never yet passed a law for the protection of any man's property in a territory." I forbear to repeat what the Supreme Court has decided, but I like to get a sound, Constitutional idea into the minds of my fellow-citizens.

"Congress never," says Mr. Douglas, passed a law for the protection of any man's property in a territory." Gentlemen, it has done so in many instances. I happened to meet, the other day, with a striking case in which it did so. In 1834, when great statesmen were in the Senate and House of Representatives, and Andrew Jackson was President of the United States, the Legislature of the Territory of Florida, undertook to lay a tax upon the slaves of non-residents higher than upon the slaves of residents. The non-residents from Virginia and other States appealed to Congress to restrain the Legislature of Florida from discriminating against their property.

The committee in their report say:  
"The committee are satisfied that the memorialists are entitled to relief. It is certainly against the policy of the United States, as well as the dictates of common justice, to allow any Territorial Legislature to tax the same property of non-residents higher than the same property of residents."  
"The committee think that Congress should always protect the property of citizens of the United States when subjected to the operation of unjust legislation by Territorial Governments. In the case above referred to, that principle of protection is asserted, and maintained in practice. The same principle requires the same practice now, and for that purpose the committee herewith report a bill."

Pardon me, the two sections are short, I will read them:  
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That all such acts, or parts of acts, passed by the Legislative Council of Florida, as may impose a higher tax on the slaves, or other property of non-resident citizens, be, and the same are hereby repealed and declared null and void."

Not content with that, the second section provides that if any person shall attempt to enforce the law he should be liable to punishment. The section reads thus:  
"And be it further enacted, that if any person shall attempt to enforce any of the acts of the Territory of Florida as aforesaid, by demanding or receiving any tax, imposition or assessment authorized or prescribed thereby, such person shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding \$200, or by imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both or both of said punishments."

Oh, gentlemen, would it not be an insult to your understanding to say that was not an interference of Congress to protect private property from the encroachment of Territorial legislation? Yet that gentleman says "Congress never yet passed a law for the protection of any man's property in Territories." Of course, I do not doubt that he believed his statement, but I believe him at the expense of his intelligence. (Applause.)

The principles I have tried feebly to vindicate here, are the principles on which the Constitutional Democracy stand to-day; the only principles upon which any human being will pretend to charge them with the purpose of disunion. If they are the principles of the Constitution and the Union, then are we, fellow-citizens, for two or three months back, you have heard one loud and incessant clamor, that I and the Constitutional Democracy belong to a disunion organization, and that our aim is to break up the confederation of the States.

I hardly know, as far as that is a personal charge against myself, how I hear it repeated by anonymous writers and wandering orators all over the country. Their whole stock in trade is "disunion! disunion!" "These men belong to a party intended to break up the Union of the States." You appeal to them, by reason, in vain. You say, gentlemen, these are the principles of the Constitution, as determined by the practice of the Government. The answer is, "disunion." You say to them, they are the principles of the Union and Constitution, as determined by the highest tribunal in the land. The answer is, "disunion." You say you are asserting those principles sanctioned by practice and judicial authority. We are asserting them by the ballot box, and under and by the forms of the Constitution. The answer is, "disunion." We say how can principles be sectional or disunion which have their root in the Constitution, and which are as broad as the Constitution itself, and the larger number of young gentlemen who are engaged in ringing their tongues as long, and heads as empty as the bells which they ring, cry "disunion." (Prolonged laughter and cheers.)

Now, I have shown you the point of difference between us in that bill and the agreement between the friends of the bill. I have shown you the decision of the Supreme Court. We have arrived at a point where there should have been harmony and peace. We have arrived at the point agreed upon. The only point of difference had been determined by the highest judicial authority of the United States, and the equality of the rights of persons and property of all the citizens would have been recognized, stamped by the seal of judicial authority, and we would not have had any controversy or agitation except by a little band of Abolitionists, whom the conservative masses would have subdued. The Republicans, of course, traduced the Court, but it was never to have been expected that any friend of the Kansas bill—any one pledged to abide by the decision, would attempt to override that decision. "What," you will say, "no body disputed that at all."

You will think that now you will have time to turn your attention to the great material interests of the country. You have laid the spectre of slavery agitation! Not at all! Unhappily, not at all!

The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered in 1857. Everything was quiet until 1858, when the Senator from Illinois, Mr. Douglas, was a candidate for re-election to the Senate from the State of Illinois, and then for the first time in the history of American politics was made by which subordinate authorities may override the opinion of the highest judicial tribunal in the Union. There we find no purpose to abide by the agreement to take the judicial decision of their Constitutional right, but the declaration is made that a subordinate authority may confiscate or exclude from the Territory the property of citizens of Southern States, without regard to the opinion of the Supreme Court. I don't want to do injustice, so I will read it. It is short:

In a debate between Senator Douglas and Mr. Lincoln the former said: "The next question propounded to me by Mr. L. is, 'can the people of a territory, in any lawful way against the wishes of the United States, exclude slavery from their limit prior to the formation of a State Constitution?' I answer emphatically, as Mr. L. has heard me answer a hundred times, from every stump in Illinois, that in my opinion the people of a territory can, by lawful means, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution."

That is the question put to him, and that was the question we agreed in the Kansas bill to refer to the Supreme Court of the United States. That is the question decided as I have just shown you, by the Supreme Court of the United States, by the speech of Mr. Douglas in which they say that neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature has the power to exclude slavery; but that the only right is the right coupled with the duty to guard and protect it. I have shown you that Mr. Douglas agreed to submit the question to that Court, and that Mr. Douglas acquiesced in the decision.

Mr. Douglas, further on, says the question is an abstract one. An abstract question? A question involving the Union, and involving the rights of half of them. "It matters not what the Supreme Court may hereafter decide, the people may lawfully exclude it." I have shown you in 1856, in the Senate of the United States, he said, "If the Constitution authorizes it to go there, no power on earth can take it away." I would like to see these two statements reconciled. (Applause.) Whether the Constitution did authorize it to go there, was a question that he agreed to refer to the Court; and then after the Court decides, he says no matter how the Court may decide, the people may lawfully exclude slavery from the territories; and these declarations are, and remain uncontradicted, and not taken back; and he asserts to-day as he asserted before, that the people of a territory may exclude slave property of the Southern people prior to the formation of a State Constitution—that a Territorial Legislature may do it. Hence, he says, "no matter what way the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract question whether slavery may or may not go into a territory under the Constitution, the people have the lawful means to introduce or exclude it, as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless it is supported by local police regulations."

I should have thought that the ghost of the Nebraska bill—the spectre of that abused bill—would have risen up to prevent such a declaration as this! (Applause.)

I say, gentlemen, in answer to the accusation made against me of maintaining this doctrine, and which I have disproved, I say it is not statesmanlike to agree to refer a Constitutional point to the Supreme Court of your country, and then, when the Supreme Court of your country has decided it, say, "It matters not what way hereafter decided," the people remain.

A voice—"That's higher law." That looks almost as much like higher law as some higher law we have heard of further east. If I were disposed to imitate an eminent but a bad example, I might say there is no honest man in the United States, as he said of me, who can deny that the agreement was made; that the decision was made in accordance with our view of the Constitution; and that the agreement has been violated by the Senator and his personal adherents, who agreed to abide by it.

Fellow-citizens, the serious indisposition under which I have labored for some days, making it almost impossible for me at times to see the assemblage before me, makes me unable to divide off my speech in proper proportions, as I should desire to do, considering the time I have already occupied your attention. You will excuse me if, being somewhat desultory in my remarks, I omit some topic to which I should call your attention.

How is this question met? Have I argued to-day—is it commonly argued by gentlemen who entertain the same opinion that I do—except in a many way, according to our best ability, and according to our understanding of the Constitution? Don't we state the proposition fairly? Don't we state it in the language of the Supreme Court itself? Don't we stand upon the Constitution as adjudged by that court, and express our reasons in temperate, manly and respectful arguments? Compare the manner in which the Supreme Court decided the question with the manner in which the distinguished gentleman states the other proposition. How does he state it? Here are questions upon which the best intellects of the country are exercised, engaging the attention of the wisest and best of men; of the most august tribunal on earth; debated in the Senate and House of Representatives, and before an anxious people, who want to know how to act up to the truth. How is the question stated, from one end of the country to the other? The cry is, what? Not that we will argue with you fairly and temperately, without any appeals to secular passions and prejudices, the question whether your property is the same as other property; whether it has the same rights in the territories as other property? The statement is made that you shall not force slavery down the throats of an unwilling people. The argument consists of an appeal to the passions of one section of the Union against another.

Mr. Douglas himself admitted that slave property stands upon the same footing with other property. The Supreme Court decided that under the Constitution, it stands upon the same footing and it has the same right to protection in the common Territories, and that there is no right to exclude it. Then it being a conceded point that there is no difference between property in slaves and other

things during the Territorial condition, why do they seize upon the word slave, and appealing to the passions of the people say, "You shall not force slavery down the throats of an unwilling people." Who wants to do it? Does the existence of the property in the common domain of this Union until a State is formed, which can take charge of property and determine it, endanger the Union? Substitute the word property for the word slave, and see how it would read. "You attempt to force slavery down the throats of an unwilling people." You attempt to force property down the throats of unwilling people, (laughter and cheers.) and there is no difference between slave and other property, as the court has decided, and as they admit. The Territorial Legislature is the creature of Congress; Congress is the creature of the Constitution and the Constitution of the States; and here you would have a little Territorial Legislature, three or four degrees removed from the source of power, with the right to exclude the States from their own domain. That is the irresistible conclusion.

These are not the doctrines of the Constitutional Democracy. These are not the doctrines of the Kentucky Opposition, either, or were not that property; these are sectional doctrines. (Cheers.) These are not the doctrines that make the peace and harmony of the Union of States. (Cheers.) Because we will not take them, abandoning the old practice of the Government, and the decision of the Supreme Court in our favor—because we will not bow down to a doctrine that deprives us of our rights, and is subversive of our rights—the distinguished Senator said at Norfolk, we are a faction, and must be destroyed; when we are destroyed, they will stick their daggers through the Constitution of our country. (Immense cheering.)

Just here, before I go to other matters, I want to say one word in regard to the doctrine of non-intervention, as it was originally understood, and which is now mixed up to confuse the people with the expressions "Popular Sovereignty" and "Squatter Sovereignty."

The names of Clay, Webster and others have been invoked to sustain this doctrine. The local fact of the Compromise of 1850 has been invoked for the same purpose. I assert that from 1848 down to the present period—when this false doctrine, repugnant alike to the Constitution and reason—was thrust upon the country, no respectable political party held the opinion that a Territorial Legislature had a right to exclude slave property pending its territorial condition. When did Clay ever hold such an opinion? When were such doctrines embodied in the Compromise measure of 1850? When was such a doctrine in the Clayton Compromise of 1848, of which you have heard so much, and which was defeated by a small vote?

They all looked to the period when they should come into the Union as a State as the time when the territorial authorities might act on the subject of property, and hold or to exclude the slave property of the South. (Applause.)

Time, fellow-citizens, will not allow me to do much more than state the propositions; but I will read short abstracts from the celebrated report made by the committee of thirteen, of which Mr. Clay was chairman, which resulted in the Compromise Measures of 1850. Listen to it, I pray. It is calm, lucid, has no clap-trap phrases, and puts me in mind of the language used by the Supreme Court:

"It is high time that the wounds which it has inflicted should be healed up and closed, and that to avoid in all future time the agitation which must be produced by the conflict of opinion on the slavery question—existing as this institution does in some of the States, and prohibited as it is in others, the true principle which ought to regulate the action of Congress in forming Territorial Governments for each newly acquired domain, is to refrain from all legislation on the subject in the territory acquired, so long as it retains the territorial form of government, leaving it to the people of such territory when they have attained to a condition which entitles them to admission as a State, to decide for themselves the question of the allowance or prohibition of domestic slavery." (Applause—a voice, "That is true doctrine.")

Though in a very different manner, and by something like argument, and by means above those to which I have been alluding, from sources yet more eminent, comes the information that I, and the political organization with which I am connected, are laboring for the disruption of the Confederacy. I do not reply now to what Mr. Douglas says all over New England, in Virginia, and wherever he goes, because it is quite natural for a person as much interested as he, to think that any man who opposes his principles must be a disunionist. (Cheers and laughter.) Indeed, by his declaration we must be all disunionists in Kentucky, for he declares that those who assert that a Territorial Legislature has no power to exclude slave property, and that Congress should interfere for its protection, are disunionists, and that is what the old Opposition of Kentucky said last year, and which I will prove to have been their position, expressed in every term that it could be.

Fellow-citizens, even in my own State, where I thought certainly my character and antecedents were pretty well known, one of the oldest, one of the most honest—in all our public men—has not indeed said that I was a disunionist, but has intimated, if not one, I am connected with an organization whose bone and body is disunion. I refer to a speech of Mr. Crittenden, made at Louisville. I have known and admired Mr. Crittenden since I was a boy. He also has known me. Toward him and his I have ever cherished, and expect to cherish, relations of the most respectful and cordial esteem. There are reasons which I care not to give to the public, that even if I had grounds for it, would prevent me from venturing beyond the limits of the most respectful courtesy, in answering what he has said. After speaking of Mr. Lincoln in terms fully as complimentary, it seems to me, as his principles merit, although opposing him firmly, as Mr. Crittenden does, and after speaking of the Senator from Illinois in terms of the highest eulogy, as it seems to me, he comes to speak of his fellow-citizen, expressing the lingering hope that I am not a disunionist. (Laughter.) Like a humane lawyer he gives me, personally, the benefit of a doubt, and for this I thank him. (Laughter and applause.)

A voice—"Hurrah for Breckinridge." As to my connection with principles, or a party, which tend that way, I may speak of that presently. My object now is, to relieve myself personally from the accusations or imputation that I am such. I would greatly have preferred that I should have received a strong and direct blow, than to receive, as I do, the kind and reluctant confession of a sorrowful friend. (Applause.)

In passing, I may say, in regard to the distinguished gentleman who is associated with me as a candidate for Vice President, that his whole life is a refutation of such a charge, if made against him. Born in North Carolina, reared in Kentucky, long living in Indiana, now coming from Oregon, he has been in all parts of the country, tried in all, and honored in all. He loves them, all, and brought the last, as a State, into the galaxy of the Union. (Applause.)

When a man is before the people for public office a great deal depends upon his personal character and antecedents; and he gets much if he can show that he is not liable to an injurious report. Much depends, therefore, upon whether I am a disunionist.

Born within sight of this spot; known to you for nearly forty years; your representative in the Legislature, in Congress, and other situations of trust, I invite any one to point to

anything in my record which would sanction such a charge or such an imputation. (Cheers.) I will not degrade the dignity of my declaration by epithets, but I proudly challenge my bitterest enemy to point out an act, to disclose an utterance or reveal a thought of mine, hostile to the Constitution or the Union of the States. (Loud cheers. A voice—"He couldn't do it.") The man does not live, however exalted his character, who has power enough to couple my name successfully with the slightest taint of disloyalty to the Constitution and Union of my country. (Great applause.)

But, fellow-citizens, if there be nothing in my character or antecedents to justify his accusation, what is there in the platform of principles upon which I stand? It is not pretended that these resolutions which relate to the acquisition of Cuba and a railroad to the Pacific, contain anything having the slightest tendency in that direction. It can, therefore, mean only those resolutions which have relation to the question of territorial power and slave property, in the territories. I will read to you those resolutions, and you will see if they are according to the decision of the Supreme Court, as I have shown it to be to-day.

What are they? This is the platform adopted by the Baltimore Convention, which nominated me for the Presidency of the United States.

1. Resolved, That the government of a Territory organized by an act of Congress is provisional and temporary, and during its existence all citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with their property in a Territory without their rights, either of persons or property, being destroyed or impaired by Congressional or Territorial legislation.

2. Resolved, That it is the duty of the Federal Government in all its departments to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons and property in the Territories, and wherever else its Constitutional authority extends.

The third resolution provides that when they come to form a State Constitution, they may decide the question of slavery for themselves.

That, fellow-citizens, is the platform of principle avowed. Are they Constitutional? Are they just? Or are they sectional? I say they are Constitutional, they are not sectional; for the Constitution is broad enough to cover the whole Union. Whoever, therefore, stands upon the Constitution, can be neither a sectionalist nor a disunionist. I have shown you that these principles are taken almost word for word from the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. They find their root in almost all the precedents and practices of the Government. They are principles upon which we may well live and by which we may well be willing to die. (Cheers.) They are vitally important, and they concern rights of person and property; they cannot be abstract, minute, or unimportant, for they concern the honor and equality of the States.

What has been the position of Kentucky upon that platform? You remember the position taken by the gentlemen who were candidates for Governor of this State last year. They both held that Territorial Legislatures have no power to exclude our property, and each contended that every department of Government must protect it when it became necessary. Mr. Joshua Bell, I believe, went a step further than his competitor, by expressing his opinion that the time was at that instant arrived, when it had become necessary to interpose the arm of the Federal Government to protect our property. Mr. Magoffin held, if it became necessary, private property should be protected from Territorial interference and confiscation. The whole people of Kentucky voted for one or the other of these distinguished gentlemen. Your Congressional Conventions, that nominated candidates for Congress, indorsed this principle by a most decisive and overwhelming majority. Nay, more; if I may refer to the proceedings of a party Convention, the Democratic Convention—which met on the 9th of January last at Frankfort—indorsed the same principle by an overwhelming majority. I hold in my hand the resolution by which it was done. But neither the time nor my strength suffices for me to read it. I shall incorporate it in my remarks.

Nay, more. The Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by the unanimous vote of both parties, indorsed this same principle as being true, by the following resolution:

Resolved, By the whole Senate of the State of Kentucky, that the Territories are the common property of the Union, and as a field for the expansion of the institutions and development of the energies of our advancing and progressive people, are open to the citizens of all the States; and that there exists no power in the General Government, or the Government of a Territory during its continuance as such, and until, having attained sufficient population, it shall have formed a Constitution and been admitted into the Union, to impair the right of any citizen who may have emigrated thereto, to the enjoyment of any species of property recognized by the States. But that this right having been solemnly affirmed by the decision of the highest tribunal, shall be guarded by suitable laws, faithfully administered; and if in any case a Territorial Government shall that right by unfriendly legislation, or experience should show that existing laws are inadequate for its protection, it will then be the duty of the General Government, by the exercise of its powers, legislative, executive and administrative, to provide such security and protection as the exigencies of the occasion may demand."

What is that but copying the decision of the Supreme Court and the resolutions of the convention of Kentucky, last winter, by a like unanimous vote, passed a resolution in almost the same words. I cannot read it, for my strength does not allow—I will incorporate it with my remarks. So that both parties at the polls, last summer, and by the unanimous vote of their representatives in the Senate and House of Representatives of the State, have declared that these are the principles of the Constitution and of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Surely I might pause here, but I want, in support of these principles, the high authority of one of our most venerable and eminent statesmen; I want the authority of Mr. Crittenden. Gentlemen, whatever doubts he may have as to my fidelity to the Constitution and the union of the States, I do not hesitate to say, that that eminent man is devoted to the union of the States; I do not believe he would advocate principles that he believed unconstitutional or calculated to destroy the Constitution and the union of the country, and if I can have his sanction and his indorsement, surely it goes a great way towards proving that they are true and not disunion.

I hold in my hand the official journal of the Senate of the month of May last. During that month the following resolution was adopted by an overwhelming vote:

Resolved, That the Union of these States rests on the equality of the rights and privileges among its members; and it is the special duty of the Senate, which represents the States in their sovereign capacity, to resist all attempts to discriminate in relation to persons or property in the territories, which are the common property of the United States, so as to give advantages to the citizens of one State which are not assured to citizens of the other States."

Mr. Crittenden voted for that resolution.

On the same day the following resolution was passed by the Senate:

Resolved, That neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature, whether by direct legislation, or by legislation of an indirect or unfriendly character, possess the power to annul or impair the Constitutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his property into the common territory, and there hold his property while the territorial condition there remains."

Mr. Crittenden's vote is recorded in favor of that resolution. On the same day a resolution was passed declaring it to be the duty of Congress to supply such protection as may be demanded by the necessities of the citizens. Mr. Crittenden's name is recorded in the affirmative on that resolution.

Then, gentlemen, I have the votes of my distinguished friend, Mr. Crittenden, upon the resolutions in the Senate, declaring that these questions are not minute and unimportant; declaring that the union of the States rests upon the equality of rights and privileges of the citizens, and that it is the duty of the Senate especially to guard against any discrimination in these rights of person and property, declaring that if those rights be assailed by the Territorial Legislature it will be necessary for Congress and every department of the Government to interfere and protect those rights. Precisely the principles upon which we stand to-day.

My distinguished friend, Mr. Crittenden, a few days afterwards followed these resolutions by a speech in the Senate, which I find reported in the Daily Globe, which is the official organ of the Senate. It is true that Mr. Crittenden expressed a hope and the opinion that the time might never come when it would be necessary for Congress to intervene to protect a Constitutional right in a territory. I trust so too. I trust the time will never come when the territorial authorities, without regard to their Constitutional obligations, will undertake to violate an adjudicated right so as to make it necessary for their proceedings to be annulled.

Mr. Crittenden goes on to say, that as the Territorial Government has no sovereign independent right to act on this subject, the Supreme Court of the United States having determined that every citizen of the United States may go into that Territory, carrying his slaves with him and holding them there, my opinion is that the Constitution is to protect that property which it had authorized to go there; therefore, when the proper or extreme case occurs, when property going there under the Supreme Court of the United States shall require such interposition, that it is the duty of Congress to interpose and grant protection.

Nobly and well said, in language worthy of his exalted character and reputation—in language, I repeat, that would compare favorably with arguments and utterances of the Supreme Court of the United States. (A voice—"Good, for you Major.") Mr. Douglas says, and says to-day—stands upon it and claims your votes upon it—that the Territorial Legislature, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be, has a right to exclude slavery; that you may take it there, but you must leave it subject to such local laws as the Territorial Legislature may make. The Supreme Court says you can't. Mr. Crittenden says nothing can strike him as more contradictory, nothing more illogical, than to assert the proposition which Mr. Douglas has announced, and which, he says, we must recognize, or if not recognized, he will read and destroy as he goes.

I take some satisfaction from the fact that the Hon. John J. Crittenden, whose name and authority will go far in this State, has declared and recorded on his oath as a Senator in the Senate that the principles upon which we stand are the true principles of the Constitution. (Much applause.) Fellow-citizens, I cannot enlarge. What do I think I have done? I appeal to yourselves whether I have not, with reasonable certainty, conclusively, I will say, repelled the personal accusations against me? Have I not shown that neither I nor the Constitutional Democracy indorse this dogma of the Territorial authority to exclude slavery while in a territorial condition, and that we have not broken faith? Have I not shown that by the agreement at the time of the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the Constitutional point was to be left to the Supreme Court? Have I not shown that the Supreme Court sustained our construction of the Constitution? Have I not shown that the agreement thus made has been violated by the declaration that a subordinate authority may have the Constitutional right and exclude slave property, when the Court says it has not the power? Who has abandoned the ground or violated the agreement? Who has violated the agreement?

I have shown that the principles upon which we stand, have been sanctioned by the practice of the highest judicial tribunal in the world; voted to be true by both political parties in Kentucky in 1859; unanimously asserted by both branches of the Legislature, and by an overwhelming majority of the whole Democratic party in Kentucky, and declared by Mr. Crittenden to be sound and true. (Cheers.) I think I have piled up a pyramid of fact and argument in support of these principles, which ought to commend itself to the grave consideration of every intelligent man; I have tried to do it by legitimate facts and arguments. I am not conscious of having appealed to any prejudice or passion of any section.

These principles, thus asserted, will give us harmony and peace. They will make each State in the Union feel that it is a sister to every other, and every man will feel that he stands upon a common footing with his brother. These principles have their root in the Constitution, and no party can be sectional which maintains constitutional principles; none!

Are we to be driven from their maintenance? Is this State to be twisted around the finger of politicians as they would twist a gum elastic band upon their finger? Are the people of Kentucky to turn their back upon the principles which last year they felt to be true? Driven by a loud and false clamor? Are they to be bewildered and staggered by a cry from maintaining their rights, and when Kentucky is asking to express her own opinion as to her rights, is the chivalry of the Commonwealth sunk so low that she dare not assert it? Such were not the men who laid the foundation of the State. Such were not your fathers in '38. They took the lead in vindication of the truth. The New England States stigmatized them as disunionists, but undeterred they stood by their rights, and inaugurated a political revolution that preserved the true principle of our system. These were your fathers—the men of '38. Now, in 1860, the issue is distinctly presented to you. Will you express your own opinion of the equality of your own State in the Union? Will you, by your vote, assert your own rights in the Confederacy? The Supreme Court says you have them. You yourselves have said you have them. In every term in which you can express your opinion to the world, you have claimed these rights. Here they are, embodied in this platform of principles. Upon them are standing men whom you cannot deny to be true to them, and whose loyalty to the Constitution and the Union of the country no man can successfully attack. Then will you fly from your own principles, as asserted by yourselves, at the clangor of bells and the clamor of unreasonable orators? That is the issue presented to the people of Kentucky.

(Voice—"Good," and much applause.) Fellow-citizens, can you bear with me a little longer?

(A voice—"Yes, a week, go on.") You must allow me, therefore, to make a few remarks in a tone more subdued, and I must apologize to you for the loose way in which I am going on, smitten as I am by sickness.

I know of but one political organization before the United States which asserts the principles I have undertaken to vindicate and defend. The Republican organization. They are taken precisely opposite principles. They say we have no rights in the Territories with our property. They say Congress has a right to exclude it, and it is its duty to do so, and they are willing to see the Territorial Legislature do it if Congress does not.

In regard to the platform adopted by the Convention which nominated Mr. Bell of

my distinguished friend, Mr. Crittenden, upon the resolutions in the Senate, declaring that these questions are not minute and unimportant; declaring that the union of the States rests upon the equality of rights and privileges of the citizens, and that it is the duty of the Senate especially to guard against any discrimination in these rights of person and property, declaring that if those rights be assailed by the Territorial Legislature it will be necessary for Congress and every department of the Government to interfere and protect those rights. Precisely the principles upon which we stand to-day.

My distinguished friend, Mr. Crittenden, a few days afterwards followed these resolutions by a speech in the Senate, which I find reported in the Daily Globe, which is the official organ of the Senate. It is true that Mr. Crittenden expressed a hope and the opinion that the time might never come when it would be necessary for Congress to intervene to protect a Constitutional right in a territory. I trust so too. I trust the time will never come when the territorial authorities, without regard to their Constitutional obligations, will undertake to violate an adjudicated right so as to make it necessary for their proceedings to be annulled.

Mr. Crittenden goes on to say, that as the Territorial Government has no sovereign independent right to act on this subject, the Supreme Court of the United States having determined that every citizen of the United States may go into that Territory, carrying his slaves with him and holding them there, my opinion is that the Constitution is to protect that property which it had authorized to go there; therefore, when the proper or extreme case occurs, when property going there under the Supreme Court of the United States shall require such interposition, that it is the duty of Congress to interpose and grant protection.

Nobly and well said, in language worthy of his exalted character and reputation—in language, I repeat, that would compare favorably with arguments and utterances of the Supreme Court of the United States. (A voice—"Good, for you Major.") Mr. Douglas says, and says to-day—stands upon it and claims your votes upon it—that the Territorial Legislature, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be, has a right to exclude slavery; that you may take it there, but you must leave it subject to such local laws as the Territorial Legislature may make. The Supreme Court says you can't. Mr. Crittenden says nothing can strike him as more contradictory, nothing more illogical, than to assert the proposition which Mr. Douglas has announced, and which, he says, we must recognize, or if not recognized, he will read and destroy as he goes.

I take some satisfaction from the fact that the Hon. John J. Crittenden, whose name and authority will go far in this State, has declared and recorded on his oath as a Senator in the Senate that the principles upon which we stand are the true principles of the Constitution. (Much applause.) Fellow-citizens, I cannot enlarge. What do I think I have done? I appeal to yourselves whether I have not, with reasonable certainty, conclusively, I will say, repelled the personal accusations against me? Have I not shown that neither I nor the Constitutional Democracy indorse this dogma of the Territorial authority to exclude slavery while in a territorial condition, and that we have not broken faith? Have I not shown that by the agreement at the time of the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the Constitutional point was to be left to the Supreme Court? Have I not shown that the Supreme Court sustained our construction of the Constitution? Have I not shown that the agreement thus made has been violated by the declaration that a subordinate authority may have the Constitutional right and exclude slave property, when the Court says it has not the power? Who has abandoned the ground or violated the agreement? Who has violated the agreement?

I have shown that the principles upon which we stand, have been sanctioned by the practice of the highest judicial tribunal in the world; voted to be true by both political parties in Kentucky in 1859; unanimously asserted by both branches of the Legislature, and by an overwhelming majority of the whole Democratic party in Kentucky, and declared by Mr. Crittenden to be sound and true. (Cheers.) I think I have piled up a pyramid of fact and argument in support of these principles, which ought to commend itself to the grave consideration of every intelligent man; I have tried to do it by legitimate facts and arguments. I am not conscious of having appealed to any prejudice or passion of any section.

These principles, thus asserted, will give us harmony and peace. They will make each State in the Union feel that it is a sister to every other, and every man will feel that he stands upon a common footing with his brother. These principles have their root in the Constitution, and no party can be sectional which maintains constitutional principles; none!

Are we to be driven from their maintenance? Is this State to be twisted around the finger of politicians as they would twist a gum elastic band upon their finger? Are the people of Kentucky to turn their back upon the principles which last year they felt to be true? Driven by a loud and false clamor? Are they to be bewildered and staggered by a cry from maintaining their rights, and when Kentucky is asking to express her own opinion as to her rights, is the chivalry of the Commonwealth sunk so low that she dare not assert it? Such were not the men who laid the foundation of the State. Such were not your fathers in '38. They took the lead in vindication of the truth. The New England States stigmatized them as disunionists, but undeterred they stood by their rights, and inaugurated a political revolution that preserved the true principle of our system. These were your fathers—the men of '38. Now, in 1860, the issue is distinctly presented to you. Will you express your own opinion of the equality of your own State in the Union? Will you, by your vote, assert your own rights in the Confederacy? The Supreme Court says you have them. You yourselves have said you have them. In every term in which you can express your opinion to the world, you have claimed these rights. Here they are, embodied in this platform of principles. Upon them are standing men whom you cannot deny to be true to them, and whose loyalty to the Constitution and the Union of the country no man can successfully attack. Then will you fly from your own principles, as asserted by yourselves, at the clangor of bells and the clamor of unreasonable orators? That is the issue presented to the people of Kentucky.

(Voice—"Good," and much applause.) Fellow-citizens, can you bear with me a little longer?

(A voice—"Yes, a week, go on.") You must allow me, therefore, to make a few remarks in a tone more subdued, and I must apologize to you for the loose way in which I am going on, smitten as I am by sickness.

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