# CASTORIA

for Infants and Children.

Castoria is a harmless substitute for Castor Oil, Paregoric, Drops and Soothing Syrups. It is Pleasant. It contains neither Opium, Morphine nor other Narcotic substance. It destroys Worms and allays Feverishness. It cures Diarrhœa and Wind Colic. It relieves Teething Troubles and cures Constipation. It regulates the Stomach and Bowels, giving healthy and natural sleep. The Children's Panacea—The Mother's Friend.

The Kind You Have Always Bought

Bears the Signature of

Chas. H. Fletcher.

In Use For Over 30 Years.

THE CENTAUR COMPANY, 77 MURRAY STREET, NEW YORK CITY.


## COURT DECISION INVOLVES MILLIONS.

(Continued from Page 3.)

the patent issued.

"That congress has the entire control of the public lands, can dispose of them for money, or donate them to individuals or classes of persons, can not be questioned. If the law on the subject is complied with, and the entry conforms to it, it is difficult to see why the right to tax does not attach as well to the donation as to the cash entry. In either case, when the entry is made and certificate given the particular land is segregated from the mass of public lands, and becomes private property. In the one case, the entry is complete when the money is paid; in the other when the required proofs are furnished. In neither can the patent be withheld if the original entry was lawful.

In the case of Lessee of French, et ux. v. Spencer, 21 How. 232, Mr. Justice Catron speaking for the court said: "Whether the patent related back in support of Spencer's deed is not a new question in this court. It arose in the case of Landes v. Brant, (10 How. 372), where it was held that a patent issued in 1845 to Claymorgan and his heirs, by which the heirs took the legal title, related back and insured to the protection of a title founded on a sheriff's sale of Claymorgan's equitable interest, made in 1839. There, as here, the contest was between the grantee's heirs and the purchaser of the incipient title. The court holding that when the patent issued, it related to the inception of title, and must be taken, as between the parties to the suit, to bear date with the commencement of title."

In the case of Doe, ex. dem. Mandget al. v. Wilson, 23 How. 461, 16 L. ed. 584, Mr. Justice Catron, speaking for the court, said:

"By the treaty of October 27, 1832, made by the United States, through commissioners, with the Pottawatomie tribe of Indians and the State of Indiana and Michigan Territory, said nation ceded to the United States their title and interest to and to their lands in the States of Indiana and Illinois, and the Michigan Territory south of Grand river.

"Many reservations were made in favor of Indian villagers jointly, and to individual Pottawatomies. The reservations are by sections, amounting probably to a hundred, lying in various parts of the ceded country. As to these, the Indian title remained as it stood before the treaty was made; and to complete the title to the reserved lands, the United States agreed that they would issue patents to the respective owners. One of these reserves was the chief, Pet-chi-co, to whom was reserved two sections. The treaty also provides, 'that the foregoing reservations shall be selected under the direction of the president of the United States, after the land shall have been surveyed, and the boundaries shall correspond with the public surveys.'

"In February, 1835, by a deed in fee simple, Pet-chi-co conveyed to Alexis Coquillard and David H. Colerick, of the State of Indiana, 'all those sections of land lying in the state aforesaid, in the region of country or territory ceded by the treaty of 27th October, 1832.' The grantor covenants that he is lawful owner of the lands; hath good right and lawful authority to sell and convey the same. And he furthermore warrants the same against himself and his heirs. By this deed, the defendant holds possession.

"The lessors of the plaintiff took a deed from Pet-chi-co's heirs, dated in 1836, on the assumption, that their ancestor's deed was void; he having died in 1832, before the lands were surveyed, or the reserved sections selected. And on the trial below, the court was asked to instruct the jury, 'that Pet-chi-co held no interest under the treaty in the lands in question, up to the time of his death, that was assignable; he having died before the location of the land, and before the patents issued.'

"This instruction the court refused to give; but, on the contrary, charged the jury that 'the description of the land in the deed from Pet-chi-co to Coquillard and Colerick, from Colerick to Coquillard and from Coquillard to Wilson, are sufficient to identify the land thereby intended to be conveyed as the same two sections of land which are in controversy in this suit, and which are described in the patents which have been read in evidence.'

"The only question presented by the record that we feel ourselves called on to decide is, whether Pet-chi-co's deed of February, 1835, vested his title in Coquillard and Colerick.

"The Pottawatomie nation was the owner of the possessory right of the country ceded, and all the subjects of the nation were joint owners of it. The reserves took by the treaty, directly from the nation, the Indian title; and this was the right to occupy, use and enjoy the lands, in common with the United States, until partition was made, in the manner prescribed. The treaty itself converted the reserved sections into individual property. The Indians as a nation reserved no interest in the territory ceded; but as a part of the consideration for the cession, certain individuals of the nation had conferred on them portion of the land, to which the United States title was either added or promised to be added; and it matter not which, for the purposes of this controversy for possession.

"The United States held the ultimate title, charged with the right of undisturbed occupancy and perpetual possession, in the Indian nation, with the exclusive power in the Government of acquiring the right. Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat., 603; Comet v. Winton, 2 Yerger's R., 147.

"Although the government alone can purchase lands from an Indian nation, it does not follow, that when the rights of the nation are extinguished, an individual of the nation who takes as a private owner can not sell his interest. The Indian title is property, and alienable, unless the treaty had prohibited its sale. Comet v. Winton, 2 Yerger's R., 148. Blair and Johnson v. Pathkiller's Lessee, 2 Yerger, 414. So far from this being the case in the instance before us, it is manifest that sales of the reserved sections were contemplated, as the lands ceded were forthwith to be surveyed, sold, and inhabited, by white population, among whom the Indians could not remain.

"We hold that Pet-chi-co was a tenant in common with the United States and could sell his reserved interest; and that when the United States selected the lands reserved to him, and made partition (of which the patent is conclusive evidence) his grantees took the interest he would have taken if living."

"In the case of Crews, et al. v. Burcham, et al., 1 Black's Rep. 357, the court said: Some expression in the opinion delivered in the case of Doe v. Wilson, the first case that came before us arising out of this treaty, were the subject of observation by the learned counsel for the appellant in the argument, but which were found on a misapprehension of their scope and purport. It was supposed that the court had held that the reserve was a tenant in common with the United States after the treaty of cession, and until the surveys and patent. It will be seen, however, that the tenancy in common there mentioned referred to the right to occupy, use and enjoy the lands in common with the government, and had no relation to the legal title."

In the case of Crews v. Burcham, 1 Black 352-358, 17 L. ed. 91, the treaty under consideration by the court being that with the Pottawatomie tribe of October 27, 1832, by which the nation ceded all its lands in Illinois and other states, subject to certain reservations, the court said: "It is true that no title to the particular lands in question could rest in the reserve, or in his grantee, until the location by the president, and, perhaps, the issuing of the patent; for the obligation to make the selection as soon as the lands were surveyed, and to issue the patent, is absolute and imperative, and founded on a valuable and meritorious consideration. The lands reserved constituted a part of the compensation received by the Pottawatomies for the relinquishment of their right of occupancy to the government. The agreement was one which, if entered into by an individual, a court of chancery would have enforced by compelling the selection of the lands and the conveyance in favor of the reserve, or, in case he had parted with his interest, in favor of his grantees. And the obligation is not the less imperative and binding, because entered into by the government. The equitable right, therefore, to the lands in the grantee of Nelson, when selected was perfect; and the only objection of any plausibility is the technical one as to the vesting of the legal title."

Mr. Justice Field, in Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 418, says:

"The right to a patent once vested is treated by the government, when dealing with the public lands, as equivalent to a patent issued. When in fact the patent does issue it relates back to the inception of the right of the patentees, so far as it may be necessary to cut off intervening claimants. If the patent relates back to the inception of the right it cut off intervening claimants with equal reason and justice it should relate back to estop the patentee from asserting title against his grantee under warranty deed made before the patent actually issued, and after his right to it had become absolute."

In the case of Francis v. Francis, 203 U. S. p 238, 51 L. ed. 167, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the court, said: "The third article is in the following words, 'There shall be reserved for the use of each of the persons hereinafter mentioned, and their heirs, which persons are all Indians by descent, the following tracts of land, etc. For the use of Mokitchenoqua, six hundred and forty acres of land, to be located at and near the Grand Traverse of the Flint river, in such manners the President of the United States may direct.' It is very clear that if a fee simple estate was intended to be granted, the parties to the treaties were unfortunate in the choice of terms by which to give effect to that intention; and yet it is difficult to conceive that any other estate was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of its existence. Will, then, the third article warrant such a construction? It will be observed that the reservation is to the use of Mokitchenoqua and her heirs. No limitation as to the time of holding, or restriction upon the right of alienation, is contained in the grant. The use of the word heirs clearly implies that such an estate was granted as would, upon her death, descend to her legal representatives. Here, then, are all the essential elements of a fee simple estate. This construction, we think, is justified by the words of the third article, and is strengthened by the fact that it corresponds not only with the opinion given by the attorney general of the United States to the secretary of war (Land Laws pt. 2 pp. 96, 97), but with the opinion of the senate,—a branch of the treaty making power,—which is certainly entitled to great consideration. 3 Senate Doc. 1836, No. 197. Again, in the same case, the court said: "The location of the lands became a duty devolving on the President by the treaty. This duty he could execute with an act of congress; the treaty, when ratified, being the supreme law of the land, which the President was bound to see executed. It was impossible to describe the tract granted to any of the reserves in the treaty, as it is matter of history that none of the lands ceded had ever been surveyed. But locality is given to the grant by the terms of the treaty, with authority to locate afterwards by a survey making it definite. Smith v. United States, 10 Pet. 311, 9 L. ed 444. This authority being executed, the grant then became as valid to the particular section designated by the President as though the description had been incorporated in the treaty itself. We are, therefore, of opinion, that a fee simple passed to the reservee, Mokitchenoqua, by force of the treaty itself. And that the rights of the parties could in no wise be affected by the subsequent act of the President directing a patent to be issued."

The court further says: "In Dewey v. Campau, 4 Mich. 565, 566, the court, interpreting the same treaty, said: 'A title in fee under this clause of the treaty, passed, by this language to the reserve. The term 'reservation' was equivalent to an absolute grant. The title passed as effectually as if the grant had been executed. The title was conferred by the treaty; it was not, however, perfect until the location was made; the location was necessary to give it identity. The location was duly made, and thus the title to the land in controversy was consummated by giving identity to that which was before substituted."

In the case of Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S., page 4, 44 L. ed., p. 51, the court said: "By article 9 of the treaty: 'Upon the urgent request of the Indians, parties to this treaty there shall be set apart from the tract hereby ceded a reservation of six hundred and forty acres near the mouth of Tabet river for the chief Moose Dung, and a like reservation of six hundred and forty acres for the chief Red Bear on the north side of Pembina river.....

"Moose Dung selected as his reservation, under the 9th article of the treaty, six hundred and forty acres, a part of which was lot 1 in section 34, including the strip now in controversy; and he lived on that land at the mouth of Tabet river, and made it his home, and had a log house, a garden and a fish trap there. He died in 1872, before the lands were surveyed, and was succeeded as chief by his oldest son, who had been born at Red Lake in 1828, and who was known to the whites by the same name of Moose Dung or Mandmoch, and to the Indians as Mayshokomoway, 'meaning 'The one that wears the red robes;' and, ever since the making of the treaty, his father and himself, in succession, sustained tribal relations with the Red Lake band of Chippewa Indians, and that band continued to be recognized as an Indian tribe by the government of the United States.....

"The clear result of this series of decisions is that when the United States, in a treaty with an Indian tribe, and as part of the consideration for the cession by the tribe of a tract of country to the United States, make a reservation to a chief or other member of the tribe of a specified number of sections of land, whether already identined, or to be surveyed and located in the future, the treaty itself converts the reserved sections into individual property; the reservation, unless accompanied by words limiting its effect, is equivalent to a present grant of a complete title in fee simple; and that title is alienable by the grantee at his pleasure, unless the United States, by a provision of the treaty, or an act of congress, have expressly or impliedly prohibited or restricted its alienation.....

"The title to the strip of land in controversy, having been granted by the United States to the elder Chief Moose Dung by the treaty itself, and having descended, upon his death, by the laws, customs, and usages of the tribe to his eldest son and successor as chief, Moose Dung the younger, passed by the lease executed by the latter in 1891 to the plaintiffs for the term of that lease; and their rights under that lease could not be divested by any subsequent action of the lessor, or by congress, or of the executive departments. The constructions of treaties is the peculiar province of the judiciary; and, except in cases purely political, congress has no constitutional power to settle the rights under a treaty, or to affect titles already granted by the treaty itself....."

In the case of Wallace v. Adams, 143 Fed. 720, the United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit, in construing the Choctaw-Chickasaw Agreements, containing provisions for the allotment of land in said nations therein, said: "The commission under the direction of the secretary, as a special tribunal, vested with the power to hear and determine the claims of all parties to allotment in these lands and to execute its judgment by the issuance of the allotment certificates which constitute conveyance of the right of the lands to the parties whom they decide are entitled to the property.....

The allotment certificate, when issued, like a patent to land, is dual in its effect. It is an adjudication of the special tribunal empowered to decide the question that a party to whom it issues is entitled to the land, and it is a conveyance of the right to this title to the allottee."

This case was affirmed by the Supreme court of the United States. See Wallace v. Adams, 204 U. S., 419, 51 L. ed. 547.

In the case of Quirney v. Denny, 18 Wis. 805, was a case involving the right o fthe allottee to sell his allotment before patent was issued.

That was an action in ejectment, and it appears that the land was never filed on or taken until 1845, fifteen years before the date of the patent, the court held that the law or treaty gave the allottee an equivalent title to this patent. It said: "Now we are of the opinion that this act failed to give to the allottee an equitable estate or title in the land allotted to him, which could be sold and transferred by deed as that where the patent subsequently issued. We think this side of the brief of the counsel for the appellant right. Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410; Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How. 284; Grignon v. Astor, id. 319; Les Bois v. Bramhell, 4 id. 449; March v. Brooks, 8 id. 223; Landes v. Brant, 10 id. 348; the United States v. Brooks 8 id. 442; French v. Spencer, 21 id. 228; Berthold v. McDonald, 22 id. 334; Doe v. Wilson, 23 id. 458; Crews v. Burcham, 1 Black 352; Challefoux v. Ducharme, 4 Wis. 454."

The Supreme court of the United States has uniformly held that the patent issued to the purchaser by the government is not a new acquisition of title. It is only a confirmation of the right which the patentee had before the patent was issued. Cornelius v. Kissell, 128 U. S. 456-463; Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How. (U. S.) 284; Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How. (U. S.) 317; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330-340; Dibble v. Bellingham Bay Land Co., 163 U. S. 65-68; Deffenback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, 29 L. ed. 423; Steele v. Neuberg, 5 Am. St. Rep. 211; Faulk v. Cooke, 20 Am. St. Rep. 836; Morrison v. Faulkner, 21 S. W. 984, Heard v. C. M. and L. Co., 39 S. W. 469; Frost v. Missionary Society, 22 N. W. 203; Jackson v. Ramsey, (N. Y.) 3 Cowen, 76; Washburn Real Property, Vol. 3, Sec. 2024, 6th ed.

In May, 1863, congress passed an act providing that in all cases where patents for public lands have been or may hereafter be issued, in pursuance to any law of the United States, if a person who had died or shall hereafter die, before the date of such patent, the title to the land designated therein, shall inure to and become vested in the heirs of the devisees or assigns of such deceased as if the patent had been issued to the deceased patentee during life. (5 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 21.)

In the case of Oliver v. Forber, 17 Kansas 127, it was held, that this act applied to the case of an Indian who had received his land under a treaty with the United States. After citing a number of cases referring to patents issued after the death of the patentee, the Kansas Supreme court said: "If the patent is valid, it is so merely because it is in confirmation of other existing rights, and not because it created any new rights."

In the case of Briggs v. Wash-Pukuna, 57 Fed. 135, the validity of a conveyance executed before patent was issued was involved, and Judge Foster said "The right to the patent was absolute and complete, and the duty of the secretary of the interior to issue the patent was imperative."

In the case of Porter v. Parker, 68 Neb. 238, 94 N. W. 122, the court said: (Referring to act of congress of August 7, 1882, (22 Sta. 342, c. 434.) which is as follows:) "That upon the approval of the allotments provided for in the preceding sections by the secretary of the interior, he shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name of the allottees which patents shall be of the legal effect and declare that the United States does an dwill hold the land thus allotted for a period of twenty-five years in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom the allotment shallh ave been made, or in case of his decease, of his heirs according to the laws of the state of Nebraska, and at the expiration of said period the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian or his heir as aforesaid, in fee discharged of said trust and free of all encumbrance and charge whatsoever. And if any conveyance shall be made of the land set a part and allotted as herein provided, or any contract made touching the same before the expiration of the time above mentioned, such conveyance or contract shall be absolutely null and void: provided that the law of descent and partition in force in the said state shall apply thereto after patents have been executed and delivered.' On the 29th day of December, 1884, a patent for one hundred and sixty acres, or a quarter section, of such lands, reciting, in substance, the terms of the foregoing section of the statute, was issued to one Phillip Porter, a member of the tribe, in satisfaction of his right to participate in such allotment. At that time Porter was the head of a family consisting, besides himself, of his wife, the defendant, Nada-wa Parker, and of a daughter. After the delivery of the patent Porter died intestate, leaving his wife and daughter surviving. Some time afterwards, the daughter died, also intestate, and without issue. The allottee was the son of Daniel Porter, the plaintiff in this action. Since the death of her husband and daughter, the defendant has remained in the exclusive possession of the land, claiming to be lawfully entitled thereto. The foregoing matters were submitted to the district court of Thurston county upon an agreed statement of facts praying the judgment of the court whether the plaintiff or defendant has a better right in the premises. To review a judgment in favor of defendant the plaintiff prosecutes a petition in error in this court."

The court further states: "In our opinion, an allottee and patentee of lands in severalty, pursuant to the above mentioned act of congress, is seized of an equitable interest and estate in fee, which, upon his death, before the issuance of a final patent therefor by the United States, descends to his or her heirs at law according to the laws of inheritance of this state."

The syllabus in the case of McCauley v. Tyndall, 68 Neb. 658, 94 N. W. 813, is as follows: "Under act congress August 7, 1882, c. 434, 22 Stat, 341, entitled 'An act to provide for the sale of a part of the reservation of the Omaha tribe of Indians in Nebraska,' etc., the widow of an allottee dying before the issuance ofa final patent, and without issue, takes a life estate in the allotment to her husband, remainder to his father."

The right of a person who has located a valid land certificate upon vacant public land, and has caused such land to be surveyed and the survey and certificate to be returned to the General Land office within the time prescribed by law, is a vested legal right, and is entitled to all the protection of all the constitutional guaranties with which such rights are hedged." (Howard v. Peery, 7 Tex. 259; Hamilton v. Avery, 20 Tex. 612; Milam county v. Bateman, 54 Tex. 453; Gullett v. O'Connor, 54 Tex. 400; Sutfin v. Sutfin, 60 Tex. [illegible]; Jones v. Lee, 8 Tex. 25; Threadgill v. [illegible], 57 Tex. 526; Olcott v. Ferris, (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 848; Sherwood v. Fleming, 25 Tex. Supp. 408; Thompson v. Dumas, 85 Fed. Rep. 547.)

The lands of the Seminole nation belong to the nation in its sovereign capacity, and not to its citizens as tenants in common. The lands and money of the Seminole nation are public property and public moneys and not held in an individual ownership. Stevens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 43 L. ed. 1041.

In the Cherokee nation the land is held by virtue of a patent issued by the federal government on the 31st day of December, 1838, pursuant to treaty stipulation, which provides as follows:

"Therefore in the execution of the agreements and stipulations contained in the said several treaties, the United States have given and granted unto the said Cherokee nation the two tracts of land so surveyed and hereinbefore described, containing in the whole 14,374,135 and 14-100 of an acre, to have and to hold the same, together with all the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the said Cherokee nation forever; subject, however, to the rights of the United States to permit other tribes of red men to get salt on the salt plains of the Western Prairie, referred to in the second article of the treaty of the 29th of December, 1835, etc."

As to the Creek Nation, art 2 of treaty of February 134, 1833, (7 Stat, at Large, 417) provides:

"The United States will grant a patent in fee simple, to the Creek nation of Indians for the land assigned said nation by this treaty of convention, whenever the same shall have been ratified by the President and senate of the United States, and the right thus guaranteed by the United States shall be continued to said tribe of Indians, so long as they shall exist as a nation, and continue to occupy the country hereby assigned them," and afterwards the patent was issued in accordance with this treaty stipulation.

As to the Choctaw Nation, Art. 2 of treaty of September 27, 1830, (7 Stat. at Large 333) provides: "The United States under a grant specially to be made by the President of the United States shall cause to be conveyed to the Choctaw nation a tract of country west of the Mississippi river, in fee simple to them and their descendents, to inure to them while they shall exist as a nation and live on it."

President Tyler in 1842 executed patent pursuant to the provisions of said treaty. The habendum of the same is as follows:

"To have and to hold the same with all the rights, privileges, immunities and appurtenances of whatsoever nature thereunto belonging as intended to be conveyed by the aforesaid article in fee simple to them and their descendents to inure to them while they shall exist as a nation and live on it, liable to no transfer or aliena-

(Continued on Page Four)


# Wouldn't the Fur Fly

If the piano stores of Guthrie would publish the names and the addresses of every one that they have sold a piano to in the last eight months, and state in that publication the style of the piano each individual bought and the price that they paid; would not Mr. So and So feel "sore" when he found that the dealer he thought was his personal friend had charged him $100 more than he had charged some one else for the same piano, and would not Mrs. So and So want to pull somebody's hair when she found that instead of having bought the piano $50 cheaper than anybody else in the world ever did buy that piano, that she had paid $50 more than her neighbor who lives only three blocks away? And so it would be "an awful time" as the parrot said, after his brush with the cat and the monkey.

People would find that they would not have to leave Guthrie and go to distant points to discover that some one else had bought the same piano for less money, but to think that right in their own home town, and under their very nose one person's money is worth only about 50 cents on the dollar as compared with another's! That is the situation that the people of this city have had to contend with in the past, and it is the Jenkins' One-Price, Non-Commission way of selling pianos, and their plan of marking each piano at its lowest net cash price in plain figures and charging only interest at 6 per cent per annum to people worthy of credit at all, which is the fair, square way of selling pianos.

The following prices on pianos tell the story of our success:

The New Piano we sell for $125.00 with full metal plate, with hardwood bushed tuning pins, brass capstan action is the Barmore, largest size, double veneered case, 7 1-3 octave, one of their very best pianos.

The New Piano we sell for $180.00 is the beautiful upright Grand Regal, double veneered case, of the latest design, full metal plate, etc.

The New Piano we sell for $200.00 is the style "O 2" Elburn.
The New Piano we sell for $225.00 is the style "H 2" Elburn.
The New Piano we sell for $265.00 is the new era Schaeffer.
The New Piano we sell for $310.00 is the splendid style "R" Ludwig.
The New Piano we sell for $360 is the Vose & Sons.
The New Piano we sell for $550 is the Steinway Vertegrand.

# J. W. JENKINS' SONS
## Music Co.

Cor. Oklahoma and Vine, : Guthrie, Oklahoma

BEST PLACE TO BUY A PIANO



Hay's Hair Health

Never Fails to RESTORE GRAY or FADED HAIR to its NATURAL COLOR and BEAUTY

No matter how long it has been gray or faded. Promotes a luxuriant growth of healthy hair. Stops its falling out, and positively removes Dandruff. Keeps hair soft and glossy. Refuse all substitutes. 2½ times as much in $1.00 as 50c size.

IS NOT A DYE.

Phila Hay Prod. Co., Newark, N. J.

$1 and 50c bottles, at druggists'.

J. N. WALLACE AND A. E. GRAY



WEAR UNITED CLOTHES

Whether young or old, appearance counts for a good deal. We all like to look well and we can't unless we wear good clothes.

United Clothes are good all the way through.

The fabric is thoroughly tested for wear, strength and color; the fit, style and tailoring are of the best and the prices are moderate. We are satisfied with less profit than you have been accustomed to pay and we save you $5 to $8 on a garment. Is this worth your while?

TOM JENKIN.S



GOOD

# POSITIONS

Gulledge gives contracts, backed by Colleges, with $50,000 capitalization, and 22 years' success, to secure positions under reasonable conditions or refund tuition.

BOOKKEEPING is taught in the Guthrie Business University in three months than in other schools in five. A trial will convince you.

SHORTHAND Mr. Sam Opligar, who [illegible] Court Stenographer [illegible] under Chief Justice Williams, and who is considered the best stenographer in the state, writes the system of Shorthand we teach, which is the Eclectic System.

For Free Catalogue and circular "Why Learn Telegraphy?" which explains all, call on or write W. A. GULLEDGE, A. M., LL. B., President.

GULLEDGE'S

PRACTICAL BUSINESS COLLEGES.
(We also teach by MAIL.)

GUTHRIE, OKLA.

Over Wallace's Drug Store, or Anthony, Kas.
(Write school nearest to you.)