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I One Gallon a Month Law Before Supreme Court Constitutionality of Law Argued by Attorneyj ~ I General Peeples and Assistant Attorney General Dominick in the Supreme Court?An Exhaustive Review of the Prohibition Law of All the States and Cities Cases Bearing on the Subject. There is so much just now in the limelight in regard to the liquor question, and there are several bills before the legislature touching the question, that we have decided to print in full the argument of Attorney General Peeples and Assistant Attorney General Dominick as submitted before the supreme court on Thursday of last week in the case pertaining to the constitutionality of the gallon-a-month law. It is an exhaustive argument and covers the legislation of other states on the same subject. In fact there is a prohibition wave sweeping over the country just now and we feel that this argument will be good xcauing iusl at im> ujik. This action wa< commenced by the plaintiff by service of the Summons and C ^mplairl on May 31, T915. The Complaint shows that 011 the 6th day of May, 1915, the plaintiff ordered by I'nited States mail from H. Clarke & Sons, duly licensed liquor dealers in Richmond, State of \ irginia. one gallon of whiskey, accompanied by the purchase price thereof, same to be shipped to the plaintiff at the City of Co-1 ? - 1- --* AU/v t /M-U IMII! I lumDia: tnat tnereaner, <>u or aooui ujc unn uai .v.j, a similar order was made by the plaintiff from I f. Clarke & vSons. for one gallon of whiskey: that thereafter on the 12th j day of May. 1915. plaintiff made a similar order from the! same party for two gallons of whiskey. It is alleged in the complaint that all of the shipments above j were intended by the plaintiff for his personal use and were j ?-l x?1^.1 u.. u:? mi' t\ArcAn intpTvcf-prl tbprfin to be TlOl lIlldlLltll uy llllii. Ui u\ an > pv.i cun uiivi v^kw ^ ? ? received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used contrary to the laws of South Carolina." The first shipment referred to was duly and regularly delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant. The second shipment was transported from Richmond, Virginia, to Columbia, 'South " ? Carolina, but delivery to the plaintiff was refused. The third ! shipment, of two gallons, was refused, and not accepted for j shipment by the defendant. The defendant, through its agents, advised the plaintiff that I the reason for defendant's refusal to deliver the said second shipment, and refusal to receive said third shipment, was that defendant was forbidden by an Act of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, entitled "An Act to Regulate the Shipment of Spirituous, Vinous, Fermented or Malt! Liquors or Beverages Into This State, and to Provide Penalties fo: the Violations of this Act,'? approved on the 20th day of February, 1915, commonly known as the Gallon-a-Month Act. The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the Act of the Legislature furnishes 110 valid legal ground for the refusal of the defendant company to deliver said shipments, because -Mirh Act of the General Assembly is unconstitutional and void, in that it is in violation of Article I., Section 5, of the Constitution of South Carolina; Article VIII., 'Section 2, of the Constitution of South Carolina; Article I, Section 8, Subsection 3, of the Constitution of the United States; Article VI.. Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States; Fourteenth Amendment, and, further, that if the Act of the General Assembly is authorized under what is commonly known as the Webb K-enyon Law, plaintiff says that said Act of Congress is in violation of his rights; in contravention of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United 'States, and the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiff asks that the defendant be perpetually enjoined from refusing to accept, ship and transport, or convey, intoxicating liquors from any point on defendant's line outside of the State of South Carolina, authorized by licensed dealers at such point, for delivery to plaintiff, or from refusing to deliver to plaintiff such liquors so ordered for his personal use. To this Complaint the defendant demurred on the ground that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that it appears upon the face of the complaint that the acts of the defendant complained of were done by and under the authority of "An Act to Regulate the Shipment of Spirituous, Vinous, Fermented or Malt Liquors or Bev erages, Into this State, and to Provide Penalties for the Violation of this Act," which was an Act duly passed by the General Assembly of the State of iSouth Carolina, and approved by the Governor of South Carolina on the 20th day of February, J9I5. ARGUMENT. ? * - J ^ *-1 ? mn I 1 He questions 'raisea Dy me pieaumgs m uic wjuuu av.uuii have been fully and elaborately covered in an exhaustive brief on these questions prepared by the Honorable Samuel D. Weak- . ley, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama. Mr. Chief justice Weakley has made a most thorough study of all the authorities relating to and bearing upon the questions involved and has kindly permitted the use of that brief in the presentation of these questions in the case at bar. With his permission we have adopted his brief, with a few necessarychanges, as our argument. This statement is made at this time so that full credit may be given to the author of the brief. Thp two nrnno.sitions to be maintained are: First, That " *? ? ~ I 1 the Webb-Kenyon Act is valid, and, second, that the State of South Carolina, under the police power, may validly prohibit or regulate the receipt and possession of istoxiesttag- ligaors within its borders, an<J nothing in the State Constitution, nor in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, nor in the commerce clause since the Webb-Kenyon law, will prevent it from exercising its police powers in the manner stated, even when the liquors arc for personal use. The statute relating to the shipment of intoxicating liquors j into the State of South Carolina was approved on the 20th clay of February, 1915, the following Sections of which are pertinent to the questions involved: 1 Sec. i. That it shall be unlawful for am* person, firm, cor- ! ! I poration or company to ship, transport or convey any mtoxi- j ! eating liquors from a {joint without the State into this State, j - 1 | or from one point to another in this State, for the purpose ot | ! delivery, or to deliver the same to any person, firm, corporation , i or company within this State, or for any person, firm, cor-! poration or company to receive, or be in possession of, any j spirituous, vinous, fermented or malt liquors or beverages con- ! taining more than one per cent, of alcohol, for his, her, its or their own use, or for the use of any other person, firm or 1 corporation, except as hereinafter provided. Sec. 2. Any person may order and receive from any point j without the State not exceeding one gallon within any calendar j | month, for his or her personal use, of spirituous, vinous, fer- j mented or malted liquors or beverages. i Sec. 7. Any person violating any of the provisions of this ! Act shall be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred dol lars, or imprisonment for not less than three months, or both, ! I. . . . _ t in tli#* rtitirrpfirm nf the ( Olirt. It is the purpose of this, brief to insist that the Statute of ! j South Carolina prohibiting the receipt and possession of in| toxicating liquors tor personal use, except only in limited i quantities, is a valid cxereise of the police powers of this State: j | that it is not in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment ; | of the Federal Constitution: that such a Statute lavs the predi- J j cate for the operation of prohibition contained 'in the Webb; Kenyon Act: and that said Federal Act is a valid exercise by j of tin* nowcrs to regulate commerce in liquors anions the States. I. ' In the case of .hhinis li.vprcss i'o. v. Com. of Kentucky. 238 1". S. 1 (jo, reference was made I>y this Court tu the Webb-i < Kenvon Act. which was there construed. The Court regarded the Act as a regulation of interstate commerce by Congress, pursuant to the responsibility -resting < - T t r 1 _ T T upon it as recognized and stated 111 Lcisy v. tiara in, 135 u. ; 100, and in the case of In Re Rahrcr, 140 1". S. 546, to remove, ; so far as the regulation of interstate commerce is concerned, ] the restriction upon the States in dealing with imported articles < of trade within their limits, which articles have not been min- 1 gled with the common mass of property therein. 2 T '1 ' " ~ + ll'IC -V-IOCIA f/~\ f Vt i=> ( ill II1C I\?'II Hit K'\' ( U<)( , Mipict, I Citn-iit*. ?vao uiauv. iw i???, j Wilson Act of 1890 and to the case of In Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 546, sustaining" the same, in which it was held that Congress had not thereby attempted to delegate the power to reg- i ulate commerce, or to exercise any power reserved to the < States, or to grant a power not possessed by the State, or to . adopt State laws; but had taken its own course and made its own regulation, applying to subjects of interstate commerce one common rule whose uniformity is not affected Dy varia-1 tions in State laws in dealing with such property; and that , Congress did not use terms of permission to the iState to act, j but simply removed an impediment to the enforcement of State ; laws in respect to imported packages in their original condition, such impediment having been created by the absence of ] a specific utterance on the part of Congress; that Congress j imparted no power to the State not then possessed, but allowed - -- ? M . 1 1 1 imported property to fall at once upon arrival witinn tne locai | jurisdiction. i It seems evident to us that the foregoing language applies , with equal force to the prohibitions contained in the Webb Kenyon Act, and conclusively establishes the validity of the i same. In Rhodes r. Iozca, 170 U. S. 412, and in Vancc v. Vundercook, 170 U. S. 428, the Wilson Act was construed in such a , way as that a State under its police pow-er might regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors after delivery to the consignee, < 1 ? "1 -? -? ^A cIt 1 nmptifc r\f aitnougn noining m me w n&un |^i\,vv.ntv.vi .inipuvnij . liquor in interstate commerce to a consignee for his own use, , so long as he did not undertake to sell it. This result, how- , ever, was deduced from the "commerce clause'' of tha Federal , Constitution in connection with the Court's interpretation of { the Wilson Act, and not from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, nor from a consideration of the police power of the State. , The cases just referred to rested rather upon the broad , ' --1- ,-wl +l-i^.r-^ uric ( '/-^nrrr?>ecirinn1 aptirvn principle ^WIUUl caisicu umu mut vvcio v/u?5" j to the contrary) of tl%e freedom of commerce between the i iStates, and of the right of a citizen of one State to freely con- . tract to receive merchandise from another iState, and of the equal right of a citizen of a State to contract to send merchandise into other States, and they rested also upon the obvious want of power of one State to destroy contracts concerning ' ?^ninmoroe irolirl in flip wVlPTP ITI3 rf P _ SS CX~ lilL^l Wlimiv-i v\-, laiiu ??? ?-?? >- .... 7 plained by the present Chief Justice in the case American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133. Hence there was, as explained in the Kentucky case, supra, before the passage of the Webb-KJenyon Act, nothing- to prevent shipment of intoxicating liquors in interstate commerce for the personal use simply of the consignee, the Wilson Act, as construed, not being intended by Congress to have that effect. It is easily seen that the Wilson Act, as construed, would admit of the shipment and delivery to a citizen of large quantities of intoxicating liquors under the claim or pretense that they were for personal use, and that such stocks of liquors thus admitted might easily be made the means of conducting successfully an illicit traffic in liquors, and thereby defeat the valid efforts of the States to effectually prohibit such traffic. The presence also of unlimited quantities of liquors for personal use would entirely defeat the policy of the Prohibition States in so far as efforts were made by them, directly or indirectly, to limit or prevent the consumption of intoxicants in order that drunkenness and intemperance among the people 1 1 J * * "**? - 11 *r roimnf flUgftt OC rCQUC (i. ur, U puasiuic, wukjuj yt. v. y tinvu. Congress considered proper to exercise its power for the purpose of aiding the States in the efforts they might make under the polite power to enforce their local policy in respect to intoxicating liquors, the traffic in them or the use of them !' by the people of the State, ami hence, by the Webb-Kenyon ] Act, extended the Congressional prohibition so as to forbid in i defined cases the introduction of liquors at all into a State from j another State. The meaning of the Webb-I\envon Act, as the ; ? - i - ? rr . t 1 _ * i__ _1 I Supreme Court said in tnc j\,enuicKy ease, is so piainiy suuvwi j by the title and body thereof, that there can be no room for controversy as to its construction and no resort to outside sources to ascertain its true intent is necessary. Whereas under the Wilson Act, unlimited quantities of | liquor for personal use could freely move from one State into ' another and large quantities be obtained for illicit sale in a j State under the false claim (often impossible to detect) that ' it was intended for personal use, now under the W ebb- Ken von j A of 1 cliifMvinr-it r\t lirinnr ic pntirplv interdicted forbidden CVCH to be transported across the State border?when it is intended j to be dealt with in violation of the local State law, or, as more fully explained in the Act itself, when the liquor named in the Act. "is intended by any person intersted therein, to be * - V- x1. ^ received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, enner in me original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State;" that is to say, the State into which it is proposed to ship or transport the liquor in interstate commerce. We can not forecast what argument, if any, will be pre- j sented by appellant's counsel against the constitutionality of j the Webb-Kenyon Law as a regulation by Congress of inter- i ? ? / n . j state commerce. We have, however, examined tne nriei nieci j by appellant's counsel, and in support of this proposition there ! is a short extract from the case of Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, asserting merely that the -right of contract for the transportation of merchandise from one State to another, or across another, involved interstate commerce, and imported a relation which necessarily must be governed apart from the laws of the j several States, since it embraced a contract which must come under the laws of more than one State. I Jut this evidently is no authoritv against the validity either of the Wilson Act or j nf Hi,> WVMi-k*Ynvon Act. since these Acts are regulations of j x/mmerce bv Congress. Counsel for appellant also in that connection quoted the following from the case of In Re Rahrcr. 140 U. S. 546: "Nor ;an Congress transfer legislative power to a State, nor sanction \ State law in violation of the Constitution: and if it can adopt a State law as its own, it must be one that it would be competent for it to pass itself and not a law passed in the exercise .if the police power." It is surprising that counsel would cite :hat paragraph as an authority against the Webb-Kenyon Act, since the opinion in the case of In Re Rahrcr, supra, in an extract which we have already quoted, clearly showed that the Wikrm Art f and the same thine mav be said of the Webb K-enyon Act) did not constitute a transfer by Congress of legislative power to a State, nor sanction a iState law in violation of the Constitution; and that Congress had not, by the Wilson Act, adopted a State law as its own. It is asserted further in appellant's brief in that connection, (and this completes substantially all that is said against the validity of the Webb-Kenyon Law), that contracts made by plaintiff in Virginia for the sale of liquors intended for the personal use of consignees in South Carolina, and their transonri rifiivr?rv at destination. are all subiect matters ? j ? ^ ? - - which belong to interstate commerce and not to the reserved police ?po\ver of South Carolina. This, we think, is entirely inapplicable to the present situation. Congress, bv the WebbKenyon Act, has made a regulation of interstate commerce prohibiting, shipments of liquor into one State from another in defined cases. In brief, the cases are: when the liquors desired to be shipped are intended by any person interested therein to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used in violation of the law of such State. There must, of course, in every case be a valid State law to be violated, and such State law in the matter of its validity, must be brought to the test of the State Constitution and to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution; but the commerce clause" of the Federal Constitution is no longer 1 ' - - ~i-.'?? ^onfAr^pmAnt r\f flip law 3. Dar tCJ OCtlLC clCUUII, Ui LU liic V.IUW1 vviiiviii. xvi ?.??>. ukukv -w... , since Congress has intervened by a regulation of its own and made it possible for the police power of the State, under a valid law, to do its full and perfect work in respect to liquors d{ the character named. A careful reading of the opinion of the Court in Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, supra, a consideration of the treatment of the case, and the general trend of the opinion, lead lis to the conclusion that the Court has already made up its mind that the Webb-Kenyon Act is valid. We can scarcely believe that the opinion would have been prepared as it was, w/niM Viqvp hppn madp in the ooinion to the CtllV.1 1C1V.1 VIIV.V tt UU1U >1UI V . t 1915), has said that the opinion of the Supreme Court in the in Glenn v. Southern Express Co. (decided December 1st, doubted its validity. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, YVebb-Kenyon Act in the terms employed, if the Court had case of Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, supra, gives color to the belief that the Court regards the question as settled. It seems to us that it is necessarily sustained by previous utterances of the Court in respect to the Wilson Act, and such is the conclusion of all the Courts, State and Federal, that have thus far had occasion to pass upon said Act. We cite cases - ? 1 1 which contain all that can be said upon this subject ana wnicn we think conclusively establish the validity of the WebbKenvon Act: Southern Express Co. v. State, 188 Ala. 454; 66 So. Rep. 115. Southern Express Co. v. Whittle, (Ala.) 69 So. Rep. 652. State v. S. A. L. R. R., 169 N. C. 303; 84 S. E. 283. Glenn v. Southern Express Co (N. C.) decided December 1st, 1915, not yet reported. State v. Doe (Kan.), 139 Pac. 1169. State v. Express Co. (Iowa), 145 N. W. 451. L f - ? ? Southern Express Co. v. Beer (Miss.), 65 So. 575. Atkinson v. Southern Express Co., 94 S. C. 444; 78 iS. E. 516. Taylor v. Commonwealth, (VR'G.) 85 S. E. 499. Adams Express Co. v. Com. of Ky., 160 KJy. 66; 169 S. W. State v. Grier (Del.); -88 Atl. 579. Van Winkle v. State (Del.), 91 Atl. 385. U. S. v. Oregon~W. R. & N. Co., 210 Fed. 370. (Continned on Page Three.) I 5 ' < <D b. ' sr L IT t ? < I? C M a ^5 WJ N? fin g co ? ? H < ?" ' O sr a PCrg to fi "t > g o s | a- S n A? 5 50 ~ a*c 9 a % % co ^ ^ sf ? -j ? ?11 ^ fl> c CD gg2. o ? 5* S3 ? X D : * fT 3 3 ^ 5- P j HA 5 hrt J to beH s- PI ? 7i M kari 3 X I 0 5? C