The Manning Times.

VOL. XXVIII. MANNING, S. C., WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1915.

ASQUITH WANTS MEN

PREMIER MAKES STATEMENT IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT

TELLS OF DARDANELLES

English Government Aims to Increase Army From Three Million to Four Million—Crowded Galleries Hear Speeches—Opposition is Declared Toward Conscription.

Premier Asquith made his long expected statement on the Allies' military position in the House of Commons Tuesday in connection with the introduction of a "supplementary estimate" providing for the raising of the numerical strength of the British army from three million men to four million men.

The House was crowded and the premier's speech was listened to earnestly and silently. In the peers' gallery, Lord Fisher, the former first sea lord, and Earl Derby, director of recruiting, occupied the most prominent positions above the clock.

The prime minister, as usual, got the heart of his subject in his opening sentences, and declared that, although the British fighting forces in the various theatres now total more than 1,250,000 men, the war's demands were such as necessitated calling out the empire's "recruitable maximum."

Although the premier did not put himself on record as either for or against conscription, John Redmond, leader of the Irish Nationalists, at the close of Mr. Asquith's speech, flung a bombshell by declaring that the Nationalists would oppose conscription by every means in their power. And John Dillon followed with a severe arraignment of the British war leadership, inquiring: "What is the use of sending out more troops to be led by men like those responsible for the Suvla Bay and Ansaz failures?"

The premier's statement of the need of the army for "every fit man" included a warm tribute to the overseas soldiers and he took pains to mention particularly "the men eager to be attested who have made application from far distant places—Hong Kong, Rhodesia and California"—adding: "This has been a commentary on the lethargy of some of those here at home. No more splendid exhibition of patriotism and self-denial could be conceived, or one more calculated to carry conviction to the hearts of all our gallant allies."

Referring to the Derby scheme, Mr. Asquith said the report from Lord Derby had only been sent him Monday evening, and was now being considered by the members of the cabinet. Therefore, any statement regarding the government policy on this subject must be deferred. He indicated, however, that another chance would be given those who had not yet responded.

Turning to the military situation, the premier said that the retirement from the Dardanelles position—with the notable exception of the position at the top of the peninsula—had been taken on the advice of Gen. Monro and Earl Kitchener.

"The retirement," he continued, "was an operation of peculiar hazard, for the least misjudgment might have led to serious loss. It was carried out by the navy and army combined in a manner for which no praise could be too high.

"With the exception of a relatively small proportion of the stores and a very few guns, which had to be left behind and which were destroyed, the whole force at both places was removed with perfect serenity. The total casualties—it seems almost incredible—in the whole operation were two miliatry and one naval wounded.

"I am sure that the House will take the earliest opportunity to express its admiration and gratitude to Gen. Monro for carrying out these difficult operations; while other officers deserving special praise, are Gen. Birdwood and Admiral Memyss, the latter supervising the naval operations.

"It is most gratifying to know that these splendid troops were embarked to a new destination without the loss of a single life and after a short and much needed rest they will be ready—and I am sure also eager—to resume their gallant career.

Summing up the government's war policy, Mr. Asquith said:

"In order to win the war we want an adequate supply of trained men to reinforce and augment the army in the field. We want next an ever-growing supply of munitions. We want further such a stewardship of the economic resources of the country as will enable us to lift and carry the financial burden which we are called upon to bear in behalf of ourselves and our allies.

"Finally, what perhaps is as important as anything, we want to counteract the advantage the enemy has over us in a single direction, by greater unity and concerted strategic control among the allies. The staff conferences inaugurated in Paris a fortnight ago with even a greater concentration of purpose, co-ordinating of plan, economy of energy and effectiveness of action."

In closing Mr. Asquith referred to the speech of Mr. Lloyd-George, minister of munitions, Monday, saying:

"I agree with the minister of munitions that while at this or that moment the superficial facts of the campaign seem against us, the facts that really in the long run matter are steadily and growingly on our side. There has been in this war, as in other wars, an abundance of errors and miscalculations on both sides, but our will has never wavered for a moment and our fighting resources, both in men and material, are becoming more ample, better organized and better mobilized for the purpose of victory."

John Dillon, in a fiery speech, opposed the granting of Mr. Asquith's request for an additional million men. He said:

"The premier's speech is deplorably lacking in any attempt to justify the adding of the fourth million. We place no reasonable limit on the size of the army. We are traveling the road that leads not to victory, but to financial ruin and loss of the war.

"The whole principle on which Lord Derby's groups are arranged is absurd, unfeasible. So far as Ireland is concerned, the people are quite prepared to share the burden of the war, but they are the people and conscription can not be talked. It would be an act of political insanity to embark on conscription during the war."

James Parker, labor man, speaking in behalf of the laborites, declared:

"We are prepared to fight against conscription as hard as we have fought to get men into the army under the voluntary system."

Several of the members expressed themselves in favor of conscription.

Replying to Sir Edward Carson's complaint that the government had failed to give out adequate news of the Gallipoli operations and his remark that "now the government hurls the withdrawal from two fronts at the nation as if it were a kind of victory," H. J. Tennant, parliamentary secretary of the country, Mr. Tennant said:

"Gen. Ian Hamilton's dispatch reached the war office yesterday. The general is a writer of distinction and has taken time to polish his periods."

Mr. Tennant deplored the language used by Sir Edward Carson, and declared that the latter's representation of the government as dilly dallying in Gallipoli was not a truthful representation of the facts. Continuing in reply to various members who had expressed the fear that the government, in asking for a larger army was not taking into account the economic needs of the country, Mr. Tennant said:

"The reason the government is seeking for this additional million men is that they are necessary to fill the gaps and have a large army in the field to win the war. The government is fully alive to the importance of maintaining our industries and safeguarding our financial position. The premier has indicated, however, that if certain conditions are not fulfilled relative to recruiting, the government might be forced to ask for additional powers."

In conclusion, he appealed to the Irish and labor members to join the government in these efforts.

Admiralty Defends Act.

The Austrian admiralty has issued a strong defence of the action of the submarine commander which destroyed the Ancona.

Germans Move Westward.

Geneva reports that masses of German troops are moving towards the western front.

GALLIPOLI ABANDONMENT STIRS BRITISH FEELING

Public Interest in Announcement Overshadows All Other War News.

Announcement of the British withdrawal from Gallipoli overshadowed all other war news Monday night. For the British public the abrupt war office statement marks the end of one of the great chapters of the war's history.

The shock of the news was hardly broken by the fact that rumors had been current in the street for some days and the withdrawal of the forces had been a matter of widespread pro and con discussion ever since Lord Rubblesdale's famous speech in parliament, in which he declared that withdrawal had been recommended by a high military authority.

The feeling of the man in the street was generally one of relief mixed with regret. A popular half penny sheet sums up the British public's attitude as follows:

"Thus ends the enterprise on which the highest hopes were built and which if it had succeeded would probably have turned the tide of the war. Our troops from the first to last were within a few miles of victorp."

ENGLAND INCREASES HER ARMY BY ONE MILLION

House of Commons Debated All Night Tuesday—Changes in Officers Made.

After an all night debate the House of Commons early Wednesday granted an increase of one million men in the British army, bringing up its strength on paper to four million.

With the increase come changes in higher command, Lieut. Gen. Robertson, chief of the general staff, having been recalled from France to become chief of the imperial staff in London in place of Lieut. Gen. Murray, who has been appointed to succeed Sir Charles Monroe as British commander at the Dardanelles, says an official statement issued Wednesday afternoon.

Sir Charles Monroe has been appointed in command of the First British army in France in succession to Sir Douglas Haig.

THE BALKAN SITUATION

Germany Taking Advantage of the Allied Withdrawal.

The Teutonic powers are represented as taking full advantage of th emoral effect produced by the withdrawal of British forces from Gallipoli peninsula and to be attempting once more to swing Greece and Rumania to their side in the Balkan operations.

If the news of the bombardment of Varna is correct, Russia is losing no time in an attempt to forestall these efforts. From several sources, all unofficial, London has heard of the bombardment of the Bulgarian port. Various dispatches state that the Russian warships are accompanied by a fleet of transports which, according to the morning papers, already has landed a sufficient force to hold the town.

Although the Greek elections have given a large majority to Former Premier Gounaris, a powerful member of the present cabinet who is over-friendly to the Entente powers, it is not believed here the change will have much of an effect on the attitude of Greece, which is much more agitated by the possibility that Bulgarians will cross the frontier than by the formation of a new government.

OPENS AMERICAN MAILS

Swedish Steamer Detained and Mail Sacks Removed.

The Swedish steamer Stockholm, formerly the Holland-American liner Potsdam, recently taken into Kirkwall by the British authorities while bound from Gothenburg for New York, has been released after some of her mails had been removed.

This is the first removal of mails from a vessel en route from Sweden to the United States, although the Swedish government recently complained that American bound mails from Sweden via England had been opened in England.

THE WAR LAST WEEK

DARDANELLES ATTACK WORST FAILURE IN HISTORY

TURKS HOLD OFF FOES

New York Times Reviewer Explains the Dardanelles Operations, Showing Why British and French Abandoned All Efforts and Turn to the Balkans for Action.

On October 29, 1914, German intrigue, substantially backed with German gold and ably assisted by the efforts of a few Turks under the leadership of Enver Bey, drew Turkey into the war and forced a declaration of hostilities against Russia. This move was a painful one for the Allies to contemplate.

The strength of the British empire lies in the Orient and in Egypt, the gate way to the Far East. The Turkish empire has a poplation of many millions, the vast majority of whom are in Asia. The Turks, if left free to operate in Mesopotamia, Palestine, and in the Sinai peninsula, would threaten the very heart of Great Britain, not alone through their own efforts, but through the disaffection they would endeavor to create throughout the British colonial possessions.

To meet such a move and preserve British prestige it was necessary to deflect to the threatened points troops that were much needed in other fields. This applied also with equal force to Russia, and developed in consequence an entirely new theatre of war—that of the Caucasus. The consequences to Russia, however, were more serious than those involved in the mere diversion of troops, and were incident to Russia's geographical situation.

For the greater part of the year Russia is practically an inland nation. With the Black Sea closed by the forts of the Bosporus, her only outlet is through her northern ports, the chief of which is Archangel. But only for a few months of the year can this port be used; the remainder of the year it is entirely closed by ice.

Russia, moreover, is not a manufacturing country, and while there are, of course, ammunition plants, their output in no degree is equal to th edemand placed on them by the undreamed-of use of artillery. Moreover, much of Russia's wealth, and the situation demanded money, lies in her exportation of grain.

The country along the Black Sea is the richest wheat belt of the world, and Russia needed to exchange her wheat, directly or indirectly, for the ammunition of her allies and of neutrals. To do so through Archangel was impossible, both because of weather conditions and ocause of lack of transportation facilities. **There was but one solution to the eastern political problem of Great Britain, and to the financial problem of Russia—Constantinople.**

If the Allies could take Constantinople, the Turkish empire would be shaken to its foundation, and not only the Turk but the colonials of India and Egypt would tremble at the thought of British power. Russia then would have a seaport in the south, not merely for war purposes and druing the war, but a port over which she could exercise suzerainty until it was wrested from her in the distant future by military conquest.

From a strictly military point of view, putting aside the question of opening an avenue of munition supply, the effect would be to cut Turkey off completely from all communication with the central powers and to change thereby the whole face of the war. **The stakes therefore was tremendous. And just as the British answer to Napoleon was the guns of Trafalgar, so on February 25, 1915, more than a century later, the answer to the two Kaisers and their Moslem ally was the roar of the guns of the British dreadnoughts as their high explosive shells were thrown into the fort at Sedd-el-Bahr.**

The battle for the control of the strait with Constantinople as the prize was on: and it was on that day, February 25, that England made the greatest, the most colossal blunder of all that she has been guilty of since, at the beginning of the war, her failure to send promised aid to Belgium threw open the gate to the Teutonic invasion by leaving exposed the entire left flank of the defending army.

The reason for this is plain. The objective in the Dardanelles is a narrow channel of water with its critical point at the Narrows between the forts of Kilid Bahr and Kale I Sultanie, the former on the European side, the latter on the Asiatic. The distance between these points is but a mile, so that from either one any point on the other can be efficiently reached by shell fire. **Both of these forts are defended by powerful modern guns, so that within a radius of a half mile are established permanent works that control the military destinies of the entire thirty miles of strait.** There may, of course, be introduced other factors. Temporary batteries, for example, might be established, unexpected forms of attack might be—have been, indeed—devised against ships advancing along the waterway.

But the crux of the situation is and will remain the control o fthe forts at the Narrows. With these taken, the temporary batteries and other means of attack might for a time harass a hostile fleet, but it would be for a time only, and for a short time at that. **With the Narrows in their hands a hostil force would soon be able to clear both banks and their fleet would be able to go through.**

This is the military problem of the Dardanelles reduced to its simplest terms, a problem thoroughly understood and recognized by the British military and naval authorities before the first move was made. They knew that actual physical possession by a military force of the fortress of Kilid Bahr was necessary. With it in their hands, its vis-a-vis, Kale I Sultanie, could be neutralized and the way to the Golden Horn opened wide.

They knew, or should have known, as it is common knowledge to every military man, that effective operations against a position on land can of both land and navalnbefRRuetaoi not be conducted without co-operation of both land and naval forces. They knew, or should have known, that the success of such an operation against the Gallipoli forts would in a great measure depend on the element of surprise. And yet, in blind, fetich-like faith, the navy was sent alone on its amphibious errand.

The result might easily have been foreseen. The first guns fired on February 25 against Sedd-el-Bahr was a warning to the Turks what was in the air, and when the signal was flashed, troops, ammunition, and supplies were hastened to the forts and a line of strong entrenchments was constructed in the strongest defensive position of Europe—what is now generally known as the Achi Baba position, crossing the peninsula north of Krithia.

Subsequent revelations, made as a resula of a split in the British cabinet that resulted in the resignation of Churchill, give the point of view of those responsble for the fact that at the inception of the movement only the navy was used. As has been stated above, it was the belief of the British authorities that a narrow channel flanked on either side by modern fortifications defended by powerful guns, the channel protected by submerged torpedoes, and characterized by a current that could carry unanchored mines against the advancing fleet by the guns of the battleships alone. **That the gamble was big was admitted, but, it was claimed, the size of the stake justified the admiralty in taking the chance.** True in a seanse—but it was not necessary to take the chance with the navy alone.

The idea of taking Constantinople, of carrying the war home to the Turk instead of waiting for him to appear on the battlefields of central Europe, has received the unqualified approval of military men of all countries, belligerent or neutral. It was the methods only that were criticised, and the point of view of the admiralty as reflected in the methods that have been universally condemned. As the result of this failure to direct the forces at hand on lines of sane strategy and in the light of the most expert professional knowledge we have the history of the failure of the most promising movement in the first year of the great war.

At first the allied fleet made rapid progress. Headed by the powerfully cannoned Queen Elizabeth with her 15-inch guns, the allied fleet reduced the forts at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale which guard the mouth of the strait and leveled the batteries for ten miles up the channel, none of which, however, had any importance.

This part of the work was simple, as the guns of the Queen Elizabeth outranged those in any of the Turkish forts. After a bombardment lasting about a month, the fleet attempted to force the channel, believing that it had silenced the forts. It had, gut only for a time. **Silencing a fort and destroying it are two separate matters, and each fort was reoccupied as soon as the firing ceased.** In their attempt to force the channel three gattleships—the French Bouvet and the British Irresistible and Ocean—were literally blown out of the water and destroyed by mines, and several other ships put out of action by shell fire of the land forts.

This was enough to indicate the vital mitsake the admiralty had made, and the lesson had been cruelly driven home by the naval losses sustained. The naval forces practically withdrew, being content with long range firing, and putting the matter squarely up to the army in admitting their own defeat. **The net result of the naval operation then was to attempt a task themselves which was physically impossible, and in doing so, by depriving the situation of all element of surprise, to make it almost impossible for the army.** The operations of the army may then be said to have dated from about April 1, although minor forces of marines had been landed at Camber Beach and along the shore of Morto Bay about a month before.

The function of the army was in its elements exceedingly simple, though the task was most difficult. It was to take Kilid Bahr by land, with the assistance of the guns of the fleet, taurn the strength of this fort against the fort on the Asiatic side, and so clear the Narrows.

Just as in the original naval operations, the land forces were at first successful. In a comparatively short time an advance was made from the point of the peninsula, of about four miles to their position south of Krithia. Their line, with very small variations of a fe whundred yards here and there, extended from the Dardanelles at the mouth of Chomak Dere, across a plateau about 300 feet high, south to the town of Krithia, and thence to the Aegean shore at the point near Kurkha Bluff.

And here they were held for months, unable in spite of the most heroic efforts on the part of the Australian colonial and the French troops, which had been landed from Lemnos and Tenedos. The losses suffered in these attacks were great. Great Britain alone has reported over 100,000 in killed, wounded, and missing.

The reasons for the failure of the allied land forces to make any material impression on the Turkish defense are two. **The first was that, warned by the bombardment of the forts at the gateway of the strait, the Turks had prepared their positions with a thoroughness characteristic of the German officers who commanded them.** The bombardment, it will be remembered, began on February 25, and it was the middle of April before the army really went into action. The Turks therefore had at least six weeks in which to prepare.

The second is the topographical nature of the country itself, which greatly augmented the defensive strength of the Turks' position. Gallipoli is a confused tangle of hills rising at numerous points to summits of from 300 to 600 feet, though along one stretch, on the Gulf of Taros, there is a continuous height of over 1,000 feet. This is the reason why a landing could not be effected further north.

It is faily well watered by numerous little streams which wind in and out between the series of hills. Its communications by land are poor. One fairly good, roughly paved road runs the full length of the peninsula from Sedd-el-Bahr to the town of Gallipoli and from there on to Bulair, where the peninsula is only three miles wide. Unless a railroad has been laid by the Germans since the war began, there is no artificial means of communication of any sort, and the forts are dependent entirely on roads for their supplies.

From Sedd-el-Bahr to a point somewhat north of the Narrows the European side dominates the Asiatic, so that if the land forces on Gallipoli were successful the way could be readily cleared for the advance of the fleet. The Turkish line in front of the Krithia position is thoroughly guarded from any attack against the flanks. In front of either there is a deep ravine that breaks in from the coast. These ravines have almost perpendicular sides and therefore protect from direct assault any line formed behind them.

The line runs behind both ravines and follows the general line of the hills between the Aegean and the Dardanelles. The town of Krithia, on the outskirts of which the Allies' line runs, could not be held by the Turks were it really a part of the Turkish defense. But it is not. The entire basin in which the town is located is entirely controlley by two dominating hill positions in the main defensive line. **These two points are absolutely essential to the Allies' advance.** Krithia, although on the only road to the Turkish base at Maidos, is more than useless unless the positions which control it are either broken or made untenable by artillery fire.

Behind the Turks' position there is yet another, the plateau of Pasha Dagh, which includes the fort at Kilid Bahr, which position is fully as strong as the Achi Baba position. **To accomplish anything, therefore, the Allies would not have to take one alone but both—and in nearly eight months' fighting they had not taken the first.**

Frontal attacks against the Turkish line having been carried out for some months without having produced any result except a great expenditure of shell and a heavy loss in effectives, **the Allies' methods changed and a threat was made against the Turkish line of supply.** This took shape in the landing of forces at Suvla Bay and at Anzac Cove.

From these points, particularly from the latter, the way to the German base at Maidos is through comparatively open country. Just inland from Suvla or Little Anafarta Bay is the Salt Lake lying low in a sea level plain. There are several roads, none of them particularly good, traversing the plain, all of which, directly or indirectly, connect with the main road from Bulair to Maidos.

It was apparently the object of the British to advance along one of these roads and cut the Turkish line of communications. This is indicated by the landing at Anzac Cove, from which there is an absolutely flat passage to the strait, the distance to be traversed not being more than five and a half miles. The valley through which the advance would have to be made, however, is flanked by hills.

Either side would, of course, have to be cleared before the line could be extended across this part of the peninsula. Every indication was that the eye of the British was on the connecting Gaba Tepe with Khelia Bay. **But the Anafarta line was no more successful in its progress than that at Krithia. Both were, and for some time had been, absolrtely at a standstill when the Teston-Bslgar drive on Serbia was inahglrated.**

The true reason for this move by the Germans does not concern us here. The apparent reason was the approaching exhaustion of the Turkish supply of ammunition. Whether such a shortage existed or not, no one knows. **There is some doubt of it, in spite of recent reports, as there is anenormous ammunition factory just outside of Constantinople, which has a capacity almost if not equal to the demands of such a short defensive line as that held by the Turks. At any rate, it had become evident that unless such a shortage did exist, there was practically no hope of the British overcoming the Turkish resistance.**

Nish, the Serbian junction of the Oriental railroad from Berlin to Constantinople, fell in a short time after the Serbian invasion began, and both the Danube and the Oriental railroad were thrown open to Teuton traffic. **If the Turks' ammunition had got low there was now in sight a full replenishing of the supply. The last British hope of a real Gallipoli success had vanished.**

During the Russian disasters of the late spring and summer the Russian press choked hostile criticism of the Allies' inaction by dilating on the need for Russian development of Constantinople, the only feasible southern port, and stilled the murmurings of the people by recounting the great work the British soldiers were ding at the Hellespont.

The peoples of the Far East, who are in a position to strike Tngland a severe blow through her colonies, were watching the progress of the Moslem and wondering whether the pistol which England had for years been holding at their heads was not, after all, an empty one. With nothing to occupy their army at their own doors what could the Turk do against Egypt and Suez, what would happen in Mesopotamia and along the Bagdad railroad?

On the other hand, there were the Balkans, seething, boiling, until it seemed that the explosion must come without delay. Bulgaria already in arms against her; Greece, under the tremendous pressure of Berlin on the Kaiser's sister, refusing to abide by her treaty with Serbia; Rumania, the most powerful of them all, scorning all offers, being openly tempted by Berlin gold and listening to the voice of the tempter.

And Great Britain knew, and knows now, that help from Rumania and Greece could only come when an allied victory was assured; knew that to do otherwise was to court not defeat, but destruction. Such was the situation, and it is no wonder that the British—press, public and ministry—were in a state bordering on emotional insanity.

The British hesitated, and Serbia was lost. Then the ministry moved. A council of the allied chiefs was held in Calais; Lord Kitchener was dispatched to the Levantine battle grounds. Whether the latter event was due to the pressure of the French is not known.

But it is significant that at the time of the Calais meeting it was stated that Joffre demanded that the British concentrate their eastern forces in a drive through the Balkans, which, by implication, meant to cease wasting efforts in an impossible field, merely for the moral effect involved. Whether or not there was truth in the rumor, Kitchener, whose mission was kept silent, went to Gallipoli, transmitted the orders of his government to the officer in command, and returned, and the curtain was drawn over one of the most spectacular efforts the great war has produced.

CARRANZA WINS

Villa Generals Give Over Control of Much Territory.

The Carranza de facto government is in official control of the former Villa state of Chihuahua by virtue of an agreement reached by Gen. Roberto Limon, Gen. Mauel Banda, Lieut. Col. Flaviano Paliza and Col. Euardo Andalon and Andreas Garcia of the Carranza consulate by which about four thousand troops and the organization of the Villa government, including the cities of Juarez and Chihuahua and all border points, accept Carranza domination. The agreement grants amnesty to all except Gen. Villa and his brother, Hipolito.

NEED ARMOR PLANT

SECRETARY OF NAVY GIVES INTERESTING FACTS

CONGRESS SHOULD ACT

Extracts From Report of Secretary Daniels Upon the Advisability of Establishing an Armor Plate Foundry Owned by the Government of This Country.

While the navy department has been able to supply other important needs in markets affording some competition, in the purchase of armor plate it has been restricted to making these large purchases practically without competition. The natural result has been that the makers of armor plate and for some years they have practically charged the same price per ton. In my report for 1913 I recounted the fact that when bids were invited for the Arizona, all three of these firms made identically the same bid to a cent. They justified this sham of bidding by saying that upon the last award when the newest of the companies underbid the two older ones the department made an award of one-third of the quantity desired to each firm at the lowest figure quoted. Thereafter there was no incentive on the part of the new company to compete in bidding, because when it made a lower price it only received one-third of the contract. All the bids made then were rejected, and when the manufacturers found the department would not pay their price, a reduction of $111,875 was made for the Arizona's armor over the price of that charged for the Pennsylvania, bought in 1912. The next year, when bids were opened for armor plate for three ships, upon the basis of buying at wholesale, it was natural to expect a material reduction in the price, but the three companies submitted bids for only a trifle less than the price they received for the armor for one ship in the preceding year. All these bids being rejected, upon the second opening of bids the department effected a saving of $738,648. The prices quoted this year for battleships No. 43 and No. 44 are practically the same as for the California, Idaho, and Mississippi.

It has been demonstrated beyond controversy that the prices charged by the armor plate plants have no reference to competition and little reference to the cost of production. Recently one of these armor plate factories at Midvale, Pa., the youngest of the three and the one that some years ago underbid the others, has passed into new hands. What effect this change of ownership will have remains to be seen. In the light of past experience there seems to be no hope for better prices for the government except by the creation of a plant of its own. Under these conditions there is little probability of securing armor plate at a reasonable price from private companies unless the government itself erects a plant and is able to manufacture armor plate whenever private companies do not fix a fair price. The last session of congress appointed a committee composed of the chairmen of the naval affairs committees, House and Senate, and the chief of the bureau of ordnance. This committee made investigations and its report was filed toward the close of the last session of the Sixty-third Congress, but no action was taken upon it, as the committee had been unable to complete its report until a short time before adjournment of congress. It is to be regretted that when the committee undertook the investigation it had no opportunity to compare the cost of making armor plate in this country with the cost abroad or to make a comparison of the operation of such a factory in various countries.

When the recommendation was first made for an armor plate factory, it was expected that the committee would secure from other countries much information that would throw light upon the actual cost of a plant and its operation. With no opportunity to make such comparisons or to see any plants in operations except the three in our own country, the committee, with this limited opportunity to ascertain the world facts, made its report. It estimated that if our government should establish a plant with the capacity of 10,000 tons, armor plate could be manufactured at $262.79 per ton, or a factory with 20,000 tons capacity at $230 per ton. The price charged the government for the last armor plate purchased was $425 per ton, and the price in 1913 was $454 on contract let March 3, 1913, and $440 per ton on contract let November 17, 1913, and in 1912 (before the 8-hour law became effective) $420 per ton. This shows that a very large saving can be effected if the Congress makes an appropriation in accordance with my recommendations for the erection of an armor plate plant.

In addition to the saving that could be effected, there is another consideration in favor of such a government owned and operated plant that is entitled to great weight. The armor plate which we are now using on our ships has depended for improvements largely upon the recommendations of our expert naval officers. Such improvements as the service can suggest accrue to the private companies making the armor plate. As they may also manufacture for foreign governments, these improvements are open to all the world when they should belong only to the American people. The ability to retain for ourselves all the advantages which the skill and knowledge of naval experts give to private manufacturers ought to belong to our navy. This additional reason for the establishment of a government plant is not to be lightly regarded. Japan has erected its own armor making plant. All that it learns about the process is kept a strict secret and is not known outside of Japan.

The recommendation I urged in 1913 and again in 1914 for the establishment of an armor plate plant was not a new proposition. It had been made before. Indeed, the argument was so strong and so convincing that the naval act of June 7, 1909, after authorizing the construction of certain ships, contained the following provision:

"Provided, That the secretary of the navy is hereby authorized to procure by contract armor of the best quality for any or all vessels above referred to, provided such contracts can be made at a price which in his judgment is reasonable and equitable; but in case he is unable to make contracts for armor under the above conditions, he is hereby authorized and directed to procure a site for and to erect thereon a factory for the manufacture of armor, and the sum of $4,000,000 is hereby appropriated toward the erection of said factory."

In the next contract after the act of June 7, 1900, for armor plate the price charged the government was $420 per ton for class A (Krupp) and $400 per ton for class B (Harvey). These prices are exclusive of royalties which the government had to pay, as follows: Krupp, $21.85 per ton, and Harvey, $11.20 per ton. The secretary of the navy evidently, "in his judgment," thought the price "reasonable and equitable," for he took no step to spend the $4,000,000 appropriated toward the erection of a factory for the manufacture of armor, which he was directed to do unless he could secure a "reasonable and equitable" price.

In 1895 the same conditions which forces us to pay the price the manufacturers charge for armor plate caused the then secretary of the navy, Hon. Hilary A. Herbert, to make an investigation in this country and abroad. The result of his investigation was to recommend the building of a government plant. No action was taken, as his report was made only a short time before his term expired. Since the passage of the naval act of June 7, 1900, directing the secretary of the navy to erect a factory for the manufacture of armor unless he could make contracts for it "at a price which in his judgment is reasonable and equitable," the navy department has spent $76,195,960 for armor for its ships. It is believed that if the intent of congress in ordering the erection of a factory had been carried out at that time, the government would have saved enough money on armor plate to own a plant as large as that owned by all three of the private companies, and in the meantime to have supplied the armor plate for its own ships at a less price than it has been compelled to pay.

Taken off U. S. Steamer.

Wilhelm Garbe of Brooklyn, purser of the American steamer Borinquen, was removed from the vessel off the harbor of San Juan, P. R., by officers of the French cruiser Descartes, according to the Borinquen's skipper.

TURKS CLAIM MUCH SPOIL IN BRITISH EVACUATION

Constantinople Says Attack Was Too Violent to be Withstood—"Three Wounded," Says London.

Berlin reports by wireless: Enormous quantities of ammunition, cannon, and tents were taken by the Turks on the withdrawal of the British from the positions evacuated on the Gallipoli peninsula, it was officially announced in the Turkish quarters report dated December 20, received from Constantin ple. The report states that the withdrawal of the British from the Anzac and Suvla bay districts of the Gallipoli peninsula came as the result of a violent offensive on the part of the Turks who inflicted heavy losses on the British and drove them to the sea. The statement follows:

"Turkish troops during the nights of December 18-19, after heavy artillery preparation, began an attack against the enemy's position near Anafarta and Ari Burnu. The enemy in order to check this attack made a general attack along the whole Seddul Bahr front which completely failed with enormous losses.

"In view of the certainty of Turkish success in advances toward the north the enemy during the night of December 19-20 hastily withdrew part of his troops. The enemy was unable to impede the pursuit by the Turkish troops, so that no enemy troops now remain at Anafarta or Ari Burnu.

"Enormous quantities of ammunition, cannon and tents were taken.

"An enemy hydroplane was shot down and the occupants taken prisoner."

London reports: When the British forces withdrew from the positions at Suvla Bay and Anzac on the western shore of the Gallipoli peninsula, their total casualties were three men wounded, according to an official announcement. Six guns which were left when the British withdrew from the Suvla position, it was added.

FORD PARTY'S PEACE PLANS

Originator is Ready to Furnish All Necessary Cash.

A dispatch from Christiana via London says the first detailed announcement of the plan for the peace expedition headed by Henry Ford was made Sunday at a meeting held under the auspices of the Students and Professors of the University of Christiania. Besides the one hundred and fifty Americans already in the party ten people are to join from each of the following countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Spain and Switzerland. After Stockholm and Copenhagen have been visited all will assemble at The Hague. It is stated that William Jennings Bryan will be among the Americans if he accepts the invitation. Twenty-one delegates will be empowered to sit indefinitely. They will have a two-fold mission:

First, to suggest possible means f peace; second to receive overtures for peace directly from the belligerents.

Mr. Ford, it was publicly announced, would place unlimited funds back of the permanent peace conference at The Hague.

Augmented by other peace advocates, the party will leave for Stockholm.

NOTE GOING TO AUSTRIA

Secretary Lansing Announces Dispatch of Our Last Word.

Secretary Lansing announced Monday that the second American note to Austria on the sinking of the Ancona had gone forward Sunday and should reach Vienna Tuesday night. While Mr. Lansing gave no intimation of its contents, the note is understood to be a virtual reiteration of the original American demands with the implication that it is the United States' last word on the subject.

The text of the note will be issued for publication in newspapers Wednesday afternoon, Mr. Lansing said. The note is about six hundred words long and although characterized by those acquainted with its wording, as firm in tone, is said to be somewhat less sharp than the first note in the tenor of its demands.

It is based squarely, according to these officials, on the Austrian admiralty's own version of the Ancona sinking and while reference is made to American victims and survivors, the reference is said to be more incidental than direct.

TO INVADE EGYPT

LONDON HEARS OF GERMANY'S THREATENING OFFENSIVE

TRADE ROUTE OF VALUE

Rumors of Great Preparation and the Construction of a New Railway Causes Some to Expect a Serious Effort to Strike Suez—Other Fighting in Africa.

A special dispatch from London says the official announcement of General Smith—Dorrien's new command in East Africa, combined with various reports tending to corroborate the belief that an attack on Egypt and the Suez Canal—the wasp waist of the British empire—will be the next blow the German headquarters staff will seek to deliver, is receiving serious consideration.

The immense strategical possibilities of the world war furnish a fascinating study. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's appointment suggests, in the words of The Westminster Gazette, that **"the operations in East Africa are destined to take on a more important character than they have hitherto possessed."**

With the operations in the Kamerun practically completed, German East Africa is the only remaining German colony to be subdued, and its possession will be a valuable asset to the British empire, especially India.

Germany is understood to possess a force of about 7,000 whites at her disposal there, and she has not hesitated to arm large numbers of the native population, which numbers 10,000,000. The British forces in East Africa in the early stages of the war consisted only of two battalions of the King's African Rifles—native troops—some 3,000 native police in British East Africa and Uganda, and some small white levies. These were reinforced later by Indian troops.

The German and British forces have come into contact on various occasions, the two most important results being the failure of a British attack on the German port of Tanga and the British capture of Bukoba, the chief German base on Lake Victoria Nyanza.

Nothing in the nature of an attempt to conquer German East Africa, which is one and a half times the size of Germany, has hitherto been attempted, but the appointment of a general of the fame of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien leads to the expectation that a coup of this kind is now in preparation.

Some criticism of the plan is heard; chiefly on the ground that it is a "policy of small packets," and that such forces as will be placed at General Smith-Dorrien's disposal could be more usefully employed elsewhere.

Egypt is the particular place the critics have in view. Although the British garrison in that country has been greatly increased and, in the opinion of the military authorities, is adequate to repel German-Turkish attacks, some authorities hold that the characteristic British habit of despising the enemy may once again be unduly influencing the government's councils.

Scattered information leads to the belief that the reports of a projected great drive by combined Turkish and German forces, led by General von Mackensen, on the Suez canal are well founded. According to information, the extension of the railway line from Constantinople to Damascus by the construction of a double tracked line from Damascus to the Egyptian frontier is being pushed rapidly. This line is said now to be completed to a point within fifty miles of the Sinai peninsula, to the east of the canal, and the completion of the entire railway is expected by February 1. The course of this railway is shown in the accompanying map, the dotted lines indicating the alternative routes across the desert, which probably presented themselves to the German engineers. The Suez canal has been called "the wasp of waist of the British empire," and its loss would be very severely felt by the powers opposed to the Teutonic allies.

Reports from Syria of Turkish preparations are regarded as serious, and travelers from Syria speak of strong concentrations of Turkish troops at Jerusalem and Jaffa. The German General Trussemer is in command of an army of 70,000 men at Ghaza, and General von Mackensen, according to report, will have supreme command of the army of invasion in Egypt.

RUSSIANS SEIZE VARNA; TROOPS ON BULGAR SOIL

Sixteen Transports are Supposed to Have Landed Soldiers at Bulgarian Port.

The London Daily Chronicle reports the capture of Varna, Bulgaria's chief seaport, by the Russians. It says the bombardment of the Russians silenced the Bulgarian guns and laid the town in ruins, the garrison suffering heavily.

The Russians then, according to the report, landed infantry and artillery without loss and in sufficient force to hold the town against Bulgarian attack.

The arrival of the expedition off the Bulgarian coast was reported earlier in the day by the Athens correspondent of the Exchange Telegraph company. His dispatch said:

"A Russian cruiser and two destroyers which are convoying sixteen transports filled with troops have arrived off the Bulgarian coast and are bomabrding Varna vigorously."

The Bulgarian port of Varna is on the Black sea a few miles south of the Rumanian border. It is a railroad terminus. This city and Burgas, fifty miles further south, are the principal Bulgarian Black Sea ports.

Father Saves Child.

Frank Edgerton of Central Village, Conn., saved the life of his five-year-old daughter when she slipped through the railing of a river bridge, by diving forty feet into the water and rescuing her

Costs Turks More.

The opening of railroad communication from Turkey to Austria and Germany has resulted in a considerable increase in the price of necessaries of life in Turkey, says a Havas dispatch from Athens.