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WHEN LEE LOST HOPE.

INTERESTING SUBJECT BROUGHT UP AND DISCUSSED ANEW.

Ex-President Davis Quoted On It—He Said That the General Did Not Talk to Him as Colonel Colyar Reports Him.

Nashville, Tenn., November 26.—We are a little surprised, after nearly thirty years, when the whole nation is more than anxious to draw the veil of oblivion over the bloody history of the past, when the possible errors of our patriotic and lamented chieftain who sacrificed so much in so faithfully serving his people and a cause worthy of any sacrifice which man could make, that any one should hold up to criticism and tear open old wounds that were settled and healed over by the only two then living witnesses, sixteen years ago.

Colonel A. S. Colyar writes an article addressed to S. A. Cunningham, entitled, "When General Lee Lost Hope of Success," published in the Confederate Veteran, which the editor styles "A Story that is Now Being Made of Record"—the "Hampton Roads Commission," which is a rehash of an article of Colonel Colyar's, written on the same subject and published in the "Annals of the Army of Tennessee," January 1, 1877, addressed to Hon. R. M. T. Hunter.

Colonel Colyar proposed to remember no action of a "secret committee" of the Confederate congress and the "resolution" suggested, as he wrote them and the writing of his article published as stated above, but he seems to have forgotten President Davis' reply, and also Hon.

Mr. Barksdale's reply to his original letter, both of which were published, as stated above, in the "Annals of the Army of Tennessee," most emphatically denying Colonel Colyar's statements.

As a matter of historical interest we quote from Colonel Colyar's letter in the Veteran, and answer to his charges by President Davis and Mr. Barksdale.

Colonel Colyar, in his article published in November's Veteran, says: "I, with all other members, was put on the committee. The first thing the committee did was to take the deposition of General Lee. Then the evidence of other general officers. General Lee said in his evidence that he would be compelled to give up Richmond and disband his army for the lack of supplies, and in answer to a direct question put by the Chairman he said he could devise no means of carrying on the war.

President Davis, in answer, says: "I can say that the representations made of the opinions of General Lee do not accord with the full, and, I must believe, frank conversation he held with me at the period referred to by Colonel Colyar."

Colonel Colyar further says: "This evidence created in the committee a profound impression. The feeling was that another campaign should not be fought, that the further shedding of blood was useless. * * It was hoped and believed that Mr. Davis would at once take some steps leading to a settlement. This was not done, but after consulting with General Atkins Smith, and after conferring with Mr. Lyons, who was vice president, and getting his consent to act, I wrote the resolution which Mr. Stephens himself received and redrafted and afterward introduced them in secret session, asking the president to appoint Stephens, Hunter and Campbell to confer with Mr. Lincoln on the subject of bringing the war to a close. While the debate was progressing, before a vote was taken, a member, Mr. Barksdale of Mississippi, intimated that the commission would be created if debate was stopped, and that no vote could be taken. Thereupon Mr. Davis appointed Mr. Hunter of Virginia, Mr. Campbell of Louisiana, and Mr. Stephens. But, as Mr. Stephens informed me when he came back, and I think he substantially states it in his book, the conditions of the commission forbade any except on basis of independence."

In answer to these statements Mr. Davis says: "Of the proceedings in secret session I have no knowledge, but must express my surprise that congress should have held its deliberations, and concealed their action from the executive, who had a right to expect their cooperation in his effort to save the people whom they and he alone represented; or that the house of representatives should assume to itself the war making power, which the constitution gives to the executive and senate. As to the fact, which puts me in the attitude of having proceedings, directly of my action as executive, by assurance of compliance with the will of the house, even as to the person to be appointed, I will say that it is utterly unwarranted by anything I ever said or thought.

My incentive to the appointment of a peace commission at that time was the presence of Mr. F. P. Blair, Sr., a confidential friend of President Lincoln, that I might send such a commission if I should be invited by the government at Washington. It is not to be surprising that Mr. Stephens did not in his work speak of the proceedings described by Colonel Colyar in connection with the action of the committee of the people of the Confederate States, because I early conferred with leading men on the subject of sending a commission, as well as in regard to the men who should constitute it. Subsequently, after conferring with my cabinet, I selected the personnel of the commission myself. Mr. Stephens, not originally included, I did make one of them, not because he desired it, for the reverse was the fact, to be the fact. It will be remembered that I had, on a previous occasion, sent Mr. Stephens on a mission to Mr. Lincoln, especially in regard to the horrors of war, and that he had been furnished a pass to go to the Federal lines. Such considerations as to these which had caused me to select him on the first occasion prevailed in the second."

Colonel Colyar in closing his letter of January 3, 1877, referred to above, says: "To the great astonishment of all of us who had the matter at heart, we learned for the first time after the commissioners returned that they had been clothed with no power, except to treat upon the basis of independence, which most of us regarded as entirely hopeless, predicating our belief on General Lee's testimony mainly. This is substantially the truth of history."

Mr. Davis, in answer, says: "Colonel Colyar states that 'great astonishment' was felt when, 'for the first time, after the commissioners had returned,' the character of their instructions was learned by himself and others. One cognisant of the relations of the house of representatives to the treaty making power would justly be astonished if the executive were to communicate to the house of representatives the instructions given to commissioners sent out for purpose of negotiating before their mission was closed, but after the return of the commissioners, when for the first time it was consistent and proper, the instructions were communicated by the executive to the two houses of congress, and as they were very brief, covering little more space than Colonel Colyar has employed in giving his interpretation of them, I will here insert them: 'In conformity with the letters of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing is a copy, you are requested to proceed to Washington city for informal conference with him upon the issues involved in the existing war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries. Your obedient servant, Jefferson Davis.'"

Mr. Davis further says: "I don't know how anyone could have expected me, under the trust which I held from the people of the Confederate States, to propose to surrender, at discretion, the rights and liberties for which the best and bravest of the land were still gallantly struggling, and for which so many had nobly died. The matter they had at heart was to maintain the rights which their fathers had left them. My heart sympathized with theirs, feeling that duty and honor alike forbade that I should seek peace on conditions which our army, depleted as it was, would have rejected with disdain * * * Freely admitting my liability to err, and lack of strength adequate to the heavy burdens imposed upon me, if honesty of purpose and zeal for the public welfare be admitted, as I believe they have always been, from them there surely was a fair claim, all the stronger for any deficiencies ascribed to me, for the full cooperation, frank dealing and steady support of all who wished the success of our cause. If so, what shall be said of secret caucuses, concealed plans to embarrass the executive and to undermine the confidence and good will of the people in the administration they had chosen, and thus to destroy the corner stone and work the inevitable ruin of the Confederacy?"

Hon. E. Barksdale, member of congress, whose letter we refer to above, published in "The Annals of the Army of Tennessee," in answer to Colonel Colyar's letter, fully and forcibly covers all the points so ably presented by Mr. Davis. Mr. Barksdale in answer to the statement of Colonel Colyar that, "when they learned for the first time after the commissioners had returned that they had been clothed with no power except to treat on the basis of independence," etc., says: "As the letter of instruction was published at the time, or its contents were well known to Mr. Stephens and others of the commission, and through them were communicated to those who advocated the appointment of the commission, this latter statement of Mr. Colyar's awakens astonishment. It is proper to state, moreover, that while resolutions of inquiry into the resources of the Confederacy were passed by congress, none looking to a settlement upon any other than the basis of independence would have received respectful consideration by the majority of that body. From the statement that President Davis authorized a pledge that if the resolutions referred to were not pressed he would appoint the commission therein designated, I emphatically dissent (as a member of the body, who participated in its deliberations and was conferred with by the president upon the very subject under discussion. I was fully informed of the deliberations of the president and his cabinet, in reference to the commission, from the beginning; of the motives that influenced his action and of the persons deemed best suited for the responsible and delicate duties which they would be required to perform, and I am sure if he had authorized the pledge mentioned by Mr. Colyar I would have been cognisant of the fact. I believe he will bear me out in saying that no such promise was exacted and that none was made."

Mr. Barksdale further says: "The mission resulted as had been anticipated; the United States authorities were unwilling to treat for peace. They demanded an unconditional surrender. Any proposition short of this demand would have been rejected, and this the commission were given to understand. If they had gone with a proposition in their mouths for the establishment of peace on any other terms the result would have been the same, and I am at a loss to know the cause of Mr. Colyar's surprise and regret in view of the determination of the United States government to be satisfied with nothing less than absolute surrender of the Confederate armies and the subjugation of the Southern people to such laws as they might choose to dictate."

Colonel Colyar will be reminded that he stated in his letter to Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, referred to above, "I was, as you remember, in the house of representatives, and on intimate terms with Colonel John B. Baldwin. Some time in the latter part of the year 186, I can not remember the exact date, but probably in November, at the close of a night session, Mr. Baldwin asked me to take a walk with him, saying, when we got out on the capitol grounds, that a crisis had come and something must be done. 'But,' said he, 'for the first time in my life I feel that I lack moral courage to do my duty.' He then went on to say that a determined stand ought to be made for peace, but knowing Mr. Davis as he did, he feared nothing could be done with him. Said he: 'I have seen General Lee, who gave me to understand distinctly that the cause had to fail.'"

Mr. Barksdale, in answer to these strictures upon Mr. Davis, says: "Mr. Colyar refers to statements which were made to him by Hon. John B. Baldwin, a member of the Confederate congress from Virginia, designed to throw censure upon the president for obstructing attempts at procuring peace by negotiation. It is not my intention to dispute the statement of Mr. Colyar further than that it is contradicted by an address which was signed by Mr. Baldwin and others for the instruction and guidance of the people of the Confederate States while the war was in progress. It contained these words: 'The course of the United States government has proven that it did not desire peace, and would not consent to it on any terms that we could possibly concede. In proof of this we refer to the repeated rejection of all terms of conciliation and compromise; to their contemptuous refusal to receive the vice president (Mr. Stephens), who was sent to negotiate, not authority, the asperities of war, and their peremptory rejection of the offer of a neutral power to mediate between the contending parties. * * * Until some evidence is given of a change of policy on the part of the government of the United States, and until assurance is given that efforts at negotiation will not be spurned, the congress is of the opinion that any direct overtures for peace would compromise our self-respect, be fruitless of good and interpreted by the enemy as an indication of weakness.'"

This paper, Mr. Baldwin, who is cited by Colonel Colyar, signed and sent out to his Southern countrymen.

Now, Colonel Baldwin is dead, but before his death, with reference to these very events in a letter addressed to the public he informed the action of Jefferson Davis and utterly repudiated any such "history" as Colonel Colyar is now attempting to make.

Hon. E. Barksdale is dead, and Jefferson Davis is dead, and the old and exploded charge that has been lost and denied by these three witnesses to the facts is again sought to be foisted upon the world as true, and that, too, without referring to the answers of Baldwin, Barksdale and Davis. This "story has been made of record" long ago, and the full record as then made out is a marvelously different thing from the present. The attempt to bolster up this story by referring to suppositious statements in Stephens' work is all the more astounding, which there is no such support in Stephens' book, and when Colonel Colyar's attention had been called to the fact that there was no such statement in the stately irony with which Jefferson Davis treated this attempt to place the first Confederate president in a false position. But the more marvellous fact is still to come. The "instructions" to the commissioners contains no such words as that "they had no power to treat except upon the basis of independence," but that their powers were "to confer upon the issues involved in the existing war and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries."

The interpretation of Colonel Colyar is utterly unwarranted.

The reason the commission failed was, as Mr. Davis says in his letter, because he didn't "propose to surrender at discretion," and that is the very thing Lincoln demanded—unconditional Union on the Northern basis.

To "preserve the rights the fathers had left the Southern people," Mr. Davis gave full power "to treat for peace, and a settlement of the issues of the war, and to effect this he received the full cooperation, frank dealing and steady support of all who wished the success of our course."

Granted that Mr. Davis desired the independence of the Confederacy, as every true Southerner did, did he dramatically lay that down as a condition precedent to peace? Every fair-minded man must say that he did not. Slavery was gone. If Mr. Lincoln had intended a rehabilitation of the state government, a recognition of State sovereignty in State affairs, a turning of the sword into the plow-share, and a disbandment of the army, on honorable terms, what was there in the instructions to the commissioners to have prevented the war being settled on such terms?

If General Lee had given up all hope, if his supplies and soldiers were exhausted, was he such a pig-headed fool as not to have advised the acceptance of such a settlement.

If the terms of the Johnston-Sherman surrender as to the armies, with the further stipulation that the Southern States should remain, and not conquered provinces, I believe Mr. Davis would have accepted it. And any story or insinuation that Jefferson Davis or his people were responsible for the shedding of a drop of blood unnecessarily is a gross perversion of the truth of history. Lincoln and the North are responsible for the failure of the Hampton Roads commission. Their settled policy as shown by refusing to exchange prisoners and arming negroes, was to use their gigantic power to crush the Southern States out of existence as equal sovereigns in the Union—reduce them to provinces governed by Federal proconsuls and subject them to the oppression and pillage of the conquerors.

The subsequent history of reconstruction shows that this is true, and it was apparent to every friend of the South at the time of and after the Hampton Roads conference.

Any attempt to apotheosize the sainted Lincoln by degrading Jefferson Davis will fail. I have no desire to speak disrespectfully of Mr. Lincoln, but his policy at that time was unconditional surrender of the South and "vae victis" to its people.

As a passing thought, we are not surprised that our friend, the editor of the Confederate Veteran, should desire to gather and publish in his excellent periodical the truth of history, but we are astonished and his many friends will be puzzled to know, as the accredited agent of the Jefferson Davis monumental fund, that he should lend his columns, even in ignorance of the facts, to anyone to throw censure upon the man whose memory he is trying to perpetuate in bronze, or allow anyone, without vigorous protest, to throw upon Mr. Davis the failure to negotiate successfully for peace, which is as unjust to his memory as the attempt to make him responsible for secession and the war, when he was but the select agent of the Southern people for the execution of their will. John W. Morton,

Ex-Chief of Artillery Forrest Cavalry.

Rocking Chairs.

New York Herald.

There is nothing which offends the good taste of the cultured woman more than to find rocking chairs in the parlors of her friends. No apartment dignified by the name of drawing room is ever lowered from its standard of ceremony by this undignified furniture.

A rocking chair is, of course, a delightfully comfortable chair in its place, but the parlor is not that place. Just as photographs and negligee gowns are in order in one's private sanctum, so is that the spot where one may freely lounge in a capacious rocker, and it is also admissible in morning rooms, but in parlors—never.

It makes no difference whether it be of rose wood, mahogany or enamelled bamboo; upholstered in leather, silk or tapestry, it is an abomination to those who rightly consider a parlor a room of ceremony, where one is, at least, expected to sit in a well bred attitude while receiving callers.

Have No Confidante.

New York Herald.

There is a little word of warning that should be whispered by some older friend into the ear of every young girl—"Do not exchange confidences with your chums." She may not receive the whisper with good grace, and in all probability will not heed it in the least, but just as surely as she tries to outgrow her callow confidante there will come a bitter regret that she let another listen to the heart throbs that should have been a sacred pain which she alone must bear.

Beyond Belief.

Mexia Democrat.

A dispatch brings the intelligence that Editor Jennings of Marshall has been robbed of $200. This sounds like a fake. The idea that a Texas editor would have that amount of money is hard to believe.

No Monotony About It.

McGregor Observer.

Happiness in this world comes by fits and starts. Sometimes it's all joy, then again for a mile or so it's all woe. To have all joy, though, would become monotonous.

BAD BALES OF COTTON.

AMERICA PUTS UP HER PRODUCT IN VERY POOR CONDITION.

India and Egypt Do Much Better. The South's Cotton Goes to Market Dirty, and There Is a Heavy Percentage of Loss.

Washington, December 3.—Special.)—Consul Monaghan sends a report to the state department from Chemnitz, Germany, a large cotton manufacturing city, on the subject of the differences in baling cotton in America, Egypt and India, which will be highly interesting to growers and shippers.

Through the kindness and courtesy of the largest spinning concerns in Chemnitz I can give the department definite and very desirable information, backed by photographs.

"The packing of American raw cotton causes a deal of anxiety and complaint here. The jute cloth covering is so torn before the bales reach Chemnitz that the cotton is exposed to mud, water, fire and theft. Of the original six or eight bands two, three, four and sometimes more, are loose or broken; the cotton bulges out, takes up dirt and dust when in a dry place, mud in the docks, sea water when in the ships and rain water when on land, on wharves, or in transmission by boat, rail or wagon. In transport every gust of wind tears away pieces of the valuable commodity. The wharves, custom house floors and freight cars are usually covered with pieces torn or dropped from such bales, and the danger from fire is great, for cotton ignites easily, and sparks from cigars or locomotives, fanned by the winds, even those caused by the movement of the train or wagon, could cause not only the burning of the cotton, but of other valuable property.

"Contrasted with the packing of Egyptian and Indian cotton, the American must be regarded as very bad. Both Egyptian and Indian have close, compact, tough covering, are rather long and smooth, leave little or none of the cotton exposed, are easily and plainly marked and are wrapped close and bound strong and tight. Along the sides the firm's or seller's name appears. On both ends the kind of cotton is indicated to aid in identification should one end be torn off in handling, as sometimes happens. Thus, in the case of Indian and Egyptian cotton mixing of bales and bales without marks seldom if ever occur; on the other hand, with American cotton both happen very frequently—too frequently, hence the complaint.

"The Indian and Egyptian bales are so tightly pressed, so well covered and bound, that injury from fire, water, dirt, dust, etc., is minimized. Take this table as to space occupied by the different bales:

Bales of Cotton.	Weight. Pounds	Space occupied. Cubic feet.
Egyptian	700	11
Indian	400	10
American	472	22

"The Lloyd's, who can pack into their vessels holds 18,000 to 19,000 bales of Indian cotton, can take only 600 to 12,000 American, which, according to the ratio of weight (4 to 4½), they should take in 14,000 bales. Consider this in the figuring of expenses where $2, $3, $5, etc., are paid per cubic yard for ocean freights. What appears here in the matter of ships holds equally good in relation to transport wagons, room taken up in freight houses, magazines and storehouses, etc., all of which add to the expenses. I am informed that producers, as well as manufacturers, have to pay 'enormous sums' for these 'unnecessary' expenses. Besides, the American planters waste large quantities of unnecessary packing material, the losses by dirt, dust, mud, burning of bales, by stealing, etc., affect the producer and manufacturer in about the same ratio.

"The increased danger of fire increases the premiums on fire insurance policies. The mixing of the bales and the 'no mark bales' cause no end of confusion. More secure packing, a much closer pressing and greater care in covering or wrapping up would be of inestimable and permanent benefit to the cotton trade of the United States.

"Planters formerly entertained a fear that the enormous pressure used in India would injure the fine fibers of the American cotton, would make more difficult the processes of cleaning, and would cause the formation of small knots which would injure the carding machinery, but such belief has disappeared. The fact that Egyptian cotton, with as fine or finer and longer fiber, has stood greater pressure satisfies everybody interested that the time has come for a reform in American methods of packing. Of course great care is to be taken before packing to see that the cotton is perfectly dry, otherwise internal fermentation will create 'cakes,' resulting in the same danger to the carding machinery as that caused by the little knots described above. Egypt and India have small fear of these dangers, because of their particularly dry climate, especially during the packing and shipping season." E. W. B.

Soften Your Voice.

New York Herald.

If women heeded half the good advice they read, there would, by this time, be a marked improvement in their voices, but, like the Nereids who forever dipped up water in their sieves the average woman listens with one ear and forgets with the other, not troubling herself to make mental note of anything she does not like to hear, and it is not pleasant to hear it so often said that she hasn't a charming voice like her English cousins.

A woman that is conscious that she speaks in a high pitched, unnatural key in common conversation must also be conscious that she could do otherwise if she chose. By lowering the pitch a tone or two, persistently checking the impulse to break bounds into a shrill staccato register that ends in a veritable screech, you may go on improving from day to day, till your friends begin to compliment you on your mellow tones, and men especially will be quick to appreciate the low, sweet voice.

It is to be hoped that foreigners will not judge our American voices by those heard at the Fair, for then we metropolitans may not hope to retrieve our reputation. There the most strident tones and crude reflections prevail, to the distress of Eastern ears, and the "ya" multiply themselves through their words, like burrs about the chestnut. Soften your voice and you soften your accent.

From Bad to Worse.

Truth.

Charlie—By gad, this scorching weather brings out all the latent laziness there is in anyone. I wish I could get someone to eat my meals for me.

Mamie (a very hearty eater)—Well, that's right in my line, old boy. I'll take the job.

Charlie—No, no; I don't believe I want you to. I'm afraid you would eat enough to make me sick.

And Texas Also.

Coleman Voice.

John Hyward is now of and for Houston.

A SENSIBLE MAN

Looks for a solid footing and takes the right course to secure it. The only way to get solid and stay so is to live on what you own, and not what you owe for to a landlord. The longer you pay rent, the longer you have nothing, and you can have nothing until you stop doing so. Buy, build and own the house in which you live. We are offering building sites in Houston and vicinity at figures that look more tempting the more you examine them. Nobody needs to be told that these lots are cheap—just look at our list: ..... for $.....; ..... etc.

GAULT & THOMAS,

. . . THE . . .

REAL ESTATE BROKERS,

. . . OF . . .

HOUSTON AND SOUTH TEXAS,

Offer unparalleled inducements both to home seekers and investors, as the following prices will show:

A BIG SPECULATION.

Is often risky, but frequently returns big profits. The chances we are offering in desirable building lots are a big speculation, in the sense that there is a certainty of large returns on the outlay without so much as a shadow of a risk. When you're on the top of the highest mountain in the world you can't get any higher, except in a balloon, and you're on the very summit of the Mountain of Opportunity when you purchase one of these superb home sites which are really unequaled in Houston or vicinity. Now's the time to buy, just before an advance in values. We have in

Own the house in which you live. Nobody needs to be told that these residence and building lots are cheap. Just look at our list.

IMPROVED CITY PROPERTY.

1—6½ lots with one house on same, splendidly located near Union depot; price $4500. Terms if desired.

2—Five-room cottage on Chenevert street; corner lot; price $1900; $300 cash, balance long time.

3—Lot and one-half on McKinney; a beautiful corner; two-story house; price $4250.

4—An elegant nine-room cottage, with 3-2-5 lots, on Dallas avenue; beautiful trees and shrubbery; price $5500 $1500 cash, balance in five annual payments.

5—Six-room cottage on Calhoun avenue, near paved street and street car line; one lot, nice trees, etc.; price $3000; one third cash; balance long time.

6—Two houses in Fifth ward, one with six and other with four rooms; price for both $1200, on easy terms.

7—Two story seven-room house, on Crawford street; price $2600; $500 cash, balance monthly.

UNIMPROVED CITY PROPERTY.

1—Two lots on Crawford, near in, on corner; partially improved; price $3500.

2—Three lots on St. Emanuel, on corner; price$ 475 each.

3—Two nice lots in First ward, for $475 each.

4—Two lots on corner Austin street, good neighborhood; price $2000.

5—Two corner lots on Dallas avenue; price $2000.

6—One block of twelve lots in Fifth ward; price $1500 this is a snap.

7—Lots in Ranger Addition, near Harrisburg road, for $400 each.

LANDS FOR SALE.

753 acres near Trinity river, in Liberty county; railroad building near it; fenced with new ten-rail fence; 100 acres in cultivation; one four-room house, two tenant houses, one gin house, cotton gin, mill and cotton press, all in good condition; good land; price $8 per acre; one-half cash, balance to suit purchaser.

808 acres near H. & T. C. Railway station, 18 miles from Houston; all prairie; price $4.50 per acre.

1385 acres about ten miles west of Houston, on Buffalo bayou and M. K. & T. railway; all rich land, mostly prairie; price $6 per acre.

2500 acres in Polk county, partly timbered; price $1.10 per acre.

226 acres adjoining La Porte, for $15 per acre.

1107 acres on Trinity river, 4 miles from Liberty, one-half good timber, balance black prairie; a bargain at $3 per acre.

PROPERTY FOR TRADE OR EXCHANGE.

170 acres adjoining city of Dallas; fine orchard and trees, some good improvements.

Two tracts of land in Brazoria county, adjoining the town of Brazoria and fronting on Brazos river; will trade for Houston, San Antonio, Austin, Waco, Dallas or Fort Worth property; unincumbered.

A fine two-story, seven-room house, located in the finest residence part of the city of Waco; all modern improvements.

17,712 acres of fine grazing land in Hockley and Cochran counties, to trade for city property or suburban acreage.

One league of pine timber land to trade for unincumbered city property.

GAUT & THOMAS,

Real Estate, Loan and Investment Agents. 310½ MAIN STREET, HOUSTON, TEXAS.